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Abstract 
This	thesis	argues	that	the	ethics	of	care	is	an	important	lens	through	which	to	view	complex	
international	moral	and	political	contexts.		Specifically,	I	argue	care	ethics	offers	a	different	
perspective	than	human	rights	discourses,	because	the	relational	perspective	care	ethics	offers	
generates	different	questions,	and	thus	different	answers,	about	the	moral	and	political	landscape	
than	the	traditionally	individualist	perspective	of	mainstream	human	rights	theories.		This	thesis	
does	not	deny	the	usefulness	of	human	rights	analysis,	but	instead	questions	their	assumed	pride	of	
place,	especially	when	assessing	and	addressing	contexts	such	as	severe	poverty,	gender	and	race	
oppression,	and	the	activity	of	care	work	itself.		Further,	this	thesis	argues	that	the	ethics	of	care	is,	
in	some	situations,	the	better	philosophical	tool	for	the	task	at	hand.	
	 Fiona	Robinson’s	body	of	work	on	a	global	ethic	of	care	is	central	to	this	project.		She	claims	
that	global	institutional	relations	structure	our	lives	and	our	relationships	with	others,	and	as	such,	
are	a	prime	target	for	a	critical	care	analysis,	revealing	the	ways	in	which	governments,	corporations,	
and	social	norms	shape	our	lives.		In	particular,	her	focus	is	on	how	such	institutions	perpetuate	
harmful	relations	of	power,	which	continue	to	marginalize	women	and	the	work	of	care	itself	from	
public	consideration.		This	critical	care	analysis	prioritizes	understanding	the	root	causes	of	such	
moral	and	political	contexts	in	order	to	transform	the	way	in	which	we	approach	and	judge	these	
contexts,	which	in	turn	would	allow	us	to	craft	longer	lasting	and	more	holistic	solutions.			
	 The	global	care	ethic,	however,	has	faced	sharp	criticism	about	its	ability	to	be	a	
prescriptive	theory	because	of	its	contextual	flexibility.		I	engage	with	the	work	of	Daniel	Engster	
and	Kimberly	Hutchings,	who	each	critique	the	global,	critical	ethic	of	care.		Engster	argues	that	
critical	care	ethics	is	too	flexible	to	be	practicable,	especially	where	public	policy	is	concerned,	and	
as	such	he	argues	a	‘care	based’	human	rights	theory	provides	better	action	guidance.		Conversely,	
Hutchings’	critique	of	care	ethics	criticises	the	universalization	of	the	standpoint	of	care,	which	then	
negates	its	usefulness	in	making	intelligible	moral	judgments	across	cultures.	
		 I	reject	Engster’s	‘caring’	human	rights	and	argue	that	care	ethics	can	be	a	substantive	guide	
for	public	policy.		I	do	so	by	critiquing	Engster’s	version	of	care	theory,	and	then	using	care	ethics	to	
examine	real	world	case	studies	of	public	policy	to	demonstrate	its	practical	applications.		I	also	
reject	Hutchings’	final	claim,	arguing	we	need	not	relinquish	the	standpoint	of	care	as	an	important	
moral	point	of	view.		Instead,	I	argue	that	the	critical	ethic	of	care	is,	in	fact,	able	to	outline	a	means	
by	which	we	can	reach	moral	and	political	judgments	across	cultures,	spurring	the	transformation	of	
our	moral	and	political	landscape.			
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Introduction 
	
The	last	twenty	years	have	seen	a	decrease	in	absolute	levels	of	severe	poverty,	with	the	number	of	
people	in	severe	poverty	halved	from	1990	to	2010,	such	that	there	are	900	million	people	in	
poverty	or	12.7	percent	of	the	global	population.1		The	largest	decreases	in	poverty	have	been	in	
China	and	India,	and	the	World	Bank	estimated	that	in	2015	those	in	severe	poverty	only	comprised	
9.6	percent	of	the	global	population.2		There	has	also	been	marked	success	in	the	education	of	
women	and	girls,	with	an	increase	in	the	number	of	girls	receiving	primary	and	secondary	education,	
and	an	increase	in	the	number	of	countries	that	have	achieved	gender	parity	in	primary	and	
secondary	education	(from	36	countries	in	2000	to	62	countries	in	2015).3		There	has	also	been	an	
increase	in	legal	reforms	addressing	women’s	concerns	such	as	more	equitable	family	laws,	stronger	
laws	against	sexual	harassment,	and	protections	for	parental	leave	and	childcare.4		
	 However,	in	spite	of	these	successes,	the	growth	and	increase	in	prosperity	is	not	evenly	
distributed	across	countries.5		Even	within	countries	economic	inequality	is	on	the	rise,	which	is	
often	linked	to	increased	political	and	social	inequality.		A	recent	report	on	inequality	in	OECD	
Countries6	demonstrates	that	even	nominally	prosperous	‘developed’	nations	are	beginning	to	face	
ever	increasing	levels	of	unequal	wealth	distribution	and	income.7		Further,	trying	to	pinpoint	the	
exact	cause	of	inequality	is	nearly	impossible.		While	some	point	to	increased	globalization,	ill-
advised	taxation	schemes,	or	a	shift	in	the	job	market,	it	is	more	likely	that	a	combination	of	factors	
is	responsible	for	the	pervasive	inequality	we	face	locally	and	globally.		Compounding	the	problem	is	
a	growing	awareness	that	current	solutions	are	largely	ineffective	at	curtailing	the	rising	inequality.8	
	 Further,	women	and	girls,	on	average,	continue	to	face	structural	barriers	to	health,	
education,	housing,	technology,	and	financial	independence.		Recent	data	suggests	that	“[e]ven	
where	women	and	men	are	both	just	as	likely	to	live	in	a	poor	household,	women	are	more	likely	to	
be	deprived	in	other	key	areas	of	well-being,	such	as	education,	and	less	likely	to	have	an	
independent	source	of	income	through	paid	work,	which	can	result	in	the	uneven	distribution	of	
																																								 																				
1	"Development	Goals	in	an	Era	of	Demographic	Change,"		(Washington	D.C.:	World	Bank	Group	and	
International	Monetary	Fund,	2015),	32.	
2	Ibid.	
3	"Gender	and	Efa	2000-2015:	Acheivements	and	Challenges,"		(Paris:	UNESCO,	2015),	3.	
4	"Progress	of	the	World's	Women	2015-2016,"		(United	States:	UN	Women,	2015),	29-32.	
5	"Development	Goals	in	an	Era	of	Demographic	Change,"		7.	
6	The	current	countries	with	OECD	Membership	are:	Australia,	Austria,	Belgium,	Canada,	Chile,	Czech	Republic,	
Denmark,	Estonia,	Finland,	France,	Germany,	Greece,	Hungary,	Iceland,	Ireland,	Israel,	Italy,	Japan,	Korea,	
Luxembourg,	Mexico,	Netherlands,	New	Zealand,	Norway,	Poland,	Portugal,	Slovak	Republic,	Slovenia,	Spain,	
Sweden,	Switzerland,	Turkey,	United	Kingdom,	and	the	United	States.	
7	"Divided	We	Stand:	Why	Inequality	Keeps	Rising,"		(Paris:	OECD,	2011),	22.	
8	Ibid.,	38.	
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power	and	resources	within	the	household.”9		The	austerity	measures	taken	by	some	nations	in	
response	to	the	Global	Financial	Crisis	of	2008	have	also	pushed	women	back	into	the	role	of	the	
care	giver,	because	such	women	no	longer	receive	childcare,	elder	care,	health	care	and	other	kinds	
of	support	that	had	previously	enabled	them	to	enter	the	labour	market.10			The	current	rough	
estimate	is	that	women	and	girls	perform	2.5	times	as	much	of	the	domestic	work	as	men	do,11	
signalling	that	although	there	are	policies	that	prioritize	women	entering	the	labour	market	as	a	
matter	of	equality,	there	is	little	that	has	been	done	to	make	the	division	of	caring	labour	more	
equitable.	
	 Women	and	girls	in	the	Global	South	still	struggle	to	receive	an	education	as	well.		The	
gender	disparity	in	education	widens	at	higher	education	levels,	and	the	poorest	girls	in	the	world	
still	continue	to	face	the	largest	obstacles	to	even	setting	foot	in	a	school,	let	alone	finishing	their	
education.12		The	challenges	that	women	and	girls	face	are	significant	and	include:	structural	barriers	
and	discriminatory	social	norms,	child	marriage,	long	travel	distances	to	schools,	the	costs	of	
education,	a	lack	of	female	teachers	and	gender-sensitive	teacher	training,13	and	sexual	harassment	
from	older	male	students	and	even	male	teachers.14		Additionally,	the	gender	bind	cuts	both	ways,	
sometimes	forcing	boys	to	drop	out	because	their	families	need	them	to	pursue	employment,	owing	
to	the	male-breadwinner	social	norm.15		Nevertheless,	women	and	girls,	on	average,	face	more	
challenges	to	their	prosperity	than	men	and	boys.		They	are	also	more	vulnerable	in	general	to	the	
indirect	effects	of	conflict	and	natural	disasters,	which	includes	but	are	not	limited	to	increased	
migration,	a	higher	likelihood	of	being	a	displaced	person	or	refugee,	gender-based	violence,	which	
includes	rape,	human	trafficking,	forcible	marriage,	and	forced	pregnancy.16		
	 Women	are	also	nearly	half	of	all	international	migrants,	leaving	their	homes	in	the	to	seek	
work	abroad,	and	as	of	2015,	make	up	48%	of	the	international	migrant	population.17		Further,	while	
migration	between	nations	in	the	global	South	has	outpaced	migration	from	the	global	South	to	the	
global	North,18	female	migrants	outnumber	male	migrants	in	North	America	and	Europe,	whereas	
																																								 																				
9	"Progress	of	the	World's	Women	2015-2016,"		45.	
10	Ibid.,	49.	
11	Ibid.,	84.	
12	"Gender	and	Efa	2000-2015:	Acheivements	and	Challenges,"		3.	
13	Ibid.,	4.	
14	Ibid.,	29.	
15	Ibid.,	4.	
16	Therese	McGinn	et	al.,	"Shelter	from	the	Storm:	A	Transformative	Agenda	for	Women	and	Girls	in	a	Crisis-
Prone	World,"	(Columbia:	United	Nations	Population	Fund,	2015),	21.	
17	"Global	Migration	Trends	Factsheet	2015,"		(http://iomgmdac.org/global-trends-factsheet/:	International	
Organization	for	Migration,	2016),	5.	
18	Ibid.,	7.	
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men	outnumber	women	in	Africa,	Asia,	and	particularly	Western	Asia.19		A	possible	reason	for	the	
difference	in	the	distribution	of	men	and	women	might	be	due	to	the	increased	global	demand	for	
inexpensive	carers,	either	professionally	(as	nurses,	hotel	staff,	or	in	elder	care	facilities)	or	
informally	as	domestic	carers.		While	women	in	these	situations	most	often	leave	behind	their	own	
families	(which	in	turn	are	often	cared	for	by	hired	help	or	extended	family	networks,	creating	a	
‘global	care	chain’),	women	in	the	informal	sector	are	generally	more	vulnerable	to	a	wide	variety	of	
abuses.		Such	women	are	also	more	likely	to	be	trafficked	persons.		Sadly,	human	trafficking	remains	
a	large	industry,	garnering	nearly	$150	billion	(US)	per	year.20			Further,	the	United	States	
government	recognizes	that	human	trafficking	taints	the	entire	global	market,	allowing	the	
continuation	of	slavery,	child	labour,	forced	labour,	and	prostitution	through	various	methods	such	
as	debt	bondage,	removal	of	passports,	and	other	unsavoury	means.21		The	methods	human	
trafficking	are	closely	related,	and	often	run	parallel	to,	patterns	of	international	migration.	
	 In	other	words,	despite	the	successes	during	the	late	20th	and	early	21st	century	in	lowering	
the	absolute	rate	of	poverty	and	improving	the	lives	of	women	and	girls	on	average,	it	is	at	best	a	
qualified	success.		There	is	a	rising	tide	of	inequality	that	affects	not	just	some	nations,	but	the	entire	
world.		Women	and	girls	still	face	overall	reduced	life	choices	compared	to	their	male	counterparts,	
receiving	less	schooling,	less	healthcare,	and	are	often	placed	in	greater	levels	of	insecurity	due	to	
natural	disasters	and	human	conflict.		Also,	women	are	more	likely	to	suffer	abuse	when	they	
become	international	migrants,	either	legally	or	through	human	trafficking.		
	 In	general,	human	rights	discourses	have	been	instrumental	in	combating	the	problems	of	
poverty,	the	discrimination	and	abuse	of	women	and	girls,	and	the	injustices	of	human	trafficking.		
However,	it	is	my	contention	that	human	rights	alone	are	not	enough,	because	they	cannot	always	
account	for	the	root	causes	of	structural	inequality	nor	do	they	necessarily	give	us	the	tools	to	
transform	how	we	think	about	social	justice	with	regard	to	the	perspective	of	care.		There	is	a	
growing	consensus	that	in	order	to	eradicate,	rather	than	reduce,	these	problems,	we	must	more	
deeply	investigate	their	structural	causes,22	cultivate	wider	community	engagement	by	building	upon	
existing	networks,23	and	incorporate	a	greater	understanding	of	the	role	that	care	provision	plays	in	
all	of	our	lives.24		We	must	be	able	to	better	clarify	why	these	problems	occur	in	the	first	place,	we	
must	understand	the	underlying	norms	and	institutional	supports	of	such	problems,	and	we	must	
																																								 																				
19	"International	Migration	Report	2015	(Highlights),"		(New	York:	United	Nations,	2016),	1.	
20	"Trafficking	in	Persons	Report	",		(Washington	D.C.:	United	States	Department	of	State,	2015),	13.	
21	Ibid.,	13-8.	
22	"Gender	and	Efa	2000-2015:	Acheivements	and	Challenges,"		32.	
23	"Health	in	All	Policies:	Report	on	Perspectives	and	Intersectoral	Actions	in	the	African	Region,"		(Brazzaville:	
WHO	Regional	Office	for	Africa,	2013),	7,	10.	
24	"Progress	of	the	World's	Women	2015-2016,"		132.	
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attempt	to	solve	these	problems	in	a	way	that	brings	to	the	fore	the	knowledge	that	care	is	
necessary	for	all	human	beings.			
	 The	central	argument	of	this	thesis	is	that	the	critical	ethics	of	care	provides	a	different	
perspective	on	the	international	realm	in	comparison	to	human	rights	discourses,	and	that	this	
perspective	is	a	valuable	one.		It	can	be	used	as	a	lens	through	which	to	view	international	moral	and	
political	contexts,	offering	new	information,	new	motivations,	and	the	ability	to	provide	cross-
contextual	judgments.		Additionally,	it	is	able	to	guide	us	toward	different	solutions,	which	enable	
the	transformation	of	our	world.		In	the	first	instance,	I	argue	that	the	critical	ethics	of	care	can	be	
used	as	a	lens	through	which	to	view	these	global	moral	contexts	and	highlight	the	political	nature	of	
the	provision	of	care.		For	example,	through	the	lens	of	care	we	can	see	how	a	lack	of	legal	
protections	for	parental	leave	can	unfairly	impact	women	and	have	profound	economic	and	social	
consequences.		It	also	has	political	consequences,	for	when	women	continue	to	be	relegated	to	the	
private	sphere,	they	are	often	rendered	unable	to	participate	fully	in	political	discourse.		The	lens	of	
care	can	also	demonstrate	how,	when	those	in	the	global	North	import	domestic	carers,	they	do	
more	than	import	labour,	they	also	import	affection,	tenderness,	and	other	forms	of	emotional	
investment,	which	means	that	such	women	are	not	only	exploited	for	their	labour,	but	also	for	their	
love.25		This	love	is	redirected	away	from	their	own	children	and	toward	the	children	of	those	who	
have,	to	some	degree,	abrogated	their	own	caring	responsibilities	in	favour	of	other	pursuits.		The	
ethics	of	care	gives	us	the	tools	to	investigate	and	understand	how	these	contexts	impact	real	
people’s	lives	as	they	live	them,	and	their	root	causes	as	well.		The	foundation	for	such	contexts	is	
often	due	to	the	still-strong	link	between	women,	femininity,	and	care	provision,	and	it	is	a	link	we	
must	work	toward	breaking.		Not	to	say	that	care	provision	is	unimportant,	quite	the	reverse:	that	
caring	should	be	a	human	activity,	not	solely	a	female	one.		Care	ethics	strongly	fights	the	
devaluation	of	care	and	the	concurrent	devaluation	of	those	who	provide	and	receive	care,	as	
though	care	had	no	political	ramifications,	or	that	those	who	engage	in	care	are	themselves	not	
proper	political	subjects.	
It	is	these	kinds	of	analyses	that	most	mainstream	human	rights	discourses	cannot	provide.		
Because	human	rights	discourses	cannot	provide	these	different	kinds	of	analyses,	they	are	also	
unable	to	provide	a	different	array	of	solutions.		Therefore,	I	argue	that	the	different	view	offered	by	
the	critical,	feminist	ethics	of	care	can	provide	not	only	new	information,	but	new	kinds	of	solutions	
as	well.		We	cannot	rely	on	‘business	as	usual’	to	foster	greater	equality.		That	idea	runs	counter	to	
																																								 																				
25	Arlie	Russell	Hochschild,	"Love	and	Gold,"	in	Global	Woman:	Nannies,	Maids	and	Sex	Workers	in	the	New	
Economy,	ed.	Barbara	Ehrenreich	and	Arlie	Russell	Hochschild	(New	York:	Henry	Holt	and	Company,	2002),	22-
4.	
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the	data	that	indicates	the	rising	rate	of	inequality	in	the	world	in	spite	of	stated	human	rights	
commitments.		We	must	reach	for	new	ways	of	seeing	the	world,	which	provide	new	ways	of	solving	
these	very	real	problems	experienced	by	real	people.		This	does	not	mean	that	I	argue	that	human	
rights	should	be	abandoned:	far	from	it.		Rather,	I	argue	that	human	rights	alone	cannot	address	the	
complex	moral	and	political	contexts	that	exist	in	the	world	today.		We	need	another	tool,	and	that	
tool	is	the	ethics	of	care.		Lastly,	I	argue	that	the	different	solutions	offered	by	a	care	analysis	would	
lead	to	the	transformation	of	our	world.		It	would	not	be	a	fast	transformation,	rather	a	slow,	
gradual	one,	sustained	in	dialogue	with	others	about	how	care	is	best	accomplished.		Yet,	it	would	
be	a	transformation	all	the	same,	toward	a	world	where	the	concerns	of	care	are	seen	as	primary	to	
human	life	and	given	greater	consideration	than	they	are	today.		Alongside	that	comes	a	deep	
feminist	commitment	to	overcoming	the	barriers	erected	by	patterns	of	power	that	in	turn	foster	
harmful	patterns	of	exclusion	based	on	race,	gender,	class,	sexual	orientation,	and	religion.		It	is	not	
a	commitment	to	erasing	our	differences,	but	instead	a	commitment	not	to	allow	our	differences	to	
be	the	reason	for	barring	particular	groups	of	people	from	making	political	choices	about	their	own	
lives.	
In	Chapter	One,	I	explore	the	conceptual	history	of	the	ethics	of	care,	investigating	its	
beginnings,	outlining	the	critiques	of	early	care	ethics,	and	exploring	its	development	into	a	robust	
political	ethic,	which	laid	the	foundation	for	a	global	critical	ethic	of	care.		I	begin	with	the	work	of	
Carol	Gilligan,	who	in	1982	published	her	book	In	a	Different	Voice,	which	challenged	the	then	
prevalent	assumptions	about	the	trajectory	of	human	moral	development.		The	assumption	was	that	
the	‘highest’	level	of	development	occurred	when	persons	embraced	a	Kantian-like,	rule-based	
universal	morality.26		Gilligan	argued	that	women	reason	differently	than	men	in	moral	matters,	
focused	more	on	how	to	balance	the	responsibilities	they	have	in	virtue	of	being	inexorably	
embedded	within	a	web	of	relations.27		Nel	Noddings,	publishing	only	two	years	after	Gilligan	in	1984,	
used	Gilligan’s	work	as	a	starting	point	to	further	refine	the	scope	of	care	ethics	and	demonstrate	
that	it	was	an	important	moral	theory	that	could	guide	our	interpersonal	interactions.		Noddings	in	
particular	focused	on	the	importance	of	the	emotional	aspect	of	caring,	and	the	implications	of	the	
relational	ontology	of	care	ethics.28		The	ethic	of	care,	then,	was	predicated	on	two	basic	ideas.		The	
first	is	that	traditional	‘male’	moralities	were	unable	to	encompass	the	experiences	of	women,	and	
that	the	assumption	of	‘gender-blindness’	in	traditional	moralities	actually	served	to	obfuscate	
																																								 																				
26	Carol	Gilligan,	In	a	Different	Voice:	Psychological	Theory	and	Women's	Development	(Cambridge,	Mass.:	
Harvard	University	Press,	1993),	22.	
27	Ibid.,	62.	
28	Nel	Noddings,	Caring,	a	Feminine	Approach	to	Ethics	&	Moral	Education	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	
Press,	1984),	49.	
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important	moral	questions.		The	second	idea	was	that	the	ethics	of	care	begins	from	the	viewpoint	
of	humans-in-relationship,	and	the	moral	question	becomes	how	we	best	fulfil	our	caring	
responsibilities,	rather	than	how	one	best	fulfils	one’s	obligations	based	upon	abstract,	rule-like	
duties.		It	was	in	her	book	that	Gilligan	coined	the	term	‘ethic	of	care,’	and	since	then	the	theory	has	
grown	from	its	small,	and	somewhat	controversial	beginnings.29			
However,	this	early	(‘orthodox’)	care	ethics	was	not	without	its	challengers.		The	three	major	
critiques	of	this	‘orthodox’	care	ethics	were	that:	1)	the	ethics	of	care	could	only	ever	be	a	private	
morality,	not	suited	for	public	concerns;30	2)	that	care	ethics	was	unable	to	answer	questions	of	
justice;31	and	3)	that	care	ethics	served	to	reinforce	instead	of	challenge	pervasive	norms	about	
gender	(i.e.	that	women	are	essentially	carers).32		These	critiques,	however,	instead	of	dooming	care	
ethics,	benefited	the	theory.		In	order	to	answer	these	criticisms,	the	ethics	of	care	was	developed	
into	a	political	ethic.		The	work	of	Joan	Tronto,	Eva	Feder	Kittay,	and	Virginia	Held	were	instrumental	
in	shifting	the	scope	of	care	ethics	to	expressly	include	political	concerns.		Their	work	showed	how	
questions	about	how	our	relationships	are	structured,	how	care	work	is	allocated,	and	how	care	
work	is	(under)valued	are	deeply	political	questions.33		This	later	version	of	care	ethics	is	a	sharply	
critical	theory,	posing	difficult	questions	about	the	root	causes	of	moral	and	political	problems.		It	
requires	us	to	examine	the	underlying	norms	of	race,	gender,	class,	and	ability,	to	challenge	the	
relations	of	power	that	structure	our	lives	that	either	hinder	or	enable	good	caring	relations,	and	to	
understand	how	perceptions	of	difference	and	patterns	of	exclusion	are	perpetuated	through	those	
very	norms	and	relations	of	power.		Rather	than	focusing	only	on	relations	between	persons,	the	
critical	ethics	of	care	examines	how	the	political	shapes	the	webs	of	relations	we	inhabit.		Further,	
this	critical	care	ethic	is	able	not	only	to	critique	present	arrangements,	but	can	also	offer	positive	
guidance	in	how	to	assess	and	provide	solutions	to	moral	and	political	problems.		Tronto’s	practices	
																																								 																				
29	The	philosophical	commitments	of	these	original	ethics	of	care	feminists	have,	of	course,	evolved	since	the	
1980s,	but	in	this	project	I	am	providing	an	account	of	the	development	of	care	ethics,	and	these	arguments	
constitute	the	original	conceptual	framework	of	the	theory.		Gilligan,	for	example,	took	on	the	criticism	
regarding	her	focus	on	white	middle	class	women	and	co-authored	a	book	with	Jill	McLean	Taylor	and	Amy	
Sullivan	entitled	“Between	Voice	and	Silence:	Women	and	girls,	race	and	relationships”	(1995)	that	focused	on	
the	racial	and	socio-economic	dimension	that	was	missing	from	her	first	book.		Noddings	also	has	a	focus	on	
the	philosophy	of	education	and	continues	to	produce	works	arguing	for	incorporating	the	ethics	of	care	into	
education,	not	only	to	infuse	educational	institutions	with	caring	practices,	but	to	aid	in	the	ethical	education	
of	children	as	well.		Some	of	these	works	include:	“The	Challenge	to	Care	in	Schools:	An	Alternative	Approach	
to	Education”	(1992),	“Justice	and	Caring:	The	Search	for	Common	Ground	in	Education”	(1999),	and	“A	Richer,	
Brighter	Vision	for	American	High	Schools”	(2015).	
30	Mary	G	Dietz,	"Citizenship	with	a	Feminist	Face:	The	Problem	with	Maternal	Thinking,"	Political	Theory	13,	
no.	1	(1985):	25.	
31	Virginia	Held,	The	Ethics	of	Care:	Personal,	Political,	and	Global	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2006),	68-9.	
32	Dietz,		20.	
33	Eva	Feder	Kittay,	Love's	Labor:	Essays	on	Women,	Equality,	and	Dependency,	Thinking	Gender	(New	York:	
Routledge,	1999),	38.	
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of	care	(attentiveness,	responsibility,	competence,	and	responsiveness)	are	the	basic	guidelines	for	
action,	a	method	by	which	the	goals	of	care	ethics	might	be	positively	enacted,	as	well	as	providing	a	
standard	measure	of	success	for	any	action.34		These	practices	as	formulated	by	Tronto	also	serve	as	
the	grounds	for	how	the	lens	of	care	can	then	be	applied	to	international	moral	and	political	
contexts.			However,	this	political	aspect	of	critical	care	ethics	would	not	have	been	possible	without	
the	critiques	of	the	early,	‘orthodox’	ethics	of	care,	and	also	owes	much	to	the	work	of	early	care	
theorists.		The	conceptual	history	of	care	ethics	demonstrates	that	the	ethics	of	care	is	a	theory	that	
can	adapt	and	evolve	based	upon	critique,	able	to	expand	its	scope	and	offer	new	insights,	
motivations,	and	solutions	to	moral	and	political	problems.		Although	the	core	of	care	ethics,	its	
relational	ontology,	has	remained	unchanged	since	Gilligan’s	book,	the	way	in	which	we	understand	
the	moral	content	of	our	relations	has	expanded	considerably.		Not	only	must	we	balance	our	
responsibilities	to	particular	others,	but	we	begin	to	understand	that	our	relations	themselves	are	
structured	by	larger	forces,	norms,	institutions,	and	patterns	of	power	that	serve	to	underscore	the	
deeply	political	nature	of	how	and	why	we	care	for	particular	others.	
The	critical	ethics	of	care	expanded	the	scope	of	care	ethics,	making	explicit	that	the	moral	
problems	that	arise	in	caring	relations	are	also	profoundly	political	ones.		This	view,	that	norms	and	
institutions	shape	our	caring	relations,	laid	the	foundation	for	expanding	care	ethics	to	the	global	
level.		In	Chapter	Two	I	follow	the	pioneering	work	of	Fiona	Robinson,	who	was	the	first	to	articulate	
a	global,	critical	ethic	of	care.		In	this	chapter	I	argue	that	the	ethics	of	care	is	an	important	and	
viable	different	perspective	in	comparison	to	human	rights	discourses	when	it	comes	to	addressing	
global	moral	and	political	contexts.		Further,	because	the	critical	ethic	of	care	challenges	the	
pervasive	norms	and	institutions	that	shape	our	caring	relations	(often	shaping	them	to	our	
detriment),	it	is	aimed	at	the	transformation	of	the	international	landscape	in	order	to	foster	better	
caring	relations	between	persons.35		I	review	the	unique	insights	that	are	offered	by	a	critical	care	
ethic,	as	well	as	unpack	the	different	practices	of	care	(attentiveness,	responsibility	and	
responsiveness)	used	by	Robinson.		This	set	of	practices	does	not	neatly	map	to	Tronto’s	formulation,	
which	includes	a	markedly	different	conception	of	responsiveness	and	a	fourth	practice	termed	
‘competence.’		From	there,	I	clarify	how	we	can	justifiably	use	the	ethics	of	care	on	the	international	
level.		In	brief,	the	argument	is	that	if	we	accept	that	the	ethics	of	care	is	able	to	assess	and	provide	
moral	guidance	and	judgment	for	relationships,	and	that	the	international	realm	is	a	set	of	
relationships	between	institutions	that	structure	our	interpersonal	caring	relations,	then	care	ethics	
can	and	should	be	used	to	analyse	and	judge	moral	and	political	contexts	on	the	international	level.		
																																								 																				
34	Joan	C.	Tronto,	Moral	Boundaries:	A	Political	Argument	for	an	Ethic	of	Care	(New	York:	Routledge,	1993),	108.	
35	Elisabeth	Conradi,	"Redoing	Care:	Societal	Transformation	through	Critical	Practice,"	Ethics	and	Social	
Welfare	9,	no.	2	(2015):	123.	
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It	is,	to	use	a	turn	of	phrase,	‘turtles	all	the	way	down,’	that	is,	everyone	exists	within	a	web	of	
relations	that	does	not	stop	at	state	boundaries.36		The	benefits	of	such	an	analysis	is	that	it	opens	
up	new	areas	of	moral	and	political	inquiry,	new	motivations	for	action,	and	even	different	possible	
solutions	to	problems.		Specifically,	we	can	begin	to	see	certain	contexts,	ones	that	were	previously	
not	considered	to	be	of	express	moral	or	political	concern	internationally.		In	this	chapter,	I	focus	on	
the	contexts	of	difference,	exclusion,	gender,	and	violence	to	highlight	how	the	ethics	of	care	can	
‘make	seen’	the	background	assumptions	that	are	part	of	our	current	international	landscape	that,	
in	fact,	serve	to	render	people	unable	to	fulfil	their	caring	obligations	or	to	receive	the	care	they	
need.		In	the	aforementioned	contexts,	I	argue	that	the	practices	of	care	are	an	important	guide	to	
transforming	the	international	realm,	based	on	the	ability	of	a	care	analysis	to	enable	us	to	challenge	
our	assumptions,	offer	new	motivations	for	action,	and	suggest	different	kinds	of	solutions.	
In	Chapter	Three	I	directly	engage	with	human	rights	discourses	to	clarify	what	I	mean	when	
I	claim	that	critical,	feminist	care	ethics	offers	a	different	lens	through	which	to	view	international	
moral	and	political	contexts.		Because	the	ethics	of	care	is	often	cast	in	opposition	to	human	rights,	it	
is	necessary	to	spend	time	understanding	what	human	rights	are	and	the	benefits	they	offer	when	
addressing	global	moral	contexts.		However,	I	argue	against	the	claim	that	human	rights	should	be	
our	only,	or	even	the	primary,	tool	we	use	when	thinking	about	and	working	to	address	complex	
international	moral	and	political	contexts.		First,	I	do	acknowledge	that	human	rights	literature	is	a	
vast	area,	and	as	such	I	present	more	of	a	summary	than	a	detailed	picture	of	human	rights.		I	strive	
to	present	a	fair	picture	of	what	human	rights	are,	examining	the	work	of	prominent	rights	theorists	
such	as	Thomas	Pogge,	Charles	Beitz,	and	James	Griffin,37	to	demonstrate	that	in	spite	of	the	
differences	between	types	of	human	rights	discourses,	they	nevertheless	have	two	important	
features	in	common:	they	are	considered	1)	to	be	a	set	of	(sometimes	negotiable)	moral	and	political	
standards	that	are	aimed	at	protecting	what	it	means	to	live	a	‘human’	kind	of	life,	which	
subsequently	2)	generate	claims	of	duty	upon	institutions	and	individuals.38			
Further,	human	rights	discourses	are	similar	enough	in	basic	structure	such	that	they	can	be	
understood	as	providing	the	same	kinds	of	benefits,	as	well	as	being	vulnerable	to	the	same	kinds	of	
critique.		The	first	benefit	of	human	rights	is	that	they	are	strong	claims	of	justice.		They	are	
expressed	in	terms	of	duties	and	obligations,	which	can	serve	to	define	who	the	relevant	actors	are,	
																																								 																				
36	Fiona	Robinson,	Globalizing	Care:	Ethics,	Feminist	Theory,	and	International	Relations	(Boulder,	Colo.:	
Westview	Press,	1999),	45.	
37	Although	these	philosophers	are	by	no	means	exhaustive	of	human	rights	literature,	they	do	represent	the	
main	proponents	of	those	human	rights	discourses	that	are	aimed	at	the	reduction	of	severe	poverty	and	
generally	championing	wider	enforcement	of	human	rights	internationally.			
38	Duncan	Ivison,	Rights	(Stocksfield:	Acumen	Publishing	Ltd,	2008),	200-1.	
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avoiding	possible	ambiguity	when	assigning	responsibility	for	particular	harms	done	to	others.		
Second,	human	rights	also	mark	out	problems	that	are	of	international	concern,	issues	such	as	
severe	poverty	that	transcend	national	boundaries	and	do	not	stop	at	ethnic,	religious,	or	social	
divisions.		Lastly,	human	rights	can	also	provide	clear	guidance	for	policy	makers,	in	that	they	are	
standards	that	are	set,	and	are	less	likely	to	be	stalled	by	contextual	factors.		Yet,	in	spite	of	these	
benefits,	human	rights	are	not,	nor	should	they	be,	our	only	means	by	which	to	address	moral	and	
political	contexts	internationally.		The	care	critique	brings	to	the	fore	aspects	of	the	international	
realm	that	human	rights	discourses	frequently	overlook	or	deem	as	outside	their	scope,	and	
although	the	first	and	second	points	of	the	critique	are	not	necessarily	unique	to	the	feminist	ethic	
of	care,	it	was	critical,	feminist	care	theorists	who	put	these	critiques	together	to	form	a	larger,	more	
sustained	critique	of	mainstream	human	rights	theories.		First,	human	rights	can	overlook	the	
embedded	structural	harms	of	globalization,	such	as	the	way	in	which	relations	of	power	foster	
harmful	forms	of	exclusion,	or	the	emotional	exploitation	of	transnational	migrant	care	workers.39		
Secondly,	the	care	critique	highlights	that	human	rights	also	carry	with	them	cultural	and	gender	
biases,	because	human	rights	come	from	a	very	specific	tradition	that	developed	in	Western	Europe	
and	was	often	focused	on	men	or	male-led	households	until	the	last	century.		These	biases	serve	to	
render	invisible	the	way	in	which	difference	is	obscured	in	favour	of	‘sameness’	and	how	gender	
deeply	alters	the	way	in	which	human	rights	claims	can	be	made.40		Finally,	human	rights	are	
generally	unable	to	encompass	issues	of	social	reproduction,	i.e.	the	work	of	care	itself,	which	means	
that	care,	under	a	human	rights	discourse,	is	often	devalued	or	marginalized,	along	with	those	who	
give	and	receive	care.41		Thus,	these	critiques	offer	very	good	reasons	not	to	solely	rely	on	human	
rights	to	provide	the	answers	to	international	moral	and	political	problems.		Yet,	this	does	not	mean	
that	we	should	abandon	human	rights	altogether.		Rather,	we	should,	as	I	argue,	use	the	lens	of	care	
to	provide	a	different	means	of	understanding	moral	and	political	contexts,	supplying	different	
motivations,	and	suggesting	a	wider	array	of	solutions	that	can	lead	to	substantial	transformation	for	
the	better.	
In	light	of	the	care	critique	of	human	rights,	and	the	lingering	problem	with	care	ethics	(that	
its	flexibility	renders	it	too	unwieldy	to	address	global	moral	concerns,	which	are	assumed	to	require	
‘harder’	answers	in	the	form	of	rights	standards),	a	reasonable	solution	might	be	to	craft	a	set	of	
‘caring’	human	rights	that	incorporates	the	best	of	both	theories.		In	Chapter	Four,	I	examine	the	
																																								 																				
39	Annette	C	Baier,	"The	Need	for	More	Than	Justice,"	in	Justice	and	Care,	ed.	Virginia	Held	(Colorado:	
Westview	Press,	1995),	55.	
40	Virginia	Held,	"Feminist	Transformations	of	Moral	Theory,"	Philosophy	and	Phenomenological	Research	50,	
no.	Supplement	(1990):	327.	
41	Robinson,	63.	
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attempt	Daniel	Engster	made,	and	ultimately	conclude	that	combining	care	ethics	and	human	rights	
does	not	provide	a	satisfactory	kind	of	care	theory.42		Engster	suggests	that	his	‘caring’	human	rights	
would	provide	human	rights	with	a	cross-culturally	acceptable	foundation	(care)	instead	of	
something	contentious	like	human	dignity	or	agency.		He	also	argues	that	a	critical	ethic	of	care	
cannot	offer	guidance	for	public	policy,	and	as	such	it	is	too	ambiguous	when	it	comes	to	providing	
answers	to	global	moral	problems.43			Engster	argues	for	a	rational	theory	of	obligation,	based	on	our	
mutual	dependence,	in	order	to	ground	our	various	caring	obligations	and	justify	the	purchase	of	
caring	human	rights.		We	have,	he	argues,	residual	responsibilities	of	care	to	distant	strangers	when	
their	own	circles	of	family,	friends,	and	community	are	unable	to	fulfil	their	human	rights.44	
While	I	am	sympathetic	to	Engster’s	practical	aims,	and	some	of	his	proposed	solutions,	
there	are	two	major	problems	with	his	theory.		The	first	problem	with	Engster’s	rational	theory	of	
obligation	is	that	it	is	built	upon	an	uncritical	acceptance	of	dependence.		Engster	agrees	with	care	
theorists	that	our	(inter)dependence	is	an	inexorable	fact	of	our	lives,	but	what	he	fails	to	make	clear	
is	how	our	very	relations	of	dependence	are	shaped	by	global	and	local	patterns	of	power,	such	as	
norms	of	gender	and	race,	economic	forces,	and	political	forces.		Because	the	caring	human	rights	
Engster	develops	are	built	upon	his	rational	theory	of	obligation,	which	in	turn	is	based	upon	an	
uncritical	view	of	dependence,	I	argue	that	his	caring	human	rights	would	only	serve	to	perpetuate	
the	harms	of	difference,	exclusion,	gender,	and	violence.		The	second	problem	is	that	he	claims	in	
order	to	have	wide	acceptability	and	broad	uptake	of	his	theory,	he	must	make	his	rights	minimally	
feminist,	i.e.	not	incorporate	strong	claims	for	women’s	equal	status	or	political	participation.		Not	
only	is	this	disingenuous	to	the	history	of	care	ethics,	but	I	argue	that	by	not	pushing	for	stronger	
feminist	commitments	his	caring	human	rights	would	still	leave	room	for	women	to	be	strongly	
linked	to	care.		This	means	that	care	and	women	would	both	remain	devalued,	and	that	women	
would	continue	to	be	excluded	from	power.		Further,	I	argue	that	taken	together,	these	problems	
make	it	very	unlikely	that	caring	human	rights	could	address	the	complicated	context	of	the	
transnational	migrant	care	worker,	and	its	darker	aspect,	human	trafficking.		Without	the	ability	to	
see	how	global	and	local	patterns	of	power	impact	people’s	dependence	relations,	and	without	the	
																																								 																				
42	Not	that	we	should	avoid	reimagining	human	rights	from	different	perspectives.		Jennifer	Nedelsky’s	work	
on	relational	rights	provides	an	excellent	example	of	this	very	goal,	though	her	work	is	more	focused	on	the	
legal	aspects	of	rights	not	necessarily	the	moral	aspect.		My	concern	here,	however,	is	specifically	about	the	
‘ground-level’	political	and	moral	realty	of	people’s	lives	as	they	live	them,	embedded	in	relations	that	are	
shaped	by	institutions,	public	policy,	and	socio-cultural	norms.		The	point	here,	then,	is	that	Engster’s	attempt	
was	problematic	because	of	the	kind	of	care	theory	he	produced,	not	necessarily	the	outcome	for	human	
rights.	
43	Daniel	Engster,	The	Heart	of	Justice:	Care	Ethics	and	Political	Theory	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2007),	
162.	
44	Ibid.,	171.	
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gender	analysis	of	a	strong	feminist	theory,	we	cannot	fully	engage	with	the	underlying	causes	of	
transnational	migration	or	trafficking,	and	therefore	cannot	begin	to	find	lasting	solutions.		In	sum,	I	
argue	that	this	attempt	to	combine	care	ethics	and	human	rights,	because	it	removes	vital	parts	of	
care	ethics,	is	a	‘non-starter.’		Doing	so	does	not	‘solve’	the	problem	of	the	practical	application	of	
care	ethics,	but	instead	allows	the	same	problems	found	in	human	rights	discourses	to	continue	
unchallenged.	
In	Chapter	Five,	I	argue,	in	direct	answer	to	Engster’s	original	critique,	that	the	critical	ethics	
of	care	can,	in	fact,	be	used	as	a	guide	for	the	public	policy	process.		This	chapter	utilizes	the	policy	
stages	theory	in	order	to	break	down	the	process	of	policy	making	into	more	intelligible	steps,	
although	I	acknowledge	the	complex	and	often	cyclical	nature	of	policy	making.		With	the	policy	
stages	as	a	‘road	map’	for	the	policy	process,	I	show	how	although	human	rights	discourses	offer	
some	benefits	to	the	policy	process,	the	ethics	of	care	can	also	be	used	at	each	stage	of	the	policy	
process	to	uncover	the	root	causes	of	social	problems,	offer	different	kinds	of	solutions,	guide	policy	
decision-makers	and	policy	implementation,	as	well	as	suggest	different	standards	for	the	success	or	
failure	of	a	policy.		Throughout	the	chapter	I	focus	on	real	policy,	real	case	studies,	and	real	
outcomes	in	order	to	demonstrate	the	problems	that	arise	when	we	assume	that	human	rights	alone	
can	provide	a	full	and	complete	set	of	solutions	to	the	complex	moral	contexts	that	exist	in	the	real	
world.		What	is	necessary,	I	argue,	is	a	more	flexible	moral	guide	that	places	an	emphasis	on	the	
contextual	nature	of	any	problem,	and	the	importance	of	understanding	how	policy	affects	the	lives	
of	real	persons.		I	argue	that	the	different	perspective	afforded	by	the	lens	of	care	is	an	important	
addition	to	our	policy	processes,	locally	and	globally,	and	that	through	policy	we	can	achieve	some	of	
the	transformative	potential	of	critical,	feminist	care	ethics.		The	major	shift	would	be	bringing	into	
focus	how	policy	can	shape	our	caring	relations.		We	would	be	able	to	begin	crafting	policy	that	
enables	us	to	fulfil	our	caring	responsibilities,	to	ourselves	and	others,	where	‘productive’	work	fits	
into	our	lives	as	carers,	rather	than	care	work	fitting	into	our	lives	as	‘productive’	citizens.45	
The	final	chapter	of	this	thesis	addresses	one	last	critique	of	the	ethics	of	care,	which	
challenges	its	transformative	potential,	and	the	assumed	ability	of	care	ethics	to	enable	moral	
judgment	in	particular	contexts	from	the	universal	perspective	of	care.		As	Kimberly	Hutchings	points	
out,	it	is	the	methodology	of	care	ethics	that	is	suspect,	because	it	is	similar	to	feminist	standpoint	
theory.		The	problem	with	feminist	standpoint	theory,	and	thus	with	the	ethics	of	care,	is	three-fold.		
First,	both	have	a	universalizing	aspect	(that	of	care	or	women’s	experiences)	that	sits	uneasily	with	
the	understanding	that	all	knowledge,	especially	ethical	knowledge,	is	situated	and	contextual.		
																																								 																				
45	Fiona	Williams,	"A	Good	Enough	Life:	Developing	a	Political	Ethic	of	Care,"	Soundings,	no.	30	(2005):	29.	
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Second,	while	both	theories	assume	that	dominant	discourses	are	ill-suited	to	handle	some	moral	
contexts,	such	as	the	ability	of	human	rights	to	‘see’	issues	of	care,	neither	theory	explicitly	
incorporates	the	understanding	that	they,	too,	have	limits	in	scope	and	applicability.		Third,	the	
standpoint	for	each	theory	grounds	a	larger	moral	and	political	project,	which	rests	on	the	
problematic	universalizing	aspect	of	the	theory.		Essentially,	the	claim	is	that	the	ethics	of	care	does	
not	go	far	enough	in	rejecting	universalist	foundations,	nor	can	it	fully	address	embedded	gender	
biases.46		The	goal,	claims	Hutchings,	should	be	to	mark	out	a	feminist	ethical	method	that	entirely	
eschews	any	universal	claims,	and	instead	focuses	on	the	specific	feminist	concerns	that	she	
elaborates,	which	is	meant	to	lead	to	a	more	material	kind	of	transformation	of	the	global	moral	
political	landscape.47		It	is	not	that	the	world	will	merely	be	‘more	just’,	but	rather	that	some	kinds	of	
harms,	such	as	the	mass	rapes	of	the	Bosnian	war,	would	be	unable	to	be	conceived	of	in	the	first	
place,	i.e.	rape	is	no	longer	an	abhorrent,	though	grimly	expected,	part	of	warfare.	
	 While	I	concede	that	the	ethics	of	care	and	standpoint	theory	have	similar	methodologies,	I	
reject	Hutchings’	conclusions.		First,	I	argue	that	the	transformative	potential	of	care	ethics	is	rooted	
not	in	its	ability	to	render	certain	moral	contexts	unthinkable,	but	rather	in	its	ability	to	engage	with	
the	moral	contexts	we	face	today	and	to	view	them	in	a	different	way,	working	to	understand	their	
underlying	causes	and	imagine	different	kinds	of	solutions	from	the	perspective	of	care.48		Even	
though	is	not	the	kind	of	transformation	that	Hutchings	endorses,	does	not	mean	it	is	not	
transformation	at	all.		Rather,	it	is	transformation	that	works	through	existing	webs	of	relations	in	
order	to	reshape	them.		Second,	I	use	the	work	of	Seyla	Benhabib	to	support	my	claim	that	care	
ethics	can	underwrite	moral	judgments	from	the	universal	standpoint	of	care.49		In	short,	the	
argument	is	that	because	care	is	a	part	of	every	human	life,	it	can	serve	as	a	shared	‘touchstone’	
between	persons	engaged	in	dialogue,	allowing	people	from	different	contexts	to	have	a	shared	
point	of	commonality	that	can	transcend	their	differences.50		However,	we	must	also	be	honest	
about	our	own	contexts,	and	how	our	particular	circumstances	can	colour	our	judgments.		By	
accepting	the	vulnerability	of	judgment	the	ethics	of	care	is	able	to	take	on	board	the	critique	
elaborated	by	Hutchings,	and	has	gained	a	more	nuanced	method	of	ethical	judgment.		In	the	end,	I	
conclude	that	the	ethics	of	care	retains	its	transformative	potential	and	ability	to	make	ethical	
																																								 																				
46	Kimberly	Hutchings,	"Towards	a	Feminist	International	Ethics,"	Review	of	International	Studies	26,	no.	05	
(2000):	119.	
47	Ibid.,	113.	
48	Fiona	Robinson,	"Care	Ethics,	Political	Theory,	and	the	Future	of	Feminism,"	in	Care	Ethics	and	Political	
Theory,	ed.	Daniel	Engster	and	Maurice	Hamington	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2015),	307.	
49	Although	the	content	of	Benhabib’s	work	specifically	deals	with	Arendt’s	interpretation	of	Kant,	the	
methodology	of	her	argument	is	one	that	can	also	be	applied	to	the	ethics	of	care.	
50	Seyla	Benhabib,	Situating	the	Self:	Gender,	Community	and	Postmodernism	in	Contemporary	Ethics	
(Cambridge:	Polity	Press,	1992),	124.	
20	
	
judgments.		It	is	a	feminist	theory	that	is	well	suited	to	today’s	moral	and	political	international	
landscape,	one	that	can	be	utilized	right	now	in	order	to	begin	transforming	the	world	from	its	
current	state	into	a	world	that	enables	beneficial	caring	relations	instead	of	perpetuating	harmful	
ones.	
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Chapter One: A Conceptual  History of Care Ethics 
	
The	history	of	the	ethics	of	care	in	philosophy	is	relatively	short,	emerging	in	the	late	1970s	and	early	
1980s,	but	since	that	time	it	has	grown	from	its	roots	in	moral	psychology	into	a	global	political	ethic.		
In	this	chapter,	my	primary	goal	is	to	provide	a	measure	of	context	for	the	genesis	of	care	ethics	and	
trace	its	evolution	into	a	political	ethical	theory.		Care	ethics	began	by	questioning	the	primacy	of	
deontological	ethical	theories	and	the	early	strains	of	care	theory	championed	a	wholesale	rejection	
of	Kantian,	neo-Kantian,	and	rights	based	ethical	theories.1		I	do	not	subscribe	to	such	versions	of	
care	ethics.		Instead,	I	reject	the	primacy	of	deontological	ethics	and	human	rights	approaches	in	the	
global	political	and	moral	arena.		The	history	of	care	ethics	provides	reasons	for	this	rejection	and	
the	further	claim	that	the	ethics	of	care	illuminates	moral	and	political	problems	that	Kantian	ethics	
and	human	rights	approaches	are	either	unable	to	encompass	or	to	fully	explain.	Using	the	lens	of	
care	ethics	makes	visible	particular	moral	and	political	situations	(relationships,	care	work,	
dependence,	exclusion,	gender,	race,	and	class)	in	a	different	way—a	way	that	provides	new	
information,	motivations,	and	solutions.		I	develop	this	idea	more	fully	in	Chapters	Two	and	Three,	
and	in	this	chapter	I	focus	more	on	the	historical	and	conceptual	context	that	laid	the	foundations	
for	a	global	ethic	of	care.	
I	begin	with	the	early	‘orthodox’	care	ethics,	exemplified	by	the	early	work	of	Carol	Gilligan	
and	Nel	Noddings.		Then	I	will	explore	how	philosophers	Joan	Tronto,	Eva	Feder	Kittay,	and	Virginia	
Held	developed	the	ethics	of	care	into	a	political	theory	in	response	to	the	three	major	critiques	of	
early	care	theory.		As	I	trace	the	history	of	care	ethics	in	this	chapter,	I	will	highlight	key	features	of	
the	theory.		In	particular	I	focus	on	the	moral	situations	(or	contexts)	illuminated	by	the	lens	of	care	
as	the	theory	continued	to	grow	from	its	roots	into	a	viable	political	ethic.		As	the	ethics	of	care	
continued	to	grow	and	expand	in	scope,	the	theory	began	to	encompass	not	just	norms	about	care	
itself,	relationships,	and	gender,	but	also	norms	about	race,	class,	sexual	orientation,	dependence,	
exclusion,	and	even	violence.		This	expansion	continued	as	the	ethics	of	care	became	globalized,	
which	is	addressed	in	Chapter	Two.		Lastly,	I	will	briefly	outline	the	codified	set	of	caring	practices	
that	Joan	Tronto	developed	and	that	other	care	theorists,	such	as	Fiona	Robinson	and	Olena	
Hankivsky,	have	continued	to	utilize.		Elaborating	Tronto’s	caring	practices	sets	the	stage	for	
																																								 																				
1	However,	this	questioning	does	not	necessarily	lead	to	a	complete	rejection	of	the	importance	or	the	
usefulness	of	Kantian	ethical	theories	or	of	human	rights	discourses.		As	discussed	in	Chapter	Three,	human	
rights	discourses	offer	ways	to	identify	and	address	global	moral	problems,	however,	as	I	argue	throughout	
this	thesis,	human	rights	alone	are	not	enough	to	fully	address	all	the	complex	global	moral	problems	that	exist	
in	the	world	today.	
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demonstrating	how	the	global	critical	ethic	of	care	differs	from	earlier	political	conceptions	of	care	
theory.	
	
Section 1 – The Genesis of the Ethics of Care 
In	1982,	Carol	Gilligan	published	In	a	Different	Voice,	a	work	on	psychological	moral	development	
that	had	profound	implications	for	how	moral	concerns	might	vary	along	gender	lines.		Noddings’	
book	Caring	(1984)	continued	in	much	the	same	vein	as	Gilligan’s	work,	contrasting	what	she	termed	
a	male-morality	with	a	female-morality.		Both	suggested	that	men	and	women	had	different	
methods	of	moral	reasoning,	and	that	the	‘male’	morality	and	the	‘female’	morality	could	not	be	
substituted	for	one	another.		Noddings	states	that	until	the	theorization	of	this	new	morality	
emerged,	“ethics	has	been	discussed	largely	in	the	language	of	the	father:	in	principles	and	
propositions,	in	terms	such	as	justification,	fairness,	and	justice.		The	mother’s	voice	has	been	
silent.”2		The	claim	is	that	the	unique	experiences	and	perspectives	of	women	had	been	absent	from	
moral	reasoning,	either	through	inattention	or	actively	silencing	dissenting	viewpoints.		What	care	
ethics	began	to	elaborate	was	an	alternative	moral	epistemology,	a	“different	way	of	identifying	and	
appreciating	the	forms	of	intelligence	which	define	responsible	moral	consideration.”3		Care	ethics	
was	based	upon	a	unique	standpoint,	a	feminist	standpoint	that	viewed	the	moral	world	differently	
from	traditional	ethical	theories.4		This	new	source	of	moral	knowledge	was	important	because	it	
challenged	the	supposed	‘gender-blindness’	of	traditional	moralities,	uncovering	a	male	bias,	which	
in	turn	meant	that	women’s	experiences	and	subsequent	moral	content	remained	in	the	private	
realm.5		Further,	Gilligan	and	Noddings	both	claim	that	women’s	experiences	opened	up	a	new	way	
of	looking	at	the	world,	a	relational	ontology	where	all	persons	are	understood	as	existing	in	the	
context	of	their	relations	with	particular	others.		They	did	not	claim	that	only	women	viewed	the	
world	this	way,	but	that	women	were	more	likely	to,	and	that	this	relational	perspective	provides	a	
more	accurate	picture	of	human	life.	
The	philosophical	theory	of	care	ethics	has	roots	in	moral	psychology	and	the	psychological	
studies	of	Nancy	Chodorow	and	Carol	Gilligan.		Chodorow’s	work	in	the	1970s	challenged	the	then-
current	masculine	bias	of	psychoanalytic	theory	and	explored	the	psychology	of	gender	identity	
formation.		This	work	focused	on	how	gender	identity	formation	impacted	the	way	in	which	men	
																																								 																				
2	Noddings,	1.	
3	Margaret	Urban	Walker,	"Moral	Understandings:	Alternative	"Epistemology"	for	a	Feminist	Ethics,"	Hypatia	4,	
no.	2	(1989):	16.	
4	There	is	tension	between	the	situated	standpoint	of	care	ethics	and	the	universal	claim	of	care,	and	that	
tension	will	be	addressed	in	Chapter	Six.	
5	Held,	"Feminist	Transformations	of	Moral	Theory,"	327.	
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and	women	engage	in	relationships,	particularly	relationships	of	dependence.6		Gilligan,	aware	of	
Chodorow’s	work,	and	frustrated	with	the	apparent	male-centric	bias	in	the	work	of	psychologist	
Lawrence	Kohlberg,	with	whom	she	had	worked,	undertook	a	review	of	Kohlberg’s	study.		She	also	
organized	her	own	interviews	with	female	subjects	to	demonstrate	that	women,	on	average,	tended	
to	use	a	different	kind	of	moral	reasoning	than	men.		Kohlberg	originally	performed	a	series	of	
interview-based	experiments	to	explore	the	moral	development	of	girls	and	boys	as	they	grew	into	
adulthood.		However,	Kohlberg’s	six-stage7	hierarchy	of	moral	development	was	based	on	his	study	
of	eighty-four	boys	over	a	twenty-year	period,8	thus	embedding	a	male	bias	in	his	methodology.		
Kohlberg	claimed	that	his	six	stages	were	universal,	but	his	study	produced	the	outcome	that	
women	were,	in	general,	judged	to	be	morally	deficient	when	compared	with	men;	that	is	women	
consistently	arrested	in	the	third	stage	whereas	men	were	often	able	to	‘progress’	to	later	stages,	
where	relationships	took	second	place	to	abstract	rules.9		The	majority	of	women	seemed	to	be	
stuck	in	the	concrete,	relational	stage,	with	few	developing	to	the	sixth	and	highest	stage	of	the	
Kantian	and	abstract	stage	of	moral	development.	
Gilligan	identified	two	major	problems	with	Kohlberg’s	results.		First,	that	his	results	were	
heavily	biased	towards	a	pre-conceived	idea	of	what	the	so-called	‘highest	and	best’	level	of	moral	
development	might	be,	that	is,	a	morality	focused	on	rights	and	non-interference,	a	neo-Kantian	
model	of	ethics.10		Second,	the	results	seemed	to	reinforce	the	idea	that	women	were	not	as	good	at	
moral	reasoning	as	men.		The	first	problem	was	a	result	of	the	way	in	which	Kohlberg	established	his	
baseline	for	moral	development.		To	determine	his	six	stages,	Kohlberg	initially	only	interviewed	
boys	and	men.		Gilligan,	by	contrast,	found	in	her	own	set	of	interviews	that	when	women	are	the	
baseline	for	determining	what	moral	development	is,	moral	problems	arise	from	competing	
responsibilities,	not	competing	rights.11		The	way	in	which	Kohlberg	researched	the	stages	of	moral	
development	was	already	skewed	to	present	men	as	being	more	morally	developed,	because	
Kohlberg’s	research	counted	the	experiences	of	men	as	though	they	were	‘universal’.		This	biased	
baseline	produced	the	second	problem	that	Gilligan	identified.		Rather	than	ask	why	the	data	
																																								 																				
6	Owen	Flanagan	and	Kathryn	Jackson,	"Justice,	Care,	and	Gender:	The	Kohlberg-Gilligan	Debate	Revisited,"	
Ethics	97,	no.	3	(1987):	629.	
7	The	six	stages	are	grouped	into	three	paired	sets.		The	first	set	is	Pre-conventional	morality,	which	contains	
stages	one	and	two,	stage	one	is	concerned	with	avoiding	punishment,	and	stage	two	is	concerned	with	self-
interest.		The	second	set	is	Conventional	morality,	containing	stages	three	and	four,	where	stage	three	is	
concerned	with	interpersonal	accord	and	conformity,	and	stage	four	is	concerned	with	authority	and	social	
order.		The	third	set	is	Post-conventional	morality,	containing	stages	five	and	six,	stage	five	being	social	
contract	morality,	and	stage	six	being	morality	based	on	universal	ethical	principles.	
8	Gilligan,	18.		
9	Ibid.			
10	Ibid.,	22.	
11	Ibid.,	19.		
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seemed	to	show	women	as	‘less	morally	developed’	than	men,	and	thus	investigate	if	the	scale	of	
moral	development	based	only	on	men	was	problematic,	Kohlberg	initially	seems	to	accept	his	
results	as	a	fact	of	moral	psychology.			
Gilligan	rejects	the	primacy	of	male-centric	theories,	and	in	particular	she	rejects	the	idea	
that	Kantian	ethics	should	hold	pride	of	place	among	ethical	theories	as	the	‘end’	of	moral	
development.		This	work	in	the	field	of	psychology	was	paralleled	by	feminist	philosophers,	
particularly	Sara	Ruddick	and	Nel	Noddings.		Sara	Ruddick	advocated	an	understanding	of	care	
through	the	process	of	mothering.		Though	she	did	not	claim	that	only	women	were	mothers,	she	
did	put	the	concepts	of	motherhood	and	birth	at	the	forefront	of	her	ethical	reasoning.		Virginia	Held	
noted	that	until	1980	and	Ruddick’s	article	Maternal	Thinking,	“the	practice	of	mothering	had	been	
virtually	absent	from	all	nonfeminist	moral	theorizing,	there	was	no	philosophical	acknowledgment	
that	mothers	think	or	reason,	or	that	one	can	find	moral	values	in	this	practice.”12		The	point	for	
Ruddick	was	two-fold,	first	that	the	unique	experiences	of	women,	especially	the	activities	of	
mothering	and	care	giving,	had	previously	been	ignored	in	moral	philosophy	and	second,	that	
through	a	philosophical	inquiry	into	mothering	and	care	giving,	one	could	find	different	kinds	of	
answers	to	moral	problems.13		Other	philosophers,	such	as	Nel	Noddings,	identified	an	additional	
problem	with	mainstream	ethical	theories14	as	ignoring	the	sphere	of	private	relationships,	that	is,	
issues	of	family	and	friends,	and	how	to	negotiate	conflicts	between	and	among	these	private	
relationships.		This	rejection	was	coupled	with	the	insight	that	“[m]any	persons	who	live	moral	lives	
do	not	approach	moral	problems	formally.		Women,	in	particular,	seem	to	approach	moral	problems	
by	placing	themselves	as	nearly	as	possible	in	concrete	situations	and	assuming	personal	
responsibility	for	the	choices	to	be	made.”15		For	Noddings,	the	ethics	of	care	is	heavily	grounded	in	
concrete	situations,	as	that	was	where	women’s	experiences	lay,	in	contrast	to	the	“traditional	
logical	approach	to	ethical	problems	that	arises	more	obviously	from	masculine	experiences.”16		Like	
Gilligan,	Noddings	worked	to	demonstrate	that	previous	ethical	theories	were,	perhaps	
unintentionally,	biased	towards	a	more	masculine	experience,	which	focused	on	duties	and	
obligations.		This,	in	turn,	would	mean	that	for	a	woman	to	count	as	or	be	considered	as	a	moral	
actor,	she	must	adopt	the	masculine	framework	and	leave	behind	the	feminine	and	the	ethical	
concerns	that	fell	outside	the	scope	of	duties	and	obligations.17	
																																								 																				
12	Held,	The	Ethics	of	Care:	Personal,	Political,	and	Global,	26.	Emphasis	in	the	original	
13	See	Sara	Ruddick,	Maternal	Thinking,	(1989).	
14	Kantian	ethics,	utilitarianism,	and	to	a	lesser	extent,	virtue	ethics.	
15	Noddings,	8.		
16	Ibid.	
17	Annette	C	Baier,	"What	Do	Women	Want	in	a	Moral	Theory?,"	Nous	19,	no.	1	(1985):	56.	
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The	rejection	of	the	primacy	of	Kantian	ethics	for	early	care	theorists	required	the	creation	
of	a	new	kind	of	ethical	theory.		Although	early	care	ethics	faced	heavy	critique	and	criticism,	it	was	a	
turning	point	in	feminist	ethics	because	it	demonstrated	a	firm	shift	away	from	feminist	readings	or	
critiques	of	Kantian	or	utilitarian	ethics	and	the	development	of	a	purely	feminist	ethic.18		For	both	
Gilligan	and	Noddings,	the	first	salient	point	of	difference	between	care	ethics	and	Kantian	ethics	
regarded	the	ontological	view	of	persons	and	self-identity.		The	ethics	of	care	requires	the	
understanding	of	persons	to	occur	within	webs	of	relationships	with	particular	others	instead	of	a	
focus	on	the	individual	as	a	discrete	agent,	who	can	be	thought	of	in	absentia	from	their	particular	
relationships	with	concrete	others.		Gilligan	claims	this	is	an	integral	part	of	how	women	reason	
morally,	and	that	relationships	themselves	are	deeply	constitutive	of	any	individual’s	self-identity	or	
personhood.		In	her	work	she	found	what	she	believed	was	a	deep	difference	in	the	way	men	and	
women	might	construct	their	moral	identities.19		Men’s	self-identity	is	measured	against	abstract	
ideals	of	perfection,	whereas	women’s	self-identity	is	assessed	through	particular	activities	of	care,20	
which	underscore	a	social	dimension	of	their	identity.		Gilligan	claims	that	this	is	borne	out	by	how	
men	and	women	understand	relationships,	where	men	focus	on	a	hierarchy,	which	expresses	“the	
wish	to	be	alone	at	the	top	and	the	consequent	fear	that	others	will	get	too	close.”21		Conversely,	
women	view	themselves	as	being	in	a	web	of	relationships,	where	there	is	“the	wish	to	be	at	the	
centre	of	connection	and	the	consequent	fear	of	being	too	far	out	on	the	edge.”22		The	contrast	
between	the	conceptual	relationship	models	of	the	hierarchy	and	the	web,	for	Gilligan,	
demonstrates	the	difference	in	how	men	and	women	think	about	themselves	as	moral	agents	and	
subsequently	reason	morally.23		Because	women	appeared	to	reason	from	this	relational	standpoint,	
this	means	that	feelings	of	empathy	and	sympathy	are	no	longer	seen	as	moral	deficiencies,	but	are	
instead	“essential	components	of	adult	moral	reasoning	at	the	postconventional	stage”	and	thus	
“women’s	apparent	moral	confusion	of	judgment	becomes	a	sign	of	their	strength.”24		The	deep	
concerns	of	the	self	as	a	moral	agent	impacts	how	the	agent	approaches	and	solves	moral	problems,	
																																								 																				
18	Held,	The	Ethics	of	Care:	Personal,	Political,	and	Global,	23.	
19	Interestingly,	Marilyn	Friedman	argues	that	what	Gilligan	uncovered	was	not	the	‘different	voice’	of	women	
as	such,	but	rather	that	she	“discerned	the	symbolically	female	moral	voice,	and	has	disentangled	it	from	the	
symbolically	male	moral	voice.”	(1995,	65,	Emphasis	in	the	original).		The	idea	is	that	the	moral	voice	Gilligan	
uncovered	is,	to	some	degree,	is	a	moral	dichotomy	that	she	expected	to	exist.		Friedman,	however,	does	not	
take	this	to	mean	that	care	ethics	is	without	merit,	rather	that	this	kind	of	expectation	points	to	conceptions	of	
justice	and	care	that	are	disassociated	from	each	other.		What	must	be	done	is	rethink	both	concepts	in	order	
to	obtain	a	better	picture	of	our	moral	reasoning.			
20	Baier,	"What	Do	Women	Want	in	a	Moral	Theory?,"	62.	
21	Gilligan,	62.		
22	Ibid.			
23	The	imagery	of	the	web	is	used	in	contrast	to	a	hierarchy,	such	that	in	a	web,	there	are	different	points	of	
lateral	connection,	as	opposed	to	a	vertical	stratification	of	relations.	
24	Benhabib,	149.	
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and	for	care	ethics	is	firmly	connected	to	the	emotional	connection	to	the	concrete	other.		Thus:	
“Since	relationships,	when	cast	in	the	image	of	hierarchy,	appear	inherently	unstable	and	morally	
problematic,	their	transposition	into	the	image	of	a	web	changes	an	order	of	inequality	into	a	
structure	of	interconnection.”25	
Women’s	identity,	as	constructed	within	a	web	of	relationships,	grounds	a	unique,	non-
rights	based	approach	to	moral	problems.		This	conception	of	identity	as	constituted	in	relationship	
is	the	relational	ontology,	or	the	‘relational	turn,’	that	is	a	fundamental	part	of	care	ethics.		Noddings	
also	underscores	the	importance	of	this	relational	ontology	because	all	care	work	is	done	with	the	
understanding	that	“[t]he	ethical	self	is	an	active	relation	between	my	actual	self	and	a	vision	of	my	
ideal	self	as	one-caring	and	cared-for.		It	is	born	of	the	fundamental	recognition	of	relatedness;	that	
which	connects	me	naturally	to	the	other,	reconnects	me	through	the	other	to	myself.”26		We	first	
understand	ourselves	in	relation	to	others,	and	care	theory	asserts	that	this	is	the	only	way	to	
understand	the	self.		Then	we	realize	that	we	are	in,	what	Noddings	calls,	concentric	circles	of	care:	
family,	friends,	acquaintances,	and	finally,	distant	strangers.		We	must	be	prepared	to	care	for	all	of	
them,	though	in	relation	to	strangers	she	notes	that	while	we	might	not	be	bound	to	care	for	them	
in	a	very	direct	and	lasting	way,	one	“can	remain	receptive”27	to	the	caring	needs	of	distant	others	
without	being	tightly	obligated	to	them.		In	the	early	ethics	of	care,	the	focus	was	primarily	on	how	
one	cares	for	one’s	‘nearest	and	dearest,’	because	emotional	caring	over	vast	distances	would	prove	
difficult	or	even	impossible.		This	focus	on	the	emotional	aspect	is	an	obstacle	to	globalizing	a	theory	
based	around	the	practices	of	care	and	how	this	obstacle	is	overcome	is	explained	in	Chapter	Two.		
Regardless,	the	importance	of	relationships	cannot	be	understated	because	the	“self	and	other	are	
interdependent	and	that	life,	however	valuable	in	itself,	can	only	be	sustained	by	care	in	
relationships.”28		Relationships	between	people	are	what	foster	care	in	the	first	place,	and	also	allow	
us	to	understand	human	life	as	inherently	interdependent.		This	is	in	stark	contrast	to	the	traditional	
moral	view	of	all	persons	as	autonomous	individuals,	where	traditional	understandings	of	autonomy	
often	contrast	sharply	with	the	concerns	of	nurturance	or	bonding	(i.e.	care).		This	dichotomy	serves	
to	reinforce	that	autonomy	is	necessary	for	political,	public	life,	whereas	care	work	is	best	left	in	the	
private	realm	of	home	and	family.		Traditional	moralities	tend	to	entrench	this	understanding,	and	
conversely	the	ethics	of	care	serves	to	highlight	how	traditional	moralities	unnecessarily	restrict	the	
scope	of	moral	reasoning.29	
																																								 																				
25	Gilligan,	62.		
26	Noddings,	49.	
27	Ibid.,	47.	
28	Gilligan,	127.	
29	Benhabib,	158-9.	
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Because	of	the	relational	ontology,	responsibility	is	understood	differently	through	the	
ethics	of	care.		Gilligan	noted,	“Development	for	both	sexes	would	therefore	seem	to	entail	an	
integration	of	rights	and	responsibilities	through	the	discovery	of	the	complementarity	of	these	
disparate	views.”30		This	means	that	women	understand	that	“rights	and	responsibilities	[take]	place	
through	an	understanding	of	the	psychological	logic	of	relationships.”31		Moral	reasoning	for	early	
care	ethics	was	not	about	rights,	but	the	need	to	balance	the	competing	responsibilities	that	people	
had	in	virtue	of	being	in	relationships	with	particular	others.		The	fully	realized	moral	agent	would	
then	be	one	who	could	negotiate	between	the	conflicting	relationships	involved	while	respecting	the	
rights	of	others;	they	could	care	and	be	fair	at	the	same	time.		Gilligan’s	subsequent	work,	based	on	
interviews	with	women	who	are	going	to	have	or	have	had	an	abortion,	underscores	this	conception	
of	responsibility,	because	“women	impose	a	distinctive	construction	on	moral	problems,	seeing	
moral	dilemmas	in	terms	of	conflicting	responsibilities.”32		Noddings	also	investigates	what	it	means	
to	balance	responsibilities	of	care.		She	argues	that	through	the	ethics	of	care	our	obligations	are	
self-limiting.		In	this	context,	‘self-limiting’	means	that	our	obligations	to	care	become	less	binding	as	
they	are	further	from	the	immediate	sphere	of	our	concern,	because	those	who	are	closest	to	us	
have	the	greater	claim	on	our	care	due	to	emotional	commitment	and	a	willingness	to	become	
engrossed	with	each	other’s	needs.		However,	as	Noddings	stressed	“We	are	never	free,	in	the	
human	domain,	to	abandon	our	preparedness	to	care.”33		
Noddings	also	more	explicitly	investigates	the	ways	in	which	emotional	attachment	to	
particular	others	can	and	should	play	a	role	in	moral	reasoning.		She	notes,	“Feeling	is	not	all	that	is	
involved	in	caring,	but	it	is	essentially	involved.”34		Concerns	of	love,	joy,	even	frustration	and	anger	
are	important	in	the	ethics	of	care.		Emotions	must	be	accounted	for	and	brought	to	the	fore	for	
consideration	and	analysis.		If	one	denies	emotions	a	place	in	moral	reasoning,	one	downplays	an	
integral	part	of	the	human	experience.		In	part,	we	become	engrossed,35	that	is,	invested,	because	of	
emotions,	even	though	“this	engrossment	is	not	completely	characterized	as	emotional	feeling.”36		It	
is	this	combination	of	emotion,	investment,	and	motivation	that	forms	the	basis	of	what	it	is	to	care	
and	perform	morally	good	care.		Importantly,	Noddings	does	not	say	that	all	care	is	good	care,	or	
that	all	care	is	done	in	a	morally	good	manner.		She	acknowledges	that	caring	can	go	wrong.		It	is	
possible	that	the	cared-for	person	can	become	an	object	of	caring,	or	that	one’s	worries	about	caring	
																																								 																				
30	Gilligan,	100.			
31	Ibid.		
32	Ibid.,	105.		
33	Noddings,	86.	
34	Ibid.,	32.	Emphasis	in	the	original.	
35	‘Engrossment’	for	Noddings	is	a	technical	term,	such	that	one’s	motivational	energies	are	directed	toward	a	
particular	other	in	whom	one	is	invested.	
36	Noddings,	33.		Emphasis	in	the	original.	
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can	shift	inward,	focused	on	the	self	and	the	burdens	caring	places	on	the	care	giver.37		Instead	of	
deeming	all	caring	morally	good,	the	ethics	of	care	seeks	to	find	a	way	to	morally	evaluate	close,	
caring	relationships.	
These	psychological	and	philosophical	investigations	into	the	distinctive	moral	experiences	
of	women,	along	with	the	ethical	exploration	of	the	work	of	care,	resulted	in	a	major	shift	in	how	
moral	reasoning	is	understood.		Starting	with	a	rejection	of	‘masculine’	theories,38	particularly	
Kantian	ethics	and	its	focus	on	the	individual,	the	ethics	of	care	emphasized	the	relationality	and	
interdependence	of	persons.		In	the	early	ethics	of	care,	care	work	itself	was	seen	as	a	source	of	
information	about	how	people	reason	morally	in	the	everyday,	particularly	with	regard	to	the	
experiences	of	women.		Because	women	were	(and	are)	the	main	providers	of	care	to	others,	it	was	
their	experiences	that	provided	the	most	information	about	how	an	ethics	of	care	functions.		It	
underscores	that	attention	to	particular	persons,	rather	than	generalized,	abstract	persons,	entails	a	
different	epistemological	standpoint,	which	requires	a	distinctive	kind	of	understanding	about	the	
world.39		Part	of	this	understanding	is	the	relational	ontology	of	care	ethics,	which	stresses	the	self	as	
constructed	in	the	context	of	relationships	with	others,	and	the	moral	questions	that	are	embedded	
within	those	relations.40	
From	these	beginnings,	many	other	women	found	the	idea	of	care	ethics	to	resonate	more	
strongly	with	their	own	experiences	and	have	greater	impact	upon	their	daily	lives	when	compared	
with	traditional	ethical	theories.		However,	the	ethic	of	care	faced	sharp	criticism,	not	only	from	
Kantian	and	utilitarian	ethical	and	political	philosophers,	but	from	feminist	philosophers	as	well.		In	
the	next	section	I	examine	three	primary	critiques	of	early	care	ethics.		I	claim	that	because	care	
ethics	was	forced	to	answer	these	three	critiques,	care	ethics	was	then	able	to	develop	into	a	viable,	
fully-fledged	political	ethic,	with	codified	practices	of	care	to	provide	greater	structure	to	the	theory.			
While	the	early,	‘orthodox’	care	theory	began	the	investigation,	the	development	of	a	political	ethic	
of	care	laid	the	foundation	for	a	global	critical	ethic	of	care.	
	
																																								 																				
37	Ibid.,	12-3.	
38	‘Masculine’	theories	being	those	theories	judged	to	have	a	built-in	masculine	bias,	where	the	experiences	of	
men	are	considered	universally	applicable,	and	can	stand	in	or	‘count’	for	the	experiences	of	women.	
39	Walker,		17.	
40	It	is	beyond	my	scope	to	fully	unpack	the	subtle	connections	between	epistemology	and	ontology.		For	more	
on	this	point,	particularly	with	reference	to	care	ethics	and	other	relational	theories,	see	Margaret	Urban	
Walker	(1989).	
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Section 2 – The Development of a Polit ical  Ethic of Care 
The	ethics	of	care	offers	more	than	a	different	morality,	but	also	a	different	grounding	for	political	
philosophy.		Joan	Tronto	argued	that	an	ethic	of	care	could	only	be	workable	if	political	institutions	
themselves	are	first	critically	assessed	by	a	standard	of	care.41		This	step,	crafting	the	ethic	of	care	
into	a	political	theory,	was	vital	for	not	only	addressing	the	major	objections	to	the	ethic	of	care,	but	
also	for	providing	the	groundwork	for	a	global	critical	ethic	of	care,	which	is	further	explored	in	
Chapter	Two.42		In	this	section,	I	will	first	briefly	introduce	the	three	major	critiques	of	early	care	
ethics.43		Then	I	will	demonstrate	that	by	answering	these	critiques,	the	ethic	of	care	was	able	to	
develop	into	a	political	ethic,	because	care	philosophers	argued	that	the	lens	of	care	could	illuminate	
previously	obscured	or	‘unseen’	problems	of	private,	public	and	political	practices.		As	I	trace	this	
development,	I	will	also	highlight	how	the	scope	of	the	lens	of	care	came	to	include	difference	and	
dependence	as	areas	of	moral	and	political	investigation.	
	
Section 2.1 – Three Major Critiques of Early Care Ethics 
The	first	critique	of	the	ethic	of	care	is	that	it	can	only	be	a	private	ethic,	or	even	worse,	that	it	
actually	serves	to	reinforce	the	split	between	the	public	and	the	private.44		The	assumption	is	that	
the	‘orthodox’	ethic	of	care	could	not	be	applied	to	a	public	context	because	what	it	is	concerned	
with	is	private,	interpersonal	concerns,	and	as	such	it	has	no	purchase	in	political	reasoning.		To	
understand	this	critique,	it	is	important	to	define	this	particular	terminology,	namely,	the	private,	
the	public,	and	the	political.		First,	I	consider	the	private	as	the	relationships	we	have	in	our	daily	
lives	with	particular	others,	friends	and	family	are	most	common.		The	public	is	commonly	
everything	outside	that	private	sphere	of	one’s	own	life.		The	public	has	multiple	parts,	a	civil	society,	
the	marketplace,	and	a	political	realm.		Civil	society	includes	strangers	on	a	train	or	in	a	park	who	
inhabit	a	public	realm	together,	whereas	the	marketplace	is	a	more	particular	subset	of	the	public,	
which	includes	the	workplace.		The	public	also	includes	the	political	realm,	which	can	be	understood	
as	the	state	and	the	power	the	state	has	with	regard	to	its	citizens,	and	also	what	the	state	might	
owe	its	citizens.		Therefore,	it	is	more	precise	to	speak	of	the	private,	the	civil,	the	marketplace,	and	
																																								 																				
41	Tronto,	157.	
42	Throughout	this	thesis	I	use	the	terms	‘global	ethic	of	care’,	‘critical	ethic	of	care’,	‘feminist	ethic	of	care’,	
and	‘critical,	feminist	care	ethics’	interchangeably,	and	from	this	point	forward	I	consider	‘care	ethics’	to	
denote	the	feminist	critical	ethic	of	care.		The	‘orthodox’	ethics	of	care	will	hereafter	always	be	referred	to	as	
such.	
43	These	are	not	the	only	critiques	of	care	ethics,	but	three	of	the	major	ones.		Gilligan’s	work	in	particular	
faced	heavy	criticism.		Some	of	those	critiques	are:	1)	that	in	spite	of	her	rejection	of	hierarchy,	she	herself	
created	another	moral	hierarchy;	and	2)	she	had	an	overly	individualist	outlook	on	responsibility,	and	she	
embedded	racial	and	class	bias	by	only	interviewing	white,	middle	class	women	in	her	abortion	study.		See	
Kathleen	League	(1993)	for	the	full	argument.	
44	Dietz,		25.	
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the	political,	each	marking	a	different	set	of	relationships.		Considering	the	ethic	of	care	began	by	
arguing	“that	in	the	sphere	of	interpersonal	relations,	it	is	desirable	that	an	agent	be	swayed	in	her	
thinking	by	her	partiality,	her	particular	feelings	of	care	and	concern,	toward	the	other,”45	it	is	
evident	why	this	objection	took	root.		An	ethic	based	on	particular	bonds	of	affection	can	remain	
parochial	and	suitable	only	to	the	private	realm,	and	therefore	cannot	function	when	there	are	no	
bonds	of	affection	present	or	possible.		The	basic	assumption	about	the	public	and	political	realms	is	
that	moralities	in	these	realms	require	an	abstract	set	of	rules	all	persons	could	be	expected	to	
adhere	to,	without	needing	to	rely	on	kindness	to	address	public	moral	problems.46		For	this	reason,	
it	was	long	thought	that	Kantian	or	utilitarian	theories	were	more	apt	for	the	public	and	political	
realms	than	anything	built	on	sentiment	or	notions	of	care.47		
The	second	major	critique	of	the	ethic	of	care	comes	from	the	belief	that	the	theory	cannot	
address	the	problems	of	justice,	and	conversely	that	justice	cannot	always	answer	the	problems	of	
care.		An	ethic	of	justice	might	be	understood	as	the	expression	of	Kantian	or	utilitarian	ethics	as	a	
rights-based	system,	concerned	with	issues	of	fairness	and	equal	treatment	by	the	state,	which	was	
part	of	the	dominant	moral	and	political	landscape	of	the	20th	and	early	21st	centuries.		Rights	
discourses	have	been	instrumental	in	improving	the	lives	of	women	and	other	oppressed	
populations	throughout	recent	history.		From	the	women’s	suffrage	movement,	to	civil	rights,	gay	
rights,	minority	rights,	and	rights	of	the	disabled,	the	ethics	of	justice—based	either	in	Kantian	or	
utilitarian	ethics—has	been	mobilized	in	the	bid	to	reduce	the	inequality	and	oppression	in	the	world.		
Rights	language	has	been,	and	continues	to	be,	very	powerful.48		Early,	‘orthodox’	care	ethics,	on	the	
other	hand,	was	understood	as	primarily	focused	on	small,	private	moral	concerns,	about	how	to	
balance	competing	responsibilities	with	particular	others.		Care	and	justice	were	seen	to	be	
concerned	with	different	spheres	of	life,	and	as	such	care	theory	had	no	purchase	on	questions	of	
justice	and	the	reverse	was	also	true:	an	analysis	of	justice	could	not	be	applied	to	the	realm	of	care.		
For	example,	how	could	care	have	a	place	in	a	courtroom	or	a	legislative	body?		It	could	not	speak	to	
what	rights	should	be	upheld	or	how	a	particular	right	has	been	violated.		Similarly,	questions	of	
rights	and	fairness	might	seem	inappropriate	when	engaging	in	caring	relations.		This	critique	is	
closely	linked	to	the	public/private	critique,	because	care	was	seen	as	a	private	concern,	whereas	
																																								 																				
45	Jean	Keller,	"Autonomy,	Relationality,	and	Feminist	Ethics,"	Hypatia	12,	no.	2	(1997):	154.	
46	Jeremy	Waldron,	"When	Justice	Replaces	Affection:	The	Need	for	Rights,"	Harvard	Journal	of	Law	&	Public	
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justice	is	a	public	concern.		If	the	ethics	of	care	could	not	cross	the	public/private	divide,	then	it	
could	not	answer	questions	of	justice.49	
The	third,	and	last,	major	critique	of	the	‘orthodox’	ethics	of	care,	particularly	from	other	
feminists,	was	that	care	ethics	seemed	to	demonstrate	that	there	are	fundamental	differences	
between	men	and	women,	and	that	these	differences	carry	over	to	how	men	and	women	reason	
morally.		Thus	care	ethics	actually	serves	to	reinforce	the	relegation	of	women	to	a	second-class	
status.		The	ethics	of	care,	on	this	account,	only	served	to	further	entrench	gender	norms,	and	other	
forms	of	oppression,	not	combat	them.50		The	tension	here	arises	out	of	a	history	of	women	
traditionally	being	caregivers,	the	early	feminist	drive	to	re-think	traditional	gender	roles,	and	the	
lingering	question	regarding	the	possibility	that	mainstream	ethical	models	are	somehow	inherently	
male-centric.		The	anxiety	about	the	ethics	of	care	reinforcing	gender	essentialism	(especially	the	
idea	that	women	are	essentially	carers)	stems	from	the	worry	that	the	ethics	of	care	as	presented	by	
those	such	as	Gilligan,	Noddings,	and	particularly	Ruddick’s	brand	of	care	theory	based	on	the	
practice	of	mothering,	would	only	serve	to	reinforce	“a	one-dimensional	view	of	women	as	creatures	
of	family.”51		The	objection	is	that	the	ethic	of	care	does	describe	a	different	kind	of	morality,	but	a	
morality	that	is	used	mostly	by	women,	as	if	it	describes	something	essential	about	women	
themselves	that	women	are	meant	to	be	carers.		This	picture	of	women	as	natural	carers	is	at	odds	
with	the	larger	feminist	project	of	challenging	the	very	gender	norms	that	historically	relegated	
women	to	the	home	and	the	private	sphere.52	
	
Section 2.2 – A Political Ethic of Care 
Without	the	above	critiques	and	the	need	to	respond,	the	ethics	of	care	might	have	remained	as	it	
was	in	its	early	stages,	focused	primarily	on	interpersonal	relationships	and	the	competing	
responsibilities	they	entailed.		Critical,	feminist	care	ethics	emerged	as	a	different	moral	
epistemology	that	could	function	as	a	lens	to	reimagine	how	we	think	of	moral	and	political	
problems.53		Because	the	core	of	the	critiques	outlined	above	has	to	do	with	the	public/private	
divide,	questions	of	justice,	and	socially	constructed	gender	roles,	care	theorists	responded	to	these	
critiques	by	crafting	a	political	ethic	of	care.		In	this	section,	I	demonstrate	how	a	political	ethic	of	
care	answered	the	three	major	critiques	of	early	care	ethics.		As	care	ethics	was	used	to	examine	the	
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political,	it	expanded	the	range	of	moral	concern	to	include	ideas	about	dependence	and	difference,	
challenging	traditional	moral	and	political	views	of	these	concepts.		Vital	to	this	enterprise	was	the	
work	of	Joan	Tronto,	Eva	Feder	Kittay,	and	Virginia	Held,	who	continued	the	rejection	of	dominant	
theories,	in	particular	that	of	John	Rawls,	as	the	‘best’	way	to	assess	a	political	system.		The	work	of	
Tronto,	Kittay,	and	Held,	although	primarily	focused	on	the	national	political	realm,	was	another	
necessary	step	toward	the	creation	of	a	global	care	ethic.	
	 Attending	to	the	critique	that	early	care	ethics	can	only	be	a	private	morality,	Tronto	and	
Held	make	two	points:	first	that	the	critical,	feminist	ethics	of	care	calls	into	question	the	
private/public	divide,	and	second	that	the	relational	values	identified	in	the	ethics	of	care	are	
applicable	to	the	public	realm.		Tronto	argues	that	it	is	possible	to	use	“a	concept	of	care	that	will	
serve	as	the	basis	for	rethinking	moral	boundaries	and,	by	extension,	the	terrain	of	current	moral	
and	political	life.”54		The	ethics	of	care	seeks	to	challenge	the	boundaries	or	the	very	definition	of	the	
different	spheres	of	life	(i.e.,	the	private,	civil,	marketplace,	and	political).		Tronto	calls	into	question	
the	sharp	divide	between	the	moral	and	the	political	that	some	philosophers	seek	to	maintain.		In	so	
doing,	she	claims	that	it	is	possible	to	see	how	a	morality,	specifically	the	ethic	of	care,	can	have	
political	purchase	and	great	effect.		This	questioning	of	the	moral	boundaries	of	everyday	life	speaks	
directly	to	the	supposed	inability	of	‘orthodox’	care	ethics	to	be	a	public	morality,	and	challenges	the	
entrenchment	of	the	public/private	divide	itself.		In	addition,	as	Held	argues,	the	perspective	of	care	
calls	for	a	reorganizing	of	the	private	sphere	(such	as	the	domestic	tasks	of	cooking,	cleaning,	child	
care,	and	elder	care),	and	“an	adequate	understanding	of	the	ethics	of	care	should	recognize	that	it	
elaborates	values	as	fundamental	and	as	relevant	to	political	institutions	and	to	how	society	is	
organized,	as	those	of	justice.”55		People	in	civil	society	and	the	political	realm	can	be	assessed	
through	the	lens	of	care,	because	all	people	are	in	relation	to	each	other;	persons	are	
interdependent	not	independent.56		This	interdependence	holds	true	even	in	wider,	less	intimate	
social	contexts	because	political	systems	are	inexorably	shot	through	with	countless	dependencies	
that	are	necessary	for	the	processes	of	daily	life.			
First,	just	as	the	critical,	feminist	ethics	of	care	seeks	to	rethink	the	relation	between	persons	
in	discrete	spheres	of	life	“relations	between	the	spheres	of	society	also	need	to	be	rethought	from	a	
feminist	point	of	view.”57		Because	the	ethics	of	care	can	be	used	to	question	the	public/private	
divide	itself,	we	can	see	how	the	boundary	between	the	two	spheres	of	life	has	already	become	
blurred.		For	example,	public	concerns	have	already	broached	the	private	realm	of	the	family	in	
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terms	of	custody	battles,	alimony	payments,	and	domestic	violence	legislation.		Yet,	akin	to	how	
justice	has	been	inserted	into	the	private,	critical,	feminist	care	ethics	charges	that	a	“fairer	division	
of	responsibilities	for	care,	the	care	made	available	through	the	institutions	of	the	welfare	state	
needs	to	be	strengthened	as	well	as	reformed.		Care	and	justice,	then,	cannot	be	allocated	to	the	
separate	spheres	of	the	private	and	the	public.”58		The	ethics	of	care,	rather	than	being	a	solely	
private	morality,	instead	works	to	challenge	basic	assumptions	about	the	realms	of	human	life:	in	
this	instance	about	how	we	divide	concerns	into	public	and	private	categories.			We	should	be	
sceptical	of	moves	to	relegate	theories	like	care	ethics,	with	its	focus	on	particular	others,	to	the	
private	sphere,	in	favour	of	relying	on	more	abstract,	universalist	ethics	for	public	contexts.59		
Perhaps	nothing	is	completely	one	or	the	other,	considering	“as	a	society	we	cannot	do	without	
dependency	work	in	the	narrowest	sense	and	that	standard	theories	ignore	this	most	fundamental	
work	and	form	of	relationship.”60		Using	the	lens	of	care	to	view	persons	as	being	situated	in	
relationships	would	alter	how	we	reason	morally	and	politically.		These	relations	of	
(inter)dependence,	and	the	work	of	care,	foster	continued	human	life,	and	a	political	care	ethic	
would	expand	the	scope	of	public	concern	as	well	as	provide	guidance	in	addressing	these	
concerns.61		
Second,	as	our	webs	of	relations	extend	ever	outwards,	a	public	conception	of	care	is	
necessary	for	the	betterment	of	our	governments,	our	societies,	our	economies,	and	our	
environment.		Not	only	can	an	ethic	of	care	assess	our	personal	relationships	but:	
If	we	understand	care	as	an	important	value	and	framework	of	interpretation	for	
government	as	well	as	for	the	sphere	of	the	personal,	we	will	approach	many	of	the	issues	
involved	in	the	relation	between	government	and	the	economy	differently	from	those	for	
whom	the	government	should	be	only	the	protector	of	rights	or	the	maximiser	of	preference	
satisfaction.		We	can	see	how	government	should	foster	caring	connections	between	
persons	and	put	limits	on	the	markets	that	undermine	them.		The	ethics	of	care	provides	
grounds	for	arguing	that	we	should	care	about	one	another	as	fellow	members	of	
communities,	including	gradually	of	the	global	community	on	which	the	future	health	of	our	
mutual	environments	depends.62	
The	kinds	of	laws	about	family,	welfare,	housing,	and	taxation	structure	the	ways	in	which	we	are	
able	to	fulfil	our	caring	responsibilities	to	particular	others.		Care,	as	a	critical	standard	of	
government	action,	can	challenge	the	ways	in	which	laws	and	policies	prevent	people	from	carrying	
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out	their	caring	responsibilities.		Further,	the	lens	of	care	can	serve	as	a	different	standard	of	
political	participation	by	asking	how	the	structures	of	institutional	relations	“combine	with	typical	
situations	to	enable	or	deform	the	abilities	of	all	concerned	to	hear	and	be	heard.”63		The	ethics	of	
care	is	a	theory	that	can	find	purchase	within	every	sphere	of	human	activity	and	challenge	the	very	
lines	we	draw	between	them.		In	no	way	is	the	critical,	feminist	ethics	of	care	a	‘mere’	private	
morality.		Rather,	it	is	a	powerful	tool	that	can	be	used	to	question	negative	assumptions	about	the	
feasibility	of	care	as	a	public	good.	
	 Once	care	is	used	to	address	the	public	realm,	then	the	understanding	of	other	related	
concepts	begin	to	shift.		In	particular,	when	assessing	the	moral	quality	of	any	political	system,	there	
needs	to	be	some	set	of	standards,	and	Tronto	claims	“care	serves	as	a	critical	standard.”64		If	the	
political	is	measured	by	a	standard	of	care,	the	kinds	of	questions	we	can	pose	of	any	political	
system	are	altered.		Questions	about	needs	and	desert	shift	away	from	the	idea	that	persons	are	
entitled	to	what	they	have	because	they	have	‘earned’	it,	and	toward	the	idea	that:	“people	are	
entitled	to	what	they	need	because	they	need	it;	people	are	entitled	to	care	because	they	are	part	of	
ongoing	relations	of	care.”65		The	lens	of	care	also	provides	a	window	into	relations	of	power	that	
colour	our	everyday	lives,	because	“people	can	be	in	different	positions	vis-à-vis	those	who	care	for	
them.”66		Extending	this	to	the	political	means	that	care	ethics	can	analyse	the	ways	in	which	
governments	and	public	policy	structure	our	lives	and	the	caring	relations	we	engage	in.			
From	this	point	we	can	respond	to	the	second	critique	of	‘orthodox’	care	ethics:	that	care	
cannot	address	the	problems	of	justice.		Held	makes	the	claim	that	justice	and	care	cannot	replace	
one	another,	but	that	concerns	of	justice	inform	caring	practices,	and	that	caring	practices	can	be	
subject	to	the	concerns	of	justice.67		For	example,	welfare	and	social	services,	being	state	concerns,	
often	operate	on	an	ethic	of	justice,	that	the	citizenry	have	certain	rights	to	be	protected	to	some	
degree	by	their	governments	against	the	perils	of	modern	life.		Yet,	the	burden	of	poverty	and	caring	
for	others	more	often	falls	upon	women,	such	that	women	are	more	often	placed	in	vulnerable	
positions,	caught	between	their	caring	responsibilities	to	dependents	and	the	need	to	provide	for	
them	as	well.		Held	notes	that	there	should	be	“greatly	increased	public	concern	for	child	care,	
education,	and	health	care,	infused	with	the	values	of	care.”68		It	is	not	enough,	therefore,	to	simply	
claim	one’s	rights,	and	await	governments	to	fulfil	their	obligations	properly,	but	rather,	the	ethic	of	
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care	may	be	used	to	impose	a	responsibility	to	meet	those	rights.		Conversely,	traditional	spheres	of	
care	might	also	require	more	fairness,	i.e.	more	justice.		There	is	little	justice	in	the	traditional	
division	of	labour	in	the	home,	even	less	so	when	women	are	often	working	and	come	home	to	what	
is	called	the	‘double-day,’	where	they	must	also	provide	the	bulk	of	the	care	work	as	well.		This	
domestic	sphere,	a	traditional	seat	of	care,	has	already	been	subject	to	the	lens	of	justice	in	the	form	
of	divorce	proceedings,	custody	battles,	and	domestic	violence	legislation.		While	such	practices	are	
emotionally	complicated	and	sometimes	volatile,	nevertheless,	concerns	about	justice	have	been	
factored	in	to	the	situation.		In	the	end,	Held	argues	that	“caring	relations	should	form	the	wider	
moral	framework	into	which	justice	should	be	fitted.”69		This	is	because	while	justice-based	ethics	
proclaim	a	formal	equality,	it	does	so	on	the	assumption	that	all	persons	should	be	extended	equal	
treatment.		However	equal	treatment	as	a	political	good	fails	to	incorporate	the	profound	ways	in	
which	difference	(gender,	race,	class,	sexual	orientation,	and	ability)	affects	how	we	live	our	lives	
and	can	serve	to	reinforce	deeper	inequalities.70			
Kittay’s	critique	of	theories	of	justice,	however,	is	much	more	pointed.		She	heavily	critiques,	
and	rejects,	the	liberal	political	theory	of	John	Rawls.		She	rightly	argues	that	although	Rawls’	theory	
contains	a	commitment	to	equality	and	liberty,	it	fails	“to	attend	to	the	fact	of	human	dependency	
and	the	consequences	of	this	dependency	on	social	organization.”71		Kittay,	importantly,	began	to	
bring	ideas	about	dependence	into	the	critical,	feminist	ethics	of	care,	and	demonstrated	that	
relations	of	dependence	matter	when	it	comes	to	ethical	and	political	thinking.		She	shows	how	the	
lens	of	care	could	illuminate	moral	and	political	problems	that	theories	such	as	Rawls’	either	ignored	
or	could	not	‘see,’	i.e.	they	were	not	considered	to	be	problems	for	a	liberal	political	theory,	but	
through	the	lens	of	care	were	revealed	as	vitally	important	areas	of	public	moral	concern.			
Although	Rawls’	liberal	political	theory	championed	the	ideals	of	liberalism,	equality	and	
liberty,	Kittay	claims	this	presumption	of	equality	is,	in	and	of	itself,	a	problem.		A	presumed	equality	
blinds	us	to	the	reality	of	the	vast	inequality	present	in	the	world	today,	and	the	relationships	of	
dependence	that	permeate	our	lives.		She	notes	that,	“[b]ecause	dependency	strongly	affects	our	
status	as	equal	citizens	(that	is,	as	persons	who,	as	equals,	share	the	benefits	and	burdens	of	social	
cooperation),	and	because	it	affects	all	of	us	at	one	time	or	another,	it	is	not	an	issue	that	can	be	set	
aside,	much	less	avoided.”72		An	ethic	of	justice,	especially	a	Rawlsian	one,	presupposes	a	fully	
functioning	and	fully	informed	adult,	but	such	people	are	few	and	far	between,	and	as	such	an	ethic	
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of	justice	seems	to	contain	a	starting	position	that	is	far	too	abstracted	from	the	realities	of	day-to-
day	existence.		Children	are	dependent	upon	their	parents,	an	aged	person	is	dependent	upon	his	or	
her	nurse,	who	in	turn	is	dependent	upon	his	or	her	employer.		Even	‘fully-functional’	adults	are	
dependent.		Consider	a	heterosexual	couple	with	children,	and	we	find	that	a	husband	is	often	
heavily	dependent	upon	his	wife	for	several	kinds	of	care,	because	frequently	she	is	the	one	who	
attends	more	closely	to	the	chores	of	daily	life:	cooking,	cleaning,	and	caring	for	children.		For	
example,	one	of	the	more	recent	valuations	of	the	work	done	by	a	full	time	stay	at	home	mother	is	
upwards	of	$112,962	a	year	(in	the	United	States),	and	even	to	replace	the	care	work	of	a	mother	
who	also	works	outside	the	home	would	cost	over	$60,000	a	year.73		The	traditional	‘autonomous’	
male,	the	breadwinner	of	the	family,	is	unavoidably	dependent	upon	others,	especially	his	wife,	for	
his	care.		In	contrast,	most	liberal	theories	portray	dependence	as	a	failure	on	the	part	of	the	
individual,	instead	championing	independence	and	self-sufficiency,	both	impossible	ideals.74		Critical	
care	ethics	views	human	life	as	moving	through	different	states,	a	dependent	child,	perhaps	less	
dependent	as	an	adult	(though	still	interdependent),	and	then	once	more	dependent	as	one	grows	
old,	each	state	with	varying	levels	of	vulnerability.		Kittay	developed,	as	an	alternative	to	the	
Rawlsian	liberal	ideal,	the	concept	of	the	doulia,75	which	encompasses	the	idea	that	“[j]ust	as	the	
caretaker	has	a	responsibility	to	care	for	the	dependent,	the	larger	society	has	an	obligation	to	
attend	to	the	well-being	of	the	caretaker.”76		This	concept	would	serve	to	bring	to	bear	a	
responsibility	upon	the	public,	and	thus	governments,	to	care	for	those	who	are	already	caring	for	
others,	because	if	care-givers	are	not	themselves	maintained	(and	often	due	to	time	and	financial	
constrains	they	cannot	always	adequately	care	for	themselves),	the	care	that	their	dependents	
receive	can	suffer	as	well.		The	ethics	of	care	can	highlight	the	ways	in	which	governments	have	
responsibilities	to	their	constituents	that	goes	beyond	merely	respecting	their	rights.		The	lens	of	
care	illuminates	those	to	whom	governments	have	and	should	fulfil	their	own	caring	
responsibilities.77		
Even	though	Held	and	Kittay	demonstrate	that	the	ethics	of	care	could	address	justice	issues,	
there	was	still	a	lingering	about	doubt	whether	‘orthodox’	care	ethics	provided	an	intelligible	picture	
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of	reciprocity.		The	problem	is	that	without	an	intelligible	picture	of	reciprocity,	the	ethic	of	care	
cannot	fully	attend	to	concerns	of	justice	because	justice	requires	a	measure	of	reciprocity	to	
function	properly.		To	address	this	doubt,	care	theorists	have	argued	that	care	theory	can	provide	a	
coherent	picture	of	reciprocity.		In	‘orthodox’	care	ethics,	Noddings	claims	that	reciprocity	is	
achieved	when	the	recipient	of	care	is	able	to,	through	whatever	means,	acknowledge	that	care	has	
been	given.78		It	need	not	be	verbal	or	even	written,	but	some	kind	of	body	language	or	even	a	
meaningful	moment	of	eye	contact	might	be	enough	to	qualify	as	reciprocity.		However,	this	concept	
of	reciprocity	is	not	robust	enough	for	the	political	realm	where	actors	do	not	necessarily	have	such	
close	relations.		In	the	political,	it	is	assumed	that	something	more	substantial	than	mere	
acknowledgement	is	required	for	reciprocity	to	have	occurred.		
Kittay	returns	to	the	key	feature	of	the	ethics	of	care:	our	relatedness,	to	develop	a	different	
notion	of	reciprocity	that	has	a	more	substantial	outcome.		If	our	equality	is	connection-based,	if	
“we	can	see	each	individual	nested	within	relationships	of	care,	we	can	envision	relationships	that	
embrace	the	needs	of	each.”79		All	of	our	relationships	are	nested,	or	linked,	to	one	another,	and	our	
communities	are	wide	and	capable	of	much.		As	Kittay	explains:	
This	chain	of	obligations	linking	members	of	a	community	creates	a	sense	of	reciprocity	
between	those	who	give	and	those	who	receive	that	raises	the	expectation	that	when	one	is	
in	the	position	to	give	care,	one	will,	and	when	that	person	is	in	need	another	who	is	suitably	
situated	to	give	care	will	respond.		It	is	a	reciprocity	of	those	who	see	their	equality	in	their	
connection	with,	and	obligation	toward,	others.80	
Instead	of	a	traditional	‘pay	it	back’	notion	of	reciprocity,	Kittay	suggests	a	‘pay	it	forward’	
understanding.		Thus	any	transaction	(so	to	speak)	of	care	(or	rights	and	duties)	is	not	bi-directional,	
but	a	multi-directional	web.		Our	care	or	our	fulfilled	duties	flow	from	us	and	are	focused	on	some	
other,	and	in	turn	their	care	and	duties	flow	from	them	to	others,	and	eventually	return	to	us.		This	
formulation	of	reciprocity	based	on	the	ethics	of	care	rejects	the	idea	that	care	theory	could	only	
support	reciprocity	within	kin	structures,	but	instead	places	an	emphasis	on	the	fact	that	“the	
affective	boundaries	of	reciprocity	are	fluid	and	are	not	fixed	by	kinship	alone.”81		Reciprocity	is	part	
of	critical,	feminist	care	ethics.		Instead	of	reciprocity	imagined	as	a	two-way	interaction	between	
two	individuals,	we	can	picture	reciprocity	as	a	series	of	connections	beginning	with	ourselves,	
stretching	toward	particular	others,	and	from	those	persons	on	to	others,	until	the	connection	loops	
around	to	us	once	again.		Our	web	of	relations	ensures	that	while	those	I	care	for	might	not	have	any	
direct	responsibility	to	care	for	me,	other	persons	might,	and	as	long	as	caring	needs	are	met	and	we	
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all	take	part	in	the	work	of	care,	reciprocity	is	possible.		This	does	not	mean	that	all	persons	will	take	
part	in	the	web	of	relations	and	this	less	direct	kind	of	reciprocity,	but	like	an	ethic	of	justice,	care	
ethics	claims	that	those	who	fail	to	do	so	are	bad	moral	actors.	
	 Tronto	approaches	reciprocity	by	arguing	that	an	ethic	of	care	is	important	for	a	just	political	
system,	and	actually	helps	to	promote	a	better	democratic	nation.		Tronto	notes,	“unless	a	
democratic	theory	deals	substantively	with	the	question	of	‘who	cares,’	it	results	in	an	account	of	
politics	that	misconceives	citizens	and	their	lives,	overvaluing	their	lives	as	workers,	devaluing	their	
lives	as	people	engaged	in	relationships	of	care.”82		To	do	otherwise	obfuscates	care	givers,	care	
receivers,	and	the	sheer	amount	of	care	work	that	is	necessary	for	any	society	to	function.		While	an	
ethic	of	care	seeks	to	challenge	inequality,	and	acknowledges	the	inequalities	present	in	politics	
today,	it	presumes	one	way	in	which	human	beings	are	all	equal	(and	perhaps	that	is	a	good	place	to	
begin	a	political	theory):	we	are	all	care	receivers.		If	we	were	to	view	all	citizens	as	care	receivers,	
then	“citizens’	needs	for	care	and	their	interdependent	reliance	on	others	to	help	them	meet	their	
caring	needs	becomes	the	basis	for	equality.”83			
Justice	and	care	need	not	be	thought	of	as	opposing	opposites.		They	can	be	theorized	as	
complementary,	able	to	take	on	aspects	of	each	other,	such	as	equality	and	reciprocity,	or	as	Virginia	
Held	argues,	that	care	is	the	wider	moral	framework	into	which	justice	fits	as	one	component.84		
Regardless,	by	rejecting	or	at	least	questioning	the	primacy	of	dominant	political	theories,	a	political	
ethic	of	care	can	be	used	to	expand	the	scope	of	justice,	illuminating	the	ways	in	which	standard	
theories	of	justice	fail	to	encompass	all	persons	and	human	activity,	particularly	those	who	do	the	
work	of	care,	those	who	are	dependent	upon	the	care	of	others,	the	political	implications	of	
difference,	dependence,	and	the	work	of	care	itself.		Annette	Baier	notes	that	in	dominant	moral	and	
political	theories,	the	important	relationships	were	relationships	between	equals,	and	historically	
those	who	were	not	equal	often	were	outside	the	scope	of	moral	and	political	thought.		Even	though	
previously	marginalized	persons	have	often	‘gained’	a	measure	of	equality	before	the	law	in	most	
Western	states,	she	argues	that	we	can	question	the	material	content	of	this	equality.		Certainly	
some	vulnerable	groups	have	achieved	desired	protections	in	this	way,	but	it	“somewhat	masks	the	
question	of	what	our	moral	relationships	are	to	those	who	our	superiors	or	our	inferiors	in	power.”85		
It	is	this	insight,	that	care	ethics	can	be	used	to	assess	relations	of	power	that	makes	critical,	feminist	
care	ethics	a	robust	critical	lens	for	the	political	sphere.		The	lens	of	care	can	illuminate	the	power	
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the	state	has	to	structure	our	relations	with	particular	others,	which	reveals	new	information	about	
our	lives	and	how	we	live	them.	
The	ethics	of	care,	when	translated	into	a	political	theory	challenges	the	traditional	
public/private	divide	and	expands	the	scope	of	justice.		In	this	process,	it	also	interrogates	many	of	
the	social	norms	that	have	often	relegated	women	to	the	role	of	the	caregiver	and	subsequent	
secondary	citizen	status,	directly	challenging	the	third	critique	of	‘orthodox’	care	ethics	(that	care	
ethics	in	fact	serves	to	reinforce	instead	of	challenge	gender	norms).		A	goal	of	critical,	feminist	care	
ethics,	rather	than	reinforce	the	picture	of	women	as	essentially	carers,	is	to	reject	gender	
essentialism	that	claims	women	or	men	are	essentially	better	at	particular	roles,	i.e.	that	women	are	
carers	and	men	are	providers.		Care	ethics	instead	claims	that	caring	is	a	human	activity	that	men	
must	fully	participate	in	as	well.		Care	ethics	can	also	be	used	to	assess	the	political	implications	of	
gender,	and	the	effect	social	policy	has	on	different	groups	of	people,	such	as	men	and	women,	but	
also	the	implications	of	race,	class,	ability,	age,	and	sexual	orientation.	The	ethics	of	care	challenges	
the	gender	bias	and	assumptions	present	in	other	strains	of	moral	thought.		As	Held	notes,	the	ethics	
of	care	does	not	merely	“accept	and	describe	the	practices	of	care	as	they	have	evolved	under	actual	
historical	conditions	of	patriarchal	and	other	domination;	it	evaluates	such	practices	and	
recommends	what	they	morally	ought	to	be	like.”86		Unlike	the	‘orthodox’	ethics	of	care,	the	political,	
feminist	ethic	of	care	does	not	say	anything	essential	about	women;	rather	it	highlights	as	a	failure	
any	practice	that	continues	to	devalue	and	marginalize	the	work	of	care	and	those	who	give	and	
receive	care,	highlighting	how	different	social	locations	produce	different	experiences	for	carers.		For	
example,	a	white,	middle-class	woman	performs	caring	labor	under	different	conditions	to	a	
transnational	male	domestic	worker	from	the	Philippines.		Racialized	conceptions	of	persons,	
intersected	with	geopolitical	origin,	and	gender	combine	to	create	a	complex	picture	of	who	
performs	caring	labor	and	under	what	conditions:	it	is	this	picture	that	the	critical,	feminist	ethics	of	
care	is	well	suited	to	examining.	
	 Further,	just	because	the	ethics	of	care	describes	and	investigates	an	arena	that	women	
traditionally	have	occupied	does	not	mean	it	equates	womanhood	and	care	work,	which	in	turn	
allows	men	to	receive	a	‘pass’	exempting	them	from	care	work,	or	maintain	a	position	of	“privileged	
irresponsibility.”87		As	Kittay	notes:	“Dependency	work	is	done	not	only	in	the	home,	but	in	nurseries	
and	hospitals	as	well.		Still,	where	affectional	and	domestic	labor	is	assigned	to	women,	dependency	
work	is	also	assigned	by	gender.”88		Even	in	the	realm	of	professional	care	work,	women	and	
																																								 																				
86	Held,	The	Ethics	of	Care:	Personal,	Political,	and	Global,	39.	
87	Tronto,	Moral	Boundaries:	A	Political	Argument	for	an	Ethic	of	Care,	146.	
88	Kittay,	Love's	Labor:	Essays	on	Women,	Equality,	and	Dependency,	30.	
40	
	
racialized	persons	are	still	the	majority	of	dependency	(care)	workers,	and	such	people	are	often	
underrepresented	in	positions	of	power,	either	politically	or	economically.		Care	ethics,	instead,	can	
become	“a	tool	for	critical	political	analysis	when	we	use	this	concept	to	reveal	relationships	of	
power.”89		Those	in	power	are	often	able	to	be	what	Tronto	terms	‘care-demanders,’	people	who	
expect	to	be	cared	for,	but	do	not	do	any	of	the	care	giving	themselves.		They	seek	to	be	given	a	free	
‘pass’	on	the	basis	of	their	earning	power,	or	their	gender,	but	mostly	because	“they	are	engaged	in	
other	activities	that	they	(and,	presumably	society)	deem	are	simply	more	important	than	caring.”90		
Such	passes	illustrate	that	there	are	some	for	whom	caring	is	not	important,	largely	because	it	is	
rendered	invisible.		The	‘care-demanders’	take	for	granted	the	work	of	maids,	child	carers,	and	
janitors,	among	many	others.		Should	care	providers	disappear,	however,	the	need	for	care	would	
become	very	apparent.		Persons	in	positions	of	power,	these	‘care-demanders,’	are	just	as	
enmeshed	in	webs	of	care	as	anyone	else,	the	only	difference	is	that	they	are	unaware	of	it.		Indeed,	
those	who	rely	most	heavily	on	‘unseen’	care	are	the	most	vulnerable	to	its	disruption.		However,	
the	lens	of	care	illuminates	how	power	matters,	and	how	care,	especially	the	commodified	care	of	
the	transnational	care	worker,	takes	place	within	unequal	relations	of	power,	often	to	the	detriment	
of	the	care	worker.91		These	powerful	care-demanders	frequently	hold	a	position	of	‘privileged	
irresponsibility.’		Often	those	who	hold	positions	of	privileged	irresponsibility	are	those	who	
consume	or	pay	for	care,	and	increasingly	women	in	the	global	North	consume	care	by	employing	
transnational	migrant	carers	to	carry	out	caring	labour	in	the	home,	which	reinforces	inequalities	
between	differently	situated	women.		It	is	not	as	simple	as	a	male/female	binary,	but	rather	how	
different	kinds	of	work	is	valued,	such	that	care	is	de-	or	undervalued,	and	therefore	so	too	are	
those	who	perform	the	caring	labour.		Increasingly	in	the	global	North,	migrant	women,	who	
experience	multiple	forms	of	difference,	including	racial,	ethnic,	linguistic,	and	national,	undertake	
the	care	work	of	those	who	‘have	more	important	things	to	do.’		The	ethics	of	care,	however,	
questions	the	political	and	social	means	by	which	norms	about	gender,	race,	national	origin,	and	the	
work	of	care	itself	are	reproduced	to	the	detriment	of	those	who	shoulder	an	undue	burden	of	care.	
Instead	of	reinforcing	gender	stereotypes,	care	theorists	reject	the	primacy	of	current	
dominant	ethical	and	political	theories	that	treat	equality	as	“an	association	of	equals	[which]	has	
trained	our	gaze	on	one	side	of	the	sexual	division	of	labour:	the	inclusion	of	women	into	the	male	
half.”92		Much	work	has	already	been	done	to	bring	women,	especially	in	the	Global	North,	into	the	
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public	sphere,	work	that	was	necessary	in	the	fight	for	gender	equality,	but	it	is	not	enough	that	
women	are	included	in	the	traditional	male	realm.		Men	must	also	be	fully	incorporated	into	the	
traditional	female	realm	in	order	for	a	more	material	equality	to	be	realized.		The	political	ethics	of	
care	challenges	traditional	gender	norms,	where	women	and	the	female	gender	have	attained	a	
symbolic	association	with	care	work,	vulnerability,	and	dependency;	where	vulnerability	and	
dependency	in	particular	hold	negative	connotations	of	failure	for	an	individual	under	the	liberal	
conception	of	the	person.		The	ethics	of	care	seeks	to	relocate	the	concerns	of	vulnerability,	
dependency,	and	need.		Instead	of	vulnerability,	dependence,	and	need	remaining	states	to	avoid	or	
as	a	hallmark	of	individual	failure,	those	who	are	in	such	states	can	be	viewed	as	persons	who	
require	extra	care,	full	in	the	awareness	that	at	some	point	in	the	past	and	at	some	point	in	the	
future,	all	persons	require	such	care.		Beyond	the	usual	examples	of	children	(who	rely	on	adults	for	
material	and	social	support),	the	developmentally	and	physically	disabled	(who	are	usually	accorded	
some	measure	of	aid	out	of	a	sense	of	fairness),	the	very	ill	(who	might	not	always	receive	the	same	
standard	of	care),	or	the	very	old	(who	again	are	often	marginalized),	everyone	is	in	a	constant	state	
of	vulnerability,	dependency,	and	need.		The	problem	with	the	political	liberal	conception	of	equality	
is	that	“vulnerability	and	dependency	easily	become	separated	from	the	ideal	self	and	localized	in,	or	
projected	onto	others:	weak	or	‘needy’	people.”93		Instead,	an	ethic	of	care	“situate[s]	vulnerability,	
ambiguity	and	dependency	within	the	moral	subject.”94		Doing	so	avoids	the	dangerous	othering	that	
might	occur	when	only	others	are	needy.		The	well-off	individual	might	believe	that	they	are	not	
needy	in	that	they	have	been	able	to	meet	all	their	needs	‘on	their	own,’	but	this	is	not	the	case.		
Likely	someone	else	cleans	their	home,	tends	their	garden,	cooks	their	food,	and	cares	for	their	
children	or	elderly	parents,	in	addition	to	the	goods	and	services	provided	by	the	government	and	
funded	by	a	vast	pool	of	tax	payers.	
By	rejecting	the	primacy	of	dominant	ethical	theories,	the	critical,	feminist	ethics	of	care	
strives	to	offer	a	more	complete,	holistic	conception	of	human	beings	because	of	its	view	of	persons	
as	relational	and	interdependent	instead	of	as	highly	individualized	and	autonomous.		The	ethics	of	
care	is	not	a	female	morality	or	a	woman’s	ethic,	but	rather	a	profoundly	human	ethic	that	
challenges	current	conceptions	of	gender	and	the	gendered	division	of	work	and	power	present	in	
and	perpetuated	by	the	current	structures	of	social	and	political	power.		While	the	ethics	of	care	
developed	from	investigations	into	the	unique	experiences	of	women,	it	sought	to	use	those	
experiences	as	a	starting	point	to	better	understand	human	relationships	and	moral	issues	that	had	
been	previously	overlooked	by	traditional	philosophy.		In	particular,	a	political	ethic	of	care	
																																								 																				
93	Selma	Sevenhuijsen,	Citizenship	and	the	Ethics	of	Care:	Feminist	Considerations	on	Justice,	Morality,	and	
Politics,	trans.	Liz	Savage	(New	York:	Routledge,	1998),	57.	
94	Ibid.	
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challenges	the	public/private	divide	by	using	care	to	expand	our	political	concerns	to	questions	of	
care	work,	dependency,	relationships	and	responsibilities,	and	norms	about	gender,	race,	sexual	
orientation,	and	class.		In	answering	the	critiques	that	were	levelled	at	the	early	ethics	of	care,	later	
care	theorists	created	a	robust	political	ethic	that	brought	care	to	the	fore	as	a	public	good	that	must	
be	part	of	our	political	theorizing	and	understanding	of	justice.		To	do	otherwise	is	to	engage	in	
privileged	irresponsibility	and	ignore	the	real	needs	of	real	persons.		Political	silence	on	these	issues	
only	serves	to	reinforce	their	invisibility,	and	the	invisibility	of	the	persons	who	do	care	work	or	are	
cared	for	by	others.		This	is	a	powerful	political	ethic	that,	at	base,	rejects	the	primacy	of	dominant	
political	theories,	such	as	the	‘mainstream’	political	liberal	theory	of	John	Rawls,	because	a	liberal	
political	theory	alone	is	not	enough	to	address	the	moral-political	problems	that	contemporary	
societies	face.		Something	more	is	needed,	and	that	is	the	ethics	of	care.			
From	the	political	ethic	developed	by	philosophers	Tontro,	Held	and	Kittay,	it	is	possible	to	
begin	thinking	about	care	theory	as	something	that	could	be	applied	globally,	not	only	as	a	global	
ethic,	but	also	a	critical	ethic	that	investigates	the	political	underpinnings	that	serve	to	perpetuate	
the	vast	scale	of	suffering	and	inequality	in	the	world	today.		Before	turning	to	the	critical	global	
ethic	of	care	in	Chapter	Two,	I	will	first	highlight	the	practices	of	care	as	developed	by	Joan	Tronto.		
Understanding	these	practices	is	important	to	foreground	the	work	of	Fiona	Robinson,	who	
developed	a	global	ethic	of	care,	where	these	practices	became	part	of	the	lens	of	care	that	is	used	
to	uncover	new	information,	new	motivations,	and	new	solutions	to	global	moral	problems.	
	
Section 3 – The Practices of Care 
A	political	ethic	of	care	not	only	responds	to	the	critiques	of	early	care	ethics,	but	also	provides	a	
positive	guide	to	action	that	corresponds	to	the	activities	of	care.		Tronto	developed	an	analysis	of	
the	practices	of	care	to	provide	a	more	formal	means	of	action	in	the	political	realm	on	the	basis	of	
critical,	feminist	care	ethics.		Because	it	is	a	guide	for	action,	care	must	be	understood	as	a	practice.		
Care	as	a	practice	is	an	alternative	to	viewing	care	as	an	emotion	or	a	principle,	but	is	rather	
something	that	provokes	and	fosters	action,	with	a	goal	and	a	method	of	carrying	it	out.95		Lastly,	
because	the	practices	of	care	serve	as	guides	for	action,	these	practices	can	also	serve	as	a	standard	
of	satisfaction	in	relation	to	the	process	of	caring	itself.		If	the	care	provided	does	not	meet	the	
standards	set	out	by	the	practices	of	care,	then	the	care-receiver	cannot	be	said	to	be	well	cared	
for.96		These	practices	work	to	better	clarify	what	care	is,	how	it	functions,	and	by	which	standard	we	
might	measure	the	completion	of	care.		This	will	be	especially	important	once	care	is	fully	integrated	
																																								 																				
95	Tronto,	Moral	Boundaries:	A	Political	Argument	for	an	Ethic	of	Care,	108.	
96	Ibid.,	110.	
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into	a	political	framework,	because	political	action	needs	to	have	a	standard	of	completion	and	a	
scale	of	success.97			
The	practices	of	care	that	Tronto	outlines	are	attentiveness,	responsibility,	competence,	and	
responsiveness.		Tronto	couples	each	practice	of	care	with	what	she	calls	phases	of	care	that	signify	
different	kinds	of	caring	that	persons	engage	in,	which	serves	to	clarify	what	otherwise	would	
remain	an	ambiguous	concept.		Robinson	utilizes	only	three	of	these	practices,	that	of	attentiveness,	
responsibility,	and	responsiveness,	folding	competence	into	the	other	three	practices.		Robinson	also	
refines	all	of	these	practices	for	use	on	the	global	level	as	discussed	in	Chapter	Two.		However,	
understanding	the	first	formulation	of	these	caring	practices	allows	us	to	see	the	difference	between	
Robinson’s	work	and	the	work	that	preceded	her.			
	 The	first	phase,	caring	about,	corresponds	to	the	first	practice:	attentiveness.		Caring	about	
is	where	one	person	recognizes	the	need	for	care	to	take	place,	but	takes	no	personal	responsibility	
for	it.		Tronto	points	out	that	caring	about	can	be	seen	in	the	public	realm	by	society’s	response	to	
the	homeless,	not	just	the	individual	response.98		To	care	about,	one	must	practice	attentiveness,	for	
if	we	are	not	attentive,	“then	we	cannot	possibly	address	those	needs.		By	this	standard,	the	ethic	of	
care	would	treat	ignoring	others—ignorance—as	a	form	of	moral	evil.”99		For	example,	an	employer	
who	ignores	the	fact	that	an	employee	is	a	single	parent	and	has	several	small	children,	yet	demands	
they	work	overtime,	would	not	be	attentive	to	the	needs	of	their	employee,	and	thus	we	could	judge	
the	employer	as	engaging	in	morally	bad	behaviour.			
Attentiveness	is	important	because	it	reinforces	the	relational	aspect	of	care.		Someone	
must	be	attentive	to	someone	else,	such	that	when	I	am	attentive	to	another	I	do	so	from	a	
particular	position.		As	Alison	Jaggar	notes:	
Turning	our	attention	inward	as	well	as	outward	encourages	reflexive	consideration	of	what	
the	agent	brings	to	the	situation,	her	interests,	her	location,	the	context,	her	warrant	for	
intervention.		Conceiving	moral	reasoning	as	interactive	encourages	reflection	not	only	on	
the	moral	implications	for	others	of	action	or	inaction	but	also	on	the	implications	for	the	
self,	how	it	expresses	or	develops	her	moral	character.100	
Because	part	of	care	ethics	is	the	acknowledgement	and	understanding	of	how	concrete	particulars	
matter	deeply	to	our	moral	and	political	lives,	we	cannot	escape	the	fact	that	we	are	always	located	
somewhere,	and	are	embedded	in	certain	kinds	of	knowledge.		The	practices	of	care	are	informed	by	
																																								 																				
97	For	more	on	using	care	as	a	standard	of	success	of	political	action,	specifically	in	public	policy,	see	Chapter	
Five.	
98	Tronto,	Moral	Boundaries:	A	Political	Argument	for	an	Ethic	of	Care,	106.	
99	Ibid.,	127.	
100	Alison	M.	Jaggar,	"Caring	as	a	Feminist	Practice	of	Moral	Reason,"	in	Justice	and	Care,	ed.	Virginia	Held	
(Colorado:	Westview	Press,	1995),	191.	
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the	different	moral	epistemology	of	care	ethics,	the	situated	view	of	the	relational	moral	agent,	as	
someone	who	must	take	into	account	the	knowledge	that	informs	our	daily	lives.101		This	different	
standpoint	underscores	the	importance	of	the	relational	ontology	of	care	ethics.102			
The	second	phase	of	care	is	taking	care	of	and	corresponds	to	the	practice	of	responsibility.		
In	this	phase,	either	the	individual	or	the	group	assumes	some	measure	of	responsibility:	“taking	
care	of	involves	the	recognition	that	one	can	act	to	address	these	unmet	needs.”103		The	caring	
practice	of	responsibility	is	where	the	“responsibility	to	care	might	rest	on	a	number	of	factors;	
something	we	did	or	did	not	do	has	contributed	to	the	needs	for	care,	and	so	we	must	care.”104		The	
notion	of	responsibly	here	is	flexible,	such	that	one	is	not	necessarily	obligated	as	other	moral	
theories	might	have	it,	but	rather	we	fulfil	our	responsibilities	as	we	are	best	able,	or	find	another	
way	to	fulfil	the	need	if	we	are	unable.		Because	care	ethics	recognizes	that	all	persons	are	more	or	
less	dependent	upon	others	at	any	given	time,	not	being	able	to	fulfil	one’s	caring	responsibilities	is	
not	necessarily	a	failure.		It	is,	however,	a	moral	failure	to	deny	that	one	has	caring	responsibilities	
regardless	of	one’s	ability	to	fulfil	those	responsibilities	at	any	given	time.		
The	third	phase	is	care-giving,	which	“involves	the	direct	meeting	of	needs	for	care,”105	and	
corresponds	to	the	practice	of	competence.		Care-giving	is	different	from	taking	care	of.		Taking	care	
of	another	can	be	accomplished	through	financial	means,	but	Tronto	separates	out	financial	support	
from	the	physical	work	of	care-giving	to	underscore	two	important	points.		First,	that	money	will	not	
always	solve	the	caring	needs	of	others.		For	example,	although	money	will	provide	for	higher	quality	
long	term	elder-care,	there	still	remains	the	actual	labour	of	caring	that	needs	to	be	done	to	attend	
to	the	needs	of	another,	which	is	care-giving.		Second,	that	one	cannot	substitute	taking	care	of	for	
care-giving.		These	are	not	interchangeable	phases	of	care,	and	as	such	one	cannot	count	for	
another,	allowing	for	those	who	financially	support	others	to	maintain	a	position	of	privileged	
irresponsibility.		One	cannot	ignore	one’s	responsibilities	to	engage	in	the	labour	of	being	a	parent	in	
favour	of	a	narrow	focus	on	financial	security,	as	though	taking	care	of	one’s	family	gave	one	a	‘pass’	
on	performing	caring	labour.		Thus	the	practice	of	care	associated	with	this	phase	is	competence.		
One	must	be	a	competent	care-giver,	if	one	is	to	give	care	properly,	and	competence	will	guard	
																																								 																				
101	Walker,		24.	
102	However,	there	is	a	critique	about	whether	the	feminist	standpoint	of	care	offers	a	truly	transformative	
feminist	ethic,	and	it	will	be	addressed	in	Chapter	Six.	
103	Tronto,	Moral	Boundaries:	A	Political	Argument	for	an	Ethic	of	Care,	106.	
104	Ibid.,	132.	
105	Ibid.,	107.	
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against	“[i]ntending	to	provide	care,	even	accepting	responsibility	for	it,	but	then	failing	to	provide	
good	care,	means	that	in	the	end	the	need	for	care	is	not	met.”106		
The	fourth	phase	of	caring	is	care-receiving	which	corresponds	with	the	practice	of	
responsiveness.107		This	stage	focuses	on	the	one	receiving	care	and	can	be	used	as	a	measure	for	
whether	or	not	particular	caring	needs	have	been	met.		Though	Tronto	acknowledges	that	
perceptions	of	needs	can	be	wrong,	the	need	of	the	carer	to	proceed	with	the	tasks	of	care	might	be	
less	important	than	the	care	receiver’s	need	for	something	else,	e.g.	“a	person	with	mobility	
limitations	may	prefer	to	feed	herself.”108		Those	who	receive	care,	if	they	are	able,	should	respond	
in	some	way	so	that	the	care-giver	can	better	care	for	them.		The	point	here	is	that	the	feedback	of	
the	one	who	is	receiving	care	is	of	vital	importance	for	the	care	to	continue	and	to	ensure	that	the	
care	is	good	in	so	far	as	it	meets	the	needs	of	the	one	who	is	being	cared	for.	
The	practices	of	care,	as	outlined	here,	are	not	exactly	the	same	ones	that	are	used	by	
Robinson	or	myself	when	arguing	for	a	global	critical	ethic	of	care.		The	importance	of	introducing	
the	practices	of	care	here	is	to	provide	a	contrast	for	how	Robinson’s	critical	ethic	of	care	is	different	
from	the	early,	‘orthodox’	care	ethics	as	well	as	the	political	ethic	of	care	that	grew	in	response	to	
the	three	major	critiques	of	early	care	ethics.		Certainly	the	global	ethic	of	care	retains	the	focus	on	
relationships,	the	balance	of	responsibilities,	gender,	race,	class,	and	dependence,	but	it	also	
incorporates	and	questions	norms	that	perpetuate	exclusion	and	violence,	as	well	as	expanding	
inquiries	into	the	social	norms	around	all	forms	of	difference	and	how	we	might	best	negotiate	
difference	in	a	political	landscape.			
From	its	inception	in	the	late	1970s	to	early	1980s,	the	ethics	of	care	grew	from	an	inquiry	
into	the	psychology	of	women’s	moral	reasoning,	into	an	ethic	based	upon	the	idea	that	moral	
questions	and	answers	could	be	found	within	care	work,	to	a	robust	political	ethic	that	challenges	
entrenched	patterns	of	power	that	perpetuate	harmful	social	norms	(particularly	those	about	
gender),	the	public/private	divide,	and	the	primacy	of	liberal	theories	of	justice.		A	global	critical	care	
ethic	continues	questioning	the	primacy	of	dominant	liberal	political	theories.		In	particular,	it	
questions	dominant	theories	of	international	relations	and	the	pride	of	place	given	to	human	rights	
discourses	on	the	assumption	that	human	rights	are	best	situated	to	address	global	moral	concerns.		
The	ethics	of	care	is	a	political	ethic	that	can	transform	the	way	in	which	we	view	complex	moral	
problems	in	the	world	today.		Using	the	lens	of	care,	exemplified	by	the	practices	of	care,	allows	us	
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to	uncover	new	information	about	global	moral	concerns,	provide	new	kinds	of	motivations,	as	well	
as	aid	in	the	development	of	new	solutions	to	these	concerns.			
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Chapter Two: Global iz ing the Ethics of Care 
	
In	this	chapter	I	argue	in	support	of	globalizing	the	critical,	feminist	ethics	of	care	as	a	means	to	
provide	a	different	and	important	perspective	on	the	international	sphere,	encompassing	political,	
economic,	and	socio-cultural	concerns.		This	perspective,	I	claim,	can	give	us	new	information	about	
substantive	issues	such	as	global	poverty,	especially	the	kind	of	poverty	experienced	by	those	who	
are	marked	out	as	carers	(either	by	gendered,	racialized,	or	geopolitical	difference,	or	any	
combination	thereof),	and	subsequently	provide	new	motivations	and	methods	of	action	to	remedy	
such	issues.		This	shift	in	how	we	see	and	address	such	issues	also	means	that	the	ethics	of	care	is	a	
transformative	ethic.		I	will	closely	follow	the	work	done	by	Fiona	Robinson,	who	has	pioneered	the	
effort.		It	should	be	noted	that	I	do	not	argue	care	ethics	should	be	used	instead	of	international	
human	rights	discourses.		I	believe	that	human	rights	discourses	offer	their	own	important	
perspectives	and	answers	to	issues	of	human	suffering	and	injustices	across	the	globe.		Rather,	
considering	the	complexity	of	some	of	the	moral	contexts1	that	exist	in	the	world	today,	I	hold	that	
human	rights	is	not	always	the	appropriate	ethical	theory	to	assess	moral	contexts,	as	I	will	discuss	in	
Chapter	Three.		There	are	moral	contexts	that	are	better	served	by	using	a	critical	ethics	of	care	as	
the	tool	of	analysis.	
This	is	not	to	say	that	the	global	ethics	of	care	is	without	its	critics.		Daniel	Engster	claims	
that	although	the	ethics	of	care	is	an	excellent	tool	for	critique,	it	cannot	suggest	policy	or	provide	
guidance	for	institutional	frameworks.		If	care	ethics	is	unable	to	suggest	solutions	to	the	problems	it	
identifies,	then	it	is	not	able	to	function	as	an	instrument	of	justice	as	discussed	in	Chapter	One.		
Kimberly	Hutchings	makes	a	dual	argument.		First,	that	because	care	ethics	holds	assumptions	about	
the	universality	of	care,	it	embeds	gender	assumptions	into	its	approach	and	thus	is	not	an	
acceptable	feminist	international	ethic.		Second,	that	Robinson’s	approach	is	too	inconsistent	to	
have	prescriptive	force.		I	will	address	Engster’s	claim	in	Chapter	Four,	and	Hutchings’	claim	in	
Chapter	Six.		However,	it	is	important	to	foreground	them	here	to	avoid	the	impression	that	the	
critical	global	ethics	of	care	is	somehow	the	perfect	answer	to	all	our	theoretical	problems	with	
creating	an	international	ethical	discourse.		It	is	not.		I	doubt	that	there	is	any	one	answer.	
																																								 																				
1	Robinson	uses	the	word	‘contexts’	instead	of	issues	because	Robinson	wants	to	avoid	the	language	of	‘ethical	
issues’	for	three	reasons:	1)	she	rejects	the	idea	that	“the	issues	themselves	are	in	some	measure	discrete,	
distinct,	and	separate	from	one	another;”	2)	“because	there	are	ethical	issues,	there	must	also	be	some	non-
ethical	issues	in	international	relations;”	and	3)	“that	the	issues	themselves	may	be	regarded	as	distinct	from	
moral	values	and	ethical	ideas	embedded	in	them.”	(Robinson,	1999,	137.		Emphasis	in	the	original.)	The	ethics	
of	care	rejects	this	separationist	mindset,	of	breaking	things	down	into	isolated	issues,	some	ethical,	some	not,	
that	are	free	from	bias.		Instead,	Robinson	elects	to	talk	about	‘contexts.’	
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Instead,	I	take	the	position	that	while	international	human	rights	discourses	can	provide	
valuable	insights,	human	rights	need	not	be	our	only	method	to	address	international	ethical	
concerns.		For	example,	many	women’s	groups	use	human	rights	language	to	bring	attention	and	
legitimacy	to	their	concerns	and	problems.		However,	human	rights	discourses	in	general	lack	the	
ability	to	‘look	under	the	hood’	and	find	the	source	of	those	problems	embedded	within	the	social,	
cultural,	religious,	political,	and	economic	contexts.		Another	tool	is	required.		The	ethics	of	care	is	
such	a	tool,	allowing	us	to	examine	global	moral	contexts	through	a	new	perspective,	and	provide	a	
better	understanding	of	the	root	causes	of	these	problems,	and	new	methods	for	addressing	them.	
First,	I	will	provide	a	brief	review	of	the	critical	(political)2	ethic	of	care	that	grounds	global	
care	ethics,	and	demonstrate	how	the	work	of	Fiona	Robinson	is	subtlety	different	from	other	
political	care	ethics,	largely	in	terms	of	how	Robinson	defines	and	mobilizes	the	practices	of	care	and	
expressly	takes	on	the	ability	of	care	ethics	to	judge	across	cultural	divides.		Second,	I	will	turn	to	the	
justification	for	using	the	critical	ethic	of	care	on	a	global	scale.		Third,	I	will	highlight	four	moral	
contexts	that	the	ethics	of	care	is	well	situated	to	assess	to	demonstrate	how	the	ethics	of	care	
would	transform	how	we	see	and	address	global	moral	contexts.		These	four	contexts	are	difference,	
exclusion,	gender,	and	violence	as	it	relates	to	human	security.			
	
Section 1 – A Crit ical  Ethics of Care 
Before	I	provide	the	justification	for	using	critical,	feminist	care	ethics	on	a	global	scale,	it	is	
important	to	reinforce	the	differences	between	a	critical	ethic	of	care	and	the	earlier	‘orthodox’	care	
ethics	of	Gilligan	and	Noddings,	and	also	to	draw	out	the	subtle	differences	between	the	work	of	
Robinson	and	other	political	care	philosophers	like	Tronto,	Kittay,	and	Held.		Recall	from	Chapter	
One,	that	the	orthodox	ethics	of	care	is	typically	associated	with	the	private	sphere—the	home,	
between	friends	and	family,	and	the	emotional	investment	of	caring—rather	than	the	“wider	social	
causes	of	suffering	and	need.”3		Instead	of	trying	to	extend	emotional	caring	to	its	very	limits,	
Robinson	takes	the	track	opened	by	Tronto,	Kittay,	and	Held,	who	use	care	ethics	to	critically	
examine	the	structures	of	power	and	exclusion	that	are	present	in	the	world	today.		Certainly	these	
three	political	care	theorists	are	critical	care	theorists,	but	there	are	differences	between	these	
earlier	political/critical	care	philosophers	and	Robinson.		The	main	difference	is	that	Robinson	
focuses	on	being	able	to	make	care	serve	as	a	critical	standard	for	international	(and	therefore	inter-
cultural)	moral	and	political	judgment,	and	she	accomplishes	this	by	developing	a	different	analysis	
																																								 																				
2	I	use	the	terms	‘political’	and	‘critical’	ethic	of	care	interchangeably	to	denote	the	same	thing.		A	critical	care	
ethic	is	concerned	with	the	political,	and	a	political	ethic	of	care	is	inherently	critical.		They	are	one	and	the	
same.	
3	Robinson,	Globalizing	Care:	Ethics,	Feminist	Theory,	and	International	Relations,	131.	
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of	the	practices	of	care	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter	to	increase	their	scope	and	their	flexibility	
as	tools	of	analysis.	
A	critical	care	ethic	focuses	on	how	institutions,	norms,	and	relations	of	power	shape	our	
relationships,	either	enabling	good	forms	of	care	or	perpetuating	harmful	ones;	care	ethics	is	used	as	
a	lens	to	assess	relations.		It	does	not	entail	the	claim	that	we	care	equally	about	all	persons	in	any	
kind	of	universal	sense,	but	that	“[care]	relies	on	existing	and	potential	relations	among	moral	
agents	and	the	capacity	of	those	agents	to	learn	how	to	listen	and	respond	to	the	needs	of	others.”4		
The	critical	ethics	of	care	avoids	the	problem	that	would	occur	for	global	care	ethics	if	we	were	to	
base	it	upon	Noddings’	account	of	care,	where	caring	became	less	obligatory	as	relations	became	
more	distant.5		Instead,	a	critical	care	ethic	suggests	that	a	person’s	caring	responsibilities	are	not	an	
injunction	to	care,	but	instead	it	is	assumed	that	we	already	do	care,	and	we	do	so	in	a	multi-
directional	web	of	relations.6		The	critical	lens	of	care	allows	us	to	understand	how	patterns	of	power	
(international,	national,	economic,	and	socio-cultural)	shape	and	alter	the	caring	relationships	we	
have	with	particular	others.		
This	critical	lens	of	care,	however,	does	not	of	itself	create	universal	norms	or	rules.		Lacking	
universal	norms	or	rules	makes	moral	judgment	difficult	and	risks	devolving	into	moral	relativism.		
When	judging	between	different	moral	claims,	because	the	ethics	of	care	does	not	have	a	standard	
set	of	prescriptions	as	such,	it	could	be	thought	that	there	is	an	open	question	with	how	to	judge	
“the	relative	validity	of	those	moral	claims.”7		Moral	judgments	formed	in	specific	contexts	might	not	
always	be	intelligible	in	a	different	context.		The	critique	is	correct	to	a	degree.		Unlike	human	rights	
discourses,	care	ethics	does	not	seek	to	create	a	set	of	over-arching	normative	rules.		For	example,	
the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	(UDHR)	can	serve	as	a	trump	or	bulwark	against	harmful	
values	and	cultural	contexts	that	we	have	in	the	world	today.		However,	the	arguments	for	an	ethic	
of	care	are	based	upon	scepticism	of	the	possibility	of	a	grand	unifying	ethical	theory	that	is	
formalizable,	i.e.	rule	producing.		Taken	together,	it	might	lead	one	to	the	concern	that	the	ethics	of	
care	devolves	into	moral	relativism,	especially	when	we	recall	that	the	focus	of	care	ethics	is	
supposed	to	be	on	the	concrete	and	the	particular.		This	results	in	questions	such	as:	how	can	care	
																																								 																				
4	Ibid.,	40.	
5	Noddings,	47.	
6	Tove	Pettersen,	"Conceptions	of	Care:	Altruism,	Feminism,	and	Mature	Care,"	Hypatia	27,	no.	2	(2012):	376.	
7	Robinson,	Globalizing	Care:	Ethics,	Feminist	Theory,	and	International	Relations,	40.		
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ethics	function	as	a	critical	tool	if	it	cannot	judge	the	disparate	value	systems	in	the	world,	and	how	
can	it	be	applied	globally	if	it	is	actually	relativistic	in	terms	of	its	moral	outcomes.8	
In	direct	answer	to	those	questions,	several	points	can	be	made.		First,	care	ethics	does	
privilege	a	set	of	values	and	practices:	the	values	and	practices	of	care.		Point	in	fact,	care	is	meant	
to	serve	as	a	critical,	universal	standard	for	moral	judgments,	and	importantly	care	is	a	standard	of	
judgment	that	is	much	more	flexible	than	rights	standards.9		Moral	judgment,	for	the	ethics	of	care,	
is	“based	on	the	possibility	of	making	evident,	in	particular	contexts,	what	makes	[relationships]	
healthy	and	nurturing,	or	oppressive	and	exploitative.”10		The	normative	question	is	not,	solely,	
aimed	at	how	I	fulfil	my	caring	responsibilities,	but	what	aspects	of	our	political	and	social	lives	
impact	(for	good	or	ill)	the	kinds	of	relationships	and	responsibilities	I	have.		Certainly,	this	
formulation	is	more	ambiguous	than	theories	of	human	rights,	but	its	very	ambiguity	allows	for	a	
greater	flexibility	in	applying	critical,	feminist	care	ethics	to	concrete	situations	as	they	arise.		The	
habit	of	looking	for	rule-based	answers,	like	those	that	are	produced	by	international	human	rights	
discourses,	is	not	always	beneficial	nor	is	it	always	necessarily	going	to	produce	the	answer	that	will	
solve	the	problem.		It	is	possible	that	such	answers	can	sometimes	obscure	the	deep	complexity	that	
underlies	many	global	problems,	such	as	poverty,	and	especially	the	poverty	that	women	face	
around	the	globe,	as	one	example	of	persons	who	are	coded	as	‘carers’.		This	leads	to	the	second	
point,	namely,	the	benefits	of	applying	care	ethics	to	international	relations	is	that	it	will	illuminate	
moral	contexts	that	human	rights	often	overlook	or	do	not	even	‘see’	and	thus	cannot	address,	such	
as	complex	cases	of	difference	and	exclusion,	both	of	which	have	profound	impacts	on	other	moral	
contexts	such	as	gender	and	violence.		The	lens	of	care,	then,	can	be	used	to	expand	the	limits	of	
moral	and	political	thought.11		Third,	although	there	is	no	claim	to	a	specific	set	of	universalizable	
moral	rules,	there	is	one	thing	that	holds	across	all	human	cultures:	people	do	live	within	webs	of	
relationships,	and	require	a	bare	minimum	of	care	to	at	least	survive.		This	statement	is	not	infused	
with	any	normative	content,	however,	and	is	instead	the	ontological	starting	point	of	care	ethics.		A	
critical	ethics	of	care	is	another	tool	by	which	one	can	analyse	and	assess	complex	ethical	situations,	
in	addition	to	human	rights	discourses.		It	is	important	to	reaffirm	that	I	do	not	advocate	an	either/or	
																																								 																				
8	This	is	an	echo	of	the	argument	presented	against	orthodox	care	ethics,	that	it	could	not	address	justice	
concerns.		Moral	relativism,	according	to	Robinson,	states	“there	can	be	no	criteria	for	judging	between	moral	
systems	or	for	ascertaining	a	single	objective	truth.”	(ibid.,	41.)	
9	The	tension	between	the	universal	standard	of	care	and	the	practical	aim	of	care	theory	to	be	flexible	and	
sensitive	to	context	will	be	addressed	in	Chapter	Six.	
10	Fiona	Robinson,	"Care,	Gender	and	Global	Social	Justice:	Rethinking	‘Ethical	Globalization’,"	Journal	of	Global	
Ethics	2,	no.	1	(2006):	15.	
11	Benhabib,	164.	
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situation	for	care	ethics	and	human	rights,	but	rather	acknowledge	that	both	have	their	specific	uses	
within	the	international	context,	and	both	have	their	particular	benefits.12			
Focusing	more	closely	on	moral	judgment,	Robinson’s	global	critical	care	ethic	uses	the	
practices	of	care	as	a	standard	measure	for	normative	and	political	contexts.		The	first	practice	is	
attentiveness,	which	means	we	must	accept	that	there	can	be	no	assumed	ideal,	abstract,	or	
universal	moral	situation.		Rather,	those	who	practice	a	critical	ethics	of	care	“must	listen	to	and	
learn	from	the	particular	standpoint	of	real	individuals.”13		The	practice	of	attentiveness	requires	us	
to	be	sensitive	to	the	needs	and	the	situations	of	other	people	without	ascribing	to	them	the	label	of	
Other.14		Unlike	Tronto’s	version	of	attentiveness,	which	can	be	understood	as	‘flagging’	a	problem	
or	perspective,	Robinson’s	approach	to	attentiveness	requires	more	engagement,	an	active	kind	of	
listening	where	we	must	not	only	be	aware	of	a	moral	context,	but	be	prepared	to	engage	and	
interact	with	those	who	experience	the	particular	context.	
The	second	practice	is	responsibility,	which	is	a	“primary	moral	value	because	[the	ethics	of	
care]	argues	that	moral	action	and	social	change	require	a	recognition	of	individual	and	shared	
responsibilities.”15		Robinson	extends	Tronto’s	practice	of	responsibility	to	groups	and	institutions	to	
underscore	the	point	that	institutions	have	the	ability	to	shape	our	particular	caring	
responsibilities.16		For	example,	societies	have	a	collective	responsibility	toward	their	least	fortunate,	
and	the	institutions	in	a	society	that	aid	the	homeless	and	hungry	allow	for	collective	responsibly	to	
have	tangible	outputs,	and	those	institutions	also	serve	to	structure	the	way	we	think	about	and	
relate	to	the	least	fortunate.		If	such	services	are	handled	by	the	state,	aiding	the	least	well	off	can	
be	understood	as	a	public	good.		In	contrast,	if	such	services	were	handled	by	private	charities,	aid	
for	the	homeless	and	hungry	is	seen	as	optional	and	even	supererogatory.		The	lens	of	care	shows	
that	the	way	in	which	responsibilities	are	handled	by	institutions	matters	to	our	particular	
relationships	with	other	people.	
The	last	practice	is	responsiveness,	which	means	the	ethics	of	care	is	a	practical	morality	
with	a	“concrete	vision	of	agency	and	action.”17		While	Tronto’s	practice	of	responsiveness	focuses	
																																								 																				
12	See	Chapter	Three	for	a	larger	discussion	of	the	benefits	of	human	rights	and	the	care	critique	of	human	
rights	discourses.	
13	Robinson,	Globalizing	Care:	Ethics,	Feminist	Theory,	and	International	Relations,	39.	
14	For	someone	to	be	Other,	in	this	sense,	is	that	which	is	alien	or	different	from	the	particular	point	of	
reference,	and	that	being	different	is	often	seen	as	‘lesser’	or	‘bad.’	
15	Robinson,	Globalizing	Care:	Ethics,	Feminist	Theory,	and	International	Relations,	39.	
16	In	a	more	recent	book,	Caring	Democracy,	Tronto	also	discusses	group	and	institutional	responsibilities,	
which	is	very	close	to	Robinson’s	expansion	on	Tronto’s	earlier	book,	Moral	Boundaries,	however	Tronto	is	
largely	focused	on	the	national,	democratic	(and	thus	Western)	context,	rather	than	the	international.		For	
more	on	the	practice	of	responsibility	in	a	caring	democracy,	see	Tronto	(2013).	
17	Robinson,	Globalizing	Care:	Ethics,	Feminist	Theory,	and	International	Relations,	39.	
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upon	the	care-receiver	and	the	need	for	feedback,	Robinson’s	formulation	of	the	practice	of	
responsiveness	means	that	action	must	follow	intent,	and	do	so	in	a	timely	manner.		Policy	cannot	
be	made	and	then	ignored,	nor	can	commitments	be	agreed	to	and	then	abandoned.		Intention	
alone	is	not	enough	to	garner	an	actor	moral	praise.		Instead,	the	moral	worth	of	our	interactions	are	
largely	dependent	upon	our	concrete	actions	as	they	flow	from	our	intentions.		A	critical	ethics	of	
care	is	not	preoccupied	with	necessarily	prescribing	morally	good	actions	taken	individually,	or	
assessing	the	moral	worthiness	of	a	person’s	mental	state.		Instead,	the	moral	quality	of	the	actions	
people	and—more	importantly	for	my	purposes	here—institutions	take	are	assessed	by	whether	or	
not	they	fulfil	their	caring	responsibilities	and	are	in	line	with	the	practices	of	care,	and	if	they	also	
enable	others	to	do	the	same.18		For	example,	in	terms	of	persons,	fulfilling	one’s	caring	
responsibilities	could	be	understood	as	the	normal	day-to-day	actions	taken	by	most	parents,	or	by	
nurses	at	a	retirement	home.19		In	terms	of	institutions,	the	practices	of	care	might	be	better	
understood	in	terms	of	social	welfare,	how	the	policies	in	place	can	enable	individuals	to	fulfil	their	
caring	responsibilities,	such	as	the	case	with	Australia’s	carer	pension,	which	provides	payments	to	
those	who	provide	care	for	an	elderly	or	disabled	family	member.	
Through	the	lens	of	care,	institutions	are	recognized	as	forces	that	shape	our	relationships	
with	others	and	in	turn	how	we	care	for	those	others.		A	critical	ethics	of	care	takes	the	basic	
concepts	from	the	more	‘orthodox’	care	ethics	and	extends	it	to	encompass	more	than	individuals-
in-relationships.		A	critical	ethics	of	care	is	focused	on	how	entities	like	governments,	corporations,	
and	Non-Governmental	Organizations	(NGOs)	enable	or	hinder	us	as	individuals-in-relationships	to	
fulfil	our	caring	responsibilities,	the	hindering	of	which	is	what	creates	the	moral	contexts	that	we	
must	address.		Next,	I	will	provide	an	argument	for	the	justification	of	applying	a	critical	ethics	of	
care	globally,	as	well	as	highlighting	its	potential	as	a	transformative	ethic.	
	
Section 2 – Globalizing Care 
I	argue	that	it	is	not	only	possible,	but	also	that	it	is	justifiable	to	use	critical,	feminist	care	ethics	as	a	
tool	of	assessment	and	transformation	of	global	moral	contexts.		The	critical	ethics	of	care	is	first	and	
foremost	a	tool	of	assessment,	a	method	of	discovery	to	uncover	what	underlying	forces	have	
contributed	to	the	production	and	perpetuation	of	gross	injustices	such	as	extreme	poverty,	
																																								 																				
18	From	this	point	forward,	when	I	write	about	responsiveness,	I	am	always	using	Robinson’s	conception	of	
responsiveness,	not	Tronto’s,	unless	otherwise	specified.	
19	Here,	I	am	not	necessarily	discussing	the	problems	with	the	difference	between	unpaid	(parents)	and	paid	
(nurses)	care	work,	nor	am	I	delving	into	concerns	about	the	poor	pay	care	workers	receive	and	how	it	can	be	
seen	as	a	part	of	the	devaluing	of	care.		Such	concerns	are	incredibly	important,	and	will	be	addressed	as	I	
continue.	
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systemic	violence,	and	gender	and	racial	discrimination.		Further,	one	of	the	more	valuable	aspects	
of	the	critical	ethics	of	care	is	that	it	is	a	theory	that,	while	aiming	for	transformation,	firmly	works	to	
deal	with	the	world	as	it	is	today.		By	this,	I	mean	it	does	not	rely	on	any	kind	of	ideal	theory	to	frame	
it,	nor	does	it	seek	to	create	a	sharp	break	between	the	present	and	some	transformed	future.		The	
kind	of	transformation	that	care	ethics	provides	is	more	reform	than	revolution,	and	it	is	one	that	is	
based	on	new	understandings,	and	also	suggests	ways	that	caring	practices	themselves	can	enable	
transformation.20		Care	ethics	can	be	used	by	different	institutions	with	different	aims,	but	still	be	
firm	in	the	use	of	care	as	a	critical	standard	and	a	basis	for	moral	judgment,	and	reinforce	the	
importance	of	caring	practices	in	our	lives.		In	this	section,	I	will	provide	an	overview	of	the	global	
ethic	of	care	and	in	the	next	section	discuss	in	more	detail	the	unique	advantages	the	ethics	of	care	
offers	when	working	with	moral	contexts	centred	on	difference,	exclusion,	gender,	and	violence.	
	 Using	a	global	ethic	of	care	depends	upon	accepting	the	idea	that	the	current	state	of	global	
affairs	can	be	understood	as	a	series	of	relationships	between	states,	corporations,	other	groups,	
and	specific	people	and	that	the	ethics	of	care	can	be	used	as	a	critical	tool	to	assess	those	
relationships.		It	is	not	the	mere	fact	of	globalization	that	makes	the	critical	ethics	of	care	viable	as	a	
global	ethic.		Rather	it	is	the	fact	that	the	current	global	situation	“forces	us	to	confront	the	unique	
paradox	of	increasing	interrelatedness	in	the	context	of	profound	differences.”21		Nations,	
companies,	and	people	live	within	a	web	of	global	relationships,	which	requires	us	to	be	guided	by	
the	practice	of	attentiveness	in	order	to	understand	how	individual	lives	are	constituted	by	their	
particular	location	within	this	web	of	global	relations.		If	one	accepts	that	relationships	provide	
multiple	seats	of	moral	concern,	and	that	the	critical,	feminist	ethics	of	care	is	well	suited	to	
assessing	relationships,	then	it	follows	that	the	ethics	of	care	can	be	used	in	a	global	context	because	
relationships	exist	between	international	entities.		It	cannot	say	whether	someone’s	mental	state	is	
virtuous,	or	whether	someone’s	rights	have	been	met	or	violated.		Both	of	these	assessments	can	
still	be	incredibly	valuable,	but	they	do	not	themselves	hold	all	the	answers	to	the	often-complicated	
ethical	situations	that	exist	the	world	over.		The	ethics	of	care	instead	can	assess	the	moral	content	
of	the	relationship	between	international	actors,	and	it	can	also	go	beyond	simple	assessment	to	a	
critical	questioning	about	what	a	bad	relationship	is	and	what	makes	that	relationship	occur	in	the	
first	place.		These	relationships	can	perpetuate	patterns	of	unequal	power,	difference,	and	exclusion,	
and	it	is	the	simple	fact	that	these	relationships	exist	that	justifies	our	ability	to	use	a	relational	ethic	
like	care	ethics	as	a	tool	of	assessment	of	the	current	global	order.			
																																								 																				
20	Conradi,		118.	
21	Robinson,	Globalizing	Care:	Ethics,	Feminist	Theory,	and	International	Relations,	45.	
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		 To	illustrate	the	value	of	using	care	ethics	to	assess	international	relationships,	consider	the	
‘global	care	chain’	where	some	women	migrate	from	their	home	countries	to	a	host	nation	in	order	
to	find	better	paying	employment.		Many	of	these	migrant	women	work	in	homes,	care	facilities,	or	
as	nurses	to	make	up	for	a	care	deficit	incurred	by	women	in	a	host	nation	working	outside	the	
home,	a	lack	of	people	willing	to	take	on	low-pay,	low-status	care	work,	or	a	nursing	shortage.22		
These	migrant	women	are	often	mothers	themselves,	who	leave	behind	children	and	family,	to	
whom	they	remit	much	of	their	pay.		Those	children	in	turn	need	looking	after,	so	often	local	women	
in	the	home	country	are	nannies	themselves,	leaving	their	children	behind	to	look	after	the	children	
of	a	woman	working	overseas.23		These	care	chains	are	not	the	product	of	so-called	‘free	choice’	(and	
in	Chapter	Three	I	briefly	discuss	how	the	lens	of	care	illuminates	ideas	about	freedom	and	choice),	
rather	there	are	global	“interlocking	systems	of	oppression	that	produce	domestic	workers	and	the	
women	who	depend	upon	them.”24		By	‘produce,’	it	is	important	to	make	clear	that	transnational	
care	workers	are	not	imagined	to	have	no	choice,	no	autonomy,	or	cannot	resist	the	forces	of	
globalization	as	though	they	were	perfectly	overwhelming.		Rather,	the	point	is	that	the	current	
patterns	of	power	that	exist	locally	and	globally	produce	the	set	of	choices	that	some	women	face,	
and	the	acknowledgment	that	these	choices	are	sometimes	so	constrained	as	to	not	be	‘free.’25		
Transnational	workers	certainly	make	choices,	and	do	so	with	the	best	information	they	have	
available	to	them,	and	have	already	begun	to	resist	the	relations	of	power	that,	in	part,	constitute	
their	lives	as	domestic	workers.		For	example,	the	International	Domestic	Workers	Network	operates	
in	47	countries	and	is	made	up	of	over	half	a	million	domestic	workers.26	
The	patterns	of	power	that	produce	the	choices	domestic	carers	face	are	an	interplay	
between	norms	about	gender,	care	work,	‘productive’	work,	national	and	foreign	policy,	and	
economic	and	social	pressures	combine	to	create	the	factors	that:	1)	pull	women	toward	wealthy	
nations	to	fill	the	care	deficit	created	by	‘Western’	women	engaging	in	the	labour	market;	and	2)	
push	women	out	of	their	home	countries	to	provide	more	material	security	for	their	own	
dependents.		As	Fiona	Williams	notes,	there	is	a	marked	preference,	at	least	in	some	European	
countries,	for	‘mother	substitute	care’,	and	notes	that	equality	for	someone	women	has	come	to	
mean	a	deeper	inequality	for	other	women,	those	who	take	up	the	undervalued	work	of	care	that	
‘working’	women	no	longer	have	time	to	perform.27		As	Allison	Weir	argues,	the	primary	focus	must	
																																								 																				
22	Fiona	Williams,	"Markets	and	Migrants	in	the	Care	Economy,"	Soundings,	no.	47	(2011):	23-4.	
23	Hochschild,	19-21.	
24	Allison	Weir,	"Global	Care	Chains:	Freedom,	Responsibility,	and	Solidarity,"	The	Southern	Journal	of	
Philosophy	46	(2008):	170.		Emphasis	in	the	original.	
25	See	Chapter	Three	for	what	I	mean	when	I	say	‘free’	choices.	
26	"International	Domestic	Workers	Network,"		http://www.idwfed.org/en.		3	October	2016.	
27	Williams,	"Markets	and	Migrants	in	the	Care	Economy,"	26-7.	
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be	on	the	immigrant	care	workers	and	the	question	of	whether	“they	would	be	doing	these	jobs	at	
all	if	the	global	economy	did	not	force	them	to	leave	their	impoverished	home	countries	to	care	for	
the	children	of	the	wealthy,”28	does	more	to	directly	address	the	fraught	position	that	the	
transnational	care	worker	inhabits.		Examples	of	the	global	care	chain	will	be	present	throughout	
this	thesis	and	serve	as	a	prime	scenario	to	illustrate	how	the	lens	of	care	can	offer	a	different	
perspective	than	human	rights	discourses,	which	I	will	address	in	Chapter	Three.	
	 Another	point	in	favour	for	using	care	ethics	internationally	is	that	the	focus	on	relationships	
means	that	when	assessing	the	moral	impact	of	any	political,	social,	or	economic	policy,	there	is	a	
different	standard	of	what	it	means	for	human	beings	to	flourish	and	thrive	where	care	and	its	
‘reproductive’	tasks	are	just	as	vital	as	traditional	‘productive’	labour.		Care	ethics,	and	its	practice	of	
attentiveness,	turns	our	gaze	to	aspects	of	globalization	that	are	not	often	‘seen’	by	some	of	the	
more	mainstream	human	rights	discourses.		For	all	that	I	have	discussed	the	importance	of	fulfilling	
one’s	caring	obligations,	it	is	just	as	important	to	assess	“the	way	in	which	moral	and	social	
responsibilities	are	assigned	and	distributed	within	different	social-moral	systems,	and	examining	
the	attendant	power	relations	and	material	consequences	of	those	distributions.”29		For	example,	
consider	the	‘double	day’—where	women	engage	in	paid	work	outside	the	home	and	caring	work	at	
home—that	many	women	experience	as	a	ready	example	to	demonstrate	the	ways	in	which	social	
responsibilities	are	often	unevenly	and	unfairly	distributed.		The	reasons	could	be	a	lack	of	state	
protections	for	parents	to	have	flexible	work	hours,	socially	reinforced	norms	about	women,	not	
men,	being	carers,	or	a	combination	of	both	that	contribute	to	the	continued	existence	of	the	
‘double	day’.	
	 When	the	concerns	of	care	are	understood	as	vital	to	human	flourishing,	we	can	begin	to	see	
how	the	critical	ethic	of	care	can	transform	our	understanding	of	global	moral	contexts.		Using	the	
lens	of	care,	we	can	begin	to	picture	a	world	of	profound	interdependence,	and	use	the	practice	of	
responsibility	as	a	guide	for	how	to	assign	our	caring	responsibilities,	personally	and	institutionally.		
The	increased	interconnectedness	and	interdependence	of	the	world	means	that	our	relationships	
with	distant	strangers	are	not	so	distant	as	we	might	think,	and	that	all	humans	(not	only	women,	
and	not	only	women	in	and	from	developing	nations)	would	greatly	benefit	from	rethinking	the	
relationship	between	work	and	care,	which	could	contribute	to	greater	human	flourishing	around	
the	world.		Robinson	notes,	“The	tasks	of	social	reproduction—including	fostering	the	virtues	of	
caring	and	the	carrying	out	of	the	practices	of	daily	caring	work—would	be	seen	as	important	forms	
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of	civic	participation.”30		She	acknowledges,	however,	that	this	would	not	be	the	only	part	of	civic	
participation,	but	an	important	one	that	makes	caring	a	part	of	the	lives	of	all	persons.			
	 In	focusing	on	the	relational	aspect	of	human	existence	and	flourishing	and	the	concerns	of	
care,	one	of	the	global	moral	contexts	that	a	critical	ethics	of	care	brings	to	the	fore	is	the	specific	
disadvantage	women	experience	globally,	and	specifically	in	the	Global	South.		Although	there	are	
substantive	issues	with	determining	whether	or	not	there	has	been	a	‘feminization’	of	poverty,	it	is	
at	least	true	that	by	some	of	the	most	popular	poverty	metrics,	such	as	the	World	Bank’s	
International	Poverty	Line	(IPL),	that	the	situation	of	poor	women	is	not	well	documented	or	
understood.31		Further,	because	the	IPL	is	a	metric	based	on	households,	it	cannot	encompass	the	
ways	in	which	the	distribution	of	household	resources	is	unequal.		For	instance,	“more	money	is	
often	spent	for	boys’	education	than	for	girls’	and	on	health	care	for	men	and	boys	than	for	women	
and	girls.”32		Nor	can	the	IPL	necessarily	assess	the	ways	in	which	migrant	workers	might	earn	more	
money	than	in	past	decades,	but	their	families	are	still	poor.		In	spite	of	an	increase	of	women	
engaging	in	paid	work,	especially	in	export-manufacturing,	there	has	been	“a	continuing	erosion	of	
their	potential	and	existing	social	entitlements,”33	entitlements	that	often	supported	women	such	as	
childcare,	elder	care,	and	health	care.		Further,	because	women’s	“lives	as	workers	cannot	be	
separated	from	their	lives	as	carers,”34	friction	is	created	between	the	women	who	work	and	their	
employers	because	of	the	assumption	that	work	and	home	should	be	separable.		This	is	one	of	the	
many	pressures	experienced	by	women,	because	while	there	is	an	increase	of	women	in	wage	work,	
women	are	also	heavily	relied	upon	to	supply	non-paid	care	work	for	their	family	to	survive.		One	
answer	to	the	problems	women	face	in	working	in	many	developing	countries	has	been	the	
International	Labour	Organization’s	labour	rights	and	standards.		However,	the	problem	is	that	such	
standards	and	rights	are	constructed	as	‘gender-blind,’35	which	does	not	give	enough	space	to	the	
understanding	that	the	reproductive	work	of	care	is	just	as	important	to	the	survival	of	families	as	
the	productive	work	of	paid	labour.36		Instead,	the	ethics	of	care	is	sensitive	to	the	ways	in	which	
gender,	race,	geopolitical	location	and	power	work	together	to	marginalize	some	women.		For	
example,	poorer	women	often	lack	access	to	reproductive	health,	but	are	nevertheless	accountable	
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for	their	children	as	though	they	had	the	same	choices	as	women	who	do	have	that	access.37		This	
‘double-bind’	as	it	were,	demonstrates	that	serious	attention	must	be	paid	to	the	particulars	of	the	
root	causes	of	women’s	poverty,	and	we	cannot	be	tempted	by	the	luxury	of	assumptions.		
Critical,	feminist	care	ethics	challenges	how	we	view	the	relationship	between	work	and	care,	
and	brings	forward	the	understanding	that	care	is	necessary	for	human	beings	to	survive	and	thrive,	
that	is,	to	flourish.		Our	caring	responsibilities	certainly	exist,	and	the	caring	practice	of	responsibility	
in	critical	care	ethics	demands	that	we	investigate	why	they	exist	as	they	do	now,	and	make	clear	
that	there	is	nothing	‘necessary’	about	their	current	configuration.		This	leads	to	the	transformative	
force	of	care	ethics.		The	shift	in	perception	necessary	for	this	kind	of	transformation	does	not	need	
to	originate	from	the	state,	because	“care	as	a	critical	practice	can	itself	inspire	and	challenge	
conventional	thinking.”38		Transformation	itself	is	something	we	practice,	and	we	can	understand	
transformation	as	something	that	we	do	in	relation	to	and	with	particular	others.		The	possibility	of	
social	transformation	through	the	practices	of	care	are	based	on	the	idea	that	when	we	act	
differently	we	are	doing	two	things	at	once:	1)	“demonstrating	how	to	act	better;”	and	2)	
“counteracting	bad	practice,	such	as	improving	bad	conditions	or	flawed	organisations.”39		Such	
transformations	are	already	occurring	in	developing	countries	around	the	world.		Different	
organizations	of	women	workers	are	coalescing	in	order	to	protect	the	interests	of	their	members	
and	to	help	them	balance	‘productive’	work	and	caring	labour	in	ways	that	do	not	leave	them	with	
the	larger	share	of	the	sum	total	of	the	two.		Such	organizations	include	Nari	Uddug	Kendra	and	
Uthsao	and	Phulki	in	Bangladesh,	and	the	very	successful	SEWA	(Self-Employed	Women’s	
Association)	in	India.40		These	organizations	enact	different	kinds	of	practices,	demonstrating	that	
there	are	other	ways	to	act	that	can	meet	their	needs,	and	working	against	the	bad	institutional	
practices	that	led	them	to	create	their	own	organizations	in	the	first	place.		They	are	demonstrating	
how	the	state	should	have	been	treating	them,	and	as	such	practicing	the	transformation	that	the	
state	would	not	enact	itself.		Additionally,	success	stories	such	as	the	ones	listed	above	could	very	
well	serve	to	call	attention	to	the	ways	in	which	governments	and	other	institutions	have	failed	the	
very	people	they	should	have	been	supporting.		These	organizations	serve	to	demonstrate	that	there	
was	a	gap	in	governmental	support	and	we	can	use	the	lens	of	care	to	question	why	that	gap	
occurred	and	what	made	it	politically	acceptable.	
	 Lastly,	a	critical	ethic	of	care	is	not	simply	a	way	to	protect	human	flourishing	within	
relationships,	but	to	provide	direction	for	ethical	(i.e.	morally	praiseworthy)	globalization.		The	
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increased	interconnectedness	of	persons	and	institutions	is	an	ever	more	visible	factor	of	human	life.		
Simply	looking	at	where	my	food	comes	from	demonstrates	that	national	isolation	is	hardly	possible	
or	a	truthful	picture	of	the	world	for	most	states	in	the	early	21st	century.		The	question	becomes	
how	to	best	adjust	social	and	political	policy	to	globalize	ethically,	given	the	interconnected	nature	
of	modern	human	civilization.		Using	the	lens	of	care,	core	moral	problems	would	shift	from	what	
rights	to	protect	and	how	to	protect	them,	to	issues	about	dependence,	vulnerability,	and	the	
relations	of	power	present	in	the	world	that	can	prevent	human	flourishing.		With	different	core	
moral	problems	identified,	there	would	be	a	subsequent	shift	in	the	kinds	of	policy	and	government	
programs	that	are	in	place.		Ultimately	it	would	mean	“fostering	a	global	culture	of	care.”41		While	
the	values	of	care	would	be	prioritized,	that	does	not	mean	that	care	would	be	romanticized.		One	of	
the	benefits	of	care	ethics	is	that	it	is	self-critical,	as	it	must	always	guard	against	concerns	about	
parochialism	or	paternalism.		It	can	be	self-correcting,	because	central	to	care	ethics	is	the	
knowledge	that	others	do	not	share	our	own	background	assumptions,	and	the	theorist	must	be	
sensitive	to	that	in	a	real	and	meaningful	way,	guided	by	the	practice	of	responsiveness.		This	means	
that	the	ethics	of	care	is	well	suited	to	uncovering	deeply	held	norms	that	pervade	the	current	global	
order.		It	is	to	some	of	these	norms	that	I	turn	to	next,	demonstrating	how	the	ethics	of	care	can	
shed	light	on	these	often	unseen	or	ignored	global	moral	contexts.	
	
Section 3 – Global Moral Contexts 
The	focus	of	this	section	is	to	provide	concrete	examples	of	the	capacity	of	the	critical,	feminist	
ethics	of	care	to	assess	global	moral	contexts	and	provide	a	critical	analysis.		The	transformative	
effect	of	applying	critical,	feminist	care	ethics	will	be	addressed	in	Chapter	Five	where	I	discuss	the	
intersection	of	care	ethics	and	public	policy.		Here,	I	am	more	interested	in	demonstrating	one	of	the	
benefits	of	a	critical	ethics	of	care,	which	gives	greater	attention	to	the	background	conditions	of	
inequality	and	injustice.		Many	of	these	background	conditions	have	to	do	with	issues	of	social	
reproduction,	which	are	necessary	for	human	life	to	continue.		These	issues	include	the	division	of	
responsibility	for	care	labour	in	the	home	and	the	community,	the	lack	of	resources	for	care,	the	
status	of	care	workers,	and	that	care	work	is	either	low-paid	or	unpaid,	which	sustains	a	cycle	of	
inequality	and	exploitation.		One	of	the	major	areas	of	investigation	for	global	care	ethics	is	the	
transnational	migration	of	care,	i.e.	‘global	care	chains.’		These	complex	chains	of	care	demonstrate	
that	care	is	a	transnational	issue,	that	care	shortages	matter,	and	that	perhaps	norms	about	care	and	
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work	need	to	change,	especially	norms	that	foster	racial	and	gender	inequality.42		All	of	these	issues	
are	reflected	and	influenced	by	macroeconomic	policies	instituted	by	both	domestic	and	
multinational	institutions.43	
A	related	benefit	of	examining	these	contexts	through	the	lens	of	care	is	that	the	analysis	
that	care	ethics	provides	presents	a	challenge	to	the	norms	that	underlie	these	issues	and	create	
systemic	marginalization	and	vulnerability	on	a	global	scale.		The	norms	around	difference,	exclusion,	
gender,	and	violence	are	primary	examples	of	sites	of	moral	concern	that	can	be	assessed	and	
investigated	by	the	ethics	of	care.		Further,	this	analysis	can	provide	a	different	perspective	on	the	
ways	in	which	we	understand	such	moral	contexts.44		This	different	perspective,	in	turn,	can	provide	
new	reasons	to	act	and	new	sites	of	potential	transformation.	
As	will	be	more	fully	explored	in	Chapter	Three,	contrasting	the	ethics	of	care	with	a	
standard	human	rights	approach	can	provide	very	different	perspectives	on	injustice.		Human	rights,	
while	often	used	to	identify	an	existing	site	of	inequality	or	injustice,	does	not	necessarily	tell	us	
anything	about	why	a	particular	injustice	occurs	in	the	first	place.		For	example,	we	accept	that	there	
is	a	human	right	against	racial	discrimination.		However,	this	right	only	says	that	racial	discrimination	
is	wrong;	it	does	nothing	to	investigate	why	someone	might	hold	racist	views,	nor	can	it	challenge	
powerfully	held	racist	views.		The	proclamation	of	rights	tells	us	“very	little	about	why	[some]	are	
unable	to	exercise	those	rights.”45		The	ethics	of	care,	on	the	other	hand,	would	seek	to	examine	why	
someone	would	hold	such	views	in	the	first	place,	and	perhaps	finding	that	there	is	a	feedback	loop	
between	pervasive	social	norms,	legal	sanctions,	and	personal	ignorance.		Then,	one	might	be	able	
to	not	only	determine	that	racism	is,	of	course,	wrong,	but	is	also	able	to	understand	how	racism	can	
take	hold	in	the	first	place.		Of	course,	simply	understanding	something	does	not	automatically	fix	
the	problem,	but	my	contention	is	that	a	deeper	understanding	will	provide	a	wider	range	of	options	
when	attempting	to	combat	pervasive	and	insidious	problems	like	racism,	where	often	times	the	
reasons	a	racist	holds	for	being	racist	are	not	that	clear	to	even	her	or	himself.		Greater	
understanding	leads	to	greater	potential	for	transformation.	
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Section 3.1 – Difference 
One	of	the	main	benefits	to	using	the	critical,	feminist	ethics	of	care	for	global	moral	contexts	is	that	
it	can	be	a	more	nuanced	and	subtle	approach	to	handling	problems	and	issues	that	arise	from	the	
need	to	balance	increased	connectedness	and	the	profound	differences	that	still	exist	in	the	world	
today.		Using	the	lens	of	care,	we	see	that	difference	should	not	be	erased	nor	should	it	be	an	excuse	
to	continue	to	avoid	matters	of	deep	moral	concern.		Instead,	the	ethics	of	care	prioritizes	
“[r]ecognizing	and	respecting	the	worth	of	human	differences”46	in	order	to	challenge	notions	that	
simply	treating	others	as	the	same	is	enough	to	combat	injustice.		The	ethics	of	care	instead	denies	
that	difference	necessarily	creates	social	distance,	nor	does	it	assume	that	assimilation	of	difference	
is	the	solution.47		Rather,	an	ethics	of	care,	with	the	practice	of	attentiveness,	questions	background	
assumptions	about	what	“makes	some	differences	salient	and	others	unimportant.”48		
Difference	is	best	understood	as	existing	“in	the	context	of	a	relationship.”49		For	differences	
to	be	identified,	a	relationship	must	exist	in	order	to	give	that	difference	meaning.		For	example,	
consider	the	Filipina	women	who	migrate	to	Canada	through	a	guest	worker	program.		Many	of	
these	women	leave	behind	their	own	children	to	care	for	the	children	of	often,	white	middle-class	
women.		The	Filipina	nanny	and	the	family	that	hired	her	have	a	relationship,	as	do	the	governments	
of	Canada	and	the	Philippines,	and	one	of	the	results	of	that	relationship	is	the	guest	worker	
program.		The	inequality	between	Canada	and	the	Philippines	in	terms	of	bargaining	position	and	
overall	standing	in	the	global	relations	of	power	is	a	part	of	how	the	relationship	between	the	family	
and	the	nanny	are	constructed.		Canada,	and	thus	the	Canadian	family,	has	the	greater	parity	of	the	
power,	and	as	such	has	more	ability	to	exert	that	power	over	the	Philippines	and	the	Filipina	nanny.		
Without	the	transnational	guest	worker	program,	Canadians	would	not	necessarily	construct	
Filipinas	as	being	prime	candidates	for	domestic	work.		The	lens	of	care,	here	guided	by	the	practice	
of	attentiveness,	can	uncover	how	public	policy,	like	the	guest	worker	program,	can	foster	and	
perpetuate	forms	of	difference,	especially	racialized	forms	of	difference	in	this	instance,	that	serve	
to	conceptually	connect	non-white	women	and	good	provision	of	care.		As	Allison	Weir	notes,	
eliminating	race	and	class	oppression	is	vital	to	overcoming	gender	oppression	as	well.50		These	
differences	in	race	and	class	allow	for	the	perpetuation	of	harmful	conceptions	of	others,	and	also	
stand	in	the	way	of	larger	gender	solidarity,	dividing	women	into	care-consumers	and	care-providers.		
If	we	are	to	resolve	the	problems	that	constructions	of	difference	can	generate,	we	must	be	aware	
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of	the	ways	in	which	difference	itself	is	perpetuated	through	norms,	institutions,	and	other	relations	
of	power.	
Difference	is	constructed	in	relationship,	and	those	relations	are	also	shaped	by	the	very	
norms	surrounding	how	difference	is	handled	and	perpetuated,	and	difference	can	be	further	
enforced	through	“the	structural	and	normative	inequalities	present	in	the	global	capitalist	political	
economy.”51		How	difference	is	constructed	can	serve	to	render	some	persons	as	Other,	as	someone	
who	is	only	fit	for	certain	kinds	of	work,	or	a	certain	place	in	the	world,	that	does	not	hold	the	same	
kind	of	assumed	worth	that	other	roles	are	favoured	with,	such	as	that	of	a	professor	or	doctor	or	
even	a	white	collar	office	worker.		This	kind	of	difference	can	be	linked	to	the	worth	of	a	person,	
where	those	who	engage	in	caring	labour	are	often	seen	as	worth	less	than	those	who	engage	in	
‘productive’	work.		Further,	when	disparate	groups	hold	to	different	value	systems,	this	can	be	used	
as	a	reason	to	not	engage	in	a	shared	moral	project	at	all.			
Importantly,	the	caring	practice	of	attentiveness	requires	us	to	engage	with	the	racialized	
context	of	care,	and	how	“changing	regimes	of	care	provision	reconstitute,	for	better	or	for	worse,	
existing	racial	divisions	of	labour.”52		Canadian	women	are	often	seen	as	‘freed’	from	having	to	be	a	
stay-at-home	mother,	having	to	be	seen	as	‘essentially’	a	wife	and	mother.		Feminism	has	done	a	
great	deal	for	Canadian	women,	and	millions	of	other	Western	women,	gaining	such	women	entry	
into	the	workforce.		What	has	not	materialized	alongside	such	liberation,	however,	is	a	
corresponding	cultural	shift	that	would	firmly	de-couple	women	and	child	rearing,	incorporating	
men	more	fully	into	the	sphere	of	domestic	labour	instead	of	allowing	care	to	‘pass	on’	from	men	to	
women	or	racialized	‘other’	persons.		Some	women	avoid	having	to	work	a	‘double-day,’	by	hiring	
nannies,	and	in	order	to	keep	costs	down	it	is	easier	to	hire	women53	who	will	do	good	work	but	for	
less	money.		Here,	it	is	possible	to	see	a	very	subtle,	racialized	kind	of	difference	at	play	in	situations	
like	this.		For	example,	Filipina	women	are	construed	as	‘different’	from	their	often-white	employers,	
in	that	they	are	considered	more	suited	for	domestic	work,	trustworthy	in	terms	of	childcare,	and	
willing	to	accept	less	pay	than	full	Canadian	citizens,	by	virtue	of	the	image	of	the	‘good	Filipina	
mother.’		Further,	the	labour	rights	that	protect	a	Canadian	citizen	from	workplace	abuse	do	not	
necessarily	extend	in	full	material	form	to	the	Filipina	nanny.		Because	the	material	circumstances	
are	very	different,	and	there	is	so	much	less	oversight	in	domestic	work,	treating	the	citizen	worker	
and	the	transnational	domestic	worker	as	the	same	does	not	necessarily	prevent	or	call	attention	to	
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possible	sites	of	injustice.		Then,	because	the	Canadian	family	lives	in	close	proximity	with	the	
Filipina	woman,	the	assumed	differences	can	be	reinforced	and	perpetuated	because	their	main	
contact	with	Filipino	persons	and	culture	is	with	a	Filipina	domestic	worker.		How	we	define	people	
as	different	and	therefore	as	deserving	different	kinds	of	protections	is	also	part	of	the	social	
construction	of	difference.		This	is	important	to	understand	because	difference	is	often	a	prelude	to	
harmful	exclusionary	practices.	
	
Section 3.2 – Exclusion 
Exclusion	is	often	predicated	upon	and	can	also	produce	perceived,	negative	types	of	difference.		In	
the	international	system,	exclusion	is	often	accomplished	through	citizenship	and	a	sense	of	national	
belonging,	and	at	the	same	time	defining	the	self	in	relation	to	Others.		Iris	Marion	Young	examined	
this	political	phenomenon	in	the	context	of	racial	and	social	groups	within	a	state,	noting	that	“[t]he	
ideal	of	community	[…]	validates	and	reinforces	the	fear	and	aversion	some	social	groups	exhibit	
toward	others.”54		This	can	also	hold	true	for	the	nation-state,	when	the	nation	itself	is	idealized	as	
being	composed	of	certain	kinds	of	persons,	this	underwrites	the	exclusion	of	those	who	are	
different	from	the	ideal.		The	critical,	feminist	ethics	of	care	can	offer	an	important	lens	on	exclusion	
because	of	the	“construction	of	identity	linked	to	citizenship	and	nationality.”55		The	practice	of	
citizenship	and	identity	building	in	relation	to	a	particular	nation-state	necessarily	excludes	others,	
marking	those	non-citizens	as	different	from	citizens	and	imposing	a	structure	on	our	caring	
responsibilities.		This	is	not	to	say	that	states	themselves	are	the	problem,	or	that	they	should	be	
abolished	in	favour	of	some	sort	of	world	government.		Rather,	the	point	is	that	when	pursuing	a	
theory	of	ethical	globalization,	we	must	be	attentive	to	the	construction	of	identity	and	patterns	of	
exclusion	that	serve	to	keep	billions	of	people	in	positions	of	insecurity,	as	well	as	how	the	work	of	
care	itself	can	be	obscured	from	deeper	consideration.	
Just	like	difference,	exclusion	cannot	happen	without	a	relationship.56		It	is	always	within	the	
context	of	two	or	more	actors.		The	ethics	of	care,	as	a	relational	ethic,	is	well	suited	to	uncovering	
the	often	complex	ways	in	which	international	organizations	and	national	governments	interact,	
with	the	global	rich	often	being	able	to	dictate	terms	to	the	global	poor.		Care	ethics,	guided	by	the	
practice	of	responsibility,	can	also	critically	assess	how	those	exclusionary	international	relationships	
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impact	the	lives	of	real	people	within	the	context	of	their	concrete	personal	relationships,	because	
norms	and	institutions	shape	how	we	carry	out	our	caring	responsibilities.		These	kinds	of	tensions	
are	played	out	all	over	the	world.		Let	us	once	again	use	the	example	of	the	Filipina	domestic	worker	
holding	a	place	of	employment	with	a	Canadian	family.		She	has	left	her	home	country,	and	in	
predominantly	Caucasian	Canada	she	is	an	ethnic	minority,	unable	to	gain	the	same	benefits	of	
citizenship	in	her	host	country.57		She	is	excluded	from	the	benefits	of	the	country	in	which	she	lives,	
even	though	she	might	pay	taxes	to	that	country.		She	is	responsible	for	the	care	of	children	who	are	
citizens,	but	is	not	a	part	of	the	family.		Further,	this	woman	is	in	a	unique	position	of	vulnerability,	
often	unable	to	demand	overtime	pay,	days	off,	and	is	dependent	upon	a	visa	to	continue	to	work.		
While	perhaps	none	of	her	rights	are	being	violated,	at	least	not	in	a	civic	sense,	she	is	certainly	not	
‘one	of	us’	to	Canadians,	but	rather	‘one	of	them’,	an	Other,	someone	who	is	present	to	do	the	work	
that	no	one	else	wants	to	do.		Her	difference	is	part	of	her	exclusion	from	the	larger	discussion	about	
why	there	is	a	demand	for	transnational	migrant	labour,	or	why	Western	women	and	men	feel	the	
need	to	hire	domestic	workers	in	the	first	place.		In	a	more	material	sense	she	is	also	excluded,	by	
her	lack	of	citizenship,	from	being	able	to	vote	to	strengthen	domestic	labour	laws,	as	well	being	
unable	to	use	her	own	voice	to	give	vent	to	her	concerns.58		The	Filipina	nanny	in	this	instance	faces	
more	than	one	type	of	exclusion:	from	having	a	political	voice	and	from	having	her	care	needs	
attended	and	responded	to.		Her	relative	lack	of	power	in	the	context	of	others	having	much	more	
power	over	her	is	part	of	what	allows	such	exclusions	to	happen	in	the	first	place.		Through	the	lens	
of	care,	we	can	see	that	when	the	balance	of	power	is	so	heavily	skewed,	the	globally	disadvantaged	
cannot	always	put	pressure	on	the	more	powerful	to	deal	fairly	with	those	who	are	often	
marginalized	and	excluded.	
Critical,	feminist	care	ethics	would	also	challenge	the	ways	in	which	considerations	of	care	
are	also	excluded	from	public	concern	as	well.		This	exclusion	of	care	from	public	concern	occurs	not	
only	through	legislation,	but	through	accounting	metrics	as	well.		The	United	Nations	System	of	
National	Accounts	(UNSNA)	is	still	one	of	the	most	widely	used	accounting	metrics,	but	it	relies	on	a	
‘consumption	boundary’	where	“many	domestic	and	personal	services	[…]	do	not	‘count’	when	they	
are	produced	and	consumed	within	the	same	household.”59		This	allows	for	the	work	of	care	to	be	
rendered	invisible,	to	be	excluded	from	conceptions	of	‘work’,	which	serves	to	keep	the	work	of	care	
and	those	who	provide	it	(often	women,	and/or	racialized	persons	from	different	geopolitical	
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locations)	from	public	consideration	and	understanding.		When	care	is	relegated	to	the	private	
sphere,	when	it	is	seen	as	only	a	moral	consideration	for	the	family	or	close	friendships,	then	we	
exclude	from	view	the	ways	in	which	care	is	profoundly	shaped	by	political,	economic,	and	cultural	
patterns	of	power.		Rather,	if	as	I	argued	in	Chapter	One	and	Section	2	of	this	chapter,	we	
understand	that	institutions	profoundly	shape	our	relations	with	particular	others,	and	that	how	we	
care	for	others	is	not	necessarily	fixed	(i.e.	there	is	nothing	‘natural’	about	any	of	the	ways	we	
currently	provide	care),60	then	care	itself	must	be	included	in	political	discourse,	nationally	and	
internationally.		The	imperative	to	include	care	in	international	politics	is	predicated	upon	the	
understanding	that	not	only	do	national	policies	have	international	scope	(in	the	case	of	the	Filipina	
nanny,	or	cases	of	immigration	or	refugees),	but	that	the	practices	of	care,	especially	how	caring	
responsibilities	are	portioned	out	between	persons,	are	already	internationalized.61		We	must	be	
able	to	understand	the	current	migration	of	care	work	between	nations,	and	the	lens	of	care	ensures	
that	we	include	these	concerns	when	we	reason	internationally.	
	 The	ethics	of	care,	as	an	analytical	tool,	seeks	to	uncover	the	ways	in	which	exclusion	is	
created	and	perpetuated	throughout	the	international	realm.		The	question	of	exclusion—who	
counts	and	who	does	not	count—has	been	long	a	part	of	what	political	philosophy	has	been	very	
concerned	with.		For	example,	in	the	last	few	decades	there	has	been	unprecedented	economic	
growth,	but	this	growth	has	not	been	evenly	distributed.		While	the	so-called	West	(or	Global	North	
as	some	label	it)	has	profited,	many	nations	in	the	Global	South	have	more	debt,	greater	levels	of	
“poverty,	hunger,	exploitation	of	labour,	destruction	of	the	environment,	[and]	cultural	
devastation.”62		This	unequal	playing	field,	in	part	propped	up	by	the	construction	of	difference,	can	
determine	who	has	a	‘voice’—or	at	the	very	least	whose	‘voice’	is	the	‘loudest’—in	the	conversation	
about	globe-spanning	issues,	like	international	trade	agreements,	or	environmental	protections.		The	
trans-nationalisation	of	care	work	exemplifies	the	unequal	power	relations	that	exist	in	the	world	
today,	because	a	care	deficit	in	one	part	of	the	world	creates	enough	of	a	demand	for	labour	that	
some	women	from	other	nations	become	migrant	care	workers	to	fulfil	that	demand,	and	leave	
behind	them	a	care	deficit	in	their	home	country.63		These	unequal	power	relations	allow	the	
continued	exclusion	of	care	workers,	and	even	the	concerns	of	care	itself,	from	political	
consideration,	thus	shaping	our	caring	responsibilities.	
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Section 3.3 – Gender 
The	ethics	of	care	is,	at	its	roots,	a	feminist	ethic,	and	as	such	it	expressly	examines	the	lives	of	
women.		However,	it	is	important	to	consider	more	than	femininity	and	how	women’s	lives	are	lived.		
The	ethics	of	care,	constructed	as	critical	tool,	can	be	turned	to	our	constructions	of	gender	on	a	
larger	scale.		It	is	important	to	take	a	critical	eye	to	the	construct	of	masculinity	just	as	much	as	the	
construct	of	femininity.		Both	concepts	of	gender	shape	the	world	that	we	live	in	and	influence	the	
moral	choices	that	all	people	make.		The	ethics	of	care	considers	the	moral	implications	of	gender	
beyond	basic	social	justice,	which	turns	on	the	idea	that	no	one	should	be	discriminated	against	on	
the	basis	of	their	gender.		Instead,	the	ethics	of	care	asks	how	being	gendered	alters	the	way	in	
which	we	experience	the	world	around	us,	and	how	that	gendered	experience	can	be	understood	as	
a	site	of	moral	concern.64		However,	the	point	is	not	to	say	that	there	is	anything	essential	about	
men	or	women,	nor	is	it	to	say	that	our	individual	behaviours	are	the	target.		Instead,	the	goal	is	to	
look	at	the	ways	in	which	institutions	and	norms	shape	our	relationships	as	well	as	our	constructions	
of	gender.		Further,	because	now	there	are	fewer	formally	stated	prescriptions	based	on	gender	in	
people’s	lives,	especially	in	the	West,	the	ways	in	which	being	gendered	affects	a	person’s	life	is	
often	subtle	and	not	explicitly	obvious.		Care	ethics,	through	the	practice	of	attentiveness,	can	be	
used	to	draw	attention	to	these	less	obvious	problems	and	through	critical	analysis	identify	possible	
sites	of	transformation.		Although	gender,	by	itself,	is	not	the	end	of	analysis,	because	the	ethics	of	
care	is	able	to	acknowledge	the	intersection	of	race	and	geopolitical	location	to	how	gender	is	
constructed.		However,	in	this	section	I	focus	on	gender	in	isolation	to	bring	to	the	fore	how	care	
work	itself	is	deeply	linked	to	our	conceptions	of	femininity	and	masculinity	in	order	to	challenge	our	
gendered	assumptions	about	care	work	and	resist	the	continued	devaluation	of	care.	
Typically,	the	critical,	feminist	ethics	of	care	focuses	on	how	the	feminization	of	care	is	
legitimized	and	sustained,	and	that	of	care	as	a	social	and	economic	issue.65		This	can	be	understood	
as	the	ways	in	which	caring	work	is	relegated,	through	official	and	unofficial	means,	to	women.		For	
example,	women	are	overrepresented	in	professions	like	early	childhood	care,	elder	care,	nursing,	
and	other	kinds	of	employment	that	are	primarily	concerned	with	caring	reproductive	labour.66		This	
overrepresentation	can	in	turn	reinforce	the	idea	that	those	are	positions	and	tasks	that	women	are	
suited	to,	that	is,	caring	is	a	feminine	activity.		In	contrast,	the	ethics	of	care	claims	instead	the	idea	
that	caring	is	a	human	activity,	and	that	all	people	regardless	of	gender	must	fulfil	their	own	caring	
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responsibilities.		Because	of	this	focus,	often	norms	about	masculinity	have	been	pushed	to	the	
sidelines;	however,	the	norms	of	femininity	are	linked	to	the	norms	of	masculinity.67			
Norms	of	masculinity	have	often	been	applied	to	those	who	are	biologically	male,	whether	
they	agree	with	them	or	not,	much	the	same	as	how	femininity	has	been	applied	to	women.		
However,	the	idea	is	not	to	target	specific	individuals	through	a	critical	care	ethic,	but	instead	to	
assess	the	institutional	means	that	produces	and	perpetuates	these	gender	norms.		Using	care	ethics,	
we	can	uncover	the	ways	in	which	gender	norms	are	perpetuated	through	institutions,	and	the	
relationship	between	the	conceptions	of	masculinity	and	femininity.		Just	as	many	gender	norms	for	
women	seem	to	reinforce	the	idea	that	women	are,	at	base,	carers,	it	seems	that	many	gender	
norms	for	men	either	privilege	non-caring	activity	or	go	so	far	as	to	stigmatize	men	who	do	engage	
in	caring	reproductive	labour.		In	contrast	to	women,	men	are	overrepresented	as	CEOs,	politicians,	
soldiers,	and	in	the	STEM	(science,	technology,	engineering	and	math)	fields.		Men	are	expected	to	
engage	in	‘productive’	work	outside	the	private	sphere	or	domestic	concerns.		Further,	because	men	
have	been	in	these	kinds	of	positions	for	so	long,	it	reinforces	the	idea	that	men	are	suited	or	best	
equipped	for	such	kinds	of	work.		These	male-centric	norms	have	been	termed	hegemonic	
masculinities,	and	are	not	taken	as	anything	essential	about	any	individual	or	even	all	men.		Rather,	
“[hegemonic	masculinities]	explains	a	set	of	fluid,	socially	constructed	norms	about	‘maleness’	that	
are	constituted	by	and	embedded	in	social	structures	and	institutions.”68		Families,	schools,	work	
places	and	other	institutions	all	contribute	to	the	gendering	of	an	individual,	and	this	holds	true	for	
norms	about	masculinity	as	well	as	norms	about	femininity.			
Yet	this	gendered	division	of	labour,	in	and	of	itself,	is	not	the	whole	of	the	problem.		The	
problem	deepens	when	one	type	of	work	is	seen	as	‘better’	or	as	more	praiseworthy	than	the	other.		
Often,	it	is	productive	work,	not	reproductive	labour,	which	is	seen	as	the	‘better’	option,	more	
‘fulfilling,’	or	even	able	to	infuse	the	productive	worker	with	greater	moral	worth	because	they	have	
‘contributed’	to	society	as	a	whole.		This	is	in	contrast	to	reproductive	labour,	which	has	the	
connotation	of	not	contributing	anything	material	to	society,	and	often	those	who	engage	in	
reproductive	(care)	labour	are	in	greater	positions	of	vulnerability	due	to	lower	lifetime	earnings	and	
less	economic	security.		Even	the	emotional	attachments	that	are	a	part	of	care	work	can	render	
those	who	do	care	work	more	vulnerable,	“discouraging	them	from	demanding	higher	wages	or	
changes	in	working	conditions	that	might	adversely	affect	care	recipients.”69		Not	only	is	one	type	of	
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work	less	valued,	but	those	who	engage	in	care	work	(paid	and	unpaid)	are	often	in	far	more	
vulnerable	positions	than	those	who	engage	in	‘productive’	work.	
Thinking	further	on	the	case	of	the	Filipina	nanny	and	the	Canadian	family,	we	can	see	how	
the	ethics	of	care	can	be	a	tool	of	analysis,	revealing	the	ways	in	which	gender	can	be	a	moral	
context	by	being	attentive	to	the	particulars	of	the	case.		In	this	situation,	we	can	ask	questions	such	
as:	why	is	so	much	of	the	domestic	pressure	on	women	in	Canada	such	that	many	women	deem	it	
necessary	to	hire	a	nanny,	and	why	do	male	partners	not	perform	an	equal	amount	of	care	work?		
Do	employers	not	offer	flexible	hours	to	allow	for	picking	up	children	from	school,	do	they	not	offer	
paternity	leave,	or	offer	only	marginal	maternity	leave?		Who	does	the	Canadian	government	accept	
as	guest	workers,	and	whom	do	they	turn	away?		Is	it	mostly	women	who	are	allowed	in	the	country	
to	work	because	they	are	‘better’	domestic	workers?		Are	men	not	hired	at	the	same	rate	because	
they	are	‘not	good’	in	the	domestic	sphere?		Additionally,	we	can	also	ask	what	the	pressures	are	in	
the	Philippines	that	drive	these	women	to	seek	work	abroad.		It	is	not	only	about	the	gender	norms	
of	the	host	country	in	this	instance,	but	also	about	the	ways	in	which	women	view	their	own	nation	
and	how	the	gender	dynamics	of	their	home	can	put	pressure	on	them	to	care	for	friends	or	family	
in	the	only	way	available	to	them:	by	leaving.		Taken	together,	it	is	possible	to	see	that	the	gender	
norms	involved	allow	Canadian	(and	presumably	these	situations	occur	is	most	other	highly	
industrialized	Western	nations)	women	and	men	to	abrogate	their	caring	responsibilities,	at	least	
insofar	as	they	pay	someone	else	to	rear	their	children.		For	although	hiring	a	nanny	might	ensure	
the	children	are	looked	after,	the	parents	in	such	cases	are	not	themselves	meeting	the	standards	of	
care	with	regard	to	their	own	children.		Further,	the	situation	means	that	Filipina	women	‘choose’	to	
neglect	their	personal	caring	responsibilities	in	order	to	provide	for	their	children,	leaving	their	
children	with	female	relatives	or	a	close	female	friend,	or	even	hiring	a	nanny	of	their	own	with	their	
remittances.70			
Considering	care	ethics	views	relationships	as	a	seat	of	moral	concern,	then	we	can	see	how	
the	ethics	of	care	deems	the	above	situation	morally	problematic.		The	systems,	institutions	and	the	
gender	norms	in	play	allow	a	select	few	to	avoid	their	caring	responsibilities	by	having	others	neglect	
their	own.		This	example	serves	to	highlight	the	role	institutions	play	in	the	construction	of	gender	
roles,	and	the	ways	in	which	they	contribute	to	morally	problematic	contexts	where	women	are	
linked	to	the	‘lesser’	work	of	care,	while	men	are	expected	to	pursue	the	‘better’	productive	work.		
																																								 																				
70	While	those	women	who	become	migrant	care	workers	do,	in	some	sense,	choose	to	leave	their	families	to	
work	abroad,	it	is	not	an	unbounded	choice.		It	is	a	choice	predicated	on	sometimes	very	desperate	needs.		I	
do	not	discuss	the	gray	areas	of	choice	here,	but	it	should	not	be	controversial	that	transnational	migrant	
workers	are	not	making	a	completely	‘free’	choice.		See	Chapter	Three	for	a	discussion	on	the	‘free’	choices	
that	some	women	have	to	make,	and	that	they	are	really,	as	Allison	Weir	calls	them	‘impossible	choices.’	
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This	example	also	underscores	the	privileged	status	‘productive’	work	receives.		This	is	another	
instance	of	‘privileged	irresponsibility,’	whereby	people,	most	often	men,	receive	a	‘pass’	from	their	
caring	responsibilities	due	to	‘providing’	for	their	family	in	a	monetary	sense.		This	idea	is	predicated	
on	the	still	pervasive	idea	that	men	are	the	breadwinners	or	the	economic	earner	in	the	family.71		
Further,	their	status	as	the	economic	earner	means	that	men	are	in	a	position	of	greater	power	
socially.		Privileged	irresponsibility	does	not	necessarily	break	down	when	women	enter	the	work	
force	either.		Although	the	‘double-day’	is	still	a	concern,	this	example	demonstrates	that	women	
can	engage	in	privileged	irresponsibility	as	well,	and	still	perpetuate	racial	and	gendered	
assumptions	about	caring	labour.	
The	lens	of	care	allows	us	to	understand	how	both	men	and	women	are	“affected	by	the	
institutional	context	in	which	care	is	provided,”	and	that	the	issue	at	hand	is	not	that	of	feminine	
values	against	masculine	values,	but	“how	to	reconfigure	femininity	and	masculinity	in	ways	that	
could	move	us	towards	more	gender	equality	along	with	higher	quality	of	care.”72		The	
transformative	potential	of	care	ethics	with	regard	to	gender	lies	in	the	understanding	that	even	
merely	questioning	the	validity	of	current	gender	norms	weakens	the	norms	and	the	institutional	
support	for	those	norms.		Once	we	begin	to	question	the	power	that	gender	norms	have	to	shape	
our	caring	relations,	we	are	then	able	to	understand	that	not	only	are	gender	norms	changeable,	but	
so	are	our	relations	of	care.73		There	is	nothing	‘natural’	about	the	way	in	which	care	is	currently	
provided,	and	challenging	these	assumptions	is	the	first	step	we	must	take	if	we	are	to	have	more	
material	equality	between	the	genders	and	in	terms	of	who	provides	the	work	of	care.		Although	as	
per	Robinson’s	practice	of	responsiveness,	it	is	true	that	we	must	do	more	than	question	norms	if	we	
are	to	achieve	the	kind	of	transformation	that	is	the	ultimate	goal	of	the	ethics	of	care.		Doing	so	
requires	a	reimagining	of	public	policy,	which	I	will	address	in	Chapter	Five.		Next,	however,	I	turn	to	
the	care	analysis	of	violence	and	human	security.	
	
Section 3.4 – Violence and Human Security 
A	persistent	concern	in	international	relations	is	how	to	conceptualise	and	understand	violence,	and	
there	are	doubts	that	“the	ethics	of	care	can	appropriately	address	violence	against	women,	from	
violence	in	intimate	relations	to	the	so-called	public	violence	of	wartime.”74		Yet,	these	types	of	
situations	are	ones	that	an	ethic	of	care	should	be	able	to	address.		Care	ethics	does	acknowledge,	
“that	violence	is	an	aspect	of	human	reality	that	must	be	expected,	but	we	can	successfully	work	to	
																																								 																				
71	Folbre,		609.	
72	Ibid.,	612.	
73	Ibid.,	610.	
74	Robinson,	The	Ethics	of	Care:	A	Feminist	Approach	to	Human	Security,	36.		
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contain	it.”75		Violence	is	a	part	of	human	life	as	it	stands	today,	and	the	critical,	feminist	ethics	of	
care	is	aimed	at	reducing	the	legitimacy	of	the	use	of	violence	locally	and	globally.			Questions	about	
violence	can	be	understood	to	be	about	human	security,	a	field	of	inquiry	that	has	arisen	in	contrast	
to	the	field	of	national	security.		The	question	has	become	about	the	survival	of	individuals,	instead	
about	the	survival	of	states.76		A	lack	of	security	can	be	understood	as	many	things,	but	often	it	is	the	
position	of	being	vulnerable,	marginalized,	and	poor,	a	condition	that	roughly	1.2	billion	individuals	
inhabit	today.77		Like	the	other	global	moral	contexts	previously	discussed,	the	lens	of	care,	and	its	
attendant	practices,	can	be	focused	on	the	topics	of	violence	and	human	security	to	identify	
underlying	causes	and	possible	sites	of	transformation.	
The	more	nuanced	approach	of	critical	care	ethics	can	uncover	the	ways	in	which	insecurity	
and	violence	are	made	possible	by	not	only	economic	conditions	but	also	through	moral	
understandings	related	to	gender	and	the	ways	in	which	women	and	other	carers	(racialized	women	
and	men,	and	transnational	carers	from	the	Global	South)	have	been	devalued	on	a	global	scale	
because	of	cultures	or	ideologies	that	“denigrate	the	moral	values	and	activities	associated	with	
caring.”78		Further,	this	is	not	only	a	moral	problem,	but	a	political	problem	as	well,	because	the	ways	
in	which	violence	is	either	made	legitimate	or	illegitimate	depends	on	institutional	stances	on	
particular	types	of	violence.		For	example,	although	there	might	be	legal	codes	against	domestic	
violence,	the	local	institutions	such	as	the	police	and	hospitals	might	not	fully	engage	with	victims	or	
perpetrators	to	stop	such	actions,	or	they	might	simply	not	engage	at	all	and	allow	the	violence	to	
continue,	abrogating	their	caring	responsibilities.		Care	ethics,	guided	here	by	the	practice	of	
responsibly	as	well	as	responsiveness,	would	ask	why	such	institutional	laxity	occurs,	in	addition	to	
posing	questions	regarding	what	factors	contribute	to	such	violence	in	the	first	place.		The	root	
causes	of	domestic	violence	cannot	be	easily	pinpointed,	but	can	encompass	several	factors	such	as,	
the	history	of	legally	sanctioned	male	violence	against	women,	the	troubling	fact	that	“women	are	
not	exempt	from	the	influence	of	mainstream,	masculinist	understandings	of	domestic	violence”79	
(i.e.	that	women	internalize	the	male	perspective	of	violence,	such	that	they	‘should	have	stayed,’	or	
‘shouldn’t	have	made	him	so	mad’),	and	that	domestic	violence	most	certainly	does	not	occur	
between	two	adults	of	equal	standing.		Rather,	the	lens	of	care	can	help	uncover	the	asymmetrical	
relations	of	power	involved,	and	uncover	how	the	public/private	divide	serves	to	reinforce	the	idea	
that	male	violence	against	women	occurs	in	private,	not	public	spaces,	or	that	domestic	violence	is	
																																								 																				
75	Virginia	Held,	"Can	the	Ethics	of	Care	Handle	Violence?,"	Ethics	and	Social	Welfare	4,	no.	2	(2010):	126.	
76	Fiona	Robinson,	"The	Importance	of	Care	in	the	Theory	and	Practice	of	Human	Security,"	Journal	of	
International	Political	Theory	4,	no.	2	(2008):	168.	
77	Ibid.,	169.	
78	Ibid.,	177.	
79	Paula	Wilcox,	"Communities,	Care	and	Domestic	Violence,"	Critical	Social	Policy	26,	no.	4	(2006):	729.	
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not	necessarily	a	public	concern.		Because	care	ethics	poses	a	serious	challenge	to	the	public/private	
divide,	as	elaborated	in	Chapter	One,	we	can	then	see	that	domestic	violence	is	one	form	of	male	
violence	against	women	that	cannot	be	understood	in	isolation.80		
Violence,	then,	is	one	of	the	major	reasons	why	people	are	rendered	insecure.		Human	
security,	and	its	opposite,	human	insecurity,	are	a	nucleus	of	ethical	issues	for	the	ethics	of	care.		It	is	
most	concerned	with	the	ways	“our	normative	and	ontological	understandings	of	security	serve	to	
reinforce,	rather	than	challenge,	existing	relations	of	power,	thus	perpetuating	and	even	deepening	
conditions	of	insecurity	for	much	of	the	world’s	population.”81		The	norms	about	what	it	means	to	be	
secure,	what	security	is,	and	how	it	is	obtained,	all	serve	in	many	ways	to	render	some	few	people	
secure	at	the	expense	of	millions	of	others.		For	instance,	the	price	of	making	Americans	secure	from	
terrorist	threats	have	made	it	that	much	more	difficult	for	refugees	to	reach	the	United	States.		
When	refugees	cannot	escape	the	persecution	or	violence	that	drives	them	from	their	homes,	they	
are	effectively	trapped	in	a	condition	of	insecurity.		The	security	concern	about	terrorism	as	a	threat	
to	human	lives	privileges	the	lives	of	Americans	over	the	lives	of	others	who	might	also	be	victims	of	
terrorism	who	have	become	refugees,	but	are	not	American	citizens.		A	care	analysis	of	terrorism	
and	terrorists,	however,	would	ask	why	terrorism	occurs	in	the	first	place,	what	political,	economic,	
and	personal	pressures	make	violence	an	attractive	option	to	some.		The	goal	would	be	to	“reduce	
the	appeal	of	violence”82	rather	than	using	military	intervention,	which	often	results	in	more	
violence,	instability,	and	deprivation,	i.e.	the	background	conditions	for	more	terrorism.	
When	care	is	made	central	to	questions	of	human	security,	we	can	see	who	is	responsible	
(through	the	practice	of	responsibility)	for	care	and	under	what	conditions	they	have	to	perform	the	
work	of	care.		This	in	turn	can	reveal	much	about	the	socio-political	conditions	of	race,	gender	and	
class	in	any	given	society.		When	such	conditions	are	uncovered,	we	can	see	the	ways	in	which	social	
norms	are	reinforced	that	in	turn	can	contribute	to	continued	insecurity.83		Akin	to	the	problem	with	
establishing	an	objective	standard	of	poverty,	as	per	Allison	Jaggar’s	work	discussed	in	Section	Two	
of	this	chapter,	care	theorists	recognize	the	problems	with	attempting	to	hold	to	an	objective	
standard	of	insecurity.		Rather,	as	the	ethics	of	care	is	based	on	a	feminist	relational	ontology,	an	
understanding	of	human	security	should	be	understood	from	the	position	that	“the	continuity	of	life	
and	a	sense	of	security	in	people’s	day-to-day	lives	are	impossible	without	relations	and	networks	of	
care	and	responsibility.”84		A	feminist	care	ethics	incorporates	the	effects	of	gender,	race,	class,	and	
																																								 																				
80	Ibid.,	735-6.	
81	Robinson,	The	Ethics	of	Care:	A	Feminist	Approach	to	Human	Security,	40.		
82	Held,	"Can	the	Ethics	of	Care	Handle	Violence?,"	122.	
83	Robinson,	"The	Importance	of	Care	in	the	Theory	and	Practice	of	Human	Security,"	178.	
84	The	Ethics	of	Care:	A	Feminist	Approach	to	Human	Security,	44.		Emphasis	in	the	original.	
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geopolitics	when	it	comes	to	understanding	security.		The	focus	is	not	on	any	individual	actor,	but	
the	relations	among	the	actors.		As	Robinson	notes:	
Changing	the	lens	to	focus	not	on	any	single	actor	but	on	the	relations	among	those	actors—
relationships	that	are	responsible	for	the	maintenance	of	life	itself—is	important	not	only	
because	it	recognizes	the	values	and	activities	traditionally	associated	with	women.		It	also	
questions	the	denigration	and	feminization	of	these	activities	and	demonstrates	their	
importance	to	mitigating	conditions	of	insecurity—for	men	and	women—in	a	variety	of	
contexts.85	
Human	security	is	not	an	objective	condition;	it	is	not	an	absolute	thing	that	is	experienced	
individually.		Instead,	care	ethics	understands	that	no	one	“experiences	security	or	insecurity	
‘alone’.”86			
	 Critical,	feminist	care	ethics	identifies	security	threats	as	ones	that	present	“an	existential	
threat	to	maintenance	and	flourishing	of	the	relational	webs	that	constitute	and	sustain	all	
persons.”87		An	analysis	of	cases	of	violence	and	insecurity	must	uncover	the	root	causes,	and	
investigate	the	ways	in	which	such	threats	are	played	out	in	people’s	everyday	lives,	and	as	per	
Robinson’s	practice	of	responsiveness	require	real,	concrete	action	which	can	be	guided	by	the	
answers	generated	by	the	practices	of	attentiveness	and	responsibility.		Engaging	in	this	kind	of	
reflective	analysis	opens	up	the	understanding	that	human	security	is	not	only	dependent	upon	
protections	against	gross	instances	of	violence	or	unjust	government	action.		Instead,	the	field	of	
human	security	is	opened	up	to	factors	such	as	environmental	disasters	or	health	concerns.		Both	of	
these	situations	see	women	facing	the	majority	of	the	burden	for	handling	the	related	workload.		
Women	are	more	often	caretakers	of	extended	family	in	both	instances,	and	in	the	case	of	natural	
disasters	when	civil	order	is	disrupted,	are	more	often	victims	of	violence	and	sexual	assault.		Further,	
the	case	of	HIV	in	sub-Saharan	Africa	is	a	primary	example	of	how	women	are	more	adversely	
affected	by	the	disease	than	men.		Women	more	often	care	for	the	sick,	thus	missing	work	(and	pay),	
and	can	lose	their	jobs	due	to	a	lack	of	other	caring	options	for	sick	family	members.		In	cases	of	
violence,	natural	disasters	or	health	problems,	women	are	often	in	the	most	insecure	situations.88		
The	ethics	of	care	asks,	in	addition	to	its	usual	question	about	why	women	are	the	primary	
reproductive	labourer,	what	norms	are	at	play	in	the	moral	and	social	landscape	that	also	contribute	
to	such	insecurity.		Further,	it	would	determine	which	political	institutions	are	present	that	might	aid	
or	even	hinder	those	who	are	carers,	and	which	institutions	and	practices	are	in	place	that	might	
prevent	such	instances	of	insecurity	in	the	first	place.	
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	 Importantly,	it	is	not	enough	to	examine	the	causes	of	insecurity	within	nations	alone.		A	
global	critical	ethic	of	care	must	also	assess	the	relations	of	power	present	within	the	international	
realm	that	contribute	to	human	insecurity.		For	example,	for	all	its	good	intentions,	the	food	aid	that	
the	United	States	sends	to	many	African	nations	does	feed	people,	but	also	can	collapse	local	
farming	due	to	the	ability	of	the	United	States	to	undercut	grain	prices.		This	dearth	of	work	forces	
many	people	into	a	state	of	deep	insecurity,	unable	to	make	a	profit	from	their	work	any	longer.		
Women	in	the	global	South	often	find	themselves	pushed	into	the	informal	sector	for	work	to	make	
ends	meet,	or	opt	to	work	abroad	but	in	so	doing	can	become	trafficked	as	a	domestic	or	sex	worker	
with	no	way	back	home.		Women	in	the	informal	sector,	locally	or	internationally,	have	even	less	
protections	than	in	the	formal	sector,	regardless	of	the	socio-moral	landscape.89		Neither	are	women	
the	only	ones	affected.		Children	of	women	who	experience	insecurity	cannot	always	go	to	school,	
they	do	not	always	get	enough	to	eat,	and	their	life	options	shrink	dramatically.		Men,	who	are	out	
of	work,	might	abandon	their	families	or	seek	work	elsewhere,	but	this	also	puts	them	at	risk,	
because	when	they	are	cut	off	from	their	families,	they	do	not	necessarily	have	access	to	the	kinds	of	
care	that	might	become	necessary	if	they	are	sick	or	injured.		It	also	isolates	men	from	their	
relationships,	which	may	perpetuate	feelings	of	disconnection	and	underwrites	the	‘freedom’	to	
engage	in	violence	to	meet	their	individual	needs.	
	 The	ways	in	which	humans	experience	insecurity	and	violence	are	complex,	but	these	
complex	situations	do	have	a	major	benefit:	they	offer	a	plethora	of	sites	for	transformation.		For	
example,	the	United	States	could	alter	its	food	aid	policy,	perhaps	donating	better	quality	seed	and	
only	providing	enough	food	to	aid	locals	through	a	planting	season,	which	could	give	farmers	a	
chance	to	better	their	own	crop	yields.		Western	nations	would	then	have	to	change	their	thinking	
about	aid,	perhaps	seeing	aid	as	a	way	to	help	others	improve	their	own	lives	rather	than	as	an	
expansive	kind	of	gift.		The	local	government	could	offer	better	services	for	its	citizens,	perhaps	
recognizing	that	a	more	educated	and	healthier	populace	is	just	as	much	a	part	of	the	survival	of	the	
state	as	is	military	defence.		Lastly,	and	most	difficult,	gender	norms	could	be	challenged	to	question	
why	women	face	an	unfair	share	of	the	reproductive	labour	involved	in	maintaining	a	family,	
understanding	that	such	norms	are	embedded	in	local	and	non-local	institutions.		Although	this	last	
site	of	transformation	is	the	most	difficult,	it	might	be	the	most	worthwhile.		It	is	not	to	say	that	
women	should	be	‘freed’	from	the	task	of	reproductive	labour,	nor	is	it	to	valorise	care.		Rather,	care	
																																								 																				
89	The	terms	‘informal’	and	‘formal’	for	different	kinds	of	work	refer	to	whether	or	not	the	type	of	employment	
is	contractual	or	more	ad	hoc.		For	example,	office	work	of	most	kinds	is	in	the	‘formal’	sector	where	duties	
and	benefits	are	formalized	in	clear	arrangements.		The	work	of	the	migrant	fruit	picker	is	in	the	‘informal’	
sector,	because	the	duties	and	benefits	are	left	more	ambiguous,	often	to	the	advantage	of	the	employer.	
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ethics	advocates	a	shift	to	viewing	reproductive	labour	as	infused	with	issues	of	great	moral	concern	
that	are	important	for	all	human	beings	to	be	actively	involved	with	maintaining.	
I	have	argued	that	if	one	accepts	that	the	critical	lens	of	care	ethics	can	assess	moral	and	
political	relationships,	and	that	the	current	global	landscape	can	be	conceived	of	as	a	series	of	
institutional	relations,	then	using	the	ethics	of	care	on	a	global	scale	is	reasonably	justifiable.		
Further,	that	the	lens	of	care,	guided	by	the	practices	of	care,	is	better	suited	than,	for	example,	
human	rights	theories	to	identify	the	root	causes	of	moral	contexts	such	as	difference,	exclusion,	
problematic	gender	relations,	and	violence	and	human	security.		Because	the	critical,	feminist	ethics	
of	care	engenders	this	deeper	analysis,	it	can	also	be	used	to	identify	possible	sites	of	transformation,	
places	where	we	can	alter	the	very	moral	and	political	practices	that	produce	complicated	moral	
contexts	in	the	first	place.		Although	Kimberly	Hutchings	doubts	that	care	ethics	properly	challenges	
gender	norms,	and	lacks	prescriptive	force,	I	reject	this	view	in	Chapter	Six.		Further,	care	theorists	
argue	that	NGOs	and	governments	can	take	action	now	to	alter	the	global	political	landscape	based	
on	the	analysis	of	care.		I	will	address	this	possibility	in	Chapter	Five,	when	I	examine	care	and	public	
policy.	
	 Next,	however,	it	is	important	that	I	address	what	I	have	only	referred	to	in	this	chapter:	
international	human	rights	discourses.		In	Chapter	Three,	I	will	discuss	what	international	human	
rights	are,	where	they	have	come	from,	and	how	they	function	today.		I	will	focus	primarily	on	the	
mainstream	understanding	of	human	rights	because	they	have	the	most	purchase	in	international	
political	discourse.		I	will	explore	their	advantages,	and	then	I	will	outline	their	disadvantages	from	
the	perspective	of	feminist	care	ethics.		Care	ethics	itself	is	a	critique	of	traditional	human	rights	
discourses.		Yet,	owing	to	the	fact	that	human	rights	discourses	are	very	powerful,	I	want	to	maintain	
an	understanding	that	critical,	feminist	care	ethics	and	human	rights	can	work	side-by-side.		We	do	
not	need	to	combine	them,	but	instead	might	be	better	served	by	using	each	for	a	very	specific	
purpose	when	examining	global	concerns	of	inequality	and	injustice.		This	is	not	an	either-or	
scenario,	but	a	way	to	expand	our	moral	toolkit	by	denying	that	one	theory	is	all	that	is	necessary	to	
handle	the	wide	variety	of	ethical	problems	that	are	present	in	the	world	today.	
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Chapter Three: Care Ethics and Human Rights 
	
I	have	argued	that	a	global	critical	ethic	of	care	can	be	used	as	an	analytical	tool	that	can	provide	a	
different	perspective	on	the	international:	a	tool	that	gives	us	new	information,	new	reasons	to	act,	
and	new	ways	to	affect	social	and	political	transformation.		The	previous	chapter	demonstrated	the	
justification	for	using	critical,	feminist	care	ethics	on	a	global	scale	and	argued	that	care	ethics	can	
uniquely	address	particular	moral	contexts,	which	are	often	invisible	to	other	approaches.		I	only	
occasionally	stated	that	the	ethics	of	care	offers	a	different	perspective	than	international	human	
rights	discourses.		That	gloss	is	rectified	here	as	I	argue	that	although	human	rights	have	an	
important	place	in	our	global	moral	landscape,	they	nevertheless	fail	to	make	visible	or	encompass	
particular	harms	that	people	experience,	even	if	their	human	rights	have	been	met.	
	 Certainly,	human	rights	are	important,	in	part	because	they	have	become	a	widespread	
discourse	that	has	reached	nearly	global	coverage.		However,	rights	discourses	offer	far	more	than	
merely	practical	benefits.		They	have	great	power	to	identify	cases	of	gross	injustice	or	inequality,	as	
well	as	offer	legitimacy	to	many	marginalized	groups	that	wish	to	be	heard	by	the	global	community.		
Rights	discourses	can	also	offer	arguments	for	why	we	have	very	real	and	binding	obligations	to	
distant	strangers,	and	many	who	write	on	international	human	rights	discourses	do	so	with	an	eye	to	
at	least	reducing	severe	global	poverty.		I	hardly	disagree	with	the	general	aims	of	those	who	do	
work	on	international	human	rights.		Rather,	I	question	the	idea	that	human	rights	are	our	first,	best,	
or	only	option	when	it	comes	to	global	moral	contexts.	
	 My	underlying	aim	is	to	show	the	kind	of	theoretical	framework	that	we	use	can	profoundly	
shape	how	we	see	the	world,	what	we	think	of	as	problems,	and	what	kinds	of	solutions	are	
available	to	us.		When	talking	about	the	world,	politically,	economically,	and	culturally,	“it	is	indeed	
interpretation	all	the	way	down,”	or	in	other	words,	“in	the	social	world	there	is	always	more	than	
one	story	to	tell.”1		The	kind	of	theory	any	philosopher	has	about	anything,	especially	an	
international	political	and	ethical	theory,	is	closely	tied	up	in	what	they	want	to	explain,	which	in	
turn	rests	upon	their	beliefs	and	values.2		Where	and	how	we	live	impacts	our	understanding	of	the	
world,	and	can	affect	the	kind	of	theory	we	believe	is	necessary	to	answer	the	problems	that	we	
identify.		I	argue	that	the	effort	to	create	a	more	just	world,	a	world	with	less	inequality	and	
suffering	can	only	be	aided	by	expanding	our	moral	toolkit,	not	restricting	it	to	a	homogenous	
discourse.	
																																								 																				
1	Steve	Smith,	"Introduction,"	in	International	Relations	Theories:	Discipline	and	Diversity,	ed.	Milja	Kurki	Tim	
Dunne,	and	Steve	Smith	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2013),	3.		Emphasis	in	the	original.	
2	Ibid.,	5.	
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	 In	this	chapter	I	first	provide	a	brief	overview	of	international	human	rights	and	their	main	
features.3		Then	I	will	discuss	some	of	the	benefits	of	using	human	rights	discourses.		Lastly,	I	will	
argue	that	in	spite	of	the	benefits,	the	problems	inherent	in	human	rights	discourses	mean	that	we	
cannot	rely	on	human	rights	alone	to	provide	all	the	answers	to	the	complex	moral	contexts	that	
exist	in	the	world	today.		The	three	critiques	that	I	focus	on	in	this	chapter	are	concerned	with:	1)	
the	questionable	ability	of	human	rights	discourses	to	combat	the	structural	harms	of	globalization;	
2)	the	cultural	and	gender	bias	of	human	rights;	and	3)	that	human	rights	do	not	often	‘see’	the	
pressing,	morally	complex	issues	of	social	reproduction.		On	the	basis	of	these	critiques,	I	reaffirm	
my	argument	that	not	all	cases	of	global	moral	concern	are	necessarily	rights	issues.	
	
Section 1 – Human Rights Discourses 
In	this	section	I	begin	with	an	overview	of	what	human	rights	actually	are,	exploring	the	two	major	
features	and	three	background	assumptions	that	are	a	part	of	most	mainstream	human	rights	
theories.		Second,	I	look	at	the	distinct	advantages	that	human	rights	offer	when	approaching	
international	moral	concerns.		
	
Section 1.1 – What are Human Rights? 
Modern	international	human	rights	theories	are	hardly	monolithic.		There	are	a	wide	variety	of	
human	rights	theories,	often	divided	roughly	into	the	‘moral’	and	‘political’	conceptions	of	human	
rights.		They	often	disagree	about	what	grounds	the	theory,	be	it	human	dignity	or	human	agency,	as	
well	as	who	counts	as	an	agent,	and	how	each	theory	defines	agency.4		Yet,	there	are	two	important	
points	of	commonality	that	we	can	find	across	the	different	discourses	that	exist	today.		The	first	is	
that	rights	themselves	are	standards,	regardless	of	the	specific	list	of	rights	that	any	philosopher	
might	enumerate.		The	second	is	that	human	rights	are	enforceable	claims.		Taken	together,	the	
standards,	whatever	they	may	be,	enumerated	by	rights,	generate	claims	upon	others	that	can	and	
should	be	enforced.		There	are	also	three	assumptions	that	operate	in	the	background	of	most	
human	rights	theories.		These	are	the	assumed	equality	of	persons,	the	universality	of	human	rights,	
and	that	human	choice	is	important	and	should	be	protected.		Although	the	specifics	might	be	
different,	mainstream	human	rights	discourses	share	these	important	features.	
	
																																								 																				
3	I	acknowledge	that	I	cannot	give	a	full	treatment	to	international	human	rights	discourses.		I	can	offer	only	a	
short	overview	that	highlights	the	more	prominent	ideas	about	human	rights.		
4	For	discussions	of	human	dignity	in	human	rights	see	Martha	Nussbaum	Creating	Capabilities:	The	Human	
Development	Approach	(2011)	and	Michael	Ignatieff	Human	Rights	as	Politics	and	Idolatry	(2001).	
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Section 1.1.1 – Human Rights as Standards 
The	first	shared	feature	is	that	“human	rights	are	meant	to	provide	certain	shared	standards	–	or	at	
least	a	shared	framework	–	for	evaluating	and	criticizing	various	practices	of	political	societies	in	
relation	to	their	members.”5		This	does	not	mean	that	the	list	of	standards	themselves	must	be	
agreed	upon.		Rather,	human	rights	discourses	agree	in	general	that	there	should	be	a	list	of	
standards	that	can	be	used	as	a	way	to	evaluate	how	a	political	institution	treats	its	members.		The	
agreement	to	have	evaluative	standards	means	that	there	can	be	open	discussion	about	what	kinds	
of	standards	are	appropriate,	and	also	entails	an	expectation	of	future	judgment;	we	judge	or	
evaluate	societies	based	upon	a	set	of	human	rights	standards.		Some	theories	are	more	expansive	
than	others.		Some	philosophers,	such	as	Thomas	Pogge,	allow	for	more	expansive	sets	of	human	
rights,	at	least	using	the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	(UDHR)	as	a	way	to	demonstrate	
how	political,	economic,	and	even	social	rights	can	have	international	scope.6		Conversely,	there	are	
those	who	seek	to	provide	a	narrow	set	of	human	rights	standards,	such	as	James	Griffin	and	
Michael	Ignatieff	who	express	concern	about	human	rights	‘inflation’.	
The	difference	between	how	expansive	or	how	narrow	human	rights	standards	are	depends	
on	what	those	standards	are	meant	to	appeal	to	or	protect.		There	are	many	different	accounts	of	
the	grounds	of	human	rights	standards.		Some	theories	ground	human	rights	on	human	dignity	or	
human	agency,	which	are	seen	as	necessary	to	live	a	‘human’	kind	of	life.		Theories	such	as	this	are	
often	labelled	as	‘moral’	conceptions	of	human	rights.		While	‘moral’	human	rights	discourses	do	
function	as	a	bulwark	against	political	power,	they	focus	more	upon	the	individual	and	how	to	
maintain	the	activity	of	human	life	for	the	individual	in	a	political	environment.		James	Griffin,	for	
example,	identifies	human	rights	as	“protections	of	our	human	standing	or,	as	I	shall	put	it,	our	
personhood.”7			Our	personhood,	as	Griffin	suggests,	is	a	morally	infused	concept	that	encompasses	
all	the	things	necessary	to	living	our	lives	as	human	beings,	which	allows	him	to	include	rights	to	
education	in	addition	to	basic	subsistence.8	
Other	theories	set	out	minimal	standards	for	the	functioning	of	human	society	and	establish	
these	standards	in	order	to	protect	the	kind	of	society	that	allows	human	beings	to	flourish.9		This	is	
a	more	‘political’	conception	of	human	rights.		The	focus	becomes	less	about	the	moral	foundation	
of	rights,	but	rather	how	human	rights	function	as	a	practice	within	any	political	system.		Charles	
Beitz	is	a	proponent	of	human	rights	as	a	practice,	and	he	writes:	“[o]ne	might	think	that	although	
																																								 																				
5	Ivison,	200-1.	
6	Thomas	Pogge,	World	Poverty	and	Human	Rights,	2nd	ed.	(Cambridge:	Polity	Press,	2008),	183.		
7	James	Griffin,	On	Human	Rights	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2008),	33.	
8	Ibid.	
9	Ivison,	204.	
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people	disagree	about	the	content	of	human	rights,	they	might	agree	about	the	role	of	human	rights	
in	practical	reasoning	about	the	conduct	of	global	political	life.		This	role	defines	the	concept	of	a	
human	right.”10		Human	rights	as	a	practice	focuses	on	how	we	negotiate	the	power	any	political	
organization	has	over	its	constituent	members,	be	it	a	national	political	organization	or	the	
international	conglomeration	of	political	power	that	has	become	even	more	profound	due	to	
increasing	globalization.		The	emphasis	here	is	on	the	practical	worth	of	human	rights	in	the	political,	
without	any	commitment	to	an	underlying	moral	foundation.										
	 Human	rights,	then,	regardless	of	the	differences	between	specific	theories,	protect	what	is	
assumed	to	be	necessary	to	live	as	a	human	being,	and	that	is	often	understood	as	protecting	human	
agency.		Again,	we	come	to	a	concept	that	has	a	multiplicity	of	interpretations.		For	Griffin,	human	
agency	(which	he	understands	as	interchangeable	with	autonomy11)	is	what	underlies	his	very	
concept	of	personhood.		He	explains	agency	as	having	three	parts:	1)	to	be	an	agent	“one	must	(first)	
chose	one’s	own	path	through	life—that	is,	not	be	dominated	or	controlled	by	someone	or	
something	else	(call	it	‘autonomy’),”12	2)	“one’s	choice	must	be	real;	one	must	at	least	have	a	certain	
minimum	education	and	information,”13	and	3)	“others	must	also	not	forcibly	stop	one	from	
pursuing	what	one	sees	as	a	worthwhile	life	(call	this	‘liberty’).”14		Human	agency	can	then	be	
understood,	according	to	one	interpretation,	as	being	able	to	make	choices	that	are	not	unduly	
constrained,	that	are	well	informed,	and	that	can	be	acted	upon.		Therefore,	if	human	agency,	so	
understood,	is	our	very	basis	of	being	a	person,	then	human	rights	must	protect	our	ability	to	make	
and	act	upon	our	choices.15		This	is	not	the	only	understanding	of	agency	or	autonomy.		For	Pogge,	
autonomy	is	slightly	different.		It	is	understood	as	being	able	to	develop	and	live	out	one’s	own	idea	
of	what	it	means	to	flourish,	where	flourishing	is	when	a	human	being	considers	their	life	is	good	or	
worthwhile	in	a	broad	sense.16			To	respect	a	person’s	autonomy	is	to	“accept	his	measure	of	his	
flourishing	as	well	as	his	way	of	arriving	at	this	measure.”17		Autonomy	in	this	sense	is	not	about	
giving	one’s	self	directives,	but	rather	“having	one’s	own	directives:	a	purpose	of	one’s	own.”18		
The	point	is	that	although	there	might	be	different	explanations	for	what	agency	is,	human	
rights	theories	that	privilege	the	importance	of	agency	aim	at	largely	the	same	goal:	grounding	rights	
in	the	idea	that	human	choice	matters,	especially	with	regard	to	one’s	own	life.		Because	our	choices	
																																								 																				
10	Charles	R	Beitz,	The	Idea	of	Human	Rights	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2009),	99.	
11	Griffin,	33.	
12	Ibid.	
13	Ibid.	
14	Ibid.	
15	Ibid.,	34.	
16	Pogge,	33.	
17	Ibid.,	37.	
18	Ibid.	
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about	our	own	lives	are	important,	either	for	moral	or	political	reasons	(or	both),	human	rights	are	
meant	to	serve	as	protections	for	the	choices	we	make	about	our	lives.		Human	rights	can	then	be	
viewed	as	the	standards	by	which	we	determine	what	is	necessary	to	live	a	human	life.		For	example,	
we	hold	that	part	of	living	as	a	human	being	means	that	we	should	have	some	measure	of	bodily	
integrity,	and	our	choices	should	not	be	curtailed	by	force.		If	I	choose	to	peacefully	protest	a	
government	action,	I	should	not	be	subject	to	officially	sanctioned	physical	harm.		It	might	not	be	the	
case	here	that	I	have	a	human	right	to	protest,	but	that	I	have	the	right	to	protest	in	a	peaceful	
manner	without	suffering	physical	harm	for	acting	upon	my	choices.		The	right	in	this	instance	is	
aimed	at	protecting	my	choice	by	preventing	the	state	harming	me	for	that	same	choice.	
	
Section 1.1.2 – Human Rights as Enforceable Claims 
The	second	feature	common	to	mainstream	human	rights	theories	is	that	human	rights	compose	a	
set	of	enforceable	claims.		Human	rights,	as	a	set	of	standards,	mean	very	little	unless	they	have	
political	and	legal	purchase.		This	means	that	with	rights	come	duties	or	obligations,	a	kind	of	
authority	held	against	individuals	or	institutions.		For	a	right	to	have	authority	it	must	be	able	to	be	
held	against	someone	or	something;	in	other	words,	it	is	the	obverse	of	a	duty.		The	requirement	of	
specificity,	and	the	degree	to	which	any	claim	is	binding,	varies.	In	the	case	of	international	human	
rights,	the	question	of	who	are	the	duty-holders	is	contentious.		Thomas	Pogge	provides	one	answer,	
stating	that:	
While	the	government	may,	then,	be	the	primary	guardian	of	human	rights	and	the	prime	
measure	of	official	disrespect,	the	people	are	their	ultimate	guardian	on	whom	their	
realization	crucially	depends.		Enduring	respect	of	human	rights	is,	then,	sustained	not	just	
by	the	country’s	constitution,	its	legal	and	political	system,	and	the	attitudes	of	its	politicians,	
judges,	and	police.		It	is	sustained	more	deeply	by	the	attitudes	of	its	people,	as	shaped	also	
by	the	education	system	and	the	economic	distribution.19	
Human	rights	claims	are	primarily	standards	that	should	be	enacted	through	one’s	own	national	
government.		However,	Pogge	extends	this	further,	making	the	salient	point	that	any	political	
organization	is	dependent	upon	the	attitudes	of	its	constituent	members,	all	of	whom	play	an	active	
role	in	determining	how	any	national	government	sustains	its	commitment	to	the	standards	of	
human	rights.		Human	rights	can	be	understood	as	having	multiple	levels	of	duty	holders.		The	first	
level	is	the	local	government	and	its	representatives.		The	second	level	are	the	ordinary	citizens	of	
the	nation	itself,	who	express	their	own	commitment	to	human	rights	depending	upon	who	they	
vote	into	office,	in	their	individual	practices	(such	as	their	shopping	habits),	and	their	endorsement	
of	certain	behaviours	which	show	respect	for	other’s	human	rights.		In	order	to	have	purchase	at	the	
																																								 																				
19	Ibid.,	69.	
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international	level,	then,	we	must	be	able	to	draw	a	connection	between	the	global	poor	and	the	
global	wealthy.		Pogge	does	so	by	making	an	argument	based	on	the	increased	economic	
globalization	of	the	last	several	decades,	which	is	summarized	succinctly	by	Duncan	Ivison	as	follows:		
[T]here	is	a	set	of	economic	and	political	institutions	–	including	norms,	rules,	practices	and	
processes	[…]	–	that	have	a	profound	effect	on	the	quality	of	life	of	individuals	and	peoples	
around	the	world.		It	follows	that	it	has	a	profound	effect	on	the	capacity	of	states	and	
peoples	to	exercise	forms	of	political	agency	in	ordering	their	lives	as	they	see	fit,	according	
to	their	own	conceptions	of	the	right	and	the	good.20	
The	current	global	economic	order	embodies	a	set	of	practices	and	norms	which	overall	contribute	
to	the	harm	experienced	by	the	global	poor.		The	harm	of	severe	poverty	is	not	only	being	poor,	but	
also	the	fact	that	being	so	poor	often	renders	one	unable	to	make	choices	for	her	or	him	self,	let	
alone	act	upon	them.		Essentially,	the	current	level	of	poverty	prevents	over	a	billion	people	from	
exercising	their	human	agency.	
The	global	economic	order,	furthermore,	is	understood	as	a	structure	supported	by	wealthy	
nations	and	their	citizen-members.		Human	rights	claims,	then,	can	be	made	against	any	given	
official	institution	(often	governments),	and	also	against	the	individuals	who	support	the	institutions.		
Therefore,	global	human	rights	claims	are	not	only	held	against	national	governments	(one’s	own	or	
another	that	is	contributing	to	a	such	harms),	nor	only	against	international	bodies,	but	against	
those	individual	members	who	continue	to	support	the	institutions,	national	and	global,	that	
contribute	to	severe	poverty	and	the	profound	limiting	of	human	agency	around	the	world.		It	is	not	
enough	to	say	that	institutions	have	a	duty	to	stop	harming	people,	but	that	those	citizens	who	
support	those	institutions	must	work	to	change	how	their	institutions	function	within	the	
international	sphere.		For	example,	while	the	United	States	Federal	government	should	cease	its	
gross	violations	of	human	rights	in	Guantanamo	Bay	prison,	it	is	also	incumbent	upon	United	States	
citizens	to	take	action	and	inform	their	representatives	that	they	do	not	support	the	continued	
operation	of	the	prison.		This	case	is	less	nuanced	than	the	complex	interactions	that	serve	to	create	
and	perpetuate	severe	global	poverty,	but	the	point	remains	that	although	vast	political	and	
economic	institutions	have	power,	they	are	nevertheless	made	up	of	individuals	who	can	and	should	
reiterate	their	support	for	the	enforcement	of	human	rights.		A	failure	of	institutions	to	live	up	to	the	
obligations	placed	upon	them	by	human	rights	claims	does	not	only	reflect	on	the	institutions	
themselves,	but	also	on	the	individuals	that	support	those	institutions.		According	to	some	human	
rights	theories,	then,	when	our	institutions	fail,	we	have	failed.	
																																								 																				
20	Ivison,	200.	
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	 This	connection	between	individuals	and	institutions	is	not	the	only	way	in	which	theorists	
have	described	how	human	rights	function	as	enforceable	claims.		Beitz,	for	one,	focuses	more	
narrowly	on	an	institutional	model,	not	necessarily	claiming	that	individuals	can	be	responsible	for	
institutional	failure.		He	describes	five	features	of	international	human	rights	doctrine,	which	
emphasize	human	rights	as	more	than	protections	against	threats	to	personal	security	and	liberty.		
First,	they	“guarantee	some	recourse	against	arbitrary	use	of	state	power,	but	also	to	protect	against	
various	social	and	economic	dangers	and	to	guarantee	some	degree	of	participation	in	the	political	
and	cultural	life.”21		He	stresses	that	no	single	strategy	is	required,	but	that	human	rights	can	be	
implemented,	often	through	policy,	in	many	different	ways	and	still	be	acceptable.22		Further,	
because	of	the	heterogeneous	nature	of	human	rights,	“not	all	of	the	human	rights	of	contemporary	
doctrine	can	plausibly	be	regarded	as	peremptory.”23		This	is	in	particular	a	reference	to	the	UDHR,	
such	that	depending	on	circumstance,	a	human	right	to	holiday	pay	might	not	be	intelligible.		For	
example,	in	the	case	of	family	or	subsistence	farmers	who	are	not	employed	by	anyone,	their	
holidays	are	taken	to	coincide	with	the	growing	season,	if	they	can	take	a	holiday	at	all.		Beitz	also	
notes	that	human	rights	in	some	measure	depend	on	certain	background	assumptions	that	“certain	
types	of	institutions	either	do	or	can	be	brought	to	exist.”24		Because	human	rights	do	not	make	
sense	without	some	measure	of	enforcement	or	legal-like	framework,	there	are	institutions	that	
must	or	should	exist	in	order	for	human	rights	as	a	practice	to	function.		Lastly,	Beitz	points	out	that	
“human	rights	doctrine	is	not	static.”25		It	is	changing	and	changeable,	depending	on	the	human	
rights	needs	of	the	populace,	and	depending	on	how	we	engage	with	human	rights	as	a	practice	of	
enforceable	claims.		Human	rights,	for	Beitz,	is	a	thing	that	we	do,	something	that	we	engage	in	and	
shape	as	we	talk	about	it	and	try	to	enforce	it	throughout	the	world.		It	does	not	exist	as	a	set	of	
static	standards	alone,	but	as	a	practice	where	we	make	special	kinds	of	claims	upon	others	that	we	
expect	to	be	enforced.	
Section 1.1.3 – Three Assumptions of Human Rights 
There	are	three	background	assumptions	that	are	shared	by	the	vast	majority	of	mainstream	human	
rights	theories.		These	assumptions	are	necessary	if	human	rights	are	to	be	a	cogent	set	of	standards	
that	can	function	as	enforceable	claims.26		The	first	point	is	that	human	rights	discourses	consider	all	
human	beings	to	have	equal	standing.		Here,	it	is	important	to	recall	that	human	rights	theories	are	
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22	Ibid.,	30.	
23	Ibid.	
24	Ibid.	
25	Ibid.,	31.	
26	Just	because	they	are	assumptions	does	not	mean	that	they	are	in	and	of	themselves	problematic.		I	will	
discuss	the	problems	with	these	assumptions	in	Section	2,	but	it	is	important	to	keep	in	mind	that	these	
assumptions	have	great	power	and	purchase	in	political	discourse	and	are	not	critiqued	lightly.	
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not	ahistorical.		Modern	human	rights	theories	have	grown	out	of	the	natural	law	tradition.27		A	large	
part	of	that	natural	law	tradition	was	the	then	radical	idea	that	all	men	(white,	able-bodied,	
propertied	men)	were	equal,	which	has	since	been	extended	to	all	persons.		This	can	be	found	in	the	
work	of	Thomas	Hobbes	who	wrote:	“Nature	hath	made	men	so	equall,	in	the	faculties	of	body,	and	
mind…”28	and	John	Locke	who	wrote	that	all	men	were	equal	because	they	were	all	“the	
workmanship	of	one	omnipotent,	and	infinitely	wise	maker…”.29		Although	in	more	secular	Western	
societies,	the	basis	of	equality	became	more	removed	from	religious	grounds,	the	lingering	idea	of	
the	equal	status	of	all	human	beings	remains	a	strong	and	important	background	condition	for	
human	rights	theories	today.		Without	the	assumption	of	human	equality,	human	rights	can	lose	
some	of	their	purchase,	because	it	becomes	possible	to	ignore	the	human	rights	claims	of	others	if	
they	are	considered	less	than	other	humans.		History	provides	us	with	many	examples	where	this	has	
been	the	case,	in	the	mass	genocides	of	the	20th	century,	where	those	in	power	have	rendered	so-
called	undesirable	groups	as	less	than	human.		Those	persons	labelled	as	undesirable	could	not	
make	binding	human	rights	claims,	nor	did	they	require	the	standards	of	living	that	most	human	
rights	discourses	seek	to	protect.		Further,	current	events,	such	as	the	refugee	crisis	due	to	the	
Syrian	civil	war,	demonstrate	that	these	pervasive	moral	harms	still	occur	on	a	grand	scale.		
Therefore,	for	human	rights	to	be	cogent,	we	must	assume	that	all	human	beings	have	equal	moral	
worth,	regardless	of	the	source	(or	lack	thereof)	of	that	moral	worth.	
	 The	second	assumption	is	that	human	rights	are	universal.		This	does	not	mean	that	the	list	
of	rights	enumerated	by	any	particular	human	rights	theory	is	universal,	and	holds	for	everyone	for	
all	time	in	some	sort	of	ahistorical	fashion.		Human	rights	are	universal	in	the	sense	that	certain	parts	
of	human	life	are	considered	worth	protecting	for	all	human	beings.		Historically,	human	rights	first	
explicitly	gained	universal	scope	after	the	French	Declaration	of	the	Rights	of	Man	and	Citizen	(1789),	
where	it	was	declared	that	certain	rights	applied	to	all	persons	rather	than	being	rights	of	a	
particular	people.30		However,	this	‘universal’	aspect	was	not	carried	out	in	practice,	and	non-citizens	
were	left	with	no	way	to	make	rights	claims.31		Nearly	150	years	later	after	the	French	Declaration,	in	
1948,	when	the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	was	approved—after	three	years	of	drafting	
and	review—it	was	a	turning	point	for	how	international	politics	were	negotiated.		Although	the	
UDHR	is	still	easier	to	endorse	than	enforce,	it	has	at	least	provided	the	first	truly	universal,	
international	baseline	for	the	judgment	of	political	communities	not	our	own.		If	governments	failed	
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29	John	Locke,	Second	Treatise	of	Government,	ed.	C.	B.	MacPherson	(Indianapolis:	Hackett	Publishing	
Company	Inc.,	1980),	9.	
30	Lynn	Hunt,	Inventing	Human	Rights	(New	York:	W.	W.	Norton	&	Company,	2007),	21-2.	
31	Hannah	Arendt,	The	Origins	of	Totalitarianism,	3rd	ed.	(London:	George	Allen	&	Unwin	Ltd.,	1967),	291-2.	
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to	guarantee	the	human	rights	of	their	citizens,	those	governments	could	be	understood	as	lacking	
legitimacy,	and	certainly	open	to	judgment	if	not	intervention.32		In	more	recent	scholarship,	
however,	another	way	to	accomplish	this	universality	is	to	pitch	it	at	a	more	abstract	level,	and	leave	
the	details	of	human	rights	implementation	to	depend	largely	on	local	conditions.		Griffin	notes:		
We	should	expect	abstractly	formulated	rights,	when	applied	to	the	conditions	of	a	
particular	society,	to	be	formulated	in	the	language	of	its	time	and	place	and	actual	concerns,	
and	we	should	expect	no	one	particularly	to	notice	when	the	move	down	the	scale	of	
abstraction	passes	from	global	to	local	vocabulary.	We	should	claim	only	that	universality	is	
there	at	the	higher	levels.33	
These	higher	levels	that	Griffin	mentions	are	the	important	parts	of	human	life	that	we	seek	to	
codify	and	protect	when	talking	about	human	rights.		The	universality	of	human	rights	is	concerned	
with	the	fundamental	things	that	are	necessary	for	all	humans	everywhere	to	have	in	order	to	live	a	
‘human’	kind	of	life.		In	spite	of	the	disagreement	about	particular	standards,	there	is	often	
agreement	about	what	the	standards	are	meant	to	protect.			
	 Lastly,	the	third	assumption	is	that	human	choice	is	vitally	important	to	living	a	‘human’	kind	
of	life,	and	is	what	all	human	rights	are	meant	to	protect.		In	Section	1.1.1	of	this	chapter,	I	unpacked	
Griffin’s	understanding	of	human	agency,	as	being	made	up	of	autonomy	(being	able	to	decide	for	
one’s	self)	and	liberty	(being	able	to	act	on	those	choices).		Although	there	are	different	
understandings	of	agency	in	terms	of	the	particulars,	the	common	thread	between	them	is	that	of	
being	able	to	live	a	life	of	one’s	own.		The	ability	to	make	choices,	act	on	them,	and	decide	for	one’s	
self	how	to	live.		For	example,	not	having	enough	food	to	survive	would	certainly	curtail	my	ability	to	
make	choices	and	act	upon	them.		My	choices	would	reduce	to	a	subsistence	level	rationale,	unable	
to	engage	my	ability	to	think	and	chose	for	myself	the	kind	of	life	that	I	might	actually	want	to	live,	
instead	of	the	one	I	am	forced	to	live.		The	human	rights	claim	here	would	be	that	I	should	have	
access	to	the	basic	necessities	of	living	in	order	for	me	to	make	more	meaningful	choices	about	my	
life,	not	simply	about	how	I	might	obtain	enough	calories	to	survive	another	day.		This	claim	does	not	
mean	that	I	must	be	provided	with	gourmet	dinners,	but	that	at	the	very	least	I	might	be	extended	
emergency	food	aid	to	relive	the	immediate	danger	of	death,	and	then	be	given	access	to	work	or	
educated	on	improved	farming	techniques.		Once	I	am	no	longer	in	danger	of	starving,	I	can	then	
make	choices	about	the	life	I	want	to	live,	and	take	steps	toward	achieving	that	life.		This,	however,	
does	not	mean	I	am	guaranteed	the	kind	of	life	I	want.		Instead,	human	rights	claims	are	about	being	
able	to	act,	without	any	kind	of	insurance	that	the	actions	will	result	in	success.		There	is	a	greater	
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emphasis	placed	upon	the	ability	to	act	in	light	of	one’s	choices,	than	with	the	success	or	failure	of	
any	particular	human	action.			
	 In	general,	then,	human	rights	are	universal	in	the	sense	that	they	aim	to	protect	the	same	
thing,	typically	human	agency	or	the	ability	to	act	on	the	choices	one	makes	about	one’s	own	life	and	
the	equality	of	all	human	beings,	i.e.	the	equal	right	of	all	persons	to	be	able	to	make	choices	about	
their	own	lives.		The	framework	of	human	rights	can	be	understood	as	being	a	set	of	non-static	
standards.		The	disagreement	about	what	standards	to	include	is	less	important	than	the	fact	that	
we	agree	that	there	should	be	a	set	of	standards	in	the	first	place.		Lastly,	these	standards	can	be	
used	as	enforceable	claims,	creating	a	duty	or	obligation	upon	others	(institutions	and	individuals).		
The	details	vary,	but	the	basic	notions	remain	the	same	across	a	plethora	of	human	rights	theories.		
Next,	I	will	look	at	the	distinct	benefits	of	human	rights	discourses.	
	
Section 1.2 – The Advantages of Human Rights 
The	general	field	of	human	rights	has	distinct	benefits	that	are	part	of	the	reason	why	human	rights	
remain	powerful	in	the	political	and	moral	landscape	today.		First,	human	rights	are	strong	claims	of	
justice,	because	human	rights	are	aimed	at	preventing	harm	from	official	institutions.		For	
institutions	to	be	legitimate,	they	must	provide	some	kind	of	justification	to	individuals	for	the	“rules,	
laws	and	norms	to	which	they	are	subject.”34		Abiding	by	the	standards	that	human	rights	set	out	
seems	to	offer	a	measure	of	that	political	legitimacy	to	governments	and	other	institutions.		Pogge	
calls	the	failure	of	governments	to	protect	the	human	rights	of	its	citizens	‘official	disrespect’	as	a	
way	to	separate	it	from	a	more	private	kind	of	wrongdoing.		He	notes	that	official	wrongs	are	often	
seen	as	worse	because	they	harm	and	frighten	more	people	and	“masquerade	under	the	name	of	
law	and	justice.”35		‘Official’	moral	wrongs	are	not	subversions	or	perversions,	but	are	all	out	attacks	
on	the	“very	idea	of	right	and	justice.”36		Human	rights,	then,	derive	their	strength	from	being	
understood	as	standards	for	justice.		For	a	government	to	engage	in	official	disrespect	of	a	person’s	
human	rights	is	for	that	government	to	attack	the	very	concept	of	justice	and	forfeit	claims	of	
political	legitimacy.		What	we	think	of	as	justice,	or	as	an	institution	being	justifiable	to	its	
constituent	members,	has	become	a	government	abiding	by	the	human	rights	claims	that	its	
members	make.	
	 Second,	human	rights	serve	to	identify	issues	of	international	concern.		Beitz	expands	on	this	
idea,	noting	that	human	rights	are:	“norms	worked	out	for	one	among	many	possible	situations	of	
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human	interaction	found	in	a	world	order	in	which	political	authority	is	vested	primarily	in	territorial	
states.”37	Human	rights	are	normative	guidelines	for	international	interaction,	especially	when	there	
are	issues	of	international	concern	at	hand.		Beitz	singles	out	rights	to	freedom	from	poverty,	rights	
of	political	participation,	and	the	human	rights	of	women	as	all	being	paradigm	cases	of	human	
rights	doctrine	growing	to	encompass	such	issues	as	being	of	international	concern.	In	the	case	of	
the	right	to	be	from	poverty,	for	example,	Beitz	notes:		
[W]hen	one	asserts	a	human	right,	one	is	saying,	among	other	things,	that	international	
agents	have	reasons	to	act	when	domestic	governments	fail.	In	the	case	of	severe	poverty,	it	
is	plausible	to	believe	that	in	typical	cases	there	will	be	reasons	for	action	available	of	
significant	weight,	even	if	the	contents	of	these	reasons	and	the	nature	and	extent	of	
required	action	depend	on	features	of	the	individual	case.38	
Human	rights	are	more	than	standards	of	domestic	political	legitimacy,	they	are	also	claims	of	justice	
that	can	cross	national	borders	and	create	binding	obligations	on	international	agents.		The	agents	in	
question	might	be	other	nations,	NGOs,	or	individuals.		Although	the	details	will	vary	from	case	to	
case,	the	weight	of	international	human	rights	claims	is	still	very	strong	and	tied	to	a	non-localized	
idea	of	justice.		We	cannot	justify	to	the	global	poor	any	non-action	on	our	part	in	the	face	of	a	
failure	of	their	domestic	system,	whether	or	not	we	were	responsible	for	the	failure	in	the	first	place.		
This	is	only	one	partially	presented	case.		The	point	is	that	human	rights	mark	out	problems	that	are	
of	international	scope,	which	cannot	be	considered	as	only	a	local	problem,	and	also	require	a	
measure	of	international	action	to	solve.	
	 Lastly,	human	rights	have	a	practical	benefit	of	being	able	to	offer	guidance	for	public	policy.		
Human	rights	norms	can	offer	guidance	when	developing	and	shaping	public	policy	to	address	
identified	moral	problems.		This	does	not	mean	that	policy	must	be	the	same	across	cultures.		
Different	cultures	might	emphasize	different	elements	of	any	particular	human	right,	but	the	core	
norms	would	remain	the	foundation	for	policy.39		Policy	can	be	seen	as	a	reasonable,	practical	
extension	of	human	rights	theory.		For	example,	the	human	right	to	be	free	from	physical	harm	can	
take	many	different	forms	in	public	policy,	where	the	same	right	can	ground	different	laws	and	
policies.		It	can	spawn	a	policy	against	police	brutality,	as	well	as	allow	police	to	use	force	to	prevent	
harm	to	innocent	by-standers.		The	way	in	which	policy	interprets	and	makes	human	rights	norms	
manifest	is	not	absolute,	and	they	are	not	perfect.		As	Griffin	notes,	“moral	philosophy	cannot	
realistically	aspire	ultimately	to	abolish	this	element	of	policy;	its	more	realistic,	but	still	ambitious,	
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aim	is	to	arrive	at	the	best	policy.”40		Policy	is	assessed	on	the	basis	of	how	well	it	performs	the	
desired	function	in	society	and	how	well	it	enacts	human	rights	norms	in	the	practical	and	legal	
sphere	of	the	real	world.41	
	 These	are	important	advantages	of	human	rights,	ones	that	we	should	not	overlook	when	
trying	to	address	complex	problems,	such	as	global	poverty,	and	particularly	the	poverty	
experienced	by	women	and	girls	around	the	world.		Thus	far,	my	goal	has	to	been	to	offer	a	fair	(if	
very	brief)	picture	of	what	human	rights	are,	how	they	function,	and	what	they	offer	as	a	theory	and	
a	practice.		This	does	not	mean	that	human	rights	are,	nor	should	they	be,	our	only	answer	to	the	
complex	global	moral	contexts	that	exist	in	the	world	today.		In	order	to	demonstrate	why	human	
rights	cannot	fully	encompass	all	of	our	international	problems,	I	turn	to	the	care	ethics	critique	of	
mainstream	human	rights	discourses.	
	
Section 2 – The Care Ethics Crit ique of Human Rights 
Care	ethics,	at	its	beginning,	grew	out	of	questioning	and	critiquing	mainstream	ethical	and	political	
theories,	including	human	rights	theories	and	their	assumed	primacy	for	addressing	global	moral	
concerns.		Yet,	the	critical,	feminist	care	critique	of	human	rights	does	not	require	that	we	abandon	
the	project	of	human	rights	altogether.		As	Robinson	notes:	“While	a	wholesale	rejection	of	notions	
of	individual	rights	and	obligations	is	surely	undesirable,	one	may	still	accept	the	profound	moral	
incompleteness	of	an	ethics	dominated	by	these	concepts.”42		Nevertheless,	the	care	critique	calls	
attention	to	the	fact	that	“our	moral	vocabulary	must	extend	beyond	rights	if	we	are	to	create	a	full	
and	rich	language	which	is	capable	of	addressing	the	variety	of	moral	problems	confronting	the	
international	community.”43		Human	rights	cannot	and	should	not	be	our	only	recourse	when	
addressing	global	moral	contexts.		I	demonstrate	that	although	human	rights	discourses	certainly	
have	particular	benefits,	they	also	overlook	particular	moral	issues	and	are	unable	to	address	the	
root	causes	of	these	issues.			
	
Section 2.1 – First Critique: Structural Harms of Globalization 
The	first	critique	is	that	human	rights	discourses	cannot	always	best	address	the	background	
conditions	of	harm	and	insecurity	that	occur	because	of	the	processes	of	globalization.		Human	
rights	can	be	understood	to	be	“a	feature	of,	rather	than	a	challenge	to,	globalization	and	global	
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governance.”44		The	point	is	that	human	rights	discourses	are	not	necessarily	sensitive	to	or	critically	
reflective	about	the	relations	of	power45	that	can	make	the	practice	of	human	rights	problematic	on	
the	level	of	international	relations.		On	the	level	of	international	relations,	human	rights	are	more	
than	a	theory.		They	are,	as	Beitz	noted,	a	practice.		They	are	a	practice	that	is	most	often	controlled	
by	those	with	a	greater	share	of	global	power,	like	the	United	States	and	other	Western	nations,	as	
well	as	the	United	Nations,	the	World	Bank,	and	International	Monetary	Fund	(IMF).		This	kind	of	
control	is	made	easier	because	human	rights,	at	least	as	far	as	the	mainstream	theories	go,	are	not	
geared	to	look	at	the	relations	of	power	that	operate	in	the	background	of	the	current	global	order.		
Because	human	rights	theories	are	not	necessarily	well	equipped	to	take	power	relations	into	
account,	they	can	often	fail	to	‘see’	the	full	array	of	problems	attendant	on	the	enforcement	of	
human	rights	claims,	or	the	full	depth	of	any	particular	problem,	such	as	the	case	with	exclusionary	
practices.		Failing	to	fully	appreciate	the	differences	in	power	in	the	international	realm	in	many	
ways	can	mask	the	complex	moral	relationships	we	have	with	“those	who	are	our	superiors	or	our	
inferiors	in	power.”46	
Recall	in	Chapter	Two	I	argued	that	the	lens	of	care	is	uniquely	suited	to	uncovering	
particular	global	moral	contexts,	one	of	which	is	exclusion.		Exclusion	is	a	very	real	and	endemic	
feature	of	the	current	international	landscape,	in	spite	of	the	fact	that	human	rights	are	understood	
to	be	universal.		This	is	because	when	we	think	about	the	implementation	of	human	rights	as	
enforceable	claims,	they	require	a	political	body	to	do	the	work	of	enforcing	them.		In	the	current	
global	order,	the	political	body	in	question	is	often	assumed	to	be	states,	and	so	“the	entitlement	to	
and	the	exercise	of	[…]	rights	that	one’s	status	as	a	‘citizen,’	as	a	member	of	the	body	politic	will	be	
established.”47		This	means	that	citizenship	status,	and	the	subsequent	ability	to	exercise	one’s	rights	
with	respect	to	a	government	is	one	of	the	ways	in	which	exclusion	can	occur.		While	being	a	foreign	
national	in	a	host	country	does	not	strip	one	of	their	rights,	it	certainly	means	that	one	has	a	
different	kind	of	identity,	which	invariably	alters	how	well	one’s	rights	are	enforced.48		As	Fiona	
Williams	argues,	transnational	care	workers	are	often	subject	to	being	made	vulnerable	because	of	
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seen	as	problematic	by	those	with	power	because	it	is	not	‘seen’	at	all,	i.e.	people	in	such	powerful	institutions	
are	not	aware	of	their	privilege.	
46	Baier,	"The	Need	for	More	Than	Justice,"	55.	
47	Seyla	Benhabib,	"Citizens,	Residents,	and	Aliens	in	a	Changing	World:	Political	Membership	in	a	Global	Era,"	
Social	Research	66,	no.	3	(1999):	724.	
48	Ibid.,	727.	
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“a	lack	of	citizenship	status,	devalued	as	workers	in	the	isolating	privatized	economy	of	household	
labour,	subject	as	women	to	intimate,	personalized	and	emotionally	exacting	care	work,	and,	as	
‘other’	nationals,	entering	situations	heavy	with	the	histories	of	racialised	subordination.”49	
Critical,	feminist	care	ethics,	however,	calls	into	question	our	current	justifications	for	
multiple	kinds	of	exclusion.		For	example,	the	Filipina	nanny	in	Canada	cannot	vote	in	her	host	
country	to	change	the	ways	in	which	she	is	treated.		Although	she	works	in	Canada	for	a	Canadian	
family,	she	has	no	voice	in	how	her	legal	status	is	considered,	and	her	ability	to	voice	any	grievance	
or	mistreatment	can	be	severely	curtailed	so	as	to	be	nonexistent.		Care	ethics,	in	this	sense,	
provides	a	sharp	challenge	to	current	trends	of	globalization	and	global	governance,	because	it	
would	demand	that	she	have	a	voice,	that	she	be	able	to	have	greater	input	on	her	situation.		Or,	on	
an	institutional	level,	that	the	policies	of	Canada	and	the	Philippines	be	assessed	to	determine	why	
transnational	migration	is	necessary	for	Filipina	women	and	why	having	a	nanny	seems	necessary	for	
the	Canadian	family.	
Human	rights	discourses,	on	the	other	hand,	cannot	always	see	what	the	root	causes	of	such	
problems	are	in	the	first	place,	including	the	norms	that	may	be	at	work	in	particular	cultures.		The	
Filipina	woman	might	have	a	right	to	fair	pay	and	not	to	be	mistreated,	but	“[p]roclaiming	that	the	
poor,	the	needy,	and	the	powerless	have	rights	tells	us	very	little	about	why	they	are	unable	to	
exercise	those	rights,	and	about	who	is	responsible	for	what	sort	of	action	to	alter	their	state	of	
poverty	and	powerlessness.”50		The	proclamation	of	rights	must	be	teamed	with	a	robust	theory	of	
obligation	and	moral	motivation	for	action	to	occur.		As	outlined	in	Section	1,	human	rights	are	
standards	and	enforceable	claims;	they	must	be	acted	on	in	some	way	for	them	to	make	sense.		
Even	on	generous	accounts	that	demand	a	nation’s	citizen	members	take	responsibility	for	that	
nation’s	bad	actions	at	home	and	abroad	(and	as	such	there	is	a	theory	of	obligation	that	puts	the	
responsibility	for	human	rights	doctrines	in	the	hands	of	all	persons),	there	is	still	no	vital	moral	
motivation	to	compel	action.		For	human	rights	to	be	acted	upon	in	the	case	of	the	Filipina	nanny’s	
political	exclusion,	Canadian	families	would	have	to	actively	start	campaigning	for	reforms:	either	to	
voting	rights	or	to	the	guest	worker	program.		Yet	even	if	human	rights	obligated	citizens	to	take	
such	action,	human	rights	cannot	assess	the	gender	norms	that	ground	the	practice	of	women	
working	the	‘double-day,’	or	the	company	policies	that	can	be	punitive	for	women	with	young	
children,	such	as	no	flexible	hours	or	unpaid	or	low-paid	maternity	leave,	that	care	ethics	identifies	
as	a	contributing	factor	to	the	Filipina	nanny’s	situation.		Because	the	norms	identified	by	care	ethics	
																																								 																				
49	Williams,	"Migration	and	Care:	Themes,	Concepts	and	Challenges,"	386.	
50	Robinson,	Globalizing	Care:	Ethics,	Feminist	Theory,	and	International	Relations,	49.	
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are	typically	seen	as	‘private’	concerns—not	‘public’—they	are	not	necessarily	going	to	fall	under	the	
purview	of	human	rights	discourses.	
Further,	human	rights	discourses	cannot	always	see	the	full	scope	of	the	harms	of	the	
structural	patterns	of	globalization.		The	transnational	migration	of	care	work	is	not	merely	
exploiting	labour,	but	also	an	emotional	exploitation.		Human	rights	cannot	access	the	ways	in	which	
transnational	carers	are	isolated,	emotionally,	from	their	own	dependents,	or	the	ways	in	which	
their	children	suffer	emotionally	and	intellectually	compared	to	their	peers,	in	spite	of	increased	
material	security.51		It	is	this	emotional	exploitation	that	the	lens	of	care	is	well	suited	to	examine,	
and	very	much	a	part	of	the	structural	patterns	of	power	that	serve	to	create	and	reinforce	unequal	
relations	between	people,	locally	and	globally.		We	can	begin	to	understand	‘love’	as	an	exported	
resource,	because	the	carer	is	emotionally	invested	in	her	charges,	and	this	affection	is	extracted	
from	the	emotional	energy	that	would	normally	have	been	directed	toward	her	own	family.52		For	
example,	when	‘Western’	mothers	were	asked	about	their	decision	to	employ	nannies,	they	focused	
on	the	nanny’s	relationship	with	their	own	child,	praising	the	other	woman’s	mothering	skills,	not	
acknowledging	what	the	woman	has	had	to	give	up	and	leave	behind.53		Human	rights	discourses,	
while	they	can	address	political,	economic,	and	some	social	problems,	are	not	necessarily	well	
equipped	to	handle	the	emotional	aspect	of	transnational	migration,	or	other	moral	contexts	that	
are	inexorably	linked	to	emotional	attachment.		Emotional	exploitation	or	emotional	outsourcing	is	
difficult	to	see	through	the	lens	of	human	rights,	and	it	is	one	of	the	patterns	of	globalization	that	
must	be	understood	if	we	are	to	commit	to	a	more	ethical	kind	of	globalization	that	I	argued	for	in	
the	previous	chapter.		The	lens	of	care,	however,	is	uniquely	suited	to	acknowledge	‘imported	love,’	
make	clear	why	it	can	remain	unseen,	and	guide	our	solutions	for	this	troubling	aspect	of	
transnational	care	migration.	
Because	the	standards	and	claims	of	human	rights	cannot	address	or	sometimes	even	‘see’	
the	background	conditions	of	global	moral	contexts,	this	means	that	human	rights	can	leave	in	place	
relations	of	power	that	serve	to	perpetuate	the	harms	that	exist	in	the	world	today.		While	human	
rights	have	done	much	to	correct	some	of	the	injustices	in	the	past	century,	they	are	not	enough	to	
combat	the	vast	array	of	injustices	still	present	in	the	world.		As	Williams	argues,	“home-based	work	
isolates	the	worker,	makes	the	work	invisible,	and	renders	difficult	forms	of	collective	mobilization	
for	rights.”54		
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I	argue	throughout	this	thesis	that	critical,	feminist	care	ethics	can	offer	us	a	unique	insight	
on	the	moral	problems	that	are	present	in	the	international	realm,	and	that	insight	can	underwrite	
new	kinds	of	motivation	and	new	paths	of	action	that	would	not	be	available	by	clinging	stubbornly	
to	the	idea	that	human	rights	is	our	only	moral	tool	in	the	international.			As	Griffin	writes:	
Human	rights	cover	only	one	special	part	of	morality;	there	are	very	many	highly	important	
moral	domains	outside	the	domain	of	human	rights:	for	example,	certain	considerations	of	
justice	and	fairness,	some	forms	of	equality,	and	many	cases	of	one	person’s	cruelty	to	
another.		In	addition,	human	rights	can	be	at	stake	in	ways	that	are	not	especially	important:	
a	pretty	minor	liberty	might	be	at	stake,	or	a	minor	exercise	of	autonomy.		If	so	much	of	such	
very	great	moral	importance	falls	outside	the	domain	of	human	rights,	can	infants,	the	
severely	mentally	handicapped,	and	sufferers	from	advanced	dementia	not	find	the	
protection	they	deserve	there?55	
Much	is	left	outside	the	sphere	of	human	rights,	by	Griffin’s	formulation	certainly,	but	I	do	
not	think	it	is	unique	to	Griffin’s	account	of	human	rights.	This	means	that	while	human	rights	
certainly	have	aided	people	in	the	past,	they	are	not	enough	to	address	the	complex	nature	of	
exclusion	or	international	relations	of	power	as	they	stand	today.	
However,	mainstream	human	rights	have	more	recently	been	reaffirmed	in	the	United	
Nation’s	Sustainable	Development	Goals	(SDGs),	which	pay	closer	attention	to	the	background	
conditions	of	global	moral	and	political	problems.		The	SDG	is	a	list	of	seventeen	development	goals	
that	are	strongly	rooted	in	human	rights,	express	a	deep	commitment	to	gender	equality,	and	
directly	address	the	growing	inequalities	present	in	the	world	today.56		These	goals,	and	the	
development	work	they	have	produced	have	been	beneficial	to	thousands	of	people	since	their	
creation	in	2012.		The	SDGs,	and	the	UN	reports,	specifically	focus	on	poverty,	migration,	trafficking,	
and	the	fact	that	women’s	unpaid	domestic	work	is	a	significant	factor	of	women’s	continued	
oppression	and	marginalization.57		Additionally,	these	goals	stress	the	importance	of	leaving	no	one	
behind,	in	incorporating	often	overlooked	populations,	such	as	elderly	women	who	are	routinely	
excluded	from	the	scope	of	development	policy	and	work.58			
In	spite	of	the	excellent	work	that	the	SDGs	have	produced	around	the	world	already,	these	
goals	entail	some	of	the	same	blind-spots	as	other	human	rights	discourses.		A	prime	example,	in	the	
case	of	Goal	5:	Gender	Equality,	the	documentation	for	this	goal	focuses	on	the	need	for	women	to	
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have	more	economic	freedom,	political	access,	rights	on	par	with	men,	and	the	lost	opportunity	
costs	that	women	experience	by	performing	the	bulk	of	the	caring	labour.59	Such	considerations	are	
heartening,	and	the	commitment	to	women’s	political	and	economic	empowerment	should	be	
applauded	along	with	the	acknowledgement	of	one	of	the	major	factors	standing	in	the	way	of	
women’s	empowerment.		Yet	throughout	the	entire	document,	men	are	largely	absent.		In	the	
section	about	the	importance	of	women	working	outside	the	home	while	hampered	by	being	
‘burdened’	with	the	bulk	of	the	domestic	labour,	men	are	not	mentioned	at	all.		There	is	no	
corresponding	language	to	bring	men	inside	the	home	while	moving	women	outside	of	it.		This	
signals	a	dual	problem	for	the	SDGs	for	all	that	they	are	a	more	progressive	embodiment	of	human	
rights.		First,	the	goals	still	do	not	fully	take	into	account	the	role	that	men	and	hegemonic	
masculinities	play	in	women’s	continued	oppression.		As	discussed	in	Chapters	One	and	Two,	men	
often	receive	a	‘pass’	from	performing	caring	labour,	owing	to	their	status	as	‘productive’	workers	or	
simply	by	being	men	and	thus	not	expected	to	do	what	has	traditionally	been	‘women’s	work.’		
Additionally,	hegemonic	masculinities,	as	discussed	in	Chapter	Two,	do	not	say	anything	about	any	
single	man	in	particular,	but	instead	are	the	ways	in	which	problematic	masculine	values	(such	as	the	
false	ideal	of	independence)	are	reproduced	and	perpetuated	through	official	and	unofficial	means.		
The	invisibility	of	men	in	the	Goal	5	documentation	is	predicated	upon	and	entrenches	this	picture	of	
men	as	outside	the	scope	of	women’s	empowerment	and	gender	equality	more	generally,	ignoring	
that	gender	and	empowerment	are	constructed	by	our	relationships	with	others.		Women’s	
empowerment	and	economic	and	political	power	will	not	be	accomplished,	not	fully,	without	
incorporating	men	into	the	picture.		Second,	the	language	of	Goal	5’s	documentation	continues	to	
privilege	‘productive’	work	over	and	above	the	work	of	care.		While	certainly	women	can	and	should	
participate	in	public	life,	in	the	marketplace	and	the	political	sphere,	it	is	dangerous	to	assume	that	
this	kind	of	work	is	more	important	than	the	work	of	care,	the	work	that	sustains	the	continued	
survival	of	every	human	being.		The	language	of	the	documentation	around	Goal	5	does	not	
acknowledge	that	once	a	woman	is	working	outside	the	home,	then	someone	will	have	to	perform	
the	caring	labour	that	she	used	to	do.		This	second	problem,	therefore,	ties	into	the	first,	because	if	
men	are	not	incorporated	into	the	goals	of	gender	equality	and	sharing	the	load	of	work	in	and	
outside	the	home,	then	these	goals	might	only	serve	to	reproduce	continued	gender	inequality	and	
the	devaluation	of	care	work.	
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Section 2.2 – Second Critique: Cultural and Gender Bias 
The	second	major	critique	of	human	rights	discourses	is	that	they	carry	with	them	cultural	and	
gendered	biases.		Human	rights	theories	as	a	whole	have	grown	out	of	a	long	tradition,	begun	in	
Europe,	that	started	with	natural	law	theory	and	became	a	general	rights	theory	though	the	work	of	
Thomas	Hobbes,	John	Locke	and	through	the	French	and	American	Revolutions.		Most	of	these	
theorists	also	assumed	that	the	rights	of	men	were	specific	to	men,	and	women	were	attendant	
upon	men	as	part	of	the	household.60		To	be	sure,	in	the	last	century	much	has	changed	about	how	
rights,	and	human	rights	in	particular,	negotiate	the	role	of	women	and	cultural	diversity.		Women	
and	oppressed	non-European	groups	have	utilized	rights	language	in	order	to	assert	their	claims	and	
to	gain	a	more	materially	equal	standing	to	European-descended	men.		This	does	not	mean	that	
modern	human	rights	theories	claim	that	they	can	be	understood	as	ahistorical,	as	a	‘view	from	
nowhere’	without	any	cultural	or	gendered	background	assumptions	necessary	for	them	to	operate.		
Care	ethics,	however,	explicitly	aims	at	uncovering	the	ways	in	which	our	cultural	differences	and	
our	gender	affect	our	lives	and	as	such	they	are	important	moral	and	political	sites	of	investigation	
and	potential	transformation.			
The	root	of	the	problem	here,	I	argue,	is	that	human	rights	are	predicated	on	the	idea	of	
equality,	which	is	often	understood	as	sameness.		This	kind	of	equality	is	one	that	many	people	in	
the	Western	tradition	come	to	expect	and	hold	in	high	regard.61		However,	this	assumption	of	
sameness	can	obscure	the	gendered	and	racialized	relations	of	power	that	exist,	and	that	our	ethical	
lives	are	structured	by	and	through	these	relations	of	power.		The	need	for	‘women’s	human	rights’	
and	organizations	that	are	centred	around	investigating	the	human	rights	abuses	that	are	unique	to	
women,	in	some	measure	call	into	question	the	ability	of	human	rights	analyses	to	treat	everyone	
the	same	and	still	protect	against	profound	kinds	of	injustices.		It	is	only	through	recognizing	our	
differences,	and	how	our	differences	result	in	different	treatment,	that	we	can	come	to	rectify	some	
of	the	systemic	structural	mistreatment	that	the	globally	vulnerable	experience.		In	Chapter	Two,	I	
argued	that	our	differences	have	a	profound	affect	on	our	lives,	and	we	can	understand	that	there	
are	different	sets	of	norms,	different	expectations,	and	different	values	attached	to	people	on	the	
basis	of	their	gender.		Assuming	all	persons	are	the	same	is	to	ignore	the	differences	that	can	affect	
and	alter	someone’s	life.62		Also,	if	human	rights	analyses	assume	all	persons	are	the	same,	this	begs	
the	question:	what	is	the	benchmark	of	‘sameness?’		Often	that	benchmark	is	understood	to	be	the	
European-descended	male	who	typically	has	been	the	recipient	of	rights	from	the	beginning.		The	
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goal	of	human	rights	analyses	has	to	bring	everyone	to	the	same	level,	while	not	taking	into	account	
the	embedded	cultural	and	gender	differences	that	claims	of	sameness	habitually	overlook.			
Pushing	back	against	this	kind	of	critique,	James	Griffin	presents	the	human	rights	theorist	
with	two	options	when	it	comes	to	negotiating	cultural	difference.		First,	we	can	accept	that	human	
rights	is	unalterably	a	Western	discourse,	and	hope	that	other	cultures	adopt	human	rights	because	
they	find	it	acceptable	or	a	better	way	of	doing	things.		That	is,	these	cultures	will	negotiate	their	
own	relation	to	Western	ideals	of	autonomy	and	liberty,	and	make	the	human	rights	claims	they	
deem	necessary.63		Alternately,	we	can	find	non-Western	or	indigenous	beliefs	that	might	support	
the	case	for	human	rights	or	something	like	them.64		Griffin	not	does	think	that	the	differences	
between	cultures	are	as	great	as	we	might	think	them	to	be,	and	that	we	exaggerate	the	
“disagreement	between	societies	over	human	rights.”65		However,	Griffin	asserts	that	the	first	option,	
accepting	human	rights	with	its	Western	cultural	background,	is	the	better	option.		He	argues	
against	the	second	option	because	although	it	might	make	the	conversation	easier	to	start	about	
human	rights	by	looking	for	local	values	that	are	akin	to	Western	autonomy,	justice,	fairness,	and	
liberty	the	conversation	might	come	apart	in	those	early	stages.		He	writes:	
A	useful	human	rights	discourse	is	not	made	possible	just	by	agreeing	on	the	names	of	the	
various	rights,	which	is	all	that	agreement	on	the	list	secures.		We	need	also	to	be	able	to	
determine	a	fair	amount	of	their	content	to	know	how	to	settle	some	of	the	conflicts	
between	them.66	
Different	cultures	may	have	different	ideas	of	fairness.		For	example,	one	culture	may	extend	
fairness	to	all	persons,	while	another	culture	has	separate	connotations	of	fairness-for-men	and	
fairness-for-women.		The	human	right	to	fair	treatment	under	the	law	then	can	allow	for	men	and	
women	to	be	treated	differently	when	it	comes	to	the	same	legal	statute.		On	Griffin’s	account,	the	
concept	of	fairness	must	be	the	same	everywhere	for	the	human	right	to	be	consistent.		Another	
point	Griffin	makes	is	that	Western	ideals	have	been	used	to	help	oppressed	groups	assert	their	
human	rights	against	Western	powers.		His	primary	example	is	India—often	cast	as	a	spiritual,	mystic	
counterpoint	to	Western	rationality	and	science—which	overlooks	India’s	“long	tradition	of	secular	
rationality,	scientific	investigation,	and	freedom	of	thought.”67		He	points	out	that	India	appropriated	
ideas	like	autonomy	and	liberty	to	gain	their	independence	from	the	British.68		Griffin	concludes	that	
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adopting	Western	thought	is	not	necessarily	bad,	and	it	is	something	every	culture	can	negotiate	for	
itself.		
	 Griffin,	at	least,	admits	to	the	cultural	background	that	comes	with	a	human	rights	discourse.		
He	privileges	the	concepts	human	rights	embody	and	the	entailed	culturally	specific	priorities	for	a	
very	clear	and	cogent	reason.		However,	Robinson	argues,	and	I	agree,	that	the	cultural	bias	of	
human	rights	is	inherently	problematic.		Further,	human	rights	also	entail	a	gendered	bias	that	
ignores	the	way	in	which	constructions	of	gender	shape	our	lives	and	even	the	kinds	of	human	rights	
claims	we	make.69		Her	argument	is	that	the	influential	organizations	of	global	civil	society,	like	the	
World	Bank,	the	IMF,	other	northern-based	NGOs,	and	social	movements,	rely	on	human	rights	
discourse	to	“promote	a	set	of	values	that	are	heavily	gendered	and	which	reflect	a	Western	bias.”70		
Because	of	this	gender	and	cultural	bias,	I	argue	that	human	rights	has	limited	applications	for	those	
persons	“who	are	made	most	vulnerable	by	the	processes	of	globalization.”71		Consider,	for	example,	
that	poor	women	in	the	global	South	have	experienced	greater	levels	of	vulnerability	due	to	the	
processes	of	globalization.		They	are	most	often	supporting	their	families	financially,	and	caring	for	
them	emotionally	and	physically	as	well.		This	means	they	are	carrying	a	massive	burden	that	might	
not	exactly	be	a	violation	of	their	human	rights,	but	certainly	limits	the	choices	they	can	make	about	
their	lives.		If	their	pay	is	just	enough,	and	their	hours	are	not	too	many,	and	their	working	
conditions	not	too	bad,	then	those	in	the	global	North	might	consider	that	the	cost	of	doing	business	
and	not	consider	it	morally	problematic	that	these	women	experience	truncated	life	choices.		
Returning	to	the	case	of	the	Filipina	nanny,	even	if	she	has	decent	pay,	and	works	for	a	good	family	
that	does	not	take	advantage	of	her,	she	is	still	in	Canada	instead	of	in	her	home	country,	near	her	
own	children.		It	might	have	been	her	choice	to	go	into	the	guest	worker	program,	but	how	free	is	
her	choice,	how	much	is	she	living	a	life	of	her	own,	when	that	was	the	best	way	to	make	money	to	
provide	for	her	children?		In	many	ways	she	has	sacrificed	her	own	conception	of	a	good	life	for	
herself	in	order	that	she	might	provide	for	her	children,	and	allow	a	Canadian	woman	to	have	her	
own	conception	of	the	good	life	as	well.		I	am	not	saying	that	caring	for	one’s	children	is	something	
only	women	do,	but	often	that	women	in	poorer	nations	assume	much	more	of	the	burden	and	that	
they	are	often	doing	so	without	the	aid	of	men	for	a	plethora	of	reasons.		Current	social	norms	place	
the	burden	of	care	on	women,	and	in	order	to	shoulder	that	burden	many	women	suffer,	while	at	
the	same	time	allowing	men	to	experience	‘privileged	irresponsibility,’	where	they	may	receive	a	
‘pass’	on	their	caring	obligations	in	virtue	of	their	masculinity	or	engaging	in	more	‘worthwhile’	
																																								 																				
69	Refer	to	Chapter	Two,	Section	3.3	for	more	on	how	gender	is	an	important	moral	and	political	context	that	is	
identified	and	best	assessed	through	the	lens	of	care.	
70	Robinson,	"Human	Rights	and	the	Global	Politics	of	Resistance:	Feminist	Perspectives,"	162.	
71	Ibid.	
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work.72		Suffering	like	this	is	not	necessarily	a	human	rights	violation,	and	thus	not	‘seen’	by	human	
rights	discourses.		Human	rights	are	not	useless	for	women,	but	they	cannot	encompass	all	the	ways	
in	which	social	norms,	globalization,	governments,	institutions,	and	other	people	harm	women	
because	human	rights	do	not	pay	close	attention	to	the	historical	and	cultural	context	of	women.	
	 This	critique	might	be	resolved	by	creating	a	special	category	of	human	rights	for	women.		
However,	Beitz,	responding	to	arguments	for	women’s	human	rights,	claims	that	they	do	not	need	to	
be	understood	as	a	special	set	of	rights,	but	merely	are	the	same	rights	with	some	unique	
consideration	of	women’s	reproductive	issues.		Betiz	does	acknowledge	that	the	criticism	of	the	
public/private	divide	in	human	rights	discourse	has	validity	and	that	women	are	often	under	specific	
kinds	of	threats	particular	to	women.		Yet,	he	writes	that	aside	from	issues	of	reproduction,	“the	
interests	of	women	which	are	subjects	of	distinctive	vulnerability	are	perfectly	general—they	are	
mainly	interests	in	physical	security	and	personal	liberty.”73		The	goal,	for	Beitz,	is	to	argue	against	
the	idea	that	talking	about	the	human	rights	of	women	is	inherently	problematic.		He	thinks	there	
are	good	reasons	to	talk	about	the	human	rights	of	women	because:	“The	human	rights	of	women	
are	properly	considered	matters	of	special	concern	because	certain	important	interests	of	women	
are	subject	to	gender-specific	forms	of	abuse.”74		Beitz	considers	how	the	human	rights	of	women	
might	override	cultural	practices	that	are	heavily	oppressive	of	women,	because	the	human	rights	of	
women	“seek	not	only	to	disallow	certain	forms	of	conduct	by	the	state	and	to	mandate	changes	in	
law	and	policy,	but	also	to	change	patterns	of	belief	and	conduct	in	the	surrounding	society	and	
culture.”75		For	example,	it	is	not	enough	that	women	be	considered	to	have	a	right	to	be	free	from	
physical	harm,	but	that	the	cultural	practices	and	beliefs	take	on	the	norm	of	women’s	bodies	as	
being	inviolate.		This	could	be	demonstrated	as	the	rape	of	women	being	fully	prosecuted	instead	of	
the	offender	paying	off	a	woman’s	(often	male)	relatives,	or	a	culture	abandoning	the	practice	of	
female	genital	mutilation	in	favour	of	a	more	symbolic	ceremony	of	a	girl	becoming	a	woman	in	the	
community.	
	 Here,	it	is	important	to	recall	that	Beitz	sees	human	rights	not	only	as	a	theory,	but	also	as	a	
practice.		If	human	rights	are	to	be	realized,	they	must	be	acted	upon.		The	practice	might	require,	in	
the	case	of	gross	violations	of	women’s	human	rights,	heavy	intervention.		The	question	becomes	if	a	
local	government	fails	women,	do	outside	agents	have	compelling	reasons	to	intervene?		Beitz	
answers	this	by	claiming	that	NGOs	can	be	considered	relevant	agents,	because	it	is	often	NGOs	that	
																																								 																				
72	See	Chapter	One,	Section	2.2	and	Chapter	Two,	Section	3.3	for	more	on	privileged	irresponsibility.	
73	Beitz,	188.	
74	Ibid.,	189.	
75	Ibid.,	194.	
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bring	women’s	issues	to	international	attention.76		The	success	of	an	NGO	is	often	measured	by	
working	with	locals	to	change	beliefs	and	practices	by	“offering	information	and	persuasion	rather	
than	by	imposing	sanctions.”77		The	successful	NGO	is	one	that	engages	with	local	people	in	order	to	
further	the	practices	of	human	rights	discourses.		This	can	mean	that	states	are	not	necessarily	
required	to	intervene	when	women’s	human	rights	are	under	attack.		Further,	on	the	question	of	
whether	or	not	women’s	human	rights	are	a	special	class,	and	thus	undercut	the	universal	ideals	of	
human	right	themselves,	Beitz	responds:	“Most	human	rights	of	women	are	open	to	the	same	range	
of	protective	and	remedial	action	by	outside	agents	as	most	other	civil	and	political	rights,	so	the	
problem	about	feasibility	in	the	special	case	need	not	be	especially	troubling	for	women’s	human	
rights	as	a	class.”78		The	source	of	women’s	human	rights	is	the	same	as	men’s,	and	Beitz,	like	Griffin	
and	Ivison,	does	not	require	that	a	fully	fleshed	out	list	of	rights	be	the	final	word	on	what	exactly	
our	human	rights	are.		They	all	accept	the	need	for	human	rights	to	change	and	grow.		Certainly,	this	
formulation	of	rights	is	more	women-friendly	than	documents	like	the	UDHR,	which	contains	built-in	
assumptions	that	households	exist,	which	are	often	assumed	to	be	male-led	households,	and	thus	
can	overlook	unfair	treatment	within	a	family	or	marginalize	female-led	households.	
It	is	telling,	however,	that	Beitz	acknowledged	at	least	one	case,	the	case	of	reproduction,	
where	women’s	rights	cannot	be	the	same	as	men’s.79		Pregnancy	is	certainly	a	condition	unique	to	
women,	and	issues	like	abortion,	forced	pregnancy,	or	a	lack	of	legal	rights	to	their	own	children	
would	require	a	special	set	of	rights.		This	opens	up	our	ability	to	think	of	ways	in	which	gender	
oppression	can	occur	without	any	human	rights	violations.		The	point	is	not	to	say	that	human	rights	
discourse	is	useless,	but	that	it	does	not	cover	the	multiple	ways	in	which	women	can	be	and	are	
harmed	by	governments,	other	institutions,	cultural	practices,	and	even	their	own	friends	and	family.		
It	is	certainly	not	a	violation	of	a	woman’s	rights	if,	in	a	heterosexual	relationship,	the	woman	stays	
at	home	to	care	for	the	children.		She	and	her	husband	could	have	sat	down	upon	learning	she	was	
pregnant,	looked	at	their	financial	situation,	the	price	of	good	quality	day	care	and	their	respective	
incomes,	and	determined	that	she	would	have	to	stay	home	until	the	children	went	to	school.		There	
is	no	right	being	violated,	and	one	might	say	the	decision	was	purely	a	financial	one,	but	that	does	
not	mean	she	will	not	suffer	from	mental	isolation,	boredom,	depression,	greater	vulnerability	to	
abuse,	nor	that	she	will	not	miss	her	work,	especially	if	she	found	her	work	particularly	fulfilling,	her	
long	term	career	goals	may	suffer,	and	she	may	subsequently	experience	poverty	in	her	old	age.		
Care	ethics	would	ask	why	she	had	to	stay	home,	and	why	was	her	husband	making	more	money,	
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and	why	was	there	no	affordable	day	care.		Surely	it	is	also	important	for	both	parents	to	bond	with	
young	children,	and	one	could	question	why	the	male	parent	does	not	have	flexible	hours	so	he	
might	have	that	emotional	bond	with	his	own	children	as	well.		I	argue	it	is	telling	that	human	rights	
cannot	approach	the	root	causes	of	women’s	continued	oppression	and	marginalization	or	men’s	
privilege	to	outsource	their	caring	obligations,	even	if	all	of	a	woman’s	human	rights	have	been	met.	
	
Section 2.3 – Third Critique: Ethics of Social Reproduction 
The	last	critique	critical,	feminist	care	ethics	levels	at	human	rights	discourses	is	that	they	can	overly	
focus	on	the	individual	agent,	and	too	closely	circumscribe	who	counts	as	an	agent	in	the	first	place.		
This	means,	very	often,	international	theorising	based	on	mainstream	human	rights	discourses	can	
lose	sight	of	the	importance	of	how	we	live	in	relation	to	other	people.		The	language	of	rights	
cannot	always	adequately	encompass	certain	goods	such	as	“economic	and	social	security,	the	
fulfilment	of	basic	human	needs,	and	the	cultural	survival	of	groups,”80	because	such	goods	are	
predicated	heavily	on	social	responsibility	and	care.		For	the	most	part,	human	rights	discourses	are	
aimed	at	protecting	the	rights	of	the	individual,	not	necessarily	disconnected	from	their	wider	social	
and	political	framework,	but	with	the	primary	focus	being	the	individual	as	a	moral	agent.81	
	 Care	ethics	and	human	rights	define	the	normative	agent	very	differently,	and	how	we	
define	the	normative	agent	has	real	implications	for	how	we	understand	social	reproduction.		For	
some	human	rights	theories,	the	normative	agent	is	any	human	being,	regardless	of	age	or	
intellectual	development.		Griffin,	however,	restricts	who	can	be	considered	a	normative	agent.		He	
disallows	infants	and	very	young	children,	the	mentally	handicapped,	and	the	senile	from	being	
considered	normative	agents,	because	they	lack	agency,	that	is,	the	ability	to	determine	a	life	of	
their	own.		This	does	not	mean	they	do	not	have	moral	worth	for	Griffin,	but	that	they	cannot	make	
human	rights	claims.82		He	also	rejects	the	idea	that	because	infants	have	the	potential	to	be	fully	
human	or	that	they	exist	in	a	state	of	unique	vulnerability,	they	should	be	protected	as	though	they	
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81	I	acknowledge	the	important	work	done	on	group	rights,	in	particular	indigenous	rights,	in	order	to	protect	
the	rights	of	specific,	historically	oppressed	and	marginalized	cultural	groups.		Duncan	Ivison	argues	that	some	
groups,	particularly	indigenous	Australians	might	have	group	rights,	because	group	rights	in	this	case	protect	
certain	crucial	interests	of	the	group	as	a	whole	(2003,	323).		Ivison	also	argues	for	group-differentiated	public	
policy	that	goes	beyond	the	traditional	protections	of	individual	political	and	social	rights	(2005).		However,	
human	rights	in	the	mainstream	are	still	more	often	aimed	at	the	individual.		Often,	if	one	does	include	a	
human	right	to	cultural	protection,	it	is	cast	in	the	light	of	the	individual	having	a	right	to	be	able	to	participate	
and	not	be	unduly	barred	from	engaging	in	their	cultural	heritage.		For	example,	Articles	22	and	27	of	the	
Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	both	suggest	that	it	is	the	individual	who	has	the	right	to	the	cultural	
life	of	the	community,	not	that	any	cultural	group	in	and	of	itself	has	rights.		Additionally,	the	United	Nations	
Declaration	of	the	Rights	of	Indigenous	Peoples	also	codify	and	affirm	collective	rights.	
82	Griffin,	92.	
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were	full	normative	agents	and	had	the	ability	to	make	human	rights	claims.		Griffin	does	not	think	
potentiality	or	vulnerability	by	themselves	are	enough	reason	to	protect	something;	the	thing	in	
itself	must	be	worth	preserving,	and	the	intuitions	behind	such	methods	must	be	“accommodated	
by	an	adequate	ethics.”83		Griffin	sees	the	problem	of	potentiality	again	when	one	applies	theories	of	
personal	identity,	or	consciousness,	to	the	idea	of	‘person’	to	see	if	infants	can	be	considered	
persons	on	that	account.84		But	it	is	not	as	though	Griffin	thinks	that	non-normative	agents	do	not	
have	any	rights	or	that	they	do	not	have	moral	worth.		Instead,	he	wants	to	stipulate	what	is	
necessary	for	human	rights	in	order	for	human	rights	themselves	to	be	less	unwieldy	and	more	
streamlined.85		The	point	is	that	even	though	human	rights	might	be	considered	to	apply	to	all	
humans	everywhere,	equally,	the	debate	about	who	counts,	about	who	is	in	and	who	is	out,	is	still	
pertinent	to	human	rights	discourses.		This	is	because	of	the	focus	on	the	individual.		If	the	individual	
person	is	the	seat	of	concern,	then	we	must	determine	what	kind	of	person	is	allowed	to	make	
human	rights	claims.		I	will	not	further	explore	the	debate	about	who	counts	as	a	human	rights	
claimant,	but	merely	note	that	the	debate	itself	signals	that	human	rights	analyses,	in	general,	give	
less	consideration	to	the	relations	in	which	individuals	exist	and	the	attendant	issues	of	social	
reproduction	that	are	necessary	for	individuals	to	continue	to	survive	and	even	thrive.	
	 The	critical,	feminist	ethics	of	care,	on	the	other	hand,	brings	to	the	fore	issues	of	
relationships	and	social	reproduction,	which	are	not	often	seen	when	the	focus	is	on	the	individual	
as	a	normative	agent.		Human	rights	are	“not	ends	in	themselves,	but	guarantees	of	freedom	which	
allow	individuals	to	pursue	chosen	ends	without	obstruction.”86		Rights	analyses	place	greater	value	
on	the	individual	person	being	able	to	make	choices	for	themselves	and	act	upon	those	choices.		
Focusing	narrowly	on	the	protection	of	individual	choices	means	that	other	aspects	of	human	life	are	
rendered	less	important	or	devalued.		The	very	time	one	‘chooses’	to	spend	on	caring	activities	can	
be	devalued.		As	Yanqiu	Zhou	illustrates,	the	dominant	mode	of	temporal	understanding,	which	
values	time	spent	on	productive	labour	tends	to	marginalize	and	supersede	the	time	spent	on	
reproductive	labour.		This	‘choice’,	which	is	mostly	associated	with	women’s	lives,	can	serve	to	re-
entrench	the	public/private	divide	in	terms	of	not	only	space,	but	time	spent	on	particular	kinds	of	
labour	and	who	‘should	be’	doing	said	labour.87		Taking	the	time	necessary	to	engage	in	reproductive	
labour	is	unavoidable	for	our	continued	survival,	but	who	spends	time	on	caring	labour	is	constituted	
by	the	choices	we	make,	which	are	irrevocably	bound	by	ties	of	obligation	to	friends	and	family.		The	
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assumption	that	our	ability	to	choose	enables	our	independence	allows	us	to	overlook	our	
fundamental	interdependence,	and	that	sometimes	our	‘freedom’	of	choice	necessarily	curtails	the	
choices	of	others,	such	that	others	are	forced	to	make	impossible	choices.88		However,	as	Allison	
Weir	argues,	if	we	prioritize	an	understanding	of	interdependence	we	can	reimagine	freedom	of	
choice	as	freedom	from	having	to	make	impossible	choices:89	do	I	work	or	care	for	my	children,	do	I	
go	overseas	and	earn	enough	to	support	my	children	or	stay	and	care	for	my	aging	parents?		The	
care	lens	allows	us	to	more	deeply	investigate	what	it	means	for	human	beings	to	survive	and	thrive,	
and	also	what	it	means	for	us	to	make	choices	in	the	context	of	relationships.		Protecting	the	
freedom	of	the	transnational	care	worker	would	mean	that	we	must	ask	what	institutional	patterns	
have	pushed	her	into	making	an	impossible	choice	in	the	first	place,	which	are	a	combination	of	the	
demand	for	care	abroad	and	the	multiple	kinds	of	instability	(economic,	political,	and	social)	in	her	
home	nation.	
The	requirements	of	social	reproduction	are	vital	tasks	that	must	be	accomplished	for	the	
continued	survival	of	individuals	and	the	human	species.		We	must	come	to	understand	that	rights	
and	responsibility	are	not	always	the	same	thing.		We	might	be	obligated	on	the	basis	of	rights,	but	
responsible	for	much,	much	more.		For	example,	it	is	up	for	debate	whether	future	generations	or	
potential	persons	have	rights.		According	to	Griffin,	they	do	not.		However,	we	might	still	have	a	
responsibility	to	future	generations	to	preserve	the	planet	and	prevent	wide	scale	ecological	disaster	
and	mass	extinctions.		If	Griffin	is	correct,	that	human	rights	can	and	should	only	apply	to	normative	
agents,	and	there	are	a	limited	subset	of	humans	that	have	what	he	calls	full	agency,	then	we	still	
might	be	responsible	for	those	who	are	not	normative	agents.		It	is	important	to	note	that	those	who	
are	not	normative	agents	for	Griffin—infants,	the	very	young,	the	very	old,	and	the	mentally	
disabled—are	those	for	whom	much	care	is	required.		The	moral	worth	of	such	persons	is	not	
undercut	by	their	lack	of	normative	agency,	because	they	still	require	care.		Care,	as	a	morally	
infused	term	of	assessment,	critique,	and	policy	guidance,	with	its	relational	ontology	can	‘see’	
global	moral	contexts	that	human	rights	discourses	often	overlook.		Such	contexts	include	the	
Filipina	nanny	in	Canada	on	a	guest	worker	program,	who	had	to	leave	behind	her	own	children	to	
support	them,	where	her	political	exclusion	might	not	be	considered	a	human	rights	violation.		Care	
ethics	can	also	assess	the	underlying	norms	and	laws	that	hinder	her	ability	to	directly	care	for	her	
children,	because	she	also	must	hire	or	entrust	another	woman	with	her	children	because	she	might	
not	trust	her	male	partner,	or	he	might	not	be	available	to	care	for	his	children	at	all.	
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	 In	response	to	this	critique,	the	rights	theorist	might	say	that	not	all	rights	theories	place	
undue	focus	on	the	individual,	and	this	would	be	correct.		Hegelian	rights	theories	are	heavily	
invested	in	the	importance	of	the	social,	and	the	relationships	that	people	engage	in.		The	problem	
with	Hegel	is	that	he	claims	the	relationship	between	parents	and	children	is	“subversive	of	morality	
for	male	citizens,	whose	primary	loyalty	should	be	to	the	universal	rationally	realizable,	in	his	view,	
only	at	the	level	of	the	state.”90		Trying	to	rescue	Hegel’s	relational	rights	for	feminist	theory	is	
fraught	at	best	and	troubling	at	worst.		The	assumed	naturalness	of	male	and	female	gender	roles	is	
not	something	that	can	be	neatly	cut	out	of	Hegel’s	work,	and	also	perpetuates	the	problem	of	
categorizing	care	as	a	lesser	activity	than	political	participation.		The	tasks	of	social	reproduction	
should	not	be	glorified,	but	neither	should	they	be	devalued.		We	should	understand	such	tasks	as	a	
necessary	part	of	human	life	and	survival,	and	a	site	of	moral	engagement	and	moral	complexity.			
In	contrast,	Nedelsky’s	relational	rights	are	very	much	rooted	in	the	feminist	tradition,	and	
owe	a	great	deal	to	the	transformative	insights	of	care	ethics,	although	she	does	not	see	her	work	as	
a	moral	project.91		She	focuses	on	the	legal	aspect	of	rights,	and	as	such	her	brief	treatment	of	
international	human	rights	points	to	the	idea	that	in	addition	to	concerns	about	their	
implementation,	we	must	also	pay	attention	to	“who	has	defined	the	rights	in	question.”92		
According	to	Nedelsky,	in	order	for	human	rights	to	be	considered	universally	legitimate,	the	
processes	that	produce	human	rights	must	themselves	be	legitimate,	where	legitimacy	is	obtained	
through	democratically	justifiable	means.93		While	Nedelsky’s	work	points	to	the	influence	that	care	
ethics	has	had	on	some	strains	of	human	rights	discourses,	especially	drawing	out	the	relational	
aspect	of	rights	and	autonomy,	this	does	not	mean	it	can	stand	in	for	care	ethics.		Ivison,	when	he	
wrote	that	relational	agency	and	relational	rights	are	feasible,	also	noted:	
[I]n	order	for	us	to	be	capable	of	forming	meaningful	relationships,	and	fulfilling	our	
obligations	in	the	first	place,	certain	conditions	are	required,	including	achieving	certain	
basic	capabilities	and	thus	being	protected	from	harms	that	prevent	us	from	doing	so.		Not	
all	of	these	harms	are	best	addressed	through	human	rights,	but	they	remain	one	way	of	
marking	out	and	identifying	these	capabilities	and	the	harms	that	can	befall	them.94	
Certainly	relational	rights,	like	Nedelsky	develops,	are	a	good	guide	for	how	the	law	can	mark	out	
possible	ways	in	which	people	have	been	harmed	(morally	and	legally),	however,	critical,	feminist	
care	ethics	is	an	important	different	moral	perspective	through	with	we	can	view	the	international	
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(Colorado:	Westview	Press,	1995),	158-9.	
91	Jennifer	Nedelsky,	Law's	Relations:	A	Relational	Theory	of	Self,	Autonomy,	and	Law	(Oxford:	Oxford	
University	Press,	2011),	87.	
92	"Reconceiving	Rights	and	Constitutionalism,"	Journal	of	Human	Rights	7,	no.	2	(2008):	162.	
93	Ibid.	
94	Ivison,	Rights,	207.		Emphasis	mine.	
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realm,	which	bears	on	political	(local	and	global),	economic,	and	socio-cultural	norms	and	practices.		
The	different	moral	standpoint	care	ethics	occupies	cannot	be	overlooked,	because	the	moral	
dimension	of	international	political	contexts	is	an	important	part	of	how	we	address	them.	
Another	approach,	which	has	been	instrumental	in	changing	human	rights	discourse,	is	the	
capabilities	approach	first	authored	by	Amartya	Sen	and	then	further	developed	by	Martha	
Nussbaum.		Sen	pioneered	the	capabilities	approach	in	his	landmark	Tanner	Lecture	in	1979	titled	
“Equality	of	What?”,	and	later	argued	that	the	capabilities	approach	should	be	used	to	help	explain	
and	expand	human	rights	theories,	unpacking	the	difference	between	the	opportunity	and	the	
process	aspects	of	human	rights.		By	opportunity,	Sen	means,	“whether	a	person	is	actually	able	to	
do	the	things	she	would	value	doing.”95		The	process	aspect	of	human	rights	is	the	contingent	means	
of	how	the	opportunity	is	carried	out.		Sen	claims	that	because	the	capability	approach	highlights	the	
former	over	the	later	means	the	theory	resists	a	focus	on	income	and	primary	goods,	which	could	
not	pay	attention	to	how,	for	example,	a	person	in	a	wheelchair	would	not	necessarily	be	able	to	do	
the	same	things	as	a	person	with	the	full	use	of	their	legs,	if	given	the	same	circumstances	and	
goods.96		Sen’s	work,	however,	still	bears	the	marks	of	the	economic	discourse	out	of	which	it	arose,	
and	as	such	has	an	over-focus	on	counting,	on	tallying	up	results,	and	does	not	necessarily	
incorporate	a	corresponding	sense	of	moral	motivation:	i.e.	“Why	should	one	care	about	individuals	
and	particular	capabilities?”97		Further,	Sen’s	work	is	not	necessarily	a	critically	feminist	picture	of	
human	rights	and	does	not	incorporate	concerns	about	care	and	the	institutional	ways	in	which	our	
lives	our	structured,	and	as	such	I	have	not	incorporated	Sen’s	capabilities	approach	in	this	thesis.98	
	 Nussbaum,	conversely,	critiques	Sen	for	his	lack	of	feminist	focus	and	overlooking	how	
institutions	play	a	role	in	our	lives.99		For	Nussbaum,	the	capabilities	approach	is	either	a	supplement	
or	an	alternative	to	human	rights	theories.100		In	some	of	her	early	work,	she	explicitly	albeit	briefly,	
incorporates	the	understanding	that	we	are	all	necessarily	dependent	beings,	and	that	society	
should	care	for	those	who	are	in	extreme	conditions	of	dependency	“without	exploiting	women	as	
																																								 																				
95	Amartya	Sen,	"Human	Rights	and	Capabilities,"	Journal	of	Human	Development	6,	no.	2	(2005):	153.	
96	Ibid.,	153-4.	
97	Des	Gasper	and	Thanh-Dam	Truong,	"Development	Ethics	through	the	Lenses	of	Caring,	Gender,	and	Human	
Security,"	Institute	of	Social	Studies	Working	Paper	No.	459	(2008):	16.	
98	In	addition,	much	has	already	been	written	about	Sen’s	approach.		See	Martha	Nussbaum	(2011,	2002),	
Gasper	and	Truong	(2008),	and	Ingrid	Robeyns	(2011)	for	feminist	critical	appraisal	of	Sen.	My	approach	takes	
the	treatment	of	Nussbaum	and	Truong	to	be	more	relevant	to	the	achievement	of	the	aims	of	this	thesis.	
99	Martha	Nussbaum,	Creating	Capabilities:	The	Human	Development	Approach	(Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	
University	Press,	2011),	39.	
100	"Women's	Capabilities	and	Social	Justice,"	in	Gender	Justice,	Development,	and	Rights,	ed.	Maxine	
Molyneux	and	Shahra	Razavi	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2002),	48.	
101	
	
they	have	traditionally	been	exploited,	and	thus	depriving	them	of	other	important	capabilities.”101		
Further,	Nussbaum’s	list	of	capabilities	explicitly	incorporates	the	importance	of	emotion	and	
affiliation,	which	entails	being	able	to	have	important	forms	of	social	interaction	and	to	not	be	
discriminated	against	on	the	basis	of	gender,	race,	sexual	orientation,	religion,	national	origin,	caste,	
or	ethnicity.102		While	Nussbaum’s	capabilities	approach	shares	many	of	the	same	feminist,	critical	
goals	as	the	ethics	of	care,	her	work	does	not	necessarily	target	the	historical	conditions	of	current	
inequalities	or	the	relations	of	power	that	produce	and	perpetuate	global	moral	and	political	
contexts.		Nussbaum’s	work,	like	mainstream	human	rights	discourses,	focuses	on	correcting	for	
current	injustices	where	the	capabilities	of	the	individual	agent	are	the	primary	locus	of	concern.		
This	is	a	vital	goal,	but	the	critical,	feminist	ethic	of	care	focuses	on	uncovering	and	understanding	
the	root	causes	of	injustice.		Care	ethics	shifts	the	focus	of	our	reasoning	the	complex	interplay	
between	normative	commitments	(rooted	in	local	and	global	cultural	practices),	political	power,	and	
economic	forces	that	underwrite	the	continued	devaluation	and	marginalization	of	the	work	of	care	
itself	(and	so	too	care-givers	and	care-receivers)	from	public,	political	discourse.		This	means	that	
while	Nussbaum’s	work	is	an	excellent	supplement	for	human	rights	discourse,	the	goal	and	focus	of	
her	work	is	substantively	different	from	the	critical,	feminist	ethic	of	care	that	is	the	focus	of	this	
thesis.		In	spite	of	some	shared	priorities,	those	of	care	and	affiliation,	care	ethics	works	for	the	
transformation	of	the	moral	and	political	landscape	by	brining	care—with	its	relational	ontology,	its	
emphasis	on	uncovering	the	root	causes	of	oppression,	marginalization,	and	exclusion,	and	its	
investigation	of	conditions	under	which	people	give	and	receive	care—to	the	centre	of	our	political	
reasoning,	not	the	capabilities	of	individual	persons.	
	 Critical,	feminist	care	ethics,	with	its	relational	ontology,	encompasses	a	wider	range	of	
human	activity	than	most	mainstream	human	rights	theories.		It	sees	many	people	who	are	not	
often	seen,	those	are	not	considered	‘normative	agents,’	and	investigates	situations	that	are	often	
sites	of	domination	and	oppression	but	not	necessarily	human	rights	violations.		If	there	is	one	thing	
that	some	rights	theorists—such	as	James	Griffin	and	Duncan	Ivison—and	care	theorists	like	Fiona	
Robinson	agree	on,	it	is	that	human	rights	theories	alone	are	not	necessarily	enough	to	combat	the	
vast	array	of	human	suffering	that	occurs	in	the	world	today.			
Human	rights	most	certainly	fulfil	a	function	in	the	international	political	landscape.		They	
are	excellent	as	a	starting	point	for	disparate	groups	to	craft	a	mutually	agreeable	set	of	standards,	
or	as	a	way	to	single	out	gross	injustices.		Human	rights	also	offer	certain	practical	benefits,	in	that	
they	are	understood	as	strong	claims	of	justice,	mark	out	issues	of	international	concern,	and	
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provide	clear	guidance	for	public	policy.		However,	I	have	argued	that	human	rights	cannot	address	
every	complex	context	in	the	international	sphere,	and	as	such	it	is	not	always	the	correct	tool	for	
the	task	at	hand.		The	care	critique	of	human	rights	demonstrates	that	in	spite	of	the	benefits	of	
human	rights,	it	can	overlook	the	structural	harms	of	globalization,	import	cultural	and	gender	biases,	
and	can	devalue	the	concerns	of	social	reproduction.		These	critiques	have	moral	and	political	
significance.		Care	ethics,	because	it	is	first	a	tool	of	critical	assessment,	is	more	suited	to	looking	
‘under	the	hood,’	to	identify	the	deeper	roots	of	any	moral	situation.		Futher,	it	can	provide	
guidance	as	to	how	to	address	the	pervasive	and	often	‘unseen’	norms	or	practices	that	lead	to	
negative	outcomes	associated	with	difference,	exclusion,	gender,	and	often	culminating	in	violence.	
	 However,	the	rejection	of	human	rights	discourses	as	a	primary	mode	of	analysis	does	not	
entail	that	care	ethics	can	function	as	a	guide	for	public	policy.		In	light	of	my	goal	to	put	forward	a	
practically	applicable	theory,	it	might	seem	beneficial	to	use	care	theory	to	ground	a	set	of	human	
rights	standards.		This	would	seem	a	reasonable	solution	considering	that	one	of	the	major	benefits	
of	human	rights	discourses	is	that	they	are	functional	public	policy	guides.		In	the	next	chapter,	I	
examine	the	work	of	Daniel	Engster,	who	created	a	theory	of	caring	human	rights,	where	one	of	his	
aims	was	to	offer	a	more	practical	solution	for	care	based	public	policy.		Although	I	am	sympathetic	
to	Engster’s	goals,	and	some	of	his	proposed	solutions,	his	work	demonstrates	the	exact	reasons	
why	we	should	at	least	be	sceptical	of	attempts	to	meld	care	theory	and	human	rights.		I	argue	that	
Engster	develops	a	construction	of	care	that	is	unable	to	make	visible	the	relations	of	power	that	
shape	our	relationships	with	particular	others,	and	as	such	his	practical	outcomes	are	not	well	
grounded	on	the	basis	of	care.		We	should	resist	attempts	to	lessen	the	critical,	feminist	capacity	of	
care	ethics,	and	instead	work	to	demonstrate	that	critical	care	theory	itself	can	serve	as	a	guide	for	
public	policy,	which	is	the	subject	of	Chapter	Five.
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Chapter 4:  Can Care be a Foundation for Human Rights? 
	
In	light	of	the	care	critique	of	mainstream	human	rights	discourses,	it	might	seem	reasonable	to	
create	a	set	of	human	rights	centred	on	a	core	idea	of	care.		This	is	exactly	what	Daniel	Engster	set	
out	to	accomplish	in	his	book,	The	Heart	of	Justice:	Care	Ethics	and	Political	Theory.		He	attempted	to	
create	a	set	of	human	rights	that	were	not	vulnerable	to	care	critiques,	and	to	have	a	type	of	care	
theory	that	could	guide	public	policy.		However,	Engster’s	definition	of	care	and	his	resultant	‘caring’	
human	rights	is	not	without	its	own	problems.		In	this	chapter,	I	will	critique	Engster’s	theory	in	two	
parts,	both	focused	on	how	Engster’s	care	theory	is	not	necessarily	suited	to	addressing	or	even	
‘seeing’	the	relations	of	power	that	structure	our	lives	in	the	first	place,	and	which	are	often	the	root	
cause	of	the	problems	he	strives	to	address.		First,	Engster	uses	the	fact	that	we	exist	in	webs	of	
dependence	relations	to	ground	his	theory	of	rational	obligation.		The	problem	is	that	Engster	is	not	
critical	of	those	very	dependence	relations,	and	not	taking	a	critical	lens	to	dependence	relations	can	
allow	for	a	continuation	of	entrenched	patterns	of	power.		This	means	Engster’s	care	theory	cannot	
address	the	root	causes	of	oppression,	marginalization,	and	their	attendant	harms.		Second,	because	
Engster	only	has	minimal	feminist	commitments,1	I	will	argue	that	his	care	theory	cannot	assess	the	
gendered	relations	of	power	that	exist	in	local	and	global	contexts.		While	Engster	argues	that	
women	should	not	be	oppressed	or	marginalized,	and	it	is	clear	he	is	aware	of	cultural	and	historical	
considerations,	I	will	explore	how	a	lack	of	full,	material	equality	is	part	of	the	very	oppression	and	
marginalization	that	are	a	part	of	women’s	lives.		This	means	that	Engster’s	caring	human	rights	are	
vulnerable	to	the	same	kind	of	critique	as	mainstream	human	rights	discourses,	as	discussed	in	the	
previous	chapter.			
My	critique	also	demonstrates	that	Engster’s	caring	human	rights	are	not	well	suited	to	
evaluating	transnational	care	contexts,	particularly	the	migration	of	care	workers	and	human	sex	
trafficking.		Although	Engster	does	acknowledge	that	we	should	be	critical	of	policies	and	practices	
that	engender	poverty	and	suffering,	because	his	own	definition	of	care	is	not	sufficiently	critical	of	
existing	patterns	of	power,	and	his	caring	human	rights	are	only	minimally	feminist,	we	still	need	a	
theory	to	do	the	job	of	critical	assessment.		The	critical	ethics	of	care,	as	I	argued	in	Chapter	Two,	is	
well	suited	to	provide	such	an	assessment.		Contrary	to	Engster,	I	claim	that	it	is	vitally	important	to	
maintain	the	critical,	feminist	dimension	of	care	ethics	if	care	ethics	is	to	provide	a	substantively	
different	perspective	than	mainstream	human	rights	discourses.		While	that	still	leaves	Engster	with	
the	claim	that	his	care	theory	can	guide	public	policy,	I	argue	in	Chapter	Five	that	a	critical	care	ethic	
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can	also	serve	as	a	guide	for	public	policy.		Therefore,	we	do	not	need	‘caring’	human	rights	in	order	
to	provide	a	substantive	alternative	to	human	rights	to	address	global	moral	contexts,	either	by	
critically	assessing	them	or	providing	policy	guidance.	
	
Section 1 – Care as the Heart of Justice? 
In	this	section,	I	will	provide	a	brief	outline	of	how	and	why	Engster	develops	his	theory	of	caring	
human	rights.		He	offers	a	thorough	overview	of	an	admittedly	incomplete2	set	of	standards	for	
domestic,	economic,	and	international	justice	on	the	basis	of	care	theory.		First,	I	will	unpack	
Engster’s	own	particular	version	of	care	theory,	which	uses	a	rational	theory	of	obligation	to	create	
binding	duties	of	care.		Second,	I	will	show	how	Engster’s	care	theory	informs	and	develops	a	set	of	
caring	human	rights	and	elaborate	some	of	its	practical	outcomes.	
	 Engster	provides	three	reasons	for	why	a	theory	of	care	should	be	made	foundational	to	
theories	of	justice.		First,	Engster	claims	that	no	“theory	of	justice	can	be	said	to	be	consistent	or	
complete	without	integrating	the	institutional	and	policy	commitments	of	care	theory.”3	Because	
Engster	firmly	supports	the	idea	that	care	is	central	to	human	life,	he	argues	that	care	must	be	made	
central	to	theories	of	justice	because	this	would	better	reflect	the	actual	material	conditions	of	life.		
Second,	Engster	claims	that	care	theory	offers	better	justifications	for	a	welfare	state	than	
traditional	liberal	theories	of	justice	and	a	more	flexible	approach	to	public	policy.4		Third,	he	claims	
that	care	theory	“supplies	a	minimal	basic	morality	that	can	help	to	mediate	the	cultural,	religious,	
and	moral	differences	among	people.”5		However,	while	these	are	compelling	reasons,	and	while	
there	are	points	of	commonality	between	Engster’s	theory	of	care	and	the	feminist	ethic	of	care,	I	do	
not	advocate	using	Engster’s	theory	of	care	as	a	foundation	for	human	rights,	because	it	does	not	
critically	engage	with	how	our	dependence	relations	are	constructed	and	only	has	minimal	feminist	
commitments.		Rather,	I	will	argue	that	the	critical,	feminist	ethics	of	care	should	be	maintained	as	a	
discrete	ethical-political	theory.			
	
Section 1.1 – Care and a Theory of Rational Obligation 
Engster	develops	his	own	specific	care	theory	because	he	argues	that	the	kind	of	care	theory	
advocated	by	‘orthodox’	care	ethicists,	like	Gilligan	and	Noddings,	is	too	narrow,	while	the	feminist	
critical	political	theory	of	care	offered	by	Joan	Tronto	is	too	broad.		Instead,	he	seeks	to	find	a	middle	
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ground	between	the	two	and	to	provide	a	better	foundation	for	a	moral	and	political	theory.6		The	
first	step	he	takes	is	to	offer	a	definition	of	caring	that	meets	the	task	of	offering	a	‘middle	ground.’		
Second,	he	develops	a	theory	of	rational	obligation	to	enforce	our	moral	caring	duties,	and	third	he	
outlines	a	distribution	of	our	caring	duties,	including	to	distant	strangers.		Because	Engster	claims	we	
have	duties	of	care	to	distant	strangers,	he	is	then	able	to	justify	a	set	of	caring	human	rights	that	is	
morally	binding	internationally.	
	
Section 1.1.1 – Engster’s Definition of Caring 
The	definition	of	caring,	for	Engster,	rests	upon	what	he	views	as	the	three	main	aims	of	care.		He	
summarizes	the	first	aim	as	follows:	“When	we	care	for	individuals,	we	most	basically	help	them	to	
satisfy	their	vital	biological	needs.”7		This	includes	access	to	goods	such	as	water,	food,	shelter,	
medical	care,	protection	from	harm,	and	even	important	physical	contact	for	young	children	and	
infants.		The	second	aim	of	caring	is	to	help	“individuals	develop	and	sustain	their	basic	or	innate	
capabilities;”8	i.e.	the	skills	(social,	psychological,	and	practical)	that	enable	basic	social	functioning	in	
a	particular	society.		This	includes	speech,	reasoning,	imagination,	emotion,	literacy,	and	numeracy,	
among	others	that	are	particular	to	any	given	society.		Some	societies	might	view	computer	use	as	a	
basic	capability,	while	others	might	require	members	to	learn	how	to	hunt	and	track	game,	thus	this	
aim	of	care	is	necessarily	flexible.		The	third	aim	of	care	is	“helping	individuals	to	avoid	harm	and	
relieve	unnecessary	or	unwanted	suffering	and	pain	so	that	they	can	carry	on	with	their	lives	as	well	
as	possible.”9		Engster	defines	care	so	as	to	ensure	people	can	live	their	lives	and	function	in	their	
own	specific	society	with	as	few	impediments	as	possible.	
His	definition	of	care	also	relies	on	three	virtues	of	care.		These	virtues	are	directly	inspired	
by	Tronto’s	practices	of	care.		Engster	enumerates	the	virtues	of	care	as	attentiveness,	
responsiveness,	and	respect.10	
Attentiveness	means	noticing	when	another	person	is	in	need	and	responding	appropriately.		
[…]		Responsiveness	means	engaging	with	others	to	discern	the	precise	nature	of	their	needs	
and	monitoring	their	responses	to	our	care	(whether	verbal	or	nonverbal)	to	make	sure	they	
are	receiving	the	care	they	actually	need.		[…]		By	respect,	I	do	not	mean	anything	so	strong	
as	equal	recognition	of	others	but	more	simply	the	recognition	that	others	are	worthy	of	our	
attention	and	responsiveness,	are	presumed	capable	of	understanding	and	expressing	their	
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9	Ibid.,	28.	
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construction	of	dependence	that	does	so.		This	point	is	more	fully	explored	in	Section	2	of	this	chapter.	
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needs,	and	are	not	lesser	beings	just	because	they	have	needs	they	cannot	meet	on	their	
own.11	
	
Care,	on	Engster’s	account,	thus	“include[s]	everything	we	do	directly	to	help	others	meet	their	vital	
biological	needs,	develop	or	maintain	their	innate	capabilities,	and	alleviate	unnecessary	pain	and	
suffering	in	an	attentive,	responsive	and	respectful	manner.”12		It	is	important	to	note	that,	although	
Engster	views	care	as	an	activity	that	requires	direct	connection	between	carer	and	care	recipient,	
he	does	stipulate	collective	caring	as	a	kind	of	care,	where	the	state	cares	for	those	who	are	in	need	
by	developing	policies	that	directly	help	individuals	meet	those	needs.13		Thus,	he	is	able	to	avoid	the	
same	critique	the	‘orthodox’	ethics	of	care	was	subject	to	as	outlined	in	Chapter	One:	that	caring	
could	only	ever	be	a	private	concern.		For	example,	Engster	argues	that	one	of	the	general	functions	
of	a	caring	national	government	would	be	to	incorporate	the	understanding	that	even	when	there	is	
a	relatively	prosperous	social	environment,	“some	capable	individuals	may	not	be	able	to	satisfy	
their	basic	needs	at	minimally	adequate	levels.”14		We	thus	require	state	policies	to	address	the	
situation,	such	as	housing	assistance,	job	training,	and	even	basic	unemployment	insurance.		
Engster’s	definition	of	care	thus	functions	as	a	justification	for	the	welfare	state.		Engster	argues	that	
his	definition	of	care	theory	is	able	to	offer	a	better	justification	for	a	welfare	framework	than	
traditional	theories	of	liberal	justice,15	although	those	particular	claims	are	beyond	the	scope	of	my	
argument	here.16		The	problem,	as	I	will	argue	in	Section	2	of	this	chapter,	is	that	Engster	uncritically	
accepts	our	dependence	relations	as	a	foundation	for	a	larger	theory	of	caring	rights,	which	could	
leave	unchallenged	harmful	normative	assumptions	about	gender,	race,	ability,	age,	citizenship,	and	
sexuality.	
	
Section 1.1.2 – A Theory of Rational Obligation 
On	the	basis	of	this	definition	of	care,	Engster	utilizes	a	theory	of	rational	obligation	about	our	caring	
responsibilities	to	explain:	1)	why	we	must	care	for	other	persons;	and	2)	how	care	functions	to	
enable	moral	judgment.		He	claims	such	a	theory	is	necessary	for	three	reasons.		First,	without	such	
a	defence	of	caring,	it	is	“not	self-evident	why	people	should	encourage	the	development	of	
sympathy	and	compassion.”17		Second,	because	his	theory	of	obligation	extends	to	even	distant	
strangers,	it	can	be	used	to	counter	the	critique	that	care	theory	can	be	used	to	support	parochial	
																																								 																				
11	Engster,	30-1.	
12	Ibid.,	31.		Emphasis	in	the	original.	
13	Ibid.,	36.	
14	Ibid.,	91.	
15	Ibid.,	94.	
16	For	Engster’s	justification	of	a	caring	national	government,	and	its	features,	see	Engster	(2007),	the	chapter	
titled	“Care	Theory	and	Domestic	Politics.”	
17	Engster,	37.	
107	
	
limits	to	caring,	i.e.	support	further	exclusion.		Third,	a	rational	theory	of	obligation	can	function	to	
strengthen	or	develop	sympathy	and	compassion,	which	also	works	to	avoid	a	re-entrenchment	of	
the	reason/emotion	dichotomy	that	Engster	claims	has	been	used	by	both	care	and	non-care	
philosophers	to	claim	the	supremacy	of	one	over	the	other	(where	care	theorists,	Engster	claims,	
prioritize	emotion,	whereas	Kantian	or	utilitarian	philosophers	prioritize	reason).18		Importantly,	he	
does	not	claim	that	a	rational	theory	of	obligation	will	compel	moral	transformation.		Rather,	the	
theory	of	rational	obligation	can	serve	as	a	logical	and	consistent	guide	to	mark	out	moral	or	
immoral	actions	on	the	basis	of	care	theory,	i.e.	provide	a	guide	for	moral	judgments.19	
	 Engster’s	theory	of	rational	obligation	borrows	heavily	from	Eva	Kittay’s	account	of	our	
caring	obligations.		She	argues	that	because	we	have	received	care,	we	in	turn	are	obligated	to	give	
care	to	others.		Our	web	of	relationships,	in	ever	expanding	concentric	circles,	determines	the	caring	
obligations	we	have	toward	others.	Further,	we	do	not	necessarily	just	care	for	those	who	cared	for	
us,	as	sometimes	that	is	impossible.		Instead,	we	care	for	those	who	are	dependent	upon	us	at	any	
given	point	in	time.20		Engster	formalizes	this	idea	and	produces	a	theory	of	rational	obligation	to	
argue	why	we	are	obligated	to	care	for	particular	others	and	see	the	care	claims	of	others	as	
legitimate,	which	is	as	follows:		
1. “All	human	beings	can	be	assumed	to	value	their	survival,	the	development	and	functioning	
of	their	basic	capabilities,	and	the	avoidance	or	alleviation	of	unwanted	pain	and	suffering—
unless	they	explicitly	indicate	otherwise.”21	
	
2. “[A]ll	human	beings	depend	upon	the	care	of	others	to	survive,	develop	and	maintain	their	
basic	capabilities,	and	avoid	or	alleviate	unwanted	pain	and	suffering.”22	
	
3. Therefore,	“all	human	beings	can	be	said	at	least	implicitly	to	value	caring	as	a	necessary	
good	and	to	make	claims	on	others	for	care	when	we	need	it,	meaning	that	we	at	least	
implicitly	assert	that	others	should	help	us	to	meet	our	basic	needs,	develop	and	maintain	
our	basic	capabilities,	and	avoid	or	alleviate	pain	when	we	cannot	reasonably	achieve	these	
goods	on	our	own.”23	
	
4. “In	claiming	care	from	others,	we	imply	that	capable	human	beings	ought	to	help	individuals	
in	need	when	they	are	able	to	do	so	consistent	with	their	other	caring	obligations.”24	
	
Lastly,	Engster	arrives	at	the	guiding	principle	of	his	theory	of	rational	obligation,	the	principle	of	
consistent	dependency,	as	a	means	to	validate	our	claims	of	care	upon	others,	and	other’s	claims	of	
care	upon	us:		
																																								 																				
18	Ibid.	
19	Ibid.,	39.	
20	Kittay,	Love's	Labor:	Essays	on	Women,	Equality,	and	Dependency,	29.			
21	Engster,	46.	
22	Ibid.	
23	Ibid.	
24	Ibid.,	48.	
108	
	
5. “Since	all	human	beings	depend	upon	the	care	of	others	for	our	survival,	development,	and	
basic	functioning	and	at	least	implicitly	claim	that	capable	individuals	should	care	for	
individuals	in	need	when	they	can	do	so,	we	should	consistently	recognize	as	morally	valid	
the	claims	that	others	make	upon	us	for	care	when	they	need	it,	and	should	endeavor	to	
provide	care	to	them	when	we	are	capable	of	doing	so	without	significant	danger	to	
ourselves,	seriously	compromising	our	long-term	functioning,	or	undermining	our	ability	to	
care	for	others.”25	
	
Resting	on	the	principle	of	noncontradiction,	Engster	claims	that	this	theory	of	rational	obligation	
serves	as	a	moral	basis	for	the	right	to	care,	and	that	those	who	do	not	uphold	their	moral	duty	to	
care	not	only	behave	hypocritically,	but	“renounce	the	web	of	caring	upon	which	their	own	lives,	
society,	and	human	life	generally	depend.”26		
	 This	does	not	mean	that	Engster	assumes	we	have	a	‘natural’	instinct	to	care.		Rather,	moral	
motivation	must	be	cultivated	in	persons,	especially	when	we	consider	what	we	owe	in	moral	terms	
to	distant	persons	or	persons	who	have	traditionally	been	made	Other	by	dominant	groups.		Engster	
makes	a	series	of	practical	suggestions	as	to	how	a	society	may	cultivate	this	kind	of	moral	
motivation,	from	advanced	parental	leave	policies,	to	more	expansive	early	childhood	care,	to	public	
education	reforms,	and	even	an	investigation	into	the	role	the	media	plays	in	how	we	perceive	the	
practices	of	care.		He	suggests	that	there	are	very	real	and	concrete	ways	to	cultivate	a	larger	care	
movement	by	employing	particular	strategies	such	as	favouring	universal	over	means	tested	
programs	(because	universal	programs	have	been	found	to	foster	caring	between	groups	of	people,	
while	means-tested	programs	often	entrench	race	and	class	biases27),	working	with	businesses	to	
change	the	dynamics	of	work	and	care,28	and	“highlight	the	universal	vulnerability	of	individuals	and	
the	moral	duty	to	care.”29		Engster	also	identifies	the	gendering	of	care	as	a	reason	why	care	has	
been	historically	devalued	(particularly	in	the	context	of	places	like	the	United	States	and	Australia),	
and	also	as	a	condition	that	curtails	larger	social	motivations	to	care	in	the	first	place.30			
	
Section 1.1.3 – Distribution of Caring Obligations 
Engster	argues	that	the	ultimate	benefit	of	the	rational	theory	of	obligation	is	that	we	have	a	right	to	
care,	because	we	“can	all	make	valid—that	is,	justifiable—claims	on	others	for	care	when	we	need	
it.”31		Yet,	this	does	not	mean	that	all	individuals	must	extend	care	to	all	other	individuals.		There	is	
not	necessarily	a	one-to-one	exchange	of	caring.		Instead,	Engster	stratifies	our	caring	obligations	in	
																																								 																				
25	Ibid.,	49.	
26	Ibid.	
27	"Strategies	for	Building	and	Sustaining	a	New	Care	Movement,"	Journal	of	Women,	Politics	&	Policy	31,	no.	4	
(2010):	299-300.	
28	Ibid.,	301-2.	
29	Ibid.,	305.	
30	The	Heart	of	Justice:	Care	Ethics	and	Political	Theory,	223.	
31	Ibid.,	53.	
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order	to	ensure	a	more	targeted,	logical,	and	practical	division	of	our	caring	responsibilities.		The	
basis	for	this	division	of	caring	duties	is	the	argument	for	assigned	responsibility	by	Robert	Goodin.		
The	argument,	in	sum,	is	that	while	we	have	general	moral	duties	to	all	others,	we	have	special	
moral	duties	that	are	‘distributed	moral	duties’	that	are	more	effective	when	particular	persons	are	
assigned	particular	tasks.32		This	argument	grounds	the	justification	that	we	can	and	should	be	
invested	in	the	care	of	particular	others,	although	this	does	not	preclude	the	fact	that	we	have	
residual	responsibilities	to	distant	others.33		The	upshot	for	Engster	is	two-fold.		First,	this	
distribution	underpins	the	justification	for	a	set	of	international	caring	human	rights.		Second,	it	is	
meant	to	provide	a	well-structured	framework	to	guide	our	action	and	avoid	the	ambiguities	that	
Engster	argues	are	problematic	for	other	accounts	of	care	ethics,	particularly	Tronto’s	and	
Robinson’s	critical,	feminist	accounts.34		Additionally,	it	is	important	to	understand	how	Engster’s	
caring	human	rights	rest	upon	this	distribution	of	caring	responsibilities,	because	his	caring	human	
rights	are	ultimately	grounded	on	an	uncritical	acceptance	of	our	dependence	relations	and	thus	can	
actually	perpetuate	the	same	problems	as	mainstream	human	rights	discourses,	as	discussed	in	the	
previous	chapter.		
According	to	Engster,	our	caring	obligations	are	stratified,	where	the	first	obligation	is	care	
of	self,	predicated	on	the	view	that	one	must	be	able	to	care	for	one’s	self,	and	that	individuals	are	
usually	best	able	to	determine	their	own	needs.		Further,	because	if	people	cannot	provide	adequate	
care	for	themselves,	then	they	are	unlikely	to	be	able	to	provide	adequate	care	for	others.		Lastly,	
Engster	provides	the	caveat	that	self-sacrificing	care	should	always	be	considered	supererogatory.		
The	second	obligation	is	to	our	intimate	relations	(generally	our	friends	and	family,	but	we	can	also	
consider	that	doctors,	nurses	or	others	in	caring	professions	have	these	secondary	obligations	to	
their	patients	due	to	the	specific	circumstances	of	their	relationship),	because	we	are	usually	best	
situated	to	understand	the	needs	of	our	intimate	relations	better	than	other	compatriots	or	
strangers.		This	secondary	obligation	can	also	extend	to	strangers,	however,	in	emergency	situations,	
where	proximity	and	desperate	need	are	combined.	Our	third	tier	of	obligation	is	to	those	who	live	
in	close	proximity	or	share	a	social	relationship	(neighbours,	club	members,	and	compatriots),	
because	we	are	better	situated	to	understand	their	needs	than	strangers.		We	are	justified	to	
prioritize	the	care	of	our	compatriots	over	strangers	because	such	persons	have	the	potential	to	
become	future	intimate	relations,	as	well	as	the	fact	that	compatriots,	especially	fellow	national	
citizens,	are	part	of	the	larger	social	environment	we	all	depend	upon	for	our	care.		The	fourth,	and	
last	level	of	obligation	is	to	distant	strangers.		This	is	because	we	are	often	unable	to	fully	
																																								 																				
32	For	more	on	assigned	responsibilities,	see	Goodin	(1995).	
33	Engster,	The	Heart	of	Justice:	Care	Ethics	and	Political	Theory,	55.	
34	Ibid.,	2.	
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understand	their	needs,	and	have	little	to	no	control	over	the	institutions	that	govern	the	
distribution	of	their	resources.		Rather,	our	residual	responsibility	to	care	for	distant	others	is	best	
carried	out	by	enabling	them	to	care	for	themselves	and	their	intimate	relations	and	compatriots.35			
	 Engster	acknowledges	that	this	distribution	of	care	allows	the	nature	of	our	caring	
obligations	to	remain	indeterminate,	so	he	suggests	three	guidelines	for	a	principle	of	responsibility	
for	how	we	can	determine	who	does	what	kind	of	caring.		First,	he	notes	that	“we	assume	a	special	
obligation	to	do	our	best	to	provide	at	least	adequate	care	for	individuals	when	we	take	some	action	
that	indicates	our	intention	to	take	on	primary	responsibility	for	their	care.”36		Such	is	the	case	with	
parents	who	choose	to	have	children,	or	with	persons	who	choose	to	become	doctors.		Second,	he	
argues	the	norms	that	undermine	a	caregiver’s	own	care	needs	are	morally	unjustifiable,	like	the	
norm	that	women	care	for	children	sometimes	to	the	detriment	of	themselves.		The	guideline	here	is	
that	the	caring	needs	of	others	should	not	necessarily	supersede	the	caring	responsibility	one	has	to	
one’s	own	self.		Third,	there	is	a	responsibility	to	provide	care	for	those	individuals	who	require	it,	
and	for	those	who	are	themselves	caregivers.37		It	is	this	distribution	of	caring	obligations	that	gives	
his	caring	human	rights	international	purchase,	because	our	residual	responsibilities	demand	that	
we	care	for	distant	others	when	their	own	friends,	family,	and	nation	are	unable	to	care	for	them	in	
the	first	place.			
	
Section 1.2 – Caring Human Rights 
It	is	our	residual	duty	of	care	that	obligates	us	to	care	for	distant	strangers,	according	to	Engster.		
Further,	because	Engster	strives	to	avoid	ambiguous	claims	about	what	international	global	care	
might	look	like,	he	defines	a	set	of	human	rights	grounded	on	his	particular	theory	of	care.		The	
reason	he	seeks	to	‘cut	a	middle	ground’	between	care	and	human	rights	is	because	both	theories	
have,	in	his	view,	problematic	draw	backs	that	are	best	corrected	through	merging	the	two	theories	
together.		The	problem	with	human	rights,	he	claims,	is	that	the	moral	status	of	human	rights	
remains	contentious	and	lacks	substantive	cross-cultural	agreement,	which	result	in	a	diluted	
enforcement	of	human	rights	standards.38		Regardless,	it	is	his	critique	of	Robinson’s	critical	ethic	of	
care	that	is	important	to	understand	for	my	purposes.		He	does	note	that	the	critical	ethic	of	care	is	
meant	to	“identify	and	change	social	institutions	that	make	individuals	needy	and	dependent	in	the	
																																								 																				
35	Ibid.,	55-8.	
36	Ibid.,	58.	
37	Ibid.,	59.		This	is	similar	to	Kittay’s	conception	of	the	doulia,	a	concept	I	discussed	in	Chapter	One,	where	the	
wider	society	has	an	obligation	of	care	for	those	who	provide	care	to	particular	others,	which	enables	a	higher	
standard	of	care	overall	and	does	not	unfairly	penalize	those	who	cannot	engage	in	‘productive’	labour.	
(Kittay,	1999,	143)	
38	The	Heart	of	Justice:	Care	Ethics	and	Political	Theory,	163-4.	
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first	place,”39	and	that	one	of	the	solutions	Robinson	proposes	is	to	“critically	[assess]	our	
relationships	with	others	and	[develop]	more	egalitarian	partnering	relationships,”40	particularly	
with	NGOs.		Engster’s	charge	against	Robinson’s	critical	ethics	of	care	is	that	while	it	provides	useful	
descriptions	of	how	to	care	for	others	in	international	relations,	“it	does	not	tell	us	enough	about	
whom	or	what	we	should	care	about,”41	and	because	it	is	“[f]ramed	so	abstractly,	Robinson’s	theory	
provides	little	practical	guidance	for	policymakers,	activists,	and	the	general	public	in	thinking	about	
what	it	might	mean	to	care	for	others	abroad.”42		Instead,	he	claims	that	grounding	human	rights	in	
care	theory	produces	“a	normative	international	relations	theory	that	applies	to	all	human	beings	
regardless	of	their	culture,	religion,	or	morality,	and	can	provide	substantive	guidance	for	cross-
cultural	dialogue	among	diverse	peoples	about	the	moral	treatment	of	all	human	beings.”43	
	 However,	before	I	outline	Engster’s	notion	of	caring	human	rights,	I	will	very	briefly	
foreground	my	response	to	Engster’s	critique	of	Robinson.		I	will	argue	more	fully	in	Chapter	Five	of	
this	thesis,	contra	Engster,	that	the	critical	ethics	of	care	can	be	a	substantive	guide	for	public	policy.			
I	claim	that	Engster	does	not	give	enough	credit	to	what	a	critical	care	ethic	can	actually	accomplish.		
Fiona	Robinson	constructed	a	critical	ethics	of	care	as	a	lens	for	international	relations.		Therefore,	
although	Robinson	argues	for	understanding	the	suffering	of	real	persons,	she	targets	solutions	at	
the	global-institutional	level.		This	means	that	the	vital	questions	are	not	about	fulfilment	of	
obligations	or	rights,	but	rather	the	more	vital	questions	are	about	how	care	is	structured.		Why	are	
important	forms	of	care,	such	as	child	or	elder	care,	physical	and	mental	health,	and	education	so	
lacking	in	the	world?		Why	is	care	undervalued,	and	why	are	carers	often	women	or	racialized	
persons?44		As	I	argued	in	Chapters	One	and	Two,	the	question	of	who	and	what	we	care	about	is	
already	answered	by	a	critical	care	ethic.		It	is	not	that	we	are	obligated	to	care,	but	have	a	
responsibility	to	carry	out	the	practices	of	care	in	the	context	of	our	particular	relations.		Therefore,	
guidance	for	policy	makers	can	be	found	in	asking	questions	that	allow	us	to	see	the	ways	in	which	
our	caring	relationships	are	constructed	by	national	and	international	policy,	pervasive	social	norms,	
and	economic	forces.45		These	different	questions	result	in	new	information,	which	in	turn	can	allow	
us	to	consider	new	solutions.			The	greater	concern,	on	a	critical	care	account,	is	how	and	why	care	is	
structured	in	particular	ways,	and	the	ways	in	which	people	are	made	vulnerable	and	unable	to	care	
																																								 																				
39	Ibid.,	160.	
40	Ibid.,	161.	
41	Ibid.	
42	Ibid.,	162.	
43	Ibid.	
44	Fiona	Robinson,	"Global	Care	Ethics:	Beyond	Distribution,	Beyond	Justice,"	Journal	of	Global	Ethics	9,	no.	2	
(2013):	133-4.	
45	See	Chapter	Two	for	a	larger	discussion	on	the	kind	of	analysis	that	a	critical	ethic	of	care	can	provide,	
particularly	about	international	moral	contexts.	
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for	their	particular	relations.		Engster	focuses	on	who	must	care,	and	on	the	quality	of	care	required	
but	glosses	over	the	critical	force	of	care	ethics,	which	seeks	to	identify	impediments	to	fulfilling	care	
obligations.		
	 Returning	to	Engster’s	caring	human	rights,	he	claims	that	while	national	governments	have	
the	primary	responsibility	to	secure	the	human	rights	of	their	citizens,	if	any	government	cannot	do	
so,	it	falls	to	the	international	community	to	assume	their	collective	residual	responsibilities	to	
ensure	human	rights	standards	are	met.		Engster	allows	that	there	are	limits	to	such	aid,	that	such	a	
responsibility	toward	distant	others	only	holds	when	one’s	closer	responsibilities	have	been	
fulfilled.46		Such	aid	would,	he	claims,	actually	be	simple	because	a	small	percentage	of	the	above-
poverty	income	of	persons	in	most	industrialized	nations	would	be	able	to	underwrite	the	cost	of	
such	efforts.47		Further,	these	caring	human	rights	are	minimal	moral	standards,	which	means	that	
the	list	of	human	rights	becomes	very	short,	especially	when	compared	to	the	Universal	Declaration	
of	Human	Rights.		They	are	as	follows:	1)	a	right	to	physical	security;	2)	a	right	to	subsistence	goods	
and	adequate	care	to	survive,	develop,	and	function;	3)	the	right	to	personal	and	social	care	
necessary	for	their	basic	capabilities	and	functioning;	4)	the	right	to	work	and	earn	a	sufficient	living;	
5)	the	right	to	care	for	dependents	and	self	without	undue	interference;	6)	the	right	to	a	safe	
workplace;	7)	the	right	to	unemployment	and	disability	insurance;	8)	the	right	to	protection	against	
discrimination;	9)	the	right	to	a	responsive	(though	not	necessarily	democratic)	government;	and	10)	
the	right	to	enter	into	relationships	free	from	coercion.48		This	short,	targeted	list	of	human	rights,	
grounded	in	our	residual	obligation	to	care	for	those	who	are	not	cared	for,	is	a	beneficial	outcome	
of	his	theory,	according	to	Engster.		Certainly	this	list	is	much	shorter	than	the	Universal	Declaration	
of	Human	Rights,	and	more	geared	toward	fulfilling	Engster’s	definition	of	care	as	outlined	in	Section	
1.1.1.		However,	this	state-centric	focus	feeds	into	my	critique	that	Engster’s	caring	human	rights	
could	overlook	the	plight	of	the	transnational	care	worker	because	it	remains	an	open	question	
which	government	is	responsible	for	the	rights	of	citizens	overseas,	particularly	those	working	in	the	
informal	sector.	
	 The	second	benefit of	this	minimal	standard	of	caring	human	rights,	according	to	Engster,	is	
that	it	is	less	contentious	cross-culturally,	which	provides	greater	purchase	for	cross-cultural	
dialogue	and	judgment.		There	are	minimal	standards	for	civil	and	religious	freedoms,	as	well	as	
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47	Ibid.,	172.	
48	Ibid.,	170-1.	
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nationality,	cultural	expression,	and	self-determination.49		While	caring	human	rights	would	not	be	
able	to	support	the	same	rights	as	a	robust	set	of	liberal	human	rights,	they	would	nevertheless	
support	such	rights	when	they	become	a	matter	of	basic	survival	or	functioning.50		For	example,	a	
right	to	free	speech	might	sometimes	be	protected	by	caring	human	rights	when	censorship	laws	
inhibit	basic	functioning.		The	claim	is	that	these	rights	are	less	contentious,	because	they	can	offer	
“a	practical	standard	for	determining	the	minimally	adequate	care	of	individuals.”51			Thus,	cross-
cultural	judgment	can	be	less	problematic,	and	can	take	place	in	a	dialogue	format,	guided	by	the	
caring	virtues.			
Take,	for	example,	female	genital	mutilation	(FGM).		One	might	argue	that,	for	a	particular	
culture,	FGM	enables	the	basic	functioning	of	local	women	because	without	FGM	they	are	not	
considered	‘marriageable’	and	as	such	are	vulnerable	to	not	having	a	place	in	their	society.		Engster’s	
counter-argument	is	that	however	much	FGM	might	be	understood	by	individuals	in	a	culture	as	
enabling	social	functioning,	it	nevertheless	is	wrong	because	it	“deprive[s]	girls	of	sensation	and	
feeling,	cause[s]	them	suffering,	and	threaten[s]	their	survival	and	long-term	health.”52		The	dialogue	
that	we	engage	in	to	make	this	cross-cultural	judgment,	however,	must	be	guided	by	the	virtues	of	
care:	we	must	be	attentive,	responsive,	and	respectful,	and	pursue	a	dialogue	even	though	it	is	
difficult.		Although	Engster	is	not	explicit	here,	we	could	say	that	on	a	theory	of	caring	human	rights	
it	is	not	acceptable	to	promote	one	kind	of	right	over	another.		We	cannot	promote	social	
functioning	over	and	above	basic	health	and	survival	when	there	are	alterative	options	available	to	
promote	the	same	kind	of	social	functioning;	a	woman	may	receive	another,	less	harmful	way	to	
mark	out	her	status	as	a	marriageable	woman.		However,	as	I	will	argue	in	my	critique	in	the	
following	section,	because	Engster’s	theory	is	only	minimally	feminist	and	lacks	a	critical	
investigation	into	dependence	relations,	his	approach	could	overlook	other	forms	of	oppression	that	
women	in	such	cultures	face,	leaving	some	problematic	aspects	of	interpersonal	relationships	
unchallenged.		This	means	that	Engster’s	theory	is	not	necessarily	substantively	different	from	
mainstream	human	rights	discourses	as	it	cannot	provide	a	thoroughly	different	perspective	on	
global	moral	contexts.	
	 The	remaining	question	for	Engster	to	answer	is	how,	after	one	has	engaged	in	dialogue,	we	
are	meant	to	fulfil	the	rights	of	others	on	this	account.		He	outlines	two	general	principles	of	caring	
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human	rights,	which	follow	from	the	nature	of	his	definition	of	care.		First,	“[t]he	goal	of	caring	
should	be	to	enable	to	individuals	and	families	as	much	as	possible	to	care	for	themselves.”53		
Second	“[l]ocal	peoples	and	governments	should	be	involved	as	much	as	possible	in	the	formulation	
and	implementation	of	programs	designed	to	help	them.”54			Also,	there	are	different	methods	to	
fulfil	our	caring	human	rights,	either	through	direct	aid,	through	capacity	building,	or	through	
changes	to	international	law,	yet	the	point	should	be	to	follow	the	principles	as	outlined	regardless	
of	the	method	used.55		Engster	does	not	prioritize	supplying	direct	aid,	however,	because	direct	aid,	
particularly	food	aid,	can	often	have	harmful	outcomes	such	as	the	collapse	of	local	food	markets	
and	increased	dependence	on	foreign	aid	in	general,	although	some	emergency	situations	warrant	
such	assistance.56		A	better	strategy,	according	to	Engster,	would	be	to	help	local	persons	develop	
the	social	infrastructure	for	goods	they	need.		Such	methods	would	include	extending	loans	to	
governments	to	build	schools,	bridges,	and	hospitals,	should	they	decide	that	is	what	they	need,	and	
to	withhold	loans	from	governments	that	are	irresponsible	or	behave	badly	toward	their	people.57		
Engster	also	does	give	some	weight	to	the	critical	care	lens	to	help	identify	policies	that	render	
distant	persons	unable	to	care	for	themselves,	but	he	points	out	Robinson	does	not	spend	much	
time	developing	how	care	ethics	can	substantively	guide	policy.58		Engster	suggests	that	certain	
international	treaties	might	be	altered	to	allow	for	a	better	standard	of	care	worldwide,	such	as	
international	intellectual	property	agreements	that	have	“restricted	the	access	of	many	people	in	
poor	countries	to	basic	medicines.”59		Further,	as	a	practical	consideration,	when	governments	do	
behave	badly,	rather	than	have	a	lopsided,	self-interested	effort	by	one	nation,	there	must	be	
consensus	from	the	international	community,	ideally	through	international	organizations	and	
regulatory	bodies	that	declare	some	governments	illegitimate	and	suspend	the	borrowing	or	
resource	privileges	of	such	governments.60		Engster	further	claims	that	when	such	declarations	and	
subsequent	withholding	of	resources	is	not	enough,	it	might	be	justifiable	to	undertake	
humanitarian	intervention	to	fulfil	the	human	rights	of	distant	strangers	based	on	our	residual	
responsibilities	to	care	for	others	when	their	local	institutions	have	failed	them.		Engster	argues	that	
care	theory	“justifies	the	use	of	military	force	to	ensure	people’s	physical	security	and	support	their	
ability	to	care	for	themselves.”61			If	a	government	fails	to	fulfil	the	rights	of	its	people,	it	has,	
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54	Ibid.	
55	Ibid.,	183.	
56	Ibid.,	184.	
57	Ibid.,	185-7.	
58	Ibid.,	187.	
59	Ibid.,	190.	
60	Ibid.,	189.	
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according	to	Engster,	voided	its	rights	to	sovereignty	and	non-interference	because	such	rights	are	
predicated	on	the	government	caring	for	its	people.		When	a	right	to	sovereignty	is	voided	by	gross	
harms	committed	upon	a	people,	combined	with	a	residual	duty	to	care	for	distant	strangers,	care	
theory	also	justifies	the	use	of	humanitarian	military	intervention.62		Engster	also	stipulates	two	
additional	requirements.		First,	such	operations	cannot	be	futile.		They	must	have	a	chance	of	
success,	which	is	defined	as	“not	only	protecting	individuals	from	immediate	threats	to	their	survival	
and	functioning	but	also	returning	them	to	their	normal	lives	as	quickly	as	possible.”63		Second,	a	
representative	international	body	must	also	authorize	such	interventions,	and	Engster	suggests	the	
United	Nations	Security	Council	as	one	such	option.		He	acknowledges	that	this	would	highly	restrict	
the	deployment	of	humanitarian	military	intervention,	because	it	would	then	truly	be	a	method	of	
last	resort.64	
	 Before	concluding	this	section,	Engster’s	treatment	of	military	and	humanitarian	
intervention,	using	care	theory	to	justify	their	use,	requires	a	brief	comment.		Clearly,	care	theory	
must	be	able	to	address	violent	moral	contexts,	and	I	argued	as	much	in	Chapter	Two.		Just	as	clearly,	
as	Engster	recognizes,	care	theory	justifies	only	the	most	restrained	and	reasonable	uses	of	force,	
because	violence	disrupts	the	important	caring	practices	of	human	life.		Notably,	the	use	of	care	
theory	in	military	thought	has	already	begun.		Daniel	Levine	argues	that	the	lens	of	care	can	be	
important	in	counterinsurgency	operations,	because	care	ethics	“deals	head-on	with	questions	of	
how	to	build	relationships	in	the	presence	of	coercion,	power	imbalance,	force,	and	even	
violence.”65		By	taking	into	account	the	importance	of	relations	(between	counterinsurgents,	civilians	
and	insurgents	in	combination66),	and	using	the	practices	of	care	as	a	part	of	a	new	military	ethos	
(where	courage	is	reimagined	as	holding	back	from	violence	while	under	threat67),	the	lens	of	care	
would	allow	for	military	forces	to	conduct	counterinsurgency	operations	in	a	more	moral	manner.		
The	ability	of	care	ethics,	then,	to	function	in	a	militaristic	setting	is	beginning	to	take	shape	in	the	
literature.		However,	in	Engster’s	work	there	is	less	attention	paid	to	the	ability	of	care	theory	to	
assess,	critique,	and	suggest	solutions	to	address	the	root	causes	of	violence	in	the	first	place,	and	
lessen	the	need	for	military	interventions	in	total.68		It	might	be	the	case	that	in	order	to	prevent	
more	grievous	harms,	some	force	or	violence	against	belligerent	aggressors	might	be	necessary,	but	
this	should	always	be	accompanied	by	strategies	to	undercut	the	appeal	of	violence,	“to	deter	and	
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restrain	rather	than	obliterate	and	destroy;	to	restrain	with	the	least	amount	of	necessary	force	so	
that	reconciliation	remains	open;	in	preventing	violence,	to	cause	no	more	damage	and	pain	to	all	
concerned	than	is	needed.”69		Engster	does	not	explicitly	incorporate	the	understanding	that	one	of	
the	main	priorities	of	care	ethics	is	to	address	the	root	causes	of	violence,	to	make	violence	itself	the	
least	appealing	option	to	marginalized	and	historically	oppressed	groups.		Engster’s	caring	human	
rights	assumes	the	permissibility	of	violence	and	military	intervention,	which	is	not	substantively	
different	from	the	kinds	of	justifications	human	rights	discourses	provide	for	intervention.		For	
example,	Thomas	Pogge	suggests	that	nations	should	not	singly	supply	this	kind	of	‘aid’,	but	if	such	
actions	were	authorized	or	enacted	by	the	United	Nations,	they	could	be	acceptable.70	While	there	is	
no	doubt	that	horrible	violence	still	happens	in	the	world	today,	and	that	care	ethics	must	be	able	to	
address	violence,	modern	organized,	militarized	violence	is	less	about	expansionist	state	policy	as	it	
was	in	the	past,	and	more	to	do	with	what	might	be	understood	as	‘terrorist’	violence.		Because	
terrorists	are	usually	groups	of	people	who	have	been	oppressed	or	marginalized,	violence	is	often	
seen	as	the	best	means	to	address	their	particular	concerns.		Instead,	if	we	were	to	give	some	focus	
to	the	grievances	of	such	persons	rather	than	only	on	their	methods,	then	we	might	be	able	to	avoid	
violence	in	the	first	place.71	
	 I	agree	with	Engster’s	aim	to	foster	better	and	more	care	worldwide	and	lessening	the	scope	
of	severe	poverty	and	human	suffering.		Additionally,	Engster	allows	that	caring	for	others	abroad	
does	entail	“critically	assessing	national	policies	and	international	law	in	order	to	determine	whether	
they	hinder	the	ability	of	distant	peoples	to	develop	responsive	governments	and	care	for	
themselves.”72		However,	I	argue	that	Engster’s	definition	of	care	cannot	support	the	same	depth	of	
analysis,	and	thus	is	unable	to	provide	the	same	information	as	a	critical	ethic	of	care.		It	is	this	
problem	that	is	consistent	throughout	Engster’s	discussion	of	care	theory:	his	formulation	of	care	
theory	does	not	critically	examine	our	dependence	relations,	and	as	such	it	cannot	provide	the	
necessary	kind	of	information	about	global	moral	contexts	if	we	are	understand	and	transform	our	
global	moral	landscape,	as	I	argued	in	Chapter	Two.		Lacking	critical	scope,	Engster’s	care	theory	
cannot	access	the	root	causes	of	suffering	and	vulnerability,	and	as	such	his	caring	human	rights	do	
not	pose	a	robust	alternative	to	most	mainstream	human	rights	discourses.		It	is	my	critique	of	
Engster’s	caring	human	rights	that	I	turn	to	next.	
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Section 2 – Crit ique of Engster’s Caring Human Rights 
I	am	sympathetic	to	Engster’s	aims,	and	find	some	of	his	solutions	to	a	lack	of	political	consideration	
for	care	laudable,	such	as	parental	leave	and	childcare	support,	and	the	focus	on	international	
capacity	building.		However,	in	trying	to	cut	a	middle	ground	between	a	critical	ethic	of	care	and	
mainstream	human	rights	discourses,	Engster	has	largely	removed	the	critical,	feminist	lens	from	
care	theory,	which	generates	serious	problems.		The	critiques	I	develop	here	serve	to	demonstrate	
that	Engster’s	caring	human	rights	actually	are	vulnerable	to	the	same	criticism	that	care	ethics	
levels	at	mainstream	human	rights	theories.		That	being	the	case	it	is	unclear	why,	if	we	want	a	
moral	theory	that	provides	a	different	perspective,	we	should	use	Engster’s	care	theory,	because	it	
overlooks	some	of	the	same	moral	contexts	as	human	rights	discourses.	
In	this	section,	I	put	forward	two	critiques	of	Engster’s	theory.		My	first	critique	examines	
how	Engster	uses	the	concept	of	dependence	as	foundational	to	his	rational	theory	of	obligation	to	
care.		I	claim	that	because	his	brand	of	care	theory	is	not	critical	of	our	dependence	relations,	it	is	
not	suited	to	address	the	background	conditions	of	power	that	shape	our	dependence	relations,	
which	means	we	can	be	led	to	overlook	deeply	morally	problematic	issues.		My	second	critique	is	
that	Engster	has	made	the	ethics	of	care	minimally	feminist,	which	means	that	Engster’s	caring	
human	rights	does	not	encompass	the	ways	in	which	women	experience	truncated	life	choices	
around	the	world,	nor	why	women	in	particular	are	rendered	more	vulnerable	in	the	aftermath	of	
disasters	(natural	or	man-made),	or	why	women	and	children	often	experience	more	severe	levels	of	
poverty	than	men.			
Combined,	these	problems	mean	that	Engster’s	theory	of	caring	human	rights	is	ill-equipped	
to	judge	and	handle	many	transnational	concerns,	particularly	ones	around	the	transnational	
migration	of	care,	and	its	darker	side	of	human	sex	trafficking.		The	latter	is	doubly	difficult	because	
Engster	has	removed	sexual	activity	from	his	scope	of	concern	when	he	defined	the	activity	of	caring	
in	the	first	place.		He	claims	that	it	is	not	a	part	of	‘basic	survival,’	because	it	pertains	to	the	
generation	of	life,	not	the	sustenance	of	it.73		Further,	Engster	fails	to	incorporate	sexual	activity	into	
his	understanding	of	‘basic	functioning,’	along	with	religion,	art,	and	sports,	because	they	are	part	of	
a	conception	of	‘the	good	life’74	which	he	tries	to	avoid	because	of	the	contentious	nature	of	debates	
about	what	constitutes	a	good	life.		Certainly,	Engster	might	respond	that	human	trafficking	is	an	
issue	of	bodily	integrity,	but	that	does	not	tell	us	why	human	trafficking	occurs	in	the	first	place,	and	
the	root	causes	of	sex	trafficking	have	to	do	with,	among	other	things,	sexual	activity.		Trying	to	
separate	the	economics	of	sex	trafficking	from	the	more	intimate	concerns	of	sexual	gratification	
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would	create	an	incomplete	picture	of	sex	trafficking	as	a	whole.		Importantly,	we	must	reinforce	the	
understanding	that	the	point	of	critical,	feminist	care	ethics	is,	as	Robinson	puts	it,	“not	to	‘transfer’	
care	from	one	sphere	to	another	(i.e.,	the	public	sphere)	but,	rather,	to	deconstruct	the	gendered	
dichotomies	that	have	created	two	separate	realms	of	human	existence.”75		
Engster	could	counter	my	objections,	pointing	out	that	he	does	state	that	critical	analysis	is	
required	if	one	is	to	fully	address	moral	problems.		There	are	three	locations	where	he	makes	such	
statements	in	his	book.76		However,	I	claim	that	any	such	critical	assessment	that	proceeds	on	
Engster’s	terms	would	be	inadequate.		Such	a	critical	assessment,	for	Engster,	would	likely	be	based	
upon	his	own	particular	definition	of	caring	and	his	caring	human	rights,	especially	in	the	
international	realm.77		While	Engster	does	provide	normative	standards	defining	what	ought	be	the	
case,	and	even	provides	suggestions	for	how	to	inculcate	a	more	caring	attitude	among	people	
(focused	on	the	United	States),	these	standards	are	unable	to	encompass	the	ways	relations	of	
power	(gendered,	racial,	sexual,	national,	economic,	and	international)	shape	our	very	lives,	or	how	
difference	and	exclusion	are	made	manifest.	
In	short,	while	Engster	could	claim	he	does	provide	a	critical	analysis,	it	is	not	the	same	kind	
of	analysis	that	the	critical	ethics	of	care	can	provide,	and	as	such	his	analysis	cannot	‘see’	the	same	
problems,	nor	can	it	suggest	substantively	different	solutions,	as	I	will	argue	in	Chapter	Five	when	I	
examine	the	ability	of	care	ethics	to	guide	public	policy.		I	argue,	instead,	that	it	is	vitally	important	
to	retain	the	critical	and	feminist	dimensions	of	care	ethics	if	it	is	to	be	substantively	different	to	
human	rights	discourses,	not	just	another	type	of	human	rights	discourse.		
	
Section 2.1 – First Critique: Uncritical Dependence 
Part	of	a	critical,	feminist	ethic	of	care	is	an	understanding	that	caring	practices	exist	within	patterns	
of	power	“both	material	and	discursive”	78	and	are	constituted	by	ideas	about	gender,	race,	age,	
ability,	and	location.		Care	ethics	is	and	must	be	“inherently	critical,	in	that	it	questions	both	our	
normative	assumptions	about	caring	practices	and	values,	as	well	as	the	bases	on	which	decisions	
about	the	giving	and	receiving	of	care	are	made.”79		Because	caring	practices	are	often	the	subject	of	
such	patterns	of	power,	an	ethic	of	care	must	be	critical	of	the	very	practices	that	shape	how	people	
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care	for	others,	and	understanding	the	circumstances	under	which	caring	practices	often	occur.		This	
critical	aspect	does	more	than	reveal	that	there	has	been	an	injustice,	because	it	also	reveals	the	
causes	of	such	an	injustice	in	the	first	place.80		For	example,	critical	care	theory	does	not	just	point	to	
girls	being	denied	schooling	as	a	wrong,	but	also	investigates	the	root	causes	of	girls	being	denied	
schooling	as	they	are	embedded	within	a	particular	cultural	context.		Neither	does	care	ethics	expect	
there	to	be	one	reason.		A	critical,	feminist	care	ethics	would	be	able	to	illuminate	the	intersection	of	
the	socio-cultural	and	economic	realities	that	exist	in	a	particular	society	that	shape	these	girls’	lives,	
such	as	families	possessing	only	limited	funds	and	having	to	choose	which	children	to	send	to	school,	
or	a	cultural	bias	against	education	for	women	and	girls.	
	 One	place	where	this	lack	of	critical	analysis	is	evident	is	in	Engster’s	theory	of	rational	
obligation.		Although	Engster	constructs	his	theory	of	rational	obligation	in	such	a	way	as	to	guard	
against	the	paternalistic,	parochial,	and	possibly	harmful	side	to	care,	his	theory	of	obligation	cannot	
explain	how	or	why	those	relations	of	dependence	are	constructed	and	how	they	are	possible	in	the	
first	place.		This	means	that	his	theory	could	leave	intact	some	of	the	structural	harms	of	
globalization,	like	patterns	of	exclusion,	just	as	mainstream	human	rights	discourses	do.		Engster	
argues	for	a	rational	theory	of	obligation	based	upon	the	principle	of	consistent	dependency,81	but	
he	does	not	seriously	investigate	the	patterns	of	power	that	create	that	very	dependence.		He	
acknowledges	that	there	is	a	history	of	women	being	tied	to	the	work	of	care	by	social	norms	about	
gender;82	however,	such	an	acknowledgement	does	not	begin	to	approach	how	such	norms	are	
perpetuated	or	entrenched	through	various	forms	of	power,	such	as	the	normative,	economic,	and	
political.		There	are	two	ways	Engster	might	claim	that	his	theory	serves	as	a	way	to	prevent	unequal	
relations	of	power.		First,	he	might	claim	that	his	definition	of	care	and	its	guidelines	are	meant	to	
prevent	an	unequal	distribution	of	caring	labour.		Second,	his	caring	human	rights	are	also	meant	to	
serve	as	a	set	of	standards	to	prevent	powerful	institutions	from	denying	us	our	right	to	engage	in	
caring	relations,	and	the	giving	and	receiving	of	care.		While	such	standards	are	intended	to	prevent	
avoidance	of	one’s	caring	responsibilities	or	allowing	harm	to	continue,	they	do	not	question	why	
the	harms	occurred	in	the	first	place.		Further,	because	he	also	stratifies	our	caring	responsibilities	so	
sharply,	that	can	in	turn	serve	to	further	naturalize	certain	dependence	relations,	including	their	
unequal	relations	of	power.		For	example,	although	he	argues	that	we	have	an	obligation	to	care	for	
our	‘nearest	and	dearest,’	he	does	not	build	in	ways	to	question	harmful	relations	of	power	that	can	
exist	within	the	family.		Perhaps	Engster	might	argue	that	we	can	choose	to	leave	harmful	close	
relations,	but	that	does	not	give	enough	weight	to	the	power	of	norms	around	family	life,	or	the	
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legal	and	emotional	difficulty	of	leaving	such	situations.		Rather,	the	idea	that	we	are	obligated	to	
care	for	our	families	is	somewhat	beside	the	point—we	already	do	care—but	the	question	that	is	
more	important	is	why	certain	kinds	of	power	relations,	even	within	families,	are	viewed	as	
acceptable	in	the	first	place.83			
Conversely,	a	critical,	feminist	ethic	of	care	is	able	to	question	how	“different	forms	of	
‘power’	come	to	exist,	and	how	they	are	distributed	in	society.”84		It	is	not	enough	to	say	that	
women	should	not	shoulder	the	larger	burden	of	care.		We	must	also	investigate	the	ways	in	which	
norms	about	gender	and	care	are	still	perpetuated	through	wider	social	norms	and	political	
processes,	particularly	public	policy.		Further,	the	caring	practice	of	attentiveness	requires	us	to	
understand	how	these	norms	shape	the	lives	of	real	people.		For	example,	the	increasing	number	of	
domestic	and	care	workers	in	private	homes	in	Western	countries	has	been	shaped	by	several	
factors:	a	change	from	the	male-breadwinner	to	adult-worker	model;	shifts	in	migration	patterns	of	
women	from	the	Global	South	to	support	their	families	financially;	and	how	the	immigration	policies	
of	Western	nations	shape	the	flow	of	migration.85		Equally	important,	although	the	‘pull’	factors	from	
wealthy	nations	are	part	of	the	migration	of	care,	so	too	are	the	‘push’	factors,	the	conditions	in	the	
home	countries	of	migrants	that	compel	them	to	seek	work	abroad.		Even	if	the	‘pull’	factors	were	
decreased,	the	situation	of	transnational	migrate	carers	cannot	be	fully	understood	or	addressed	
without	understanding	the	reasons	why	they	migrate	in	the	first	place,	such	as	a	lack	of	adequate	
pay,	supplies,	and	personnel.86		The	critical	lens	of	care	illuminates	the	situation	of	the	migrant	
worker,	illustrating	that	the	“yawning	gap	between	rich	and	poor	countries	is	itself	a	form	of	
coercion,	pushing	Third	World	mothers	to	seek	work	in	the	First	for	a	lack	of	options	closer	to	
home.”87		Only	through	a	critical	analysis	of	the	root	causes	of	migration	are	we	able	to	see	the	
larger	picture	of	care	migration,	as	well	as	the	care	drain	and	the	harms	that	it	perpetuates,	
especially	considering	that	most	women	who	migrate	to	do	care	work	are	themselves	mothers,	who	
leave	behind	children	who	often	do	not	adjust	well.88	
																																								 																				
83	Joan	C.	Tronto,	"Creating	Caring	Institutions:	Politics,	Plurality,	and	Purpose,"	Ethics	and	Social	Welfare	4,	no.	
2	(2010):	161.	
84	Fiona	Robinson,	"Stop	Talking	and	Listen:	Discourse	Ethics	and	Feminist	Care	Ethics	in	International	Political	
Theory,"	Millennium:	Journal	of	International	Studies	39,	no.	3	(2011):	853.	
85	Fiona	Williams,	"Towards	a	Transnational	Analysis	of	the	Political	Economy	of	Care,"	in	Feminist	Ethics	and	
Social	Policy:	Towards	a	New	Global	Political	Economy	of	Care,	ed.	Rianne	Mahon	and	Fiona	Robinson	
(Vancouver:	University	of	British	Columbia	Press,	2011),	21.	
86	G.	K.	D.	Crozier,	"Care	Workers	in	the	Global	Market:	Appraising	Applications	of	Feminist	Care	Ethics,"	The	
International	Journal	of	Feminist	Approaches	to	Bioethics	3,	no.	1	(2010):	131.	
87	Hochschild,	27.	
88	Ibid.,	21-2.	
121	
	
This	uncritical	acceptance	of	dependence	as	a	basis	for	a	rational	theory	of	obligation	poses	
problems	for	Engster’s	caring	human	rights.		All	human	relations	take	place	within	webs	of	
dependence,	and	dependence	is	constantly	constructed	by	social	and	political	patterns	of	power.		
Further,	because	these	caring	human	rights	are	largely	focused	on	how	any	particular	state	ensures	
the	caring	needs	of	its	own	citizens,	it	cannot	examine	the	root	causes	of	transnational	caring,	
effectively	reinforcing	harmful	patterns	of	exclusion	that	are	already	present	in	the	world	today.		
This	is	the	same	problem	with	mainstream	human	rights	theories	as	outlined	in	the	previous	chapter;	
they	cannot	‘see’	or	even	challenge	the	structural	harms	of	globalization.		Only	through	a	critical	
examination	of	dependence	does	it	become	clear	that	care	deficits	in	one	part	of	the	world	creates	a	
demand	to	import	carers	from	other	parts	of	the	world,	which	in	turn	creates	a	new	care	deficit.89		
The	ability	for	Western	nations	to	demand	care	from	other	parts	of	the	world	is	also	part	of	a	legacy	
of	colonial	power	relations,	perpetuating	inequality	through	“the	translation	of	the	unequal	relations	
of	personal	interdependency	into	the	unequal	relations	of	transnational	interdependency.”90		
Consider	again	the	example	of	the	Filipina	nanny.		There	are	several	layers	of	dependence	that	can	
be	analysed.		First,	a	critical	ethic	of	care	can	analyse	the	way	in	which	the	nanny	and	the	family	are	
dependent	upon	each	other.		The	Filipina	nanny	is	dependent	upon	her	employers	for	not	only	her	
income,	but	for	her	continued	stay	within	Canada,	and	the	power	that	her	employers	have	over	her	
is	prone	to	abuse.		In	turn,	the	Canadian	family	is	dependent	on	the	Filipina	nanny	to	care	for	the	
children	and	maintaining	the	house.		The	balance	of	dependence	falls	more	heavily	upon	the	nanny	
than	the	family,	because	the	family	can	always	find	another	Filipina	woman	for	the	job,	whereas	the	
nanny	might	not	be	able	to	find	another	employer/sponsor	for	her	continued	stay	within	Canada.		A	
second	level	of	dependence	analysis	is	at	the	international	level	if	we	examine	the	discrepancy	
between	Canada	and	the	Philippines	in	international	politics.		Canada,	though	its	citizens	rely	on	
cheap	imported	labour,	has	a	greater	bargaining	position	than	the	Philippines,	which	is	desperate	to	
export	its	own	women	to	expiate	its	national	debt	through	the	remittances	of	those	women.91	
Third,	and	last,	we	can	examine	how	national	and	international	policies	generate	the	
possibility	of	importing	care	workers	actually	serves	to	perpetuate	gendered	and	racialized	forms	of	
power,	and	allows	some	persons	to	shift	their	caring	responsibilities	to	others.		These	policies	can	be	
understood	as	“cost-effective	ways	of	securing	family	norms	and	meeting	care	needs	(even	though	
these	norms	and	needs	have	now	changed)”	and	can	illuminate	how	“these	women’s	[like	the	
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Filipina	nanny’s]	social	relations	and	citizenship	rights	were	inscribed	with	gendered	and	racialised	
inequalities.”92		The	caring	practice	of	responsibility,	focusing	on	how	our	responsibilities	are	
structured,	allows	us	to	see	how	importing	carers	can	allow	many	different	layers	of	norms	and	
normative	structures	of	power	to	remain	intact,	and	allow	for	some	people	to	continue	their	
‘privileged	irresponsibility.’		Because	most	often	migrant	carers	are	racialized	women,	this	can	allow	
norms	about	family	structure	to	remain	relatively	intact,	because	the	burden	of	care	is	shifted	to	
another	woman,	whose	racial	or	ethnic	difference	also	serves	to	mark	her	out	as	someone	who	is	
presumed	to	be	‘naturally’	a	carer,	and	by	occupying	that	role	of	carer,	her	differences	are	
reinforced.93		Further,	the	relations	of	power	between	nations	can	remain	intact	as	well.		Just	as	
important	as	it	is	to	investigate	norms	around	race	and	gender,	we	cannot	ignore	the	relations	of	
power	shaped	by	historical	patterns	of	colonialization,	and	historical	migration	patterns.94		As	I	
argued	in	Chapter	Two,	the	parity	of	power	between	nations	is	of	vital	importance	when	we	analyse	
global	moral	contexts,	because	such	relations	are	often	shaped	to	benefit	the	more	powerful	party,	
which	at	least	partly	generated	the	moral	context	in	the	first	place.	
If	Engster’s	care	theory	were	to	use	a	critical	analysis	of	dependence,	in	an	effort	to	refute	
my	critique,	he	would	have	to	rethink	the	purchase	of	his	rational	theory	of	obligation	to	care	and	
his	stratification	of	caring	obligations.		Once	we	critically	assess	our	dependence	relations,	it	
becomes	difficult	to	ground	a	theory	of	rational	obligation	upon	those	very	relations	in	the	first	place.	
Recall	that	the	point	of	a	rational	theory	of	obligation	is	to	say	that	if	I	deny	that	others	need	care,	I	
then	deny	that	I	need	care,	which	is	unintelligible	because	all	persons	need	care	in	order	to	at	least	
survive.95		However,	once	dependence	relations	are	critically	assessed,	and	the	nature	of	our	
dependence	relations	is	challenged,	the	rational	theory	of	obligation	itself	can	be	questioned.		
Because	the	shape	of	our	dependence	relations	are	structured	by	norms	about	gender,	race,	and	
class,	it	is	problematic	to	use	dependence	as	a	grounds	for	a	rational	theory	of	obligation,	as	though	
it	were	a	concept	without	normative	content.		For	example,	once	we	are	critical	of	gender	roles	and	
the	normative	implications	inherent	in	heterosexual	marriage,	we	can	question	whether	or	not	a	
wife	is	rationally	obligated	to	provide	certain	kinds	of	care	and	maintenance	for	her	husband.		
Certainly,	one	hopes	that	the	couple	cares	for	each	other,	emotionally	and	materially,	but	it	is	
unclear,	if	Engster	were	to	incorporate	a	critical	view	of	dependence,	why	a	wife	is	obligated	to	care	
for	her	husband	(or	vice	versa)	if	their	dependence	itself	is	structured	by	norms	and	relations	of	
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power,	and	further	reinforced	by	public	policy	that	continues	to	privilege	the	husband	working	
outside	the	home	and	the	wife	caring	for	the	home	and	children.	
Once	the	rational	theory	of	obligation	loses	its	secure	foundation,	Engster’s	stratification	of	
caring	responsibilities	does	not	necessarily	make	sense,	particularly	with	regard	to	the	idea	that	we	
have	residual	responsibilities	for	the	caring	human	rights	of	distant	strangers.		The	rational	theory	of	
obligation	made	possible	the	idea	that	we	could	neatly	stratify	our	caring	responsibilities,	because	
we	are	best	able	to	fulfil	our	obligations	to	those	closest	to	us.		However,	if	we	do	not	have	a	firm	
foundation	for	our	obligations	to	care,	it	is	unclear	what	our	residual	responsibilities	are.		Because	a	
critical	picture	of	dependence	makes	it	possible	to	question	our	rational	obligations	to	care,	the	
stratification	of	our	caring	obligations	breaks	down.		There	is	then	no	clear	distinction	between	the	
different	tiers	of	our	obligations,	and	while	we	might	be	able	to	acknowledge	that	the	care	claims	of	
distant	strangers	are	valid,	that	does	not	mean	their	claims	are	able	to	find	direct	purchase	with	us.		
For	example,	the	cocoa	farmers	who	supply	the	world	with	chocolate	certainly	have	claims	of	care,	
but	if	the	stratification	of	our	caring	obligations	breaks	down,	it	is	not	clear	any	longer	to	whom	they	
make	their	claims	of	care.		Once	we	lack	a	residual	responsibility	to	care	for	distant	strangers,	it	is	
unclear	why	it	remains	our	responsibility	to	seek	to	fulfil	their	caring	human	rights.		Thus,	
incorporating	a	critical	picture	of	dependence	into	Engster’s	caring	human	rights	is	deeply	
problematic	for	his	project	because	it	relies	on	an	uncritical	acceptance	of	dependence	in	order	to	
generate	caring	human	rights	claims	in	the	first	place.	
	
Section 2.2 – Second Critique: Minimally Feminist 
Engster	claims	that	his	brand	of	care	theory	is	minimally	feminist,	and	that	this	is	acceptable	because	
while	it	does	something	less	than	pursue	a	full	commitment	to	women’s	equality	and	rights,	it	goes	
“a	long	way	toward	supporting	more	social	equality	for	women,	since	women’s	inequality	is	closely	
tied	to	their	traditional	role	as	caregivers	and	the	low	valuation	that	caring	practices	have	been	
accorded	by	most	theories	of	justice	and	most	societies.”96		I	argue,	on	the	contrary,	that	the	ethics	
of	care	should	be	strongly	feminist,	and	that	it	should	not	back	away	from	larger	claims	about	
women’s	equality.		By	constraining	the	feminist	aims	of	care	ethics,	Engster	is	unable	to	investigate	
the	ways	in	which	women,	on	average	and	especially	those	women	in	and	from	the	Global	South,	
experience	truncated	life	choices	even	if	all	their	caring	human	rights	have	been	met,	thus	leaving	
intact	gender	biases	like	mainstream	human	rights	theories.		While	Engster	does	not	necessarily	tout	
minimal	feminism	as	a	prime	feature	of	his	brand	of	care	theory,	I	argue	that	we	should	at	least	be	
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sceptical,	and	perhaps	even	oppose,	any	kind	of	care	theory	that	does	not	have	strong	feminist	
commitments.97		Although	Engster	claims	that	there	is	nothing	preventing	us	from	using	a	liberal	
rights	theory	to	support	a	more	robust	notion	of	women’s	equality,98	relying	on	liberal	human	rights	
to	achieve	goals	already	contained	within	the	feminist	ethic	of	care	indicates	that	Engster	has	missed	
a	vital	point.		Like	Engster’s	uncritical	acceptance	of	dependence,	a	minimally	feminist	care	theory	
cannot	investigate	the	root	causes	of	global	moral	problems,	in	this	case	women’s	subjugation	on	a	
global	scale,	particularly	with	regard	to	transnational	care	migration	and	its	darker	side:	human	sex	
trafficking.			
	 In	the	previous	section,	I	examined	what	it	meant	for	care	ethics	to	be	critical,	and	here	I	
must	explain	what	it	means	for	care	ethics	to	be	feminist.		Care	ethics	is	feminist	because	it,	
“concentrates	on	the	ways	in	which	decisions	about	care	are	constituted	particularly	by	relations	of	
gender,	but	also	of	global	and	local	relations	of	ethnicity,	race	and	class.”99		That	means,	unlike	
Engster’s	formulation	of	care	theory,	which	only	has	minimal	feminist	commitments,	a	feminist	ethic	
of	care	expressly	examines	the	ways	in	which	our	caring	relations	are	shaped	by	local	and	global	
norms	about	gender,	race,	class,	and	ethnicity.100		Engster’s	minimal	feminist	commitments	are	
largely,	I	argue,	a	set	of	standards	that	women	should	not	be	expected	to	shoulder	the	majority	of	
the	care	work,	or	that	women	should	not	experience	unique	harms	due	to	their	gender.		However,	
these	should	nots	are	bulwarks	only.		The	mere	standard	does	not	require	engagement	with	the	why	
and	how	of	women’s	subjugation,	and	the	especially	precarious	position	of	transnational	care	
workers.		As	such	Engster’s	theory	is	not	substantively	different	from	mainstream	human	rights	
discourses,	because	it	can	leave	intact	gender	biases	and	overlook	important	locations	of	social	
reproduction,	i.e.	the	transnational	context	of	care.	
	 In	presenting	solutions	to	combat	the	gendered	division	of	care,	Engster	also	examines	a	
possible	cause	of	the	gendered	division	of	labour,	although	as	I	shall	argue	below	it	is	a	shallow	
examination	that	does	not	fully	challenge	the	way	in	which	the	political	sphere	matters	for	the	
gendered	division	of	labour.		His	examination	focuses	in	particular	on	the	work	of	Nancy	Chodorow.		
Although	he	is	aware	of	the	critiques	of	her	work,	he	bases	his	solutions	on	the	not	unreasonable	
understanding	that	the	perpetuation	of	the	gendered	division	of	care	has	a	great	deal	to	do	with	
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unequal	parenting	arrangements	(i.e.	the	gendered	division	of	parental	responsibility),	and	as	such	
girls	receive	messages	to	engage	in	care	while	boys	are	socialized	not	to	engage	in	care.101		
Therefore,	Engster’s	primary	solutions	are	geared	towards	equalising	parenting	arrangements,	
where	governments	should	foster	substantial	parental	leave,	encourage	men	to	take	family	leave,	
and	protect	flexible	work	arrangements	for	parents	of	both	sexes	allowing	both	women	and	men	to	
be	seen	as	caregivers.		This,	Engster	claims,	would	aid	in	eroding	the	norms	around	gender	and	
care.102		Additionally,	Engster	also	argues	that	there	should	be	greater	incentives	for	men	to	enter	
traditionally	female	dominated	professions,	such	as	early	childhood	education,	elementary	
education,	and	nursing,	much	like	how	women	have	more	recently	been	encouraged	and	
empowered	to	enter	traditionally	male-dominated	fields	such	as	math,	science,	technology,	and	
engineering.		Engster	claims	that	the	government	can	play	a	role	in	changing	the	gendered	division	
of	care	work	through	a	series	of	policy	incentives,	which	will	enable	us	to	view	caring	as	a	human	
activity,	that	men	and	women	both	should	engage	in,	not	only	a	feminine	one.103	
	 Engster	acknowledges	that	care	has	been	historically	devalued,	and	he	suggests	several	
strategies	for	inculcating	people	with	the	values	of	care.		However,	because	he	does	not	address	the	
underlying	power	structures	involved,	particularly	the	gendered	structures	of	power,	his	theory	of	
caring	human	rights	cannot	investigate	“the	patriarchal	conditions	under	which	values	and	practices	
associated	with	caring	have	developed	in	societies.”104		If	care	is	to	be	a	public,	political	issue,	and	if	
we	are	to	really	challenge	the	entrenched	public/private	divide	that	underwrites	the	feminisation	
and	devaluation	of	care,	then	those	who	care,	those	who	historically	have	been	most	associated	
with	caring	practices,	must	have	a	full	and	equal	part	of	the	political	process.		Even	if	the	caring	
human	rights	of	women	were	met,	they	would	still	experience	unnecessary	restrictions	on	their	life	
choices,	particularly	with	regard	to	being	able	to	directly	access	political	power.		Engster’s	caring	
human	rights,	therefore,	cannot	be	used	as	a	way	to	ensure	that	women	have	equal	voice	in	the	
political	arena.		Moreover,	it	could	be	the	case	that	using	caring	human	rights	as	a	set	of	standards	
could	legitimize	the	continued	exile	of	women	from	the	political	sphere.		Although	care	itself	might	
become	a	public	concern,	if	women	are	not	considered	fully	equal	with	men,	and	thus	not	able	to	
participate	in	political	discourse,	then	they	are	still	going	to	be	relegated	to	the	private	sphere	and	
lack	a	substantial	voice	in	policies	and	actions	that	directly	impact	upon	their	lives	and	the	lives	of	
the	people	they	care	for.		We	can	see	this	play	out	in	how	transnational	families	have	to	struggle	to	
provide	care	for	their	children.			
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In	a	study	of	Chinese	immigrant	families	in	Canada,	Yanqiu	Zhou	examined	how	Canadian	
visa	requirements	made	it	difficult	for	the	grandparents	of	immigrant	families	to	help	raise	their	
grandchildren,	and	that	the	caring	labour	of	the	grandparents	(mostly	grandmothers)	was	deemed	
necessary	not	only	by	traditional	Chinese	kin-structures,	but	also	because	of	the	lack	of	care	
provision	in	Canada	itself.105		Because	these	transnational	grandmothers	are	not	heard	by	the	
Canadian	government,	due	to	language	barriers	and	the	high	levels	of	bureaucracy	that	serve	to	
keep	some	elderly	women	in	a	cycle	of	perpetual	visas,	the	lens	of	care	can	aid	in	exposing	the	
“complex	multiple	inequalities	and	exploitations	(based	on	gender,	age	and	geography)	of	care	on	
both	familial	and	transnational	levels.”106		Zhou’s	study	points	to	the	fact	that	although	it	might	be	
tempting	to	construe	a	lack	of	women’s	full	political	participation	as	a	local,	cultural	problem,	we	
cannot	ignore	how	transnational	norms	about	gender	bear	upon	women,	or	that	international	
relations	of	power	can	serve	to	isolate	women	from	local	politics.107	
	 	Engster’s	minimal	feminism	also	renders	his	caring	human	rights	as	doubly	problematic	
when	we	attempt	to	investigate	the	root	causes	of	and	the	situation	of	the	transnational	migration	
of	carers.		Considering	that	Engster’s	caring	human	rights	are	only	minimally	feminist,	and	that	
Engster	does	not	include	sexual	activity	in	his	understanding	of	care,	this	means	he	cannot	fully	
understand	one	of	the	darkest	markets:	human	sex	trafficking.		Certainly	Engster	would	say	that	
human	sex	trafficking	is	a	violation	of	his	caring	human	rights,	particularly	the	first	one:	“All	
individuals	have	the	right	to	physical	security,”	which	includes	sexual	assault	as	harm.108		This	is	a	
good	standard	to	have.		I	am	not	arguing	that	we	should	abandon	the	standards	of	human	rights,	
especially	ones	that	serve	as	bulwarks	against	gross	physical	harms.		However,	standards	alone	are	
not	enough.		They	cannot	access	the	‘why’	of	human	trafficking,	the	factors—such	as	the	
intersection	of	norms	about	violence	and	gender,	economic	considerations,	and	political	instability—
that	continue	to	make	human	sex	trafficking	a	$150	billion	(US)	per	year	industry.109		A	critical	ethics	
of	care	is	able	to	access	the	‘why’	for	two	reasons.		First,	because	it	is	feminist,	it	expressly	uses	the	
lens	of	gender	to	examine	the	‘masculine’	values	that	are	some	of	the	underlying	causes	of	human	
trafficking.		Second,	it	is	able,	through	the	practice	of	attentiveness,	to	bring	to	the	fore	the	
importance	of	trying	to	understand	the	experience	of	sex	workers.	
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On	the	first	point,	although	Engster	does	claim	that	we	should	critically	investigate	the	
causes	of	such	massive	harms,	he	does	not	expressly	stipulate	the	critical	method	we	should	use	
when	doing	so.110		However,	the	critical,	feminist	lens	of	care	ethics	is	able	to	examine	how	“cultures	
of	hegemonic	masculinity	are	integral	to	both	the	discursive	and	material	constitution	of	
globalization.”111		The	current	global	power	structure	is	predicated	on	particular	values,	values	
traditionally	coded	as	masculine	such	as	self-sufficiency	and	a	kind	of	‘privileged	irresponsibility’	with	
regard	to	care.		This	means	that	we	cannot	allow	an	investigation	of	gender	to	stop	at	the	home	or	
even	the	national	level	to	address	particular	problematic	constructions	of	‘maleness’	that	are	
embedded	within	social	structures	and	institutions.		We	can	see	these	masculinities	as	part	of	the	
current	harmful	patterns	of	globalization.		Therefore,	to	combat	these	patterns	we	need	to	address	
these	constructions	of	maleness	through	the	institutions	of	global	economic	and	security	
governance.112		The	emphasis	on	these	‘male’	values	in	global	political	and	economic	discourses	
contributes	to	the	harmful	processes	of	globalization	that	allow	care	to	continue	to	be	devalued	and	
commoditized	for	consumption	rather	than	a	human	practice	necessary	for	the	continuance	of	life.		
One	of	the	commodities	is,	unfortunately,	sex.		Importantly,	it	is	not	enough	to	simply	think	of	sex	
trafficking	as	a	result	of	supply	and	demand,	because	a	purely	economic	lens	removes	the	normative	
questions	from	view.113		Rather,	we	must	investigate	why	some	persons	view	sex	trafficking	as	
acceptable	in	the	first	place.		Certainly,	most	people	would	condemn	the	practice,	but	the	fact	
remains	that	sex	traffickers	earn	a	healthy	living	on	their	activities,	and	that	people,	most	often	men,	
are	willing	to	pay	for	sex,	even	though	they	might	be	aware	of	the	plight	of	the	person	whom	they	
are	abusing.		It	is,	on	one	level,	a	legitimized	form	of	male	power	and	values	that	underwrites	the	
continued	trade	in	human	beings	for	the	purpose	of	sex.		It	is	not	just	norms	about	violence	or	
gender	at	play		here,	but	rather	an	intersection	of	these	norms	that	link	masculine	discourses	to	
norms	about	violence	which	continue	to	render	women	insecure	across	the	world.114			
Second,	the	feminist	lens	can	also	be	used	to	better	engage	with	and	understand	those	who	
have	experienced	sex	trafficking	themselves	by	following	the	practice	of	attentiveness.		Because	
Engster	does	not	include	sexual	activity	in	his	definition	of	care	(though	he	does	have	a	proscription	
against	sexual	assault),	his	understanding	of	care	could	serve	to	further	single	out	and	stigmatize	sex	
workers.		Rather,	we	cannot	nor	should	we	separate	out	sex	workers	form	other	forms	of	care	
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workers,	but	instead	be	attentive	to	their	life	experiences.		Singling	out	sex	workers	is	often	done	
through	moral	prohibitions	against	sex	work,	which	obscures	the	extent	to	which	current	patterns	of	
globalization	actually	ground	these	practices,	and	further	stigmatizes	sex	workers.		We	cannot	ignore	
the	importance	of	listening	to	the	women	who	have	survived	and	been	able	to	leave	(because	we	
will	likely	never	hear	from	women	who	cannot	leave	their	situation).		Not	only	is	it	part	of	a	critical,	
feminist	ethic	of	care	to	take	seriously	the	experiences	of	others,	but	through	the	practice	of	
attentiveness	we	also	learn	how	central	care	is	to	the	lives	of	women	trafficked	for	sex:	their	
desperate	need	to	care	for	others	in	spite	of	structural	impediments	that	resulted	in	being	trafficking	
the	first	place	and	their	subsequent	“inability	to	care	well	in	their	present	circumstances.”115		The	
testimony	of	these	women	serves	to	highlight	that	not	only	was	there	a	deficit	of	care	in	the	country	
to	which	they	were	trafficked,	but	that	there	are	many	factors	that	push	women	into	transnational	
migration	in	the	first	place,	such	as	their	own	need	to	care	for	their	dependents.116			
The	experiences	of	trafficked	women	are	also	important	because	they	demonstrate	that	the	
same	processes	that	serve	to	import	domestic	carers	and	live-in	nannies	also	pertain	to	sex	
traffickers.		Because	there	is	a	global	demand	for	‘women’s	work’	in	affluent	states,	all	“forms	of	
labor	can	only	be	made	sense	of	when	viewed	through	the	lens	of	global	gendered	relations	of	
power.”117		Most	of	the	women	who	are	trafficked	for	sexual	abuse	assume	they	will	be	domestic	
carers	or	other	transnational	migrant	workers,	but	have	the	ill	luck	to	be	trafficked	for	darker	
reasons.		Reviling	and	condemning	the	traffickers	is	not	enough,	and	does	not	help	us	understand	
the	underlying	causes	of	human	trafficking	the	first	place.118		The	various	factors	such	as	a	lack	of	
political	stability,	lack	of	social	services,	troubling	socio-economic	situations,	and	the	increased	role	
of	women	in	poorer	countries	as	providers	for	their	families	in	the	context	of	high	unemployment,	
often	push	women	into	migrant	work,	which	often	results	in	them	being	trafficked.119			
Were	Engster	to	reply	to	this	critique	by	claiming	that	his	theory	could	incorporate	stronger	
feminist	claims,	I	do	not	think	it	could	do	so	without	undercutting	his	prudential	aims.		His	claim	that	
the	minimal	feminism	of	his	care	theory	will	ensure	that	care	is	taken	seriously	in	the	political	sphere	
while	at	the	same	time	not	requiring	full,	equal	political	participation	of	history’s	traditional	carers	
(i.e.	women)	also	means	that	it	would	be	likely	to	be	adopted	world-wide.		While	his	practical	goal	is	
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laudable,	it	is	too	deeply	flawed	to	be	viable.		Were	Engster	to	put	forth	a	more	strongly	feminist	
kind	of	care	theory,	he	would	have	to	push	for	a	more	substantive	understanding	of	the	way	global	
and	local	gendered	relations	of	power	play	out	in	a	person’s	life.		Such	a	strongly	feminist	
understanding	would	require	Engster	to	expand	his	list	of	caring	human	rights	to	include	more	
substantive	civic	protections,	particularly	for	women	who	are	the	traditional	providers	of	care.		The	
basic	point	is	that	incorporating	critical	feminist	aims	would	invariably	alter	Engster’s	care	theory	
and	his	caring	human	rights.		By	eschewing	the	feminist	lens	and	exercising	sex	from	his	definition	of	
care,	Engster	is	unable	to	do	more	than	hold	to	a	set	of	standards,	which,	as	I	have	argued	in	
Chapters	Two	and	Three,	is	no	longer	enough	to	combat	the	harms	experienced	in	the	world	today.		
We	must	investigate	the	root	causes	of	sex	trafficking	if	we	are	to	better	understand	the	reasons	for	
its	continued	success,	and	ultimately	dismantle	the	system	that	allows	sex	trafficking	to	continue.	
The	unique	and	powerful	perspective	of	critical	feminist	care	ethics	should	not	be	easily	set	
aside.		Rather,	“a	critical	feminist	ethics	of	care	does	not	understand	ethics	as	a	set	of	principles	
waiting	to	be	‘applied’	to	a	particular	issue	in	world	politics;	rather,	it	views	the	task	of	normative	or	
moral	theory	as	one	of	critical	moral	ethnography,”120	that	is	to	say	how	morality	is	embedded	and	
reproduced	in	society.		It	is	not	enough	to	produce	a	set	of	standards,	rather	it	is	imperative	to	
investigate	and	understand	how	social,	economic,	and	political	arrangements	structure	our	lives,	and	
the	ethical	implications	of	that	structuring,	as	guided	by	the	practices	of	care.		My	critique	of	
Engster’s	theory,	however,	does	not	address	his	claim	that	the	critical,	feminist	ethics	of	care	is	not	a	
practical	guide	for	public	policy.		Therefore,	next	in	Chapter	Five,	I	argue	that	a	critical	ethic	of	care	
can	guide	public	policy	without	the	need	to	rely	on	any	human	rights	framework.		That	being	the	
case,	it	is	unclear	what	‘caring’	human	rights	offers	that	cannot	be	accomplished	by	a	critical	feminist	
ethic	of	care.	
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Chapter 5:  Care Ethics and Public  Pol icy 
	
As	demonstrated	in	Chapter	Four,	Engster’s	caring	human	rights	analysis	has	major	flaws.	Engster	
developed	his	theory	in	response	to	the	worry	that	the	ethics	of	care,	as	formulated	by	the	majority	
of	care	theorists,	cannot	provide	substantive	policy	guidance.		He	claims	that	Tronto’s	definition	of	
caring	is	“too	broad	to	provide	clear	guidance	on	moral	and	political	issues”	and	that	“her	political	
theory	of	care	is	also	vague.”1		Of	Fiona	Robinson’s	critical,	global	theory	of	care	he	states:	“Framed	
so	abstractly,	Robinson's	theory	provides	little	practical	guidance	for	policymakers,	activists,	and	the	
general	public	in	thinking	about	what	it	might	mean	to	care	for	others	abroad.”2			
	 In	this	chapter,	I	argue,	contrary	to	Engster,	that	critical,	feminist	care	ethics	can	be	a	viable	
source	of	ethical	guidance	for	public	policy	on	two	fronts.		First,	as	explored	earlier	in	Chapters	Two	
and	Three,	the	lens	of	care	can	expose	how	policy	based	exclusively	on	human	rights	has	certain	
‘blind	spots.’		For	example,	a	human	rights	approach	cannot	always	‘see’	how	race	and	gender	
norms,	dependence,	and	exclusion	contribute	to	and	construct	pervasive	political	and	moral	
problems.		Secondly,	critical	care	ethics	can	spur	a	transformation	of	the	policy	process	itself.		The	
transformative	potential	of	care	ethics	provides	an	opportunity	to	engage	in	the	real	world	process	
of	public	policy,	as	I	argued	in	Chapter	Two.		Although	there	are	other	sites	(e.g.	public	
administration,	business	practices,	health	care	fields,	and	education)	where	engagement	with	care	
ethics	would	be	transformative,	I	focus	on	the	policy	process	for	two	reasons.		First,	it	is	important	to	
directly	answer	Engster’s	charge	that	Robinson’s	critical	ethic	of	care	is	not	a	suitable	ethic	for	policy	
guidance.		Second,	policy	speaks	authoritatively	about	its	area	of	concern,	be	it	gender,	race,	
sexuality,	or	socio-economic	considerations.		Policy	documents	are	a	source	of	authority	in	both	a	
legal	and	a	normative	sense,	and	when	policy	documents	make	particular	assumptions	about	care	
requiring	private,	not	public,	consideration,	this	can	push	care	and	its	concerns	out	of	the	public	
sphere.		Research	done	by	Fiona	Williams	illustrates	that,	“[w]hat	is	lacking	in	the	current	policy	
debate	is	a	recognition	of	these	ethical	approaches,	and	of	their	importance	in	people’s	lives.	The	
emphasis	on	work	overshadows	care;	interdependency	is	the	poor	relation	of	economic	self-
sufficiency;	and	educational	achievement	frames	child-centredness.”3		By	making	a	strong	case	for	
care	to	be	incorporated	into	public	policy,	care	itself	can	more	fully	be	understood	as	an	issue	of	
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public	concern	and	incorporated	into	our	public	discourse,	which	would	more	accurately	reflect	“the	
way	people	[attempt]	to	balance	their	own	sense	of	self	and	the	needs	of	others.”4			
	 I	begin	this	chapter	with	a	brief	explanation	of	the	policy	stages	theory	of	public	policy,	
which	is	what	I	use	to	explore	the	policy	process.5		Second,	I	will	provide	a	brief	overview	of	how	
human	rights	have	been	incorporated	into	these	stages	of	public	policy	and	elaborate	on	some	of	
the	problems	of	policy	viewed	exclusively	through	a	human	rights	lens.		Throughout	this	discussion,	I	
will	incorporate	my	argument	for	using	the	lens	of	care	to	correct	for	some	of	these	problems:	that	
critical,	feminist	care	ethics	can	be	a	guide	for	determining	public	policy,	and	ultimately	that	critical	
care	ethics	can	transform	the	policy	process.		By	transformation	of	the	process	I	mean	the	ways	in	
which	problems	are	defined	and	prioritized,	what	kinds	of	tools	are	seen	as	available	to	address	said	
problems,	and	how	different	evaluation	metrics	can	offer	different	standards	of	policy	success	or	
failure.		My	claim	is	not	that	we	should	abandon	human	rights	as	a	basis	for	public	policy,	but	that	
human	rights	should	not	be	our	sole	basis	for	moral	and	political	reasoning,	especially	in	the	policy	
process.6			
	
Section 1 – Policy Stages Theory 
There	are	many	ways	to	understand	the	policy	process.		Here,	I	will	focus	on	one	of	the	more	‘classic’	
methods	to	assess	policy,	that	of	policy	stages	and	the	policy	cycle.		Policy	stage	theories	categorize	
the	different	stages	of	the	policy	process,	determine	who	the	actors	are	at	each	stage,	and	explore	
the	ways	in	which	each	stage	affects	the	others.7		Although	the	word	‘stages’	implies	that	there	is	a	
finished	product	this	is	not	necessarily	the	case.		Policy	stage	theories	bring	to	light	how	the	policy	
process	is	not	always	a	linear	one,	and	can	be	better	understood	as	cyclical,	repeating	over	and	over	
																																								 																				
4	Ibid.,	26.	
5	I	acknowledge	that	there	is	a	vast	array	of	theories	about	how	the	policy	process	functions,	but	there	are	
certain	advantages	to	using	the	policy	stages	theory.		For	one,	it	is	heavily	used,	and	as	such	is	often	
incorporated	into	how	ethical	philosophers	think	about	policy	in	general.		Another	advantage	is	that	it	
simplifies	the	policy	process	in	such	a	way	as	to	allow	us	to	see	how	different	ethical	theories	shape	different	
parts	of	the	process	and	generate	different	outcomes.	
6	As	an	aside,	I	take	it	as	a	given	that	ethical	guidance	should	be	incorporated	into	the	public	policy	process.		If	
one	believes	that	ethical	reasoning	has	no	place	within	the	policy	process,	the	choice	between	human	rights	or	
care	ethics	becomes	moot.		Here,	however,	I	shall	assume	that	moral	considerations	are	integral	to	the	policy	
process.		For	more	on	the	importance	of	ethics	in	the	public	policy	process,	see:	Tom	L.	Beauchamp	Ethics	and	
Public	Policy	(1975)	on	how	public	policy	is	an	excellent	method	for	applying	ethical	theories	to	modern	moral	
problems;	Robert	Goodin	Utilitarianism	as	a	Public	Philosophy	(1995)	for	a	defense	of	utilitarian	ethics	as	a	
guide	for	public	policy;	or	Jonathan	Wolff	Ethics	and	Public	Policy	(2011),	for	an	exploration	of	areas	of	public	
policy	(issues	of	crime,	health,	animal	welfare,	drug	use,	disability,	and	more)	from	a	philosophical	perspective	
to	demonstrate	how	philosophy,	ethics	in	particular,	can	intervene	in	policy	debates	to	clarify	the	issues	at	
hand.		These	are	not	exhaustive,	but	a	small	sampling	of	works	that	explore	the	ways	in	which	moral	
philosophy	can	inform	and	benefit	the	public	policy	process.	
7	Michael	Howlett	and	M.	Ramesh,	Studying	Public	Policy:	Policy	Cycles	and	Policy	Subsystems	(Ontario:	Oxford	
University	Press,	2003),	11.	
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as	policies	are	refined	and	altered	through	time.8		In	spite	of	this	non-linear,	cyclical	view	of	policy,	it	
is	nevertheless	helpful	to	break	down	the	process	into	stages	in	order	to	come	to	grips	with	the	
complex	process	that	is	policy	making,	and	because	this	policy-stage	model	can	be	used	at	all	levels	
from	local	government	to	the	international	arena.9	
Although	it	is	important	to	refrain	from	thinking	of	policy	as	a	linear	process,	we	must	begin	
our	assessment	and	understanding	of	policy	at	some	point	along	the	policy	cycle,	and	agenda	setting	
is	a	good	point	of	entry.		Agenda	setting	begins	when	a	government	(or	other	policy	making	
institution)	recognizes	a	problem	within	society.10		As	an	initial	matter,	policies	are	generally	created	
to	address	social	problems.		Understanding	the	ways	in	which	social	problems	are	identified	and	
interpreted	by	policy	makers,	policy	advocates,	and	the	general	public	can	provide	insight	into	the	
relationship	between	how	the	problem	is	framed	and	what	kinds	of	solutions	are	then	considered	
possible.		Second,	agenda	setting	is	also	a	stage	where	policy	makers	can	decline	to	act,	that	is,	they	
can	determine	that	a	social	problem	is	not	a	problem	at	all,	or	at	least	not	a	problem	that	is	
appropriate	for	a	particular	institution	to	address.			
	 Policy	formulation	is	the	stage	of	the	policy	process	when	policy	makers	and	other	relevant	
policy	actors	first	draft	and	discuss	possible	courses	of	action	to	rectify	or	counter	a	determined	
problem.11		That	does	not	mean	that	this	is	an	orderly	process,	often	far	from	it.		The	relevant	actors	
involved	are	a	mixture	of	policy	decision-makers,	experts	in	specialized	fields,	public	social	groups,	or	
special	interest	groups.		In	the	context	of	governments,	actors	are	elected	officials	and	sometimes	
invited	experts.		In	other	institutions,	they	might	be	select	workers	in	a	business,	or	trained	
development	workers	in	a	Non-Governmental	Organization	(NGO).		Experts	can	be	scientists,	
doctors,	psychologists,	sociologists,	artists,	or	other	persons	who	provide	specialized	information	
and	insight	about	a	particular	problem.		Social	groups	include	parent	advocacy	groups,	charity	
groups,	or	a	social	justice	organization	like	Amnesty	International	or	Greenpeace	that	operate	in	the	
public	eye	and	work	through	public	campaigns	to	exert	influence	over	the	formulation	process.		
Lastly,	special	interest	groups	can	be	businesses,	religious	organizations,	or	single-issue	groups	that	
operate	closer	to	the	seat	of	decision-making	and	try	to	steer	policy	formulation	toward	an	outcome	
that	benefits	them	in	some	manner.	
																																								 																				
8	Ibid.,	13.	
9	Ibid.,	14.	
10	Ibid.,	121.	
11	Ibid.,	143.	
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	 While	the	formulation	stage	produced	a	pool	of	possible	solutions,	in	the	third	stage,	
decision-making,	a	small	set	of	actors—decision-makers12—make	the	final	choices	about	what	policy	
solution	to	pursue.		There	are	two	different	kinds	of	policies	that	can	result	from	the	decision-
making	process.		Some	policies	can	be	‘positive,’	altering	the	status	quo,	or	they	can	be	‘negative’	by	
upholding	the	status	quo	instead.13		Further,	“public	policy	decision-making	is	not	a	technical	
exercise	but	an	inherently	political	process.”14		There	are	winners	and	losers	in	so	far	as	some	people	
get	something	out	of	the	decision	while	others	do	not.		Decision-making	is	a	process	that	has	directly	
grown	out	of	the	two	previous	stages,	and	involves	a	great	deal	of	back	and	forth	in	which	actors	
often	trade	promises	in	order	to	reach	an	agreement.			
	 Policy	implementation	is	“where	policy	decisions	are	translated	into	action.”15		At	this	stage	
of	the	policy	process,	the	scope	widens	once	again	to	encompass	not	only	the	policy	decision-makers,	
but	also	those	who	will	be	directly	delivering	the	policy	outcomes	and	those	who	are	receiving	the	
policy	outcomes.		In	a	government,	this	means	that	politicians	might	be	the	decision-makers,	but	
those	who	implement	the	policy	are	often	civil	servants.16		The	policy	system	now	also	expands	to	
include	target	groups:	“groups	whose	behaviour	is	intended	or	expected	to	be	altered	by	
government	action.”17		These	are	the	members	of	the	general	public	who	are	the	recipients	of	policy	
implementation,	or	are	acted	upon	by	the	policy-making	institution.			
	 Lastly,	policy	evaluation	is	“the	stage	of	the	policy	process	at	which	it	is	determined	how	a	
public	policy	has	actually	fared	in	action.”18		Like	the	other	stages	of	the	policy	process	there	are	
built-in	biases	present,	which	can	lead	to	colouring	the	outcomes	of	any	evaluation,	especially	
considering	the	terms	success	and	failure	can	often	be	subjective.19		Therefore,	many	policy	
evaluations	rely	on	policy	‘judges’	that	have	information	enough	to	make	“reasonably	intelligent,	
defensible,	and	replicable	assessments.”20		The	actors	in	the	evaluation	stage	are	not	always	located	
within	the	government	or	other	policy	institutions	themselves,	but	can	be	from	wider	social	
structures,	such	as	businesses,	interest	groups,	the	media,	and	the	general	public.		From	this	
evaluation	process,	there	are	two	outcomes:	feedback	and	termination.		Feedback	is	where	the	
																																								 																				
12	In	a	government	decision-makers	are	primarily	elected	officials,	while	in	businesses	or	NGOs	they	are	senior	
executives	or	board	members.	
13	Negative	and	positive	are	not	used	as	stand-ins	for	‘bad’	and	‘good’	outcomes,	but	merely	a	way	to	
categorize	the	type	of	action	taken	by	decision-makers.		Sometimes	upholding	the	status	quo	might	be	the	
more	beneficial	outcome.	
14	Howlett	and	Ramesh,	162.	
15	Ibid.,	185.	
16	Ibid.,	187.	
17	Ibid.,	188.	
18	Ibid.,	207.	
19	Ibid.,	208.	
20	Ibid.,	209.	
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policy	loops	back	to	a	different	stage	in	the	policy	cycle	to	be	reviewed	and	adapted	as	time	goes	
on.21		Termination	occurs	when	the	policy	is	halted	or	disbanded.22			
	 Admittedly,	much	of	the	information	about	the	policy	process	in	this	brief	examination	
focuses	on	the	domestic	policy	of	nation	states	as	a	basis	for	analysis.		Yet,	the	kinds	of	policy	
processes	discussed	here	are	not	necessarily	unique	to	nations	and	thus	do	not	preclude	thinking	
about	how	NGOs,	corporations,	and	other	institutions	draft	policies	or	agendas.		Second,	
international	influences	have	gained	greater	purchase	in	public	policy	over	the	last	several	decades	
due	to	the	processes	of	globalization.23		Globalization	has	not	only	increased	international	
connectedness,	but	the	interconnectedness	between	different	kinds	of	policy	as	well,	such	that	
“[t]raditional	social	policy	areas	such	as	social	security	and	health	care	have	thus	become	a	part	of	
economic	policy	making	as	a	result.”24		In	terms	of	international	institutions,	their	ability	to	affect	
policy	is	often	determined	by	whether	or	not	an	“international	regime	facilitates	their	
involvement.”25		An	international	institution	can	have	more	room	to	act	if	other,	powerful	
international	actors	promote	said	involvement.		For	example,	smaller,	less	powerful	nations	might	
be	eager	to	apply	for	membership	in	international	institutions	if	larger,	more	powerful	nations	
promote	joining	the	institution	on	the	basis	of	the	smaller	nation	gaining	economic	and	social	
benefits	by	doing	so.		The	ability	of	an	international	institution	to	act	within	any	particular	national	
context	can	also	depend	on	the	political	structure	of	the	nation	in	question,	as	well	as	its	disposition	
toward	international	involvement.		That	said,	we	should	not	discount	the	ability	of	NGOs	as	a	site	of	
policy	making,	and	the	ability	of	NGOs	to	work	and	exist	in	nations	that	are	not	well	disposed	toward	
large-scale	international	intervention.		NGO’s,	due	to	their	peculiar	nature	of	existing	between	the	
public	and	the	private,	are	often	able	to	implement	policy	without	the	stigma	of	broad	international	
intervention.26				
	
Section 2 – The Lens of Care and Issues in Public Policy 
In	this	section,	I	will	begin	by	briefly	explaining	how	human	rights	standards	are	used	to	inform	each	
policy	stage,	and	then	I	will	use	the	lens	of	care	to	highlight	the	‘blind-spots’—the	contexts	of	
difference,	exclusion,	gender,	dependence,	and	care	itself—that	occur	because	of	an	exclusive	focus	
on	a	human	rights	perspective.		I	will	then	argue	that	the	crucial,	feminist	ethics	of	care,	and	its	
																																								 																				
21	Ibid.,	216.	
22	Ibid.,	218.	
23	Ibid.,	55.	
24	Ibid.,	59.	
25	Ibid.	
26	Robinson,	Globalizing	Care:	Ethics,	Feminist	Theory,	and	International	Relations,	157-60.	
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corresponding	practices	(that	of	attentiveness,	responsibility,	and	responsiveness	as	outlined	by	
Robinson)	can	be	used	to	provide	new	kinds	of	information	and	new	ways	of	acting	at	each	stage	of	
the	policy	process.		Although	the	practices	of	care	can	be	a	part	of	every	policy	stage,	I	generally	
single	out	one	practice	that	I	consider	to	be	vital	at	each	stage	as	an	example	to	highlight	the	ways	in	
which	care	theory	and	the	practices	of	care	can	inform	and	transform	the	policy	process.		Policy	
shapes	our	lives,	and	how	we	live	in	relation	to	particular	others.		Considering	that	critical,	feminist	
care	ethics	investigates	and	provides	guidance	for	judging	how	institutional	patterns	of	power	shape	
these	relations,	this	means	that	care	ethics	can	and	should	be	used	as	an	ethical	guide	for	the	policy	
process.		I	will	break	this	section	into	five	sub-sections	following	the	policy	stages	in	order	to	provide	
clear	comparisons	between	a	care	ethics	and	a	human	rights	perspective	on	the	policy	process.	
Policy,	from	a	human	rights	perspective,	is	the	effort	to	implement	human	rights	standards	
through	government	action.		While	this	might	seem	to	be	the	norm	today,	this	was	not	always	the	
case.		Until	the	1990s	human	rights	discourse	was	not	necessarily	expressly	incorporated	into	
legislative	action.		A	change	occurred,	however,	after	the	collapse	of	Soviet	Union,	and	the	
subsequent	end	of	the	Cold	War,	when	it	seemed	that	there	was	a	powerful	connection	between	
neoliberal	capitalism,	representative	government,	and	human	rights	standards.		Governments	then	
began	to	use	human	rights	as	a	way	to	present	or	ground	their	political	platforms,	and	as	a	guide	for	
political	and	public	action.27		However,	the	language	of	rights	had	to	negotiate	with	the	concept	of	
New	Public	Management	(NPM),	which	is	“concerned	with	improving	the	efficiency	of	public	
administration.”28		Throughout	the	end	of	the	20th	century,	there	was	tension	between	the	drive	of	
NPM	to	privatize	public	programs29	and	a	human	rights	standpoint	that	“emphasized	that	the	
international	obligations	that	the	state	has	assumed	should	be	clearly	expressed	and	implemented	
through	its	public	policy.”30		Eventually,	policy	makers	found	a	workable	solution	between	human	
rights	discourses	and	NPM:	human	rights	provided	the	objectives	of	public	policy,	while	the	
procedures	and	specific	execution	of	any	policy	were	guided	by	NPM.31	
The	ethics	of	care	has	yet	to	be	incorporated	into	state	policy	processes.		However,	my	goal	
here	is	to	argue	that	were	care	ethics	a	part	of	public	policy,	it	would	serve	as	a	way	to	clarify	
assumptions	about	public	goods	(such	as	care),	drive	an	investigation	into	how	policy	impacts	real	
people,	embedded	in	real	relationships	and	are	affected	by	social	norms	that	policy	often	serves	to	
																																								 																				
27	Daniel	Vazquez	and	Domitille	Delaplace,	"Public	Policies	from	a	Human	Rights	Perspective:	A	Developing	
Field,"	SUR	-	International	Journal	on	Human	Rights	8,	no.	14	(2011):	36.	
28	Ibid.	
29	NPM’s	goal	of	privatization	worked	on	the	assumption	that	this	would	produce	better	financial	cost-benefit	
solutions,	albeit	sometimes	to	the	detriment	of	those	people	the	government	should	have	been	helping.	
30	Vazquez	and	Delaplace,		37-8.	
31	Ibid.,	38.	
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reinforce,	drawing	particular	attention	to	norms	around	dependence,	exclusion,	race,	and	gender.		
The	critique	that	critical,	feminist	care	ethics	cannot	guide	or	inform	policy	is	a	critique	based	upon	
the	assumption	that	because	we	have	not	used	care	ethics	as	a	guide	it	is	not	suitable.		Yet,	simply	
because	it	has	not	been	done	before	does	not	mean	it	is	implausible.		Throughout	the	remainder	of	
this	chapter,	I	will	argue	that	using	care	ethics	as	a	guide	for	public	policy	is	possible	and	something	
that	we	should	do.		Care	ethics	can	provide	new	insights,	motivations,	and	paths	of	action	that	
would	serve	to	transform	our	political,	social,	and	economic	contexts	into	ones	more	conducive	to	
people	being	able	to	live	and	build	their	caring	relationships	with	particular	others,	and	in	a	way	that	
does	not	conform	to	current	exploitative	and	harmful	assumptions	about	gender,	race,	dependency,	
and	exclusion.		In	terms	of	global	public	policy,	for	example,	we	could	work	to	not	only	eliminate	the	
‘pull’	factors	that	draw	transnational	migrant	carers	into	wealthy	nations	for	work,	but	also	
understand	the	pressing	‘push’	factors	that	that	underwrite	migrants	leaving	their	families	behind,	
producing	an	even	larger	care	deficit	in	their	home	country.		In	order	to	do	that,	we	would	need	to	
use	the	ethics	of	care,	with	its	practices	of	attentiveness,	responsiveness,	and	responsibility	to	focus	
on	the	way	in	which	migrant	workers	live	and	often	make	impossible	choices.32	
	
Section 2.1 – Agenda Setting 
Because	human	rights	have	been	used	to	outline	the	objectives	for	public	policy	and	government	
action,	human	rights	create:	“[A]	logic	of	responsibility	through	accounting	mechanisms	and	legally	
binding	obligations.		Seen	through	this	lens,	the	objective	and	the	essence	of	public	policy	is	not	to	
solve	specific	problems	or	respond	to	unsatisfied	demands	but,	rather,	to	fulfil	rights.”33		Public	
policy	from	a	human	rights	perspective	reinforces	the	idea	that	the	state	has	an	obligation	to	its	
citizens,	and	specifically	that	obligation	has	to	do	with	the	fulfilment	of	their	human	rights.		Although	
human	rights	can	still	be	used	to	identify	problems,	that	action	is	subsumed	by	the	drive	to	fulfil	the	
human	rights	of	all	citizens.		That	means	in	the	agenda	setting	stage	the	goal	is	to	‘unpack’	the	right,	
or	to	understand	the	obligations	that	the	right	will	require,	which	then	forms	the	basic	content	of	
public	policy.34		For	example,	a	human	right	to	education	will	first	focus	on	the	obligations	that	right	
generates:	access	to	schools,	available	materials	and	personnel,	and	a	certain	standard	of	quality	in	
teaching.		These	obligations	are	ones	that	the	government	‘ought’	to	meet.		Therefore,	when	
drafting	policy,	although	costs	are	kept	in	mind,	the	objective	of	the	policy	is	to	ensure	that	certain	
																																								 																				
32	Weir,	"The	Global	Universal	Caregiver:	Imagining	Women's	Liberation	in	the	New	Millennium,"	313-4.	
33	Vazquez	and	Delaplace,		39.	
34	Ibid.,	41.	
138	
	
standards	are	met	such	that	the	human	right	to	education	is	fulfilled.		This	also	means	that	the	state	
might	have	to	intervene	when	non-state	actors	deny	children	the	right	to	education.			
	 There	are,	however,	two	particular	problems	that	the	human	rights	perspective	on	public	
policy	cannot	address	at	this	stage.		First,	the	background	conditions	and	assumptions	that	exist	
within	any	society	greatly	influence	the	kinds	of	problems	that	can	be	‘seen’	as	suitable	for	policy	
solutions	in	the	first	place.		Ideas	about	what	is	normal,	what	are	deviations	from	normal,	and	
normative	political	ideals	are	all	bound	together	in	defining	any	social	problem.		As	I	argued	in	
Chapter	Three,	human	rights	do	not	necessarily	identify	some	social	problems	as	politically	relevant	
nor	do	they	investigate	the	background	causes	of	identified	social	problems.		The	second	problem	
for	a	human	rights	perspective	is	that	the	agenda	setting	stage	requires	a	fair	degree	of	‘active	
citizenship.’		This	‘active	citizenship,’	is	where	the	right	to	participation	and	consultation	in	public	
matters	“implies	the	active,	documented	participation	of	all	persons	who	are	interested	in	the	
formulation,	application,	and	monitoring	of	public	policies.”35		The	problem	with	‘active	citizenship’	
is	that	those	who	do	not	have	the	time	to	participate	in	this	way	are	often	left	out,	excluded	from	
the	policy	process	even	though	their	problems,	often	deep	ones	around	gender	and	dependency,	are	
not	brought	to	the	policy	table.		Such	persons	can	be	rendered	invisible	to	the	political	process	
because	they	cannot	participate	through	traditional	means.36			
	 Critical,	feminist	care	ethics	can	be	a	vital	asset	at	this	stage	of	the	process	for	three	reasons	
that	directly	address	the	failing	of	human	rights	based	approaches	noted	above.		One,	because	of	its	
critical	examination	of	the	root	causes	of	problems,	a	care	theory	analysis	of	any	social	problem	can	
provide	different	information	than	human	rights	that	then	can	allow	for	a	greater	understanding	of	
any	particular	problem,	as	I	argued	in	Chapters	Two	and	Four.		This	greater	understanding,	in	turn,	
can	lead	to	more	effective	and	longer-term	solutions	than	might	otherwise	be	considered.		The	
second	reason	care	ethics	can	be	important	at	the	agenda	setting	stage	is	because	it	can	widen	the	
scope	of	what	counts	as	a	problem,	such	that	concerns	about	care	and	dependency	would	come	to	
be	addressed	through	social	policy.		Third,	care	theory’s	practice	of	attentiveness	can	be	used	to	
underscore	the	importance	of	policy	makers	being	attentive	to	the	needs	and	concerns	of	the	target	
groups	of	any	policy	and	proactive	in	seeking	out	the	affected	participants	to	be	part	of	the	agenda	
setting	stage.	
	 To	illustrate	the	point,	consider	a	case	study	from	Yanqiu	Zhou	and	Shelia	Neysmith	on	
transnational	grandparenting,	where	elderly	Chinese	grandparents	travel	to	Canada	in	order	to	assist	
																																								 																				
35	Ibid.,	43.	
36	Eva	Feder	Kittay,	"A	Feminist	Public	Ethic	of	Care	Meets	the	New	Communitarian	Family	Policy,"	Ethics	111,	
no.	3	(2001):	529.	
139	
	
their	children	by	taking	on	the	labour	of	caring	for	the	home	and	young	children.37		The	Canadian	
government	certainly	benefits	from	this	transnational	grandparenting,	because	it	does	not	have	to	
invest	as	heavily	in	early	childcare.		However,	these	arrangements	are	often	stressful	for	everyone	
involved.		The	grandparents	are	trapped	in	a	cycle	of	expensive	visa	regulations,	which	is	often	
further	problematized	by	a	language	barrier.38		The	adult	children	who	live	in	Canada	are	under	
pressure	to	‘start	again’	and	often	face	the	problem	of	downward	mobility,	and	their	children	face	
the	stresses	of	uncertain	caring	arrangements.39		To	the	Canadian	government,	this	situation	is	not	a	
policy	‘problem’	because	it	does	not	take	into	account	the	ways	in	which	immigration	policy	shapes	
the	very	lives	of	immigrants	from	China.		These	transnational	grandparents	“directly	contribute	to	
their	immigrant	children’s	participation	in	the	labour	force	and	the	well-being	of	their	grandchildren	
as	‘Little	Canadians.’”40		Immigration	and	childcare	policies	in	Canada	shape	the	immigrant	family,	
often	penalizing	grandparents	for	trying	to	help	their	children	fill	a	childcare	gap	that	they	cannot	
fulfil	on	their	own.		This	demonstrates	how	agenda	setting	matters,	because	the	Canadian	
government	does	not	see	transnational	grandparenting	as	a	social	problem	to	be	addressed	through	
policy,	regardless	of	the	fact	that	current	policies—the	intersection	of	a	lack	of	childcare	and	
immigration	policy—are	the	very	thing	that	generates	the	problem	in	the	first	place.		The	pervasive	
norms	in	this	situation	might	be	ones	that	prioritize	family	care	over	paid	care,	or	even	government	
provided	care,	and	norms	around	‘desirable’	and	‘undesirable’	immigrants	as	borne	out	through	
immigration	policy.	
	 However,	by	using	the	lens	of	care	in	the	agenda	setting	stage,	instead	of	policy	reinforcing	
social	norms,	one	can	investigate	the	norms	and	assumptions	that	underlie	the	attitudes	that	gave	
rise	to	the	social	problem	in	the	first	place.41		In	particular,	the	practice	of	attentiveness	would	entail	
that	policy	makers	should	listen	to	the	needs	of	their	‘productive’	immigrant	population,	which	
would	speak	to	a	need	for	increased	childcare	provision,	and	also	listen	to	the	grandparents	in	this	
situation	who	take	up	the	labour	of	care	to	the	betterment	of	the	Canadian	economy.		A	possible	
solution,	rather	than	the	more	expensive	expansion	of	government	care	would	be	to	create	special	
provisions	for	grandparents	who	travel	to	Canada	in	order	to	provide	in-home	childcare,	making	the	
visa	process	less	complicated	and	less	expensive.		This	change	would	signal	the	understanding	that	
care	is	an	important	and	necessary	feature	of	life,	and	one	that	makes	productive	work	possible	in	
																																								 																				
37	Zhou,	"Time,	Space	and	Care:	Rethinking	Transnational	Care	from	a	Temporal	Perspective,"	163-4.	
38	Shelia	M.	Neysmith	and	Yanqiu	Rachel	Zhou,	"Mapping	Another	Dimension	of	a	Feminist	Ethics	of	Care:	
Family-Based	Transnational	Care,"	International	Journal	of	Feminist	Approaches	to	Bioethics	6,	no.	2	(2013):	
147.	
39	Zhou,	"Time,	Space	and	Care:	Rethinking	Transnational	Care	from	a	Temporal	Perspective,"	171.	
40	Neysmith	and	Zhou,		155.	
41	Olena	Hankivsky,	Social	Policy	and	the	Ethic	of	Care	(Vancouver:	University	of	British	Columbia	Press,	2004),	
59-60.	
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the	first	place.		A	care	analysis	of	such	norms	can	demonstrate	the	actual	roots	of	the	problem,	
which	often	are	the	failure	of	prevailing	norms	and	laws	to	incorporate	a	person’s	lived	experience	
into	a	larger,	institutional	framework.		Through	this	critical	analysis	of	the	causes	of	social	problems,	
the	problem	will	not	necessarily	be	seen	as	the	fault	of	the	person	who	does	not	fit	into	the	
institutional	framework,	but	a	failure	of	the	framework	to	alter	its	scope	in	order	to	accommodate	a	
wider	variety	of	persons.		The	tension	between	incorporating	more	lived	experiences	and	
maintaining	a	workable	framework	will	require	constant	negotiation,	because	it	is	entirely	possible	
that	a	particular	lived	experience	will	not	compel	a	framework	to	change,	but	it	is	vital	that	such	
negotiations	become	a	part	of	our	policy	processes,	especially	when	first	identifying	social	issues.	
	 Another	way	we	might	transform	the	agenda	setting	process	is	by	using	the	practice	of	
attentiveness	to	help	guide	action.		Care	ethics	based	policy	would	require	policy	makers,	especially	
at	the	agenda	setting	stage,	to	pay	attention	to	“what	is	actually	the	problem	as	experienced.”42		
Policy	makers	would	be	required	to	listen	to	those	who	have	a	problem	and	do	their	best	to	
understand	how	the	problem	affects	people	in	their	daily	lives	and	with	regard	to	their	relationships	
with	others.		The	practice	of	attentiveness	is	important	for	policy	makers	because	we	cannot	rely	
upon	all	persons	being	able	to	take	part	in	the	aforementioned	‘active	citizenship.’		For	example,	
women	who	must	work	at	a	paid	job	and	then	care	for	family	members	at	home	often	lack	the	time	
to	become	involved	in	ensuring	that	their	concerns	are	brought	forward	for	policy	assessment.		If	
they	do	make	the	effort	to	become	an	‘active	citizen’	they	invariably	sacrifice	either	some	paid	
labour	time	or,	more	likely,	some	of	the	time	necessary	to	fulfil	their	caring	responsibilities.		Care	
ethic’s	practice	of	attentiveness	would,	instead,	provide	guidance	for	how	policy	makers	would	need	
to	engage	with	citizens	who	are	often	not	heard.		The	ethos	of	the	‘active	policy	maker’	would	
supplement	that	of	the	‘active	citizen,’	because	care	ethics	would	highlight	that	the	actual	
responsibility	for	care	in	the	relationship	between	the	policy	maker	and	the	citizen43	lies	most	
heavily	upon	the	institution	and	the	individuals	who	make	policy,	not	the	citizen.		The	citizen	is	often	
the	target	of	policy,	which	means	that	while	the	citizen	certainly	has	some	responsibility	to	respond	
to	the	policy	and	to	provide	feedback	if	they	are	able,	the	policy	maker	is	the	one	who	must	be	
attentive	to	the	needs	of	the	policy	recipient.		Care	ethic’s	practice	of	attentiveness	means	that	
policy	makers	would	have	to	expend	effort	trying	to	understand	the	lives	of	single	parents,	domestic	
workers,	and	others	who	lack	the	time	or	funds	to	take	an	‘active’	role	in	the	political	process.		
																																								 																				
42	Selma	Sevenhuijsen	et	al.,	"South	African	Social	Welfare	Policy:	An	Analysis	Using	the	Ethic	of	Care,"	Critical	
Social	Policy	23,	no.	3	(2003):	315.	
43	However,	the	person	upon	whom	policy	acts	is	not	necessarily	a	citizen,	particularly	in	the	case	of	
immigration	policy.			I	use	citizen	as	a	stand-in,	admittedly	a	flawed	one,	for	all	persons	who	are	affected	by	a	
policy.	
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Perhaps	this	could	be	accomplished	through	new	social	media,	which	is	integrated	into	many	
people’s	lives	already,	or	by	offering	more	convenient	and	more	frequent	opportunities	for	face-to-
face	interaction,	and	by	including	services	like	child-minding	during	such	meetings.		
	
Section 2.2 – Policy Formulation 
The	second	step,	on	a	human	rights	perspective,	once	the	right	has	been	‘unpacked,’	is	to	then	
identify	which	state	institutions	are	responsible	for	fulfilling	any	given	obligation,	or	how	policy	is	
formulated.		The	questions	that	human	rights	standards	ask	of	policy	makers	are	what	are	the	
“structural	causes	of	a	right	not	being	exercised.”44		However,	no	final	decision	is	made	at	this	point,	
because	this	is	merely	where	possible	solutions	to	address	the	problem	are	considered;	where	policy	
actors	weigh	the	advantages	and	disadvantages	of	one	particular	government	office	taking	the	lead	
on	addressing	a	problem	and	perhaps	commission	studies	to	further	understand	the	problem	and	
gather	data.		This	also	means	that	human	rights	public	policy	is	a	holistic	enterprise;45	i.e.	one	that	
involves	multiple	government	offices	working	together.46		To	fulfil	the	right	to	education,	for	
example,	there	must	be	standards	for	the	education	of	children	directly	(though	the	setting	of	
curricula),	and	also	for	the	education	of	prospective	teachers.		There	must	also	be	building	codes	for	
schools	to	ensure	a	safe	learning	environment,	and	a	campaign	to	convince	parents	of	the	
importance	of	educating	their	children.		No	single	government	department	is	enough	to	fulfil	the	
right,	which	means	multiple	departments	must	work	together.		Every	barrier	to	fulfilling	human	
rights	becomes	a	‘public	problem,’	and	thus	must	be	addressed	through	appropriate	state	action.47	
	 A	problem	with	public	policy	informed	by	current	human	rights	discourses	is	that	in	many	
ways	it	still	reflects	a	mainstream	liberal	idea	of	citizenship,	that	of	the	autonomous	individual	who	
is	able	to	meet	their	basic	needs	on	their	own.48		This	conception	of	the	person	allows	for	
dependence	in	the	private	sphere,	but	assumes	that	once	an	individual	is	in	the	public	realm,	they	
are	meant	to	“transcend	dependency.”49		Human	separateness	is	a	necessary	feature	of	public	policy	
on	a	human	rights	perspective,	and	dependence	may	still	be	assumed	to	be	a	failure	on	the	part	of	
the	individual.		This	is	a	current	feature	of	traditional,	mainstream	human	rights	based	policy,	which	
																																								 																				
44	Vazquez	and	Delaplace,		48.	
45	Holistic	in	the	sense	that	Vazquez	and	Delaplace	mean	here	is	that	it	requires	multiple	government	
institutions	to	work	together	holistically	to	address	the	problem.		While	this	is	very	important	and	necessary	
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46	Murli	Desai,	"Social	Policy	Approaches,	Human	Rights,	and	Social	Development	in	Asia,"	Social	Development	
Issues	35,	no.	2	(2013):	14.	
47	Vazquez	and	Delaplace,		44.	
48	Hankivsky,	Social	Policy	and	the	Ethic	of	Care,	5.	
49	Ibid.	
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treats	the	individual	as	the	locus	of	primary	concern	without	taking	into	consideration	the	role	the	
larger	community	has	to	play	in	the	lives	of	individuals.		An	example	of	this	pitting	of	the	individual	
against	the	community	is	present	in	health	care	policy,	even	when	such	policy	explicitly	seeks	to	
incorporate	community-oriented	solutions.		Selma	Sevenhuijsen	uses	a	health	care	policy	document	
by	the	Dutch	government	called	Choices	in	Health	Care	to	highlight	key	problems	with	standard	
policy	practices.50		She	notes	that	although	the	document	seeks	to	depart	from	an	overt	focus	on	the	
individual	by	“invoking	communitarian	solutions	or	by	selectively	stating	that	needs	might	be	socially	
constructed,”51	the	individual	remains	the	primary	subject	of	concern.		The	policy	document	makes	it	
clear	that	it	is	the	individual	who	is	responsible	for	assessing	their	needs	and	expressing	them	as	
claims	within	the	health	care	system.		However,	this	document	also	assumes	that	the	individual	is	
irresponsible,	that	they	have	‘unlimited’	needs	that	must	be	curbed	by	a	responsible	political	
community	in	order	to	discuss	responsible	health	care	choices.52		For	example,	we	could	imagine	an	
individual	who	places	undue	strain	upon	the	health	care	system	by	going	to	the	doctor	based	upon	
each	symptom	rather	than	looking	for	underlying	causes	of	the	symptoms.		Through	a	community-
oriented	process,	the	various	symptoms	might	resolve	as	a	single	problem,	thus	rendering	the	
demands	upon	the	system	much	less	overall.		Yet,	this	separation	of	the	individual	from	the	larger	
community	and	from	their	relationship	networks	renders	the	community	and	the	individual	at	odds	
with	one	another.		The	‘irresponsible	individual’	can	be	perceived	as	a	threat	to	the	wider	political	
community.		Conversely,	because	the	political	community	argues	about	care	“with	abstract,	legal	
norms	as	its	main	point	of	reference,”53	the	individual	can	be	isolated,	the	subject	of	judgmental	
scrutiny,	where	the	main	concern	is	not	so	much	their	well-being	as	a	person,	but	how	to	ensure	the	
individual	meets	a	certain	set	of	health	standards	without	causing	undue	stress	upon	the	community	
as	a	whole.		Pitting	the	individual	and	community	against	each	other	is	exactly	what	we	do	not	want	
in	public	policy.		While	care	ethics	based	public	policy	must	be	sensitive	to	the	problem	of	limited	
resources,	it	would,	however,	disallow	the	perpetuation	harmful	notions	of	dependence	that	set	the	
individual	and	the	community	at	odds,	especially	if	the	reason	for	doing	so	is	to	be	perceived	as	
conserving	resources.			
In	light	of	the	above	example,	one	of	the	most	striking	insights	that	critical	feminist	care	
ethics	can	provide	at	the	policy	formulation	stage,	though	the	practices	of	attentiveness	and	
responsiveness,	is	how	care	and	dependency	are	problematically	structured,	both	politically	and	
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51	Ibid.,	133.	
52	Ibid.	
53	Ibid.	
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socially.54		By	paying	attention	to	those	who	do	the	bulk	of	the	caring	labour,	by	actually	listening	to	
such	persons,	and	then	responding	to	their	needs,	this	would	open	up	the	field	of	possible	solutions	
to	include	ones	that	take	into	account	the	way	in	which	policy	can	help	or	hinder	those	who	do	care	
work.		The	assumptions	around	care	and	dependency	are	themselves	shaped	by	current	policy,	
namely	the	tension	between	how	current	policy	shapes	caring	practices,	and	a	continued	insistence	
that	a	critical	care	perspective	is	unnecessary	or	unable	to	guide	policy,	particularly	policy	that	
impacts	caring	practices.55		As	Selma	Sevenhuijsen	argues,	if	care	is	going	to	be	adequately	discussed	
in	the	political	arena,	this	“presupposes	that	we	handle	with	care	a	number	of	key	values	for	good	
care	provision	in	the	public	sphere,”	which	“implies	a	re-evaluation	of	care	in	politics	or,	rather,	a	
relocation	of	care	from	the	margins	to	the	centre	of	political	judgment	and	collective	action.”56		
Using	care	ethics	provides	new	insights	that	require	an	examination	of	not	only	caring	practices,	but	
also	the	norms	and	assumptions	around	care,	bringing	care	into	the	centre	of	our	political	process	
and	policy-making.	
Public	policy	from	a	human	rights	perspective	is	about	the	fulfilment	of	human	rights,	and	
although	some	policies	might	acknowledge	the	need	to	correct	for	past	or	current	structural	
problems	(such	as	discrimination	against	women),	this	does	not	protect	the	individual	from	being	
cast	as	a	failure	when	they	are	dependent	upon	aid,	or	as	the	above	example	illustrated,	a	threat	in	
health	care	policy	where	the	goal	is	to	reduce	undue	strain	upon	the	system	from	‘irresponsible	
individuals’	through	a	self-policing	community.		This	tension	between	the	individual	and	the	
community,	and	our	problematic	construction	of	dependence,	is	fostered	by	human	rights	based	
public	policy,	which	often	rests	upon	human	autonomy	as	its	foundational	principle.		These	
problems	occur	because	human	rights	are	not	geared	toward	challenging	normative	notions	of	
dependence;	they	are	often	silent	about	such	norms.		Instead,	problematic	norms	of	dependence	
are	left	in	place.		Using	the	lens	of	care	can	be	the	first	step	toward	changing	how	we	think	of	
dependence,	and	thus	how	we	craft	policy.	
Once	care	ethics	is	incorporated	into	the	making	of	policy,	the	array	of	possible	solutions	will	
shift.		This	does	not	mean	that	the	array	of	solutions	will	necessarily	become	larger	or	smaller,	
merely	that	the	nature	and	kind	of	solutions	will	not	necessarily	resemble	previous	sets	of	possible	
solutions.		A	prime	example	can	be	found	in	a	case	study	by	Olena	Hankivsky,	who	examined	the	
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ways	in	which	victims	of	abuse	in	residential	schools	in	Canada	had	their	claims	addressed	and	the	
kinds	of	solutions	offered	to	make	restitution	to	the	victims,	solutions	that	were	intended	to	provide	
closure	or	healing.57		One	of	the	primary	means	of	restitution	was	to	provide	monetary	payments	
once	survivors	had	gone	through	a	claims	process,	specifically	for	“therapeutic	expenses	and	
pecuniary	loss	arising	from	injury,	pain,	and	suffering.”58		The	problem	with	these	payouts	is	that	
putting	a	dollar	amount	to	a	person’s	suffering	is	difficult,	and	while	a	payout	might	be	acceptable	
for	some	individuals,	others	felt	insulted	or	angry,	because	thinking	of	compensation	only	in	
monetary	terms	may	“trivialize	the	survivor	trauma	and	distract	from	more	important	therapeutic	
options.”59		Others	felt	confused	when	they	were	given	a	payment	without	any	advice	or	assistance	
in	how	to	manage	the	money.		By	incorporating	care	ethics	into	the	policy	process,	possible	solutions	
expand	from	the	idea	of	monetary	compensation,	but	do	not	necessarily	exclude	it.		For	some	
survivors	money	and	guidance	about	how	to	best	invest	or	utilize	the	funds	would	be	most	beneficial	
to	aiding	the	survivors	as	they	worked	to	rebuild	their	lives.60		For	others,	simply	the	chance	to	
explain	and	tell	their	story,	to	be	listened	to	and	have	their	stories	acknowledged	during	the	claims	
process	was	enough.		Other	survivors	might	require	sustained	therapy,	or	assistance	with	finding	a	
job	so	they	reach	their	professional	and	personal	goals,	or	even	a	commitment	from	the	government	
to	prevent	further	instances	of	institutional	abuse.61	
Care	ethics	can	generate	possible	solutions	with	the	understanding	that	sometimes	it	is	
necessary	to	be	flexible	and	responsive	to	the	needs	of	the	policy’s	target	group,	and	thus	the	
practice	of	responsiveness	is	of	primary	importance	at	this	stage.		The	insights	from	the	previous	
stage	are	further	expanded	upon	as	policy	makers	begin	to	formulate	possible	solutions.		When	we	
assess	situations	from	a	care	perspective,	we	can	see	that	to	address	some	problems	much	more	
than	monetary	payments	might	be	required.		The	possible	set	of	solutions	thus	generated	can	
encompass	the	many	different	ways	in	which	persons	can	be	affected	by	policy	decisions,	providing	
a	better	picture	about	how	to	address	any	given	social	problem.		While	perhaps	more	expensive	in	
terms	of	money	and	time	in	the	short	term,	in	the	long	term	the	human	benefit	and	the	wider	
benefit	to	society	to	have	healthier,	happier,	and	more	productive	citizens	could	very	well	outweigh	
the	upfront	costs.		In	the	example	from	Hankivsky’s	work,	although	it	might	require	more	money	and	
time	to	fully	address	the	trauma	caused	by	the	residential	schools,	the	net	result	would	be	more	
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stable	adults	that	can	participate	more	fully	in	society	because	their	trauma	was	addressed	in	a	way	
that	allowed	them	to	heal	and	regain	their	sense	of	autonomy.	
	
Section 2.3 – Decision-Making 
Human	rights	perspectives	on	policy	tend	not	to	touch	much	on	the	decision-making	stage,	largely	
because	most	human	rights	models	tend	to	view	this	stage	as	the	one	that	determines	“which	of	the	
possible	solutions	presents	the	greatest	degree	of	technical	certainty	based	on	the	available	
evidence.”62		While	there	is	an	allowance	for	the	fact	that	the	political	outcomes	of	elections	can	
greatly	impact	this	process,	and	that	such	outcomes	can	be	as	important	as	technical	evidence,	the	
human	rights	analysis	of	the	decision-making	stage	does	not	investigate	the	ways	in	which	policy	
decisions	are	actually	made	and	how	deeply	decision-making	is	influenced	by	any	particular	decision-
maker’s	understanding	of	governmental	responsibility.		Because	human	rights	discourses	offer	little	
guidance	for	policy	makers	other	than	existing	as	a	set	of	standards,	as	discussed	in	Chapter	Three,	I	
directly	proceed	to	a	discussion	of	the	advantages	of	the	ethic	of	care	at	this	policy	stage.	
Decision-making	is	a	process	that	has	directly	grown	out	of	the	two	previous	stages,	and	
involves	a	great	deal	of	back	and	forth	in	which	actors	often	trade	promises	in	order	to	reach	an	
agreement.		Perhaps	because	this	stage	is	the	most	political	in	terms	of	deal-making	among	the	
narrowest	set	of	actors,	one	might	be	tempted	to	argue	that	critical	feminist	care	ethics	would	find	it	
difficult	to	gain	purchase	at	this	stage.		However,	the	decision-making	stage	would	be	no	less	altered	
by	care	ethics	than	the	other	stages	of	public	policy.		The	question	of	policy	decision-making	can	be	
understood	as	a	question	about	how	any	given	institution	can	be	held	responsible	for	addressing	a	
particular	social	problem.		This	question	about	institutional	responsibility	in	politics	is	often	tied	up	
with	ideological	political	ideas	about	the	role	of	the	state,	and	what	we	mean	when	we	charge	that	
an	institution	such	as	a	government	is	‘responsible	for’	public	goods.		This	means	that	the	caring	
practice	of	responsibility	is	an	excellent	lens	through	which	to	view	the	decision	making	stage.		For	
example,	care	ethics	can	be	used	in	the	decision-making	stage	to	help	clarify	the	scope	of	
governmental	responsibility,	and	how	governmental	institutions	already	deeply	shape	people’s	lives,	
allowing	for	‘privileged	irresponsibility,’63	which	is	a	problem	care	ethics	can	be	used	to	directly	
confront.			
																																								 																				
62	Vazquez	and	Delaplace,		35.	
63	In	brief,	‘privileged	irresponsibility’	is	the	idea	that	some	persons	(as	well	as	some	institutions	in	this	case)	
are	given	a	‘pass’	from	doing	the	work	of	care	because	their	paid	work	is	more	important.		Further,	privileged	
persons,	because	of	their	financial	security,	are	often	not	aware	of	the	amount	of	care	work	that	they	rely	
upon.		For	more	on	‘privileged	irresponsibly’	see	Chapter	One.			
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To	understand	more	fully	how	care	ethics	can	be	helpful	in	this	stage,	we	must	consider	the	
different	theories	that	have	been	used	to	understand	how	a	public	policy	decision	is	made.		First,	
there	is	the	rational	choice	model,	where	actors	(legislators,	board	members,	those	who	make	the	
choice	about	what	policy	to	pursue)	are	thought	to	maximize	benefits	and	minimize	costs	on	rational	
grounds	when	deciding	on	policy.64		Second,	there	is	the	incremental	model,	where	“decision-making	
is	a	political	process	characterized	by	bargaining	and	compromise	among	self-interested	decision-
makers.”65		Changes	to	the	status	quo	are	seen	as	being	incremental	in	nature,	achieved	with	a	high	
degree	of	bargaining	and	compromise	not	necessarily	related	to	the	rational	choice	or	‘best	solution.’		
Third,	the	mixed	scanning	model	combines	both	the	rational	choice	and	incremental	models,	taking	
the	best	aspects	of	both	(the	rationality	and	the	incremental	type	of	change)	while	discarding	the	
troublesome	ones	(the	limited	scope	of	rational	understanding),	but	ultimately	is	unsatisfactory	to	
many	policy	theorists.66		These	first	three	kinds	of	decision-making	processes	all	maintain	a	focus	on	
achieving	the	best	‘technical	solution,’	which	runs	parallel	to	the	human	rights	view	of	decision-
making	as	noted	above.		The	problem	here	is	that	these	represent	shallow	understandings	of	how	
any	decision	is	made	in	a	highly	political	process.		Fourth,	and	most	helpful,	there	is	the	‘garbage	can’	
model,	which	embraces	the	irrationality	of	the	decision-making	process:	“…	decision	making	[is]	a	
highly	ambiguous	and	unpredictable	process	only	distantly	related	to	searching	for	means	to	achieve	
goals.”67		The	garbage	can	model	emphasized,	and	paved	the	way	for	other	theories	to	encompass,	
the	idea	that	“decision-making	often	tends	to	occur	in	multiple	locations	or	venues,	each	with	a	
distinct	set	of	actors,	rules	of	procedure,	and	ability	to	influence	the	outcome	of	a	decision	process	
in	a	preferred	direction.”68		These	venues	are	not	static,	which	creates	many	different	points	of	
contact	for	decision-making.	
	 What	the	‘garbage	can’	model	allows	us	to	understand	is	that	decision-making	is	highly	
political,	and	bounded	by	rules	and	procedures.		In	addition,	political	actors	are	not	merely	rational	
benefit	maximizers,	but	human	beings	who	have	ideological	assumptions	about	the	role	of	
government.		In	particular,	there	are	assumptions	about	what	a	government	can	and	should	be	
responsible	for	when	it	comes	to	the	lives	of	those	affected	by	its	policies.		Care	theory’s	practice	of	
responsibility	can	be	used	to	clarify	in	what	way	institutions,	particularly	state	institutions,	are	
responsible,	and	to	combat	some	of	the	harmful	ideological	notions	about	governance	that	allows	
the	government	itself	to	make	policy	from	a	place	of	privileged	irresponsibility.		The	problem	is	that	
																																								 																				
64	Howlett	and	Ramesh,	167.	
65	Ibid.,	170.	
66	Ibid.,	173.	
67	Ibid.,	175.	
68	Ibid.,	178.	
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governments	make	policy	about	care	work	and	those	who	perform	the	labour	of	care	without	using	
care	theory	to	fully	understand	the	issues	at	hand	or	the	stakes	that	are	involved	with	such	decisions,	
which	often	serve	to	keep	the	concerns	of	care	in	the	private	realm.	
One	kind	of	responsibility,	which	adheres	to	the	state,	is	one	that	compels	the	state	to	
address	social	problems	in	an	attentive	way.		However,	it	is	important	to	note	that	because	some	
social	problems	are	not	directly	about	the	citizens	of	a	state	(such	as	foreign	workers	who	are	
especially	vulnerable	and	targets	of	policy,	particularly	immigration	policy),	this	responsibility	cannot	
be	exclusively	directed	toward	citizens	of	a	particular	state,	or	we	run	the	risk	of	perpetuating	
harmful	patterns	of	exclusion.		This	kind	of	responsibility	is	one	that	calls	for	an	attentive,	engaged	
response	to	any	problem	that	arises.		This	responsibility	is	demanding	because	even	when	the	state	
attempts	to	disengage	itself	from	the	lives	of	individuals	as	much	as	possible,	that	very	non-
involvement	can	serve	to	shape	the	lives	of	individuals	in	their	relationships	with	particular	others.		
For	example,	if	it	is	state	policy	to	not	become	involved	in	domestic	disputes,	that	very	lack	of	
engagement	with	abusers,	victims,	and	with	social	norms	around	gender	and	violence,	codifies	it	as	a	
private	problem	wherein	those	responsible	for	solving	the	problem	are	only	private	individuals.		
Using	the	lens	of	care,	it	becomes	possible	to	see	the	ways	in	which	the	state	structures	and	shapes	
our	relationships	with	particular	others.		Thus,	the	kind	of	responsibility	that	bears	upon	the	state	to	
address	social	problems	is	one	that	is	borne	out	of	the	understanding	that	the	state	structures	
human	lives	regardless	of	what	it	does.		Policy	making	institutions	have	a	responsibility	to	use	their	
authority	and	wide-sweeping	power	to	combat	social	problems	instead	of	maintain	a	vantage	of	
what	is,	essentially,	privileged	irresponsibility.		Governments	can	maintain	such	a	position	predicated	
on	the	notion	that	the	importance	and	seriousness	of	‘actual’	government	demands	more	attention	
and	concern	than	social	problems	like	domestic	violence,	the	crisis	of	care,	or	even	wealth	inequality,	
disregarding	the	fact	that	government	involvement	(or	non-involvement)	is	integral	to	shaping	the	
world	we	live	in,	especially	whether	it	fosters	or	fights	patterns	of	institutional	privileged	
irresponsibility.69	
	
Section 2.4 – Policy Implementation 
During	the	design	and	implementation	stage	is	when	the	human	rights	perspective	is	in	most	conflict	
with	the	drive	to	be	as	cost	effective	as	possible.		Although	the	design	process	will	have	different	
outcomes	for	any	given	human	right,	one	of	the	aids	in	policy	design	is	a	Logical	Framework	Matrix	
(LFM)	which	maps	out	the	points	of	negotiation	between	the	objectives	of	the	policy	(a	human	right)	
																																								 																				
69	Sevenhuijsen	et	al.,		316.	
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and	the	practical	considerations	of	policy.		The	LFM	helps	policy	makers	weigh	the	actions,	
components,	purpose,	and	goals	of	policy	as	outlined	by	a	human	right	against	the	risks	of	the	policy	
and	how	a	policy	will	be	evaluated.70		The	idea	is	that	since	the	end	goal	of	any	public	policy	is	the	
fulfilment	of	a	human	right,	all	the	other	factors	involved	will	take	on	a	human	rights	perspective,	
which	will	enable	human	rights	indicators	to	be	established.71		Using	the	human	right	to	education	as	
an	example,	because	the	end	goal	is	ensuring	the	education	of	citizens	meets	a	certain	standard,	the	
design	process	will	incorporate	ways	to	measure	the	education	of	students	(such	as	standardized	
testing),	to	evaluate	the	effectiveness	of	certain	educational	practices	(such	as	teacher	performance	
evaluations),	and	to	anticipate	some	of	the	risks	associated	with	public	education	(such	as	overly	
invested	parents).			
	 However,	because	the	focus	on	human	rights	as	enacted	through	government	action	is	
largely	concerned	with	the	benefit	of	its	own	citizens,	this	means	that	often	non-citizen	target	
groups,	especially	transnational	migratory	care	workers	(i.e.	those	who	participate	in	the	‘global	care	
chain’72)	are	acted	upon	by	policy,	not	acted	with	in	order	to	address	the	real	concerns	and	problems	
faced	by	the	people	in	these	precarious	situations.		They	are	excluded	from	much	of	the	policy	
process	and	as	such	when	policy	implementation	occurs,	they	are	a	target	group	of	policy	without	
any	say	in	how	that	policy	affects	their	lives.		Further,	because	care	workers	are	often	excluded	from	
the	policy	process,	this	serves	to	also	exclude	ideas	about	care	itself	from	the	process.		The	exclusion	
of	care	(and	those	who	engage	in	care)	from	larger	public	debates	is	juxtaposed	with	the	vital	caring	
needs,	particularly	in	the	Western	world	with	its	aging	populations,	with	women	who	are	torn	
between	the	labour	market	and	care	work	at	home,	and	norms	about	masculinity	that	allow	for	men	
to	avoid	full	and	equal	participation	in	the	work	of	care.		In	spite	of	the	need	we	all	have	for	care,	
and	the	policy	documents	that	seek	to	find	ways	to	provide	it	for	citizens,	such	documents	do	not	
acknowledge	deeply	important	questions	about	care	itself.	
As	previously	noted,	human	rights	have	come	to	be	embodied	through	public	policy	and	are	
now	more	than	bulwarks	against	illegitimate	government	action.		Further,	ideas	about	inclusion	are	
																																								 																				
70	Vazquez	and	Delaplace,		50-1.	
71	Ibid.,	51.	
72	Global	care	chains	are	discussed	more	directly	in	Chapter	Two.		In	brief,	it	refers	to	the	way	in	which	care	
shortages	in	the	Western	world	draw	in	(mostly)	women	from	other	nations	to	perform	care	work,	as	
professionals	or	as	informal	servants.		These	migrant	women	often	leave	family	behind,	who	must	be	cared	for	
by	others,	either	hired	by	the	migrant	worker	or	by	other	extended	family	members.		Regardless,	once	again	it	
is	mostly	women	who	care	for	the	family	that	has	been	left	behind.		This	is	called	the	‘global	care	chain’	where	
a	care	demand	in	one	part	of	the	world	precipitates	care	demands	in	another	part	of	the	world.		For	more	on	
global	care	chains,	see	Hochschild	(2002).	
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often	“grafted	onto	a	notion	of	citizenship	in	terms	of	rights.”73		In	conflating	human	rights	with	
citizenship	rights,	governments	create	categories	that	allow	noncitizens	to	be	excluded	from	the	
rights	provided	to	citizens.74		This	means	those	persons	in	liminal	situations,	like	the	transnational	
migrant	worker,	are	often	excluded	from	human	rights	fulfilment	because	governments	restrict	
those	rights	to	citizens,	and	thus	can	find	the	protection	of	their	human	rights	severely	compromised.		
The	exclusion	of	transnational	care	workers,	through	public	policy,	can	also	serve	to	reinforce	the	
invisibility	of	care	and	deepen	inequality	between	the	people	who	consume	care	(i.e.	pay	for	it)	and	
those	who	provide	care.		Public	policy	based	on	human	rights	is	concerned	with	the	human	rights	of	
the	citizens	of	the	particular	state	that	makes	the	policy,	and	as	such	often	overlooks	the	effects	
such	policies	can	have	on	foreign	nationals	living	with	state	borders,	or	distant	strangers	living	in	
other	states.		As	such,	these	policies	serve	to	reinforce	two	forms	of	inequality,	that	of	“the	
devaluation	and	invisibility	of	the	private	care-domain	and	its	subservience	to	the	public	world	of	
work,	and	[…]	the	translation	of	the	unequal	relations	of	personal	interdependency	into	the	unequal	
relations	of	transnational	interdependency.”75		Without	women	from	other	nations	willing	to	leave	
their	homes	and	do	the	vital	work	of	caring,	Western	nations	would	be	in	an	even	deeper	crisis	of	
care	than	they	currently	are.		To	allow	such	a	state	of	affairs	to	remain	unexamined	and	
unchallenged	is	morally	and	politically	problematic.		Additionally,	the	ethics	of	care	can	incorporate	
the	understanding	that	it	is	not	just	gender,	but	also	that	geopolitical	and	radicalized	differences	
contribute	to	the	continued	ability	of	the	wealthy	and	powerful	to	import	and	consume	caring	
labour.		This	intersection	of	gender,	race,	and	nationality	matter	because	according	to	a	2013	report	
by	the	International	Labour	Organization,	17	percent	of	international	domestic	workers	are	men.76		
Such	men	are	marked	by	their	different	racialization	and	geopolitical	origin,	and	as	such	are	
‘acceptable’	domestic	workers.		However,	when	race	intersects	with	gender,	the	ethics	of	care	
investigates	why,	in	spite	of	being	‘acceptable’	domestic	workers,	male	domestic	workers	are	viewed	
																																								 																				
73	Selma	Sevenhuijsen,	"Caring	in	the	Third	Way:	The	Relation	between	Obligation,	Responsibility	and	Care	in	
Third	Way	Discourse,"	Critical	Social	Policy	20,	no.	5	(2000):	21.	
74	One	might	suggest	that	I	am	not	giving	due	consideration	to	the	difference	between	human	rights	and	
citizen	rights.		While	I	am	aware	of	the	vast	amount	of	literature	discussing	the	differences	between	human	
rights	and	citizen	rights,	that	is	outside	my	scope	here.		My	point	is	that	even	though	transnational	workers	are	
understood	to	have	human	rights,	their	position	can	be	so	precarious	that	human	rights	alone	are	not	enough	
to	understand	the	ways	in	which	they	are	made	vulnerable.		They	are	often	excluded	from	forms	of	public	life,	
and	their	difference	from	citizens	is	often	constructed	as	a	failing	that	allows	them	to	be	legislated	upon	
without	due	consideration	for	their	lived	experience	and	in	light	of	the	caring	responsibilities	they	have	
towards	particular	others,	such	as	family	in	their	home	country.		
75	Williams,	"Towards	a	Transnational	Analysis	of	the	Political	Economy	of	Care,"	25.	
76	Rachel	H.	Brown,	"Re-Examining	the	Transnational	Nanny,"	International	Feminist	Journal	of	Politics	18,	no.	2	
(2015):	213.	
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with	suspicion	or	face	serious	challenges	to	finding	work.77		Such	attitudes	toward	male	domestic	
workers	highlight	the	continued	problematic	association	of	women,	femininity,	and	care.		If	care	was	
not	considered	‘women’s	work’	male	domestic	workers	would	not	face	such	stigma	or	difficulty	in	
obtaining	work	in	the	first	place,	although	they	would	still	be	inscribed	with	racial	and	national	
differences	that	label	them	as	‘care-providers’	rather	than	‘care-consumers’.				
	 A	deeper	exploration	of	the	problems	faced	by	transnational	migrant	workers	will	serve	to	
draw	out	more	clearly	how	policy	can	foster	the	exclusion	of	care	workers	and	care	work	itself.		
Transnational	migrant	workers,	especially	those	who	work	in	caring	professions	or	those	who	take	
up	domestic	work,	often	within	the	home	of	their	employer,	and	under	tight	controls	from	the	host	
government.		Canada’s	Live-in	Carer	Program	demonstrates	how	host	nations	invite	foreign	
nationals	to	fulfil	a	desperate	caring	need,	but	they	do	so	without	providing	those	vital	workers	the	
full,	material	protections	of	citizenship.		Such	persons	are	given	‘partial	citizenship,’	which	grants	
formal	access	to	rights	but	due	to	the	‘points	based’	two-year	path	towards	full	citizenship,	makes	
enforcing	or	fulfilling	their	human	rights	problematic.		There	is	a	lack	of	oversight,	especially	with	
regard	to	monitoring	for	abuses	and	the	enforcement	of	contracts.78		This	partial	citizenship	is	
particularly	problematic	because	those	who	only	have	partial	citizenship	are	not	fully	integrated	into	
their	host	state	nor	are	they	fully	protected	by	their	home	state.		This	exclusion	is	brought	about	by	
public	policy	designed	to	fulfil	the	human	rights	of	the	citizen,	and	points	to	the	fact	that	“traditional	
concepts	of	rights,	justice	and	citizenship	may	be	inadequate	to	address	the	contemporary	
challenges	of	care	and	well-being	at	the	transnational	scale.”79		Additionally,	immigrants	are	often	
put	in	the	position	of	being	made	to	demonstrate	that	they	deserve	to	be	included,	not	excluded,	
when	it	comes	to	policy	protection.		The	notion	of	who	‘deserves’	the	protection	of	the	state	can	put	
an	undue	burden	on	those	who	might	not	competently	speak	the	host	language	or	understand	the	
bureaucracy	of	the	host	state.80		This	question	of	‘deserving’	can	then	further	reinforce	the	concept	
of	included	and	excluded	groups.		Notions	around	why	or	why	not	an	individual	‘deserves’	the	
protections	of	the	host	state	can	be	particularly	problematic	when	the	policy	of	the	host	country	is	in	
place	to	fulfil	a	gap	in	the	provision	of	care,	considering	the	vital	role	care	plays	in	everyone’s	lives.	
																																								 																				
77	Aster	Georgo	Haile	and	Karin	Astrid	Siegmann,	"Masculinity	at	Work:	Intersectionality	and	Identity	
Constructions	of	Migrant	Domestic	Workers	in	the	Netherlands,"	in	Migration,	Gender	and	Social	Justice:	
Perspectives	on	Human	Insecurity,	ed.	Thanh-Dam	Truong,	et	al.	(New	York:	Springer,	2013),	115.	
78	Christina	Gabriel,	"Migration	and	Globalized	Care	Work:	The	Case	of	Internationally	Educated	Nurses	in	
Canada,"	in	Feminist	Ethics	and	Social	Policy:	Towards	a	New	Global	Political	Economy	of	Care,	ed.	Rianne	
Mahon	and	Fiona	Robinson	(Vancouver:	University	of	British	Columbia	Press,	2011),	54-5.	
79	Rianne	Mahon	and	Fiona	Robinson,	"Introduction,"	ibid.,	13.	
80	Joan	C.	Tronto,	"A	Feminist	Democratic	Ethics	of	Care	and	Global	Care	Workers:	Citizenship	and	
Responsibility,"	ibid.,	173.	
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	 This	liminal	space	afforded	to	care	providers,	then,	can	in	turn	continue	to	foster	the	
exclusion	of	care	providers	and	care	receivers	from	being	seen	as	‘full	participating	citizens.’		First,	
those	who	provide	care	are	treated	poorly,	excluded	from	full	citizenship,	or	assumed	to	be	carers	in	
virtue	of	their	gender	status.		Second,	those	who	receive	care	are	often	constructed	as	‘dependent’	
upon	the	system	in	order	to	have	their	human	rights	fulfilled.		These	two	aspects	combine	to	
demonstrate	that	human	rights	based	public	policy	can	exclude	carers	and	care	receivers	from	being	
‘full	participating	citizens,’	because	their	preoccupation	with	care	(providing	or	receiving)	renders	
them	unable	to	fully	participate	in	the	public,	political	sphere.81		When	care	remains	a	private	
concern	for	Live-in	Carers,	or	the	family	(and	thus	for	women),	questions	about	how	we	care,	whom	
we	care	for,	who	does	the	caring,	and	all	the	assumptions	such	questions	entail,	are	left	to	the	side,	
unanswered	and	overlooked	in	public	discussions.	
	 The	lens	of	care	can	offer	particular	insights	into	the	policy	implementation	stage,	
particularly	around	relations	of	power	between	those	who	enact	and	implement	policy	and	those	
who	are	the	targets	of	policy.		In	particular,	it	can	interrogate	the	reasons	why	more	powerful	target	
groups	like	businesses	might	have	more	of	a	say	in	what	policies	are	implemented	upon	them,	
where	businesses	and	policy	makers	might	act	in	concert,	compared	to	the	target	groups	that	often	
lack	immediate	power	and	influence	in	the	policy	process.		The	ethics	of	care	can	also	provide	
guidance	for	how	target	groups	are	approached	and	treated	by	policy	makers	and	those	who	
implement	the	policy,	because	the	policy	implementation	stage	is	where	the	three	practices	of	care	
come	together	most	strongly	as	a	guide	for	action	in	public	administration.		
Critical,	feminist	care	ethics,	because	it	is	primarily	concerned	with	relationships	and	the	
structures	of	power	that	can	underlie	and	shape	relationships,	requires	attention	to	be	paid	to	all	
the	components	of	the	relationship.		This	means	that	the	lens	of	care	would	require	an	analysis	of	
policy	implementation	to	be	mindful	of	mechanisms	of	implementation	more	broadly,	at	the	level	of	
administrators	and	managers,	as	well	as	being	aware	of	how	the	day-to-day	processes	of	
implementation	occur	at	the	level	of	individual	persons.		To	be	certain,	the	component	of	care	ethics	
that	is	concerned	with	outcomes	would	be	geared	toward	understanding	how	policy	actually	affects	
concrete	individuals	in	the	context	of	their	relationships.82		For	example,	does	a	new	family	leave	
policy	make	it	easier	for	new	parents	to	care	for	their	children,	make	it	more	difficult,	or	serve	only	
to	reinforce	gender	norms	about	care	giving?		Yet,	this	does	not	mean	that	the	lens	of	care	ethics	
would	be	narrowly	focused	on	the	small	scale.		The	ethics	of	care	is	a	flexible	tool,	able	to	scale	up	or	
down	as	needed.		On	the	level	of	administration	and	management,	the	ethics	of	care	would	inquire	
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about	and	guide	wider-reaching	decisions	about	implementation	so	as	to	be	aware	of	the	relations	
of	power	between	the	institution	and	the	target	group.		Institutions,	and	especially	governments,	
can	and	should	be	mindful	of	the	relations	of	power	within	which	we	all	exist.		Often,	states	have	a	
great	deal	of	power	over	others,	particularly	those	who	are	most	vulnerable,	and	therefore	should	
act	with	greater	levels	of	caution	in	order	to	avoid	paternalistic	or	exploitative	actions.		Examining	
the	power	relations	at	play	can	“contribute	to	exposing	oppression,	repression	and	systematic	forms	
of	dominance	and	assist	in	ways	of	reversing	these.”83		The	question	of	who	holds	the	greater	parity	
of	power	when	implementing	policy	can	be	made	clear	using	the	lens	of	care	ethics,	and	how	that	
power	is	used	must	be	carefully	considered	to	foster	a	responsible	use	of	power	for	the	betterment	
of	people	and	the	relationships	people	maintain.	
Policy	implementation	is	also	where	the	three	practices	of	care	come	together	most	strongly.		
Attentiveness,	responsibility,	and	responsiveness	are	all	practices	that	would	serve	to	aid	civil	
servants	as	they	perform	the	work	of	administering	policy	to	a	target	group,	especially	the	practices	
as	articulated	by	Robinson.		These	practices	would	need	to	become	embedded	in	the	various	
implementation	styles	that	institutions	utilize	in	order	to	administer	policy	to	their	target	groups.		
These	different	methods	result	from	the	many	constraining	factors,	such	as	the	number	of	agencies	
involved,	target	group	size,	and	the	social,	economic,	political	and	technological	conditions	that	all	
institutions	face	when	doing	policy.84		These	constraining	factors	can	affect	policy,	and	are	part	of	
the	system	that	policy-makers	and	implementers	must	work	within.		Different	implementation	styles	
can	also	play	a	role	in	determining	what	kinds	of	instruments	are	used	to	implement	policy,	which	
can	be	understood	as	ranging	from	regulations,	to	subsidies,	to	direct	provisions,	to	information	
dissemination,	and	finally	to	institutional	reorganization,	such	as	moving	tasks	from	one	department	
to	another.85		Yet,	regardless	of	the	policy	style,	or	regardless	of	the	constraints	within	which	policy	
implementation	operates,	the	practices	of	care	can	still	be	of	great	benefit	to	those	who	are	the	
targets	of	policy,	as	well	as	a	useful	guide	for	those	who	implement	the	policy.		Returning	to	
Hankivsky’s	example	of	the	victims	of	institutional	abuse	at	residential	schools,	many	of	the	survivors	
were	able	to	tell	their	stories	and	express	how	their	experience	of	the	abuse	shaped	their	lives	and	
continues	to	shape	their	relationships	with	friends	and	family,	which	helped	to	expiate	some	of	the	
trauma	of	their	experiences.86		The	emphasis	on	listening	to	the	survivors	was	prioritized	because	
the	Canadian	government	worked	to	avoid	paternalistic	attitudes,	listened	to	those	whom	the	policy	
was	intended	to	help,	assumed	responsibility	for	their	compensation,	and	was	responsive	to	the	
																																								 																				
83	Sevenhuijsen,	Citizenship	and	the	Ethics	of	Care:	Feminist	Considerations	on	Justice,	Morality,	and	Politics,	66.	
84	Howlett	and	Ramesh,	191-3.	
85	Ibid.,	203-4.	
86	Hankivsky,	Social	Policy	and	the	Ethic	of	Care,	70-1.	
153	
	
suffering	of	the	survivors	when	the	policy	was	implemented.		This	was	by	no	means	a	perfect	
process.		Policy	is	never	a	perfect	process,	but	this	particular	policy	was	vastly	superior	to	a	bare	
acknowledgement	of	their	suffering.		By	acknowledging	that	the	target	group	of	most	policies	are	
actual	human	beings	who	are	embedded	within	webs	of	relationships,	caring	policy	implementation	
is	a	more	holistic,87	albeit	more	complicated	process.		Although	the	process	might	be	more	
complicated,	it	could	also	produce	greater	benefits	for	those	target	groups,	because	such	persons	
now	have	more	stability	and	are	more	productive,	they	can	directly	foster	wider	social	stability	and	
productivity.	
Additionally,	we	must	be	aware	that	individuals	are	not	the	only	ones	who	are	the	targets	of	
policy.		Often	the	family	or	local	communities	are	policy	targets.		However,	businesses	and	other,	
formal	organizations	are	often	regulated	or	given	subsidies	for	various	economic	and	political	
reasons.		Care	ethics	could	provide	valuable	insights	into	why	certain	interests	are	prioritized,	as	well	
as	providing	guidance	for	how	to	resist	the	consuming	interests	of	money	and	the	power	it	brings	by	
questioning	how	policies	that	shape	business	practices	benefit	or	harm	concrete	persons	within	their	
webs	of	relations.		For	example,	a	law	that	disallows	worker’s	unions	might	be	argued	to	be	of	great	
economic	benefit,	on	the	assumption	that	less	regulation	can	spur	greater	growth,	and	thus	more	
wealth.		A	care	ethics	analysis	may	reveal	such	claims	as	spurious.		For	example,	the	wealth	created	
in	such	a	manner	is	often	not	evenly	distributed,	so	the	greater	wealth	in	question	is	not	beneficial	
to	all	persons.		Weaker	unions	also	correlate	to	less	worker	protection,	higher	insecurity,	and	a	
negative	impact	upon	the	relationships	the	workers	try	to	maintain.		Alternately,	environmental	
protection	laws	can	put	a	greater	strain	on	businesses.		Yet,	such	laws	can	be	the	catalyst	for	new	
technology	as	well	as	underwriting	the	importance	of	a	clean	environment	for	the	continued	health	
of	human	beings	and	other	life	on	this	planet.		These	examples	help	to	demonstrate	that	policy,	no	
matter	its	target,	has	a	deep	impact	on	individuals	within	and	outside	of	state	borders.		How	we	
implement	policy,	all	kinds	of	policy,	can	ultimately	have	its	effects	felt	in	all	our	lives,	in	how	we	
work	and	live	together.			
	
Section 2.5 – Policy Evaluation 
On	a	human	rights	account,	evaluating	the	success	or	failure	of	any	policy	can,	at	a	basic	level,	be	
understood	as	the	fulfilment	or	non-fulfilment	of	a	human	right.		This	basic	understanding	can	be	
broken	down	into	certain	kinds	of	indicators	of	success:	structural,	process,	and	result	based.		
Structural	indicators	refer	to	legal	codes	and	institutions	conforming	to	or	facilitating	the	fulfilment	
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of	human	rights.88		Process	indicators	“seek	to	measure	the	quality	and	magnitude	of	the	State’s	
effort	to	implement	rights.”89		Progress	indicators	measure	the	reach	of	the	policy	and	whether	it	
encompasses	all	the	necessary	functions	in	order	to	fulfil	the	right.		Results	indicators	reflect	the	
actual	impact	of	the	policy	on	real	persons.90		For	example,	the	right	to	education	could	be	measured	
by	what	laws	are	in	place	that	facilitate	children	gaining	an	education	(structure),	how	much	effort	
the	state	exerts	in	providing	the	education	(process),	and	how	well	educated	children	actually	are	
once	their	schooling	is	completed	(results).		Another	interesting	point	is	that	one	of	the	ways	in	
which	some	measure	human	rights	fulfilment	is	by	the	kinds	of	policies	that	governments	enact.		
Measuring	aggregate	human	rights	through	policy	is	an	indirect	measure,	to	be	sure,	but	the	
statistics	gathered	by	policy	implementation	and	evaluation	can	be	used	as	a	“suitable	proxy	
[measure]	to	capture	the	degree	to	which	states	are	implementing	[human	rights]	obligations.”91		
These	kinds	of	aggregate,	indirect	measures	can	be	used	to	demonstrate	the	degree	to	which	
governments	“are	committed	to	putting	in	place	the	kinds	of	resources	needed	to	have	a	‘rights-
protective	regime’	in	place.”92	
	 However,	how	we	understand	the	success	or	failure	of	any	policy	by	human	rights	standards	
does	not	necessarily	take	into	account	the	fact	that	it	can	leave	problematic	social	norms	intact,	
particularly	about	race,	gender,	and	care	work,	which	in	turn	undercuts	the	basic	equality	which	
human	rights	are	meant	to	embody.		Even	the	metrics	that	are	used	to	measure	development	can	
incorporate	a	bias	against	care	work	itself,	considering	all	in-home,	family-consumed	care	work	to	be	
unimportant	when	it	comes	to	economic	reporting	and	accounting.		This	can	serve	to	render	care	
work,	and	the	workers	themselves,	invisible	to	public	policy	metrics.93		In	large	part,	this	is	because	
human	rights,	and	the	public	policy	it	inspires,	charges	that	all	individuals	should	be	treated	as	‘the	
same,’	but	the	lingering	question	remains:	the	same	as	whom?		What	model	of	individual	is	our	
‘standard’?		As	Olena	Hankivsky	argues,	feminist	critiques	have	demonstrated	that	the	standard	for	
equality	comparisons	has	“usually	been	a	very	specific,	historically	privileged	group	in	society	–	white,	
able-bodied,	middle-class	males.”94		Because	white	men	are	often	the	‘norm’	against	which	other	
equality	claims	are	considered,	public	policy	based	on	this	assumption	cannot	encompass	certain	
differences,	which	often	require	different	needs	to	be	fulfilled,	as	well	as	allowing	certain	social	
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norms,	particularly	those	of	race	and	gender,	to	remain	unexamined	and	intact.	While	there	might	
be	some	cases	and	issues	where	a	universal	standard	is	sufficient	to	address	public	problems:	
[W]omen	and	men	are	not	similarly	situated	for	the	purposes	of	legal	equality	rights	
interpretation.		Because	women	may	differ	from	men	in	their	capacity	for	childbearing	and	
in	their	socio-economic	status,	there	may	be	no	basis	in	the	male	standard	to	prove	the	
inequality	they	may	be	experiencing.95	
Thus,	even	if	someone’s	human	rights	are	being	fulfilled	by	a	public	policy,	there	might	be	other	
problems	that	exist,	because	a	human	rights	perspective	cannot	always	‘see’	the	problem,	such	as	
how	the	tasks	of	social	reproduction	are	unfairly	allocated	in	families,	as	I	argued	in	Chapter	Three.		
Further,	policy	based	on	human	rights	seeks	to	overcome	historical	disadvantages	without	engaging	
with	the	root	causes	of	those	disadvantages	in	the	first	place.		It	is	still	the	case	that	most	of	the	
dependency	work	(care	work)	that	is	done,	is	performed	by	women	and	racialized	women,	who	are	
often	transnational	workers.96		The	unequal	division	of	caring	labour	persists	in	spite	of	increased	
participation	of	women	in	the	work	place	and	the	policies	in	place	that	foster	that	participation.		This	
is	because	human	rights	based	public	policy	does	not	challenge	the	deeply	held	and	historically	
situated	norm	about	care	work	as	being	tied	to	femininity,	and	the	norms	around	men	being	
released	from	performing	care	work	due	to	their	role	as	a	worker	in	the	labour	market.97		When	
looking	at	global	care	chains,	current	transnational	migration	of	care	work	follows	historical	patterns	
of	exploitation,	particularly	colonialization,	and	international	patterns	of	racial	or	ethnic	division.98		
For	example,	the	history	of	African-American	women	caring	for	white	children	in	the	United	States	
reinforces	the	perceived	‘normality’	of	non-white	women	employed	to	care	for	children	not	their	
own,99	which	has	been	expanded	to	include	women	from	Latin	America,	drawing	poorer	women	
from	poorer	countries	across	borders.		The	focus	on	the	bare	fulfilment	of	an	individual’s	human	
rights	does	not	necessarily	mean	that	the	historical	background	will	cease	to	have	any	impact	on	our	
lives	as	we	live	them.			
	 This	kind	of	oversight	can	be	seen	in	two	examples,	where	the	success	or	failure	of	policy	
was	judged	without	reference	to	the	current	problematic	structures	of	gender	or	care.		The	first	
revisits	the	Dutch	policy	document	Choices	in	Health	Care,	and	the	second	focuses	on	the	South	
African	White	Paper	for	Social	Welfare.		In	the	document	Choices	in	Health	Care,	women	play	a	dual	
role.		On	the	one	hand,	women’s	health	organizations	were	invited	to	participate	in	the	campaign	
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because	they	were	seen	as	“the	vanguards	of	autonomy	and	free	choice	[in	health	care	provision],	as	
opposed	to	medicalization.”100		However,	prior	to	that	point,	in	this	document	women	were	
addressed	as	persons	who	manage	and	influence	the	consumption	of	care	within	the	family	unit,	so	
while	women’s	health	organizations	were	seen	as	political	actors,	women	in	general	were	cast	in	
their	traditional	role	as	facilitating	or	caring	for	their	family	members.101		Although	the	policy	
document	is	primarily	concerned	with	how	to	ensure	that	the	elderly’s	human	right	to	health	care	is	
fulfilled,	it	does	so	by	accepting	the	role	of	women	as	carers,	drawing	on	the	“silent	logic	of	a	
‘natural’	provision	of	care	within	the	family	and	kinship	networks.”102		Even	if	the	policy	were	
successful	on	the	grounds	that	it	increased	the	quality	of	elder	care,	it	will	have	done	so	by	utilizing	
the	assumed	naturalness	of	pairing	women	and	care	work.	
	 The	second	example	comes	from	an	examination	of	the	White	Paper	for	Social	Welfare	
(WPSW)	from	South	Africa.		Written	in	1996,	the	document	expresses	a	strong	commitment	to	
human	rights,	and	even	a	professed	commitment	to	the	ethics	of	care	(although	the	commitment	
was	not	carried	out	in	relation	to	the	way	social	welfare	was	conceived).103		Throughout	the	
document,	there	are	discussions	about	care	provision	and	the	important	role	care	plays	in	the	lives	
of	citizens.		However,	the	WPWS	contains	contradictory	language	concerning	women	and	care,	
which	leads	to	two	problems.		First,	care	giving	is	presented	as	a	gender-neutral	activity,	which	
ignores	the	pervasive	gendered	divisions	within	the	family	unit.		Second,	it	singles	out	women	as	a	
‘special	group’	that	has	particular	ties	to	care	work	and	should	be	supported	in	that	endeavour.		
Concerning	the	first	problem,	the	WPSW	was	informed	by	a	familial	understanding	of	care,	such	that	
care	giving	was	the	main	focus,	and	that	care	giving	was	largely	carried	out	within	the	private	sphere	
among	kin-groups.		Additionally,	in	the	chapter	of	the	document	about	care	“family	life	is	described	
in	gender-neutral,	functionalist	and	moral	terms.”104		The	silence	regarding	the	fact	that	women	still	
do	the	majority	of	the	care	work	is	problematic,	obscuring	pervasive	gender	divisions	in	spite	of	a	
formal	gender-neutrality.		It	is	only	in	a	later	chapter,	about	women	in	particular,	that	this	gendered	
division	of	labour	is	addressed.		Yet,	there	is	nothing	in	the	policy	about	rethinking	the	division	of	
care	work,	but	instead	the	document	argues	that	women	“should	be	supported	in	their	caring	roles	
without	the	gender	division	in	care	being	questioned	in	the	light	of	gender	justice	or	of	promoting	
care	giving	as	an	aspect	of	the	quality	of	men’s	lives.”105		Once	again,	there	is	a	real	problem	within	
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the	document	as	to	how	it	seeks	to	resolve	the	conflict	between	the	unequal	division	of	care	and	a	
commitment	to	the	fulfilment	of	human	rights.		The	second	problem	can	be	seen	throughout	the	
document,	because	women	are	depicted	as	a	‘special	group’	with	the	need	for	special	protections	
against	domestic	abuses,	support	in	their	caring	roles,	and	as	a	group	vulnerable	to	HIV	transmission.		
However,	the	document	does	not	discuss	men’s	roles	and	the	constructions	of	masculinity	that	
necessitate	the	need	for	such	protections.		This	invisibility	of	men	within	the	WPWS	underlies	the	
problem	with	how	policy	concerned	with	human	rights	fulfilment	does	so	on	the	grounds	of	
protecting	women	so	that	they	are	able	to	function	within	society	on	the	model	of	the	self-reliant	
and	independent	citizen	that	men	already	are	assumed	to	hold.106		This	policy	could	also	achieve	a	
successful	evaluation	while	still	perpetuating	the	norms	around	gender	and	care	that	work	to	keep	
women	and	care	from	full	political	consideration.	
	 Conversely,	critical,	feminist	care	ethics	can	be	integrated	into	policy	evaluation,	
transforming	how	we	understand	the	success	or	failure	of	any	given	policy.		This	transformation	
would	not	erase	important	features	of	policy	evaluation,	but	would	alter	collective	priorities	about	
policy	and	care	itself.		The	ethics	of	care	would	ask	of	any	policy	whether	it	aided	people	to	live	
within	particular	relations	of	care	without	reinforcing	harmful	patterns	of	power,	particularly	those	
of	race	and	gender.		Policy	can	then	fail	if	it	serves	to	entrench	harmful	relations	of	power,	or	
undermines	the	caring	relations	in	which	people	are	embedded.		Policy,	through	the	understanding	
of	care	ethics,	would	be	successful	if	it	worked	to	challenge	or	overturn	harmful	social	norms	or	
oppressive	relations	of	power.		A	care	evaluation	of	policy	would,	as	with	the	other	policy	stages,	
investigate	assumptions	about	what	makes	good	policy,	the	role	of	state	involvement,	and	the	
practices	we	use	to	implement	policy.		Although	there	are	three	main	methods	of	policy	evaluation	
(judicial,	political	and	administrative),107	I	shall	focus	on	the	administrative	method	of	policy	
evaluation	because	these	evaluations	are	a	prime	target	for	the	lens	of	care	ethics.		Judicial	
evaluation	(i.e.	judicial	review),	though	it	can	be	powerful	and	sweeping,	is	rare	and	often	
contentious.		Political	evaluation	(i.e.	voting	in	elections)	is	often	fleeting,	and	does	not	necessarily	
accurately	reflect	the	success	or	failure	of	policy.		Administrative	evaluation,	however,	is	a	driving	
force	of	whether	a	policy	is	terminated	or	fed	back	through	the	policy	cycle	for	further	refinement.		
Administrative	evaluations	are	generally	more	concerned	with	examining	the	delivery	of	services	
and	“…whether	or	not	‘value	for	money’	is	being	achieved.”108		These	kinds	of	evaluations	are	
typically	based	upon	a	financial	cost-benefit	model	and	consider	what	the	policy	actually	produced,	
																																								 																				
106	Ibid.,	311-2.	
107	Howlett	and	Ramesh,	214-5.	
108	Ibid.,	210.	
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if	the	policy	met	the	stated	goals,	how	much	effort	the	policy	required,	and	an	efficiency	evaluation	
of	the	policy	administration	processes.109			
While	care	ethics	must	be	sensitive	to	the	fact	that	there	is	a	limited	amount	of	resources,	it	
would	be	able	to	question	and	challenge	the	idea	that	a	financial	cost-benefit	analysis	should	have	
pride	of	place	among	administrative	concerns.		For	example,	when	looking	at	the	outcomes	of	the	
deinstitutionalization	of	health	care	in	Canada,	policy-makers	prioritized	cost	saving	as	a	metric	of	
evaluation	for	how	well	the	policy	worked.		Unfortunately,	families	and	communities	were	“neither	
prepared	nor	able	to	provide	the	care	and	services	needed	to	respond	to	this	shift,”	which	meant	
that	in	many	instances	“this	policy	change	is	increasing	rates	of	morbidity	and	mortality	among	
patients	as	well	as	among	their	caregivers.”110		Instead,	care	ethics	can	be	used	to	expand	the	list	of	
recognized	costs	and	benefits	(the	tangible	and	intangible)	to	create	a	more	holistic	balancing	
exercise.111		An	evaluation	that	incorporated	the	information	provided	by	care	ethics,	and	its	
practices,	would	be	sensitive	to	the	financial	needs	of	the	state,	but	would	resist	saving	money	at	the	
expense	of	real	human	lives,	not	only	in	terms	of	loss	of	life,	but	loss	of	opportunity	and	the	ability	of	
caregivers	to	make	life	choices	well.		Also,	care	ethics	would	require	a	greater	awareness	of	the	fact	
that	caregivers	for	in-home	patients	would	likely	be	women,	or	hired	help	(who	would	likely	be	non-
Caucasian	persons	or	foreign	nationals).		This	policy,	as	it	stands,	serves	to	reinforce	the	idea	that	
care	can	and	should	be	a	private	concern,	and	that	policy	is,	in	general	unconcerned,	with	who	
shoulders	the	burden	of	care,	once	again	marginalizing	women	and	racialized	persons,	as	well	as	
further	obscuring	those	who	are	dependent	upon	care.		When	care	is	placed	in	the	private	sphere	it	
is	removed	from	public	consideration,	and	those	who	need	and	give	care	are	often	removed	from	
public	concern	as	well:	made	invisible	once	more.		The	ethics	of	care	would	not	discount	economic	
concerns,	but	a	care	evaluation	would	serve	to	make	clear	that	economic	evaluations	“fit	into	a	
wider	decision-making	frame,	where	other	values	and	priorities	have	equal	or	sometimes	more	
importance.”112		Care	ethics	is	a	means	by	which	we	can	transform	how	we	understand	the	success	
or	failure	of	any	policy,	moving	beyond	a	financial	cost-benefit	analysis	as	the	primary	concern,	and	
focusing	instead	on	how	policies	impact	people	in	their	caring	relationships,	taking	into	account	how	
various	forms	of	difference	such	as	race	and	national	origin	constitute	different	conditions	under	
which	care	occurs,	and	how	any	policy	can	serve	to	reinforce	or	fight	entrenched	problematic	social	
norms.	
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110	Hankivsky,	Social	Policy	and	the	Ethic	of	Care,	99.	
111	Again,	holistic	for	care	ethics	meaning	treating	the	person	more	holistically.	
112	Hankivsky,	Social	Policy	and	the	Ethic	of	Care,	100.	
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	 I	have	argued	that	the	critical,	feminist	ethics	of	care	can	be	a	substantive	guide	for	the	
public	policy	process,	and	that	it	has	the	potential	to	transform	the	policy	process	itself.		The	
transformative	potential	lies	in	care	ethic’s	ability	to	expand	the	scope	of	public	discourse	about	care,	
gender,	race,	sexual	orientation,	age,	wealth,	and	citizenship	status.		This	expansion	is	possible	
because	of	the	lens	that	care	ethics	brings	to	the	intersection	of	social	norms,	political	patterns	of	
power,	and	the	marketplace,	providing	policy	makers	with	new	kinds	of	information.		With	that	new	
information,	and	guided	by	the	practices	of	care,	policy	makers	can	use	care	ethics	in	the	crafting	of	
public	policy.		Through	the	examples	used	in	this	chapter,	we	can	see	how	human	rights	based	policy	
can	fail	to	encompass	or	challenge	the	way	social	norms	and	institutional	patterns	of	power	can	
serve	to	perpetuate	current	patterns	of	inequality,	creating	a	feedback	loop	between	policy,	norms,	
and	the	way	people	live	their	lives.		Care	ethics	can	be	a	guide	for	how	to	bring	these	problems	into	
the	realm	of	public	discussion,	and	offer	suggestions	for	how	to	shape	our	public	discourse.		Our	
resultant	policy	would	then	better	enable	people	to	live	in	their	webs	of	relations.		These	kinds	of	
insights	and	suggestions	for	action	might	be	more	complicated,	and	as	such	more	difficult,	but	they	
would	be	longer	lasting,	deeper	solutions	that	address	the	root	causes	of	social	problems.	
	 There	is	a	final	challenge	that	care	ethics	must	answer.		The	ethics	of	care	is	a	profoundly	
feminist	ethic,	rooted	in	a	rejection	of	‘individualist’	ethics	and	directly	aimed	at	deconstructing	the	
norms	and	relations	of	power	that	make	the	link	between	women	and	care	work	seem	‘natural’.			
Conversely,	Kimberly	Hutchings	contends	that	the	ethics	of	care	assumes	a	universal	standpoint—
that	of	care—which	is	inherently	problematic	for	a	feminist	international	ethical	project.		Her	
critique	involves	two	important	claims.		First,	a	standpoint	cannot	be	separated	from	its	context	and	
thus	is	ultimately	unable	to	be	prescriptive.		Second,	the	standpoint	of	care	does	not	attack	
embedded	notions	of	gender	sufficiently	enough	to	constitute	a	feminist	ethic.		However,	in	the	next	
chapter,	I	will	defend	care	ethics	from	Hutchings’	feminist	critique,	arguing	that	if	we	take	her	
criticism	seriously,	the	critical,	feminist	ethics	of	care	can	incorporate	a	more	nuanced	method	of	
ethical	judgment.	
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Chapter 6:  A Problematic Method? 
	
In	this	chapter,	I	examine	a	tension	that	remains	at	the	heart	of	the	ethics	of	care,	and	is	best	
articulated	by	Kimberly	Hutchings.		Hutchings	investigates	the	resonances	between	the	methodology	
of	care	ethics	in	general	(the	‘orthodox’	and	critical,	feminist	versions)	and	feminist	standpoint	
theory,	a	theory	that	argues	that	previously	undervalued	viewpoints	(typically	those	of	women)	
contain	different	and	equally	important	knowledge	about	the	world.	Her	critique	is	two	fold:	1)	that	
neither	theory	goes	far	enough	toward	eschewing	universalist	claims	to	moral	foundations,	which	
throws	into	question	the	ability	of	either	theory	to	enable	moral	judgments	in	the	particular	and,	2)	
that	neither	theory	sufficiently	addresses	the	gendered	ideas	embedded	in	moral	contexts.		This	
critique	is	focused	on	the	similarity	of	method	that	care	ethics	and	standpoint	theory	utilize	for	their	
critical	analyses,	and	ultimately	concludes	that	these	types	of	methods	do	not	have	enough	force	to	
justify	making	moral	judgments.		To	clarify,	I	consider	ethical	method	the	way	in	which	we	
investigate	moral	or	political	contexts,	the	steps	taken	or	questions	asked	as	we	analyse	or	assess	
any	given	situation,	as	opposed	to	the	content	or	the	guiding	principles	of	an	ethical	theory.		For	
Hutchings,	method	matters,	and	she	seeks	to	find	a	different	kind	of	ethical	method	that	can	
navigate	between	all	standpoints,	guide	our	moral	judgments,	and	provide	a	method	for	
international	feminist	ethics.		Hutchings	claims	such	a	method	is	possible	if	one	first	eschews	any	
claims	to	a	moral	starting	point,	be	it	claims	about	human	dignity,	the	experiences	of	women,	or	the	
standpoint	of	care.		The	end	goal	for	Hutchings	is	that	ethics	be	transformative.		Transformative	not	
in	the	sense	of	correcting	for	past	moral	wrongs,	but	in	the	sense	where	certain	kinds	of	moral	
wrongs	cannot	even	be	thought	of	as	possible	in	the	first	place.		Hutchings	argues	that	care	ethics	is	
not	transformative	in	this	way,	which	she	deems	problematic	for	care	ethics,	for	two	reasons.		First,	
care	theory	privileges	the	universal	standpoint	of	care,	and	claims	it	is	applicable	to	all	contexts.		
Second,	the	ethics	of	care	in	some	sense	gives	legitimacy	to	bad	practices	and	norms	by	its	very	
engagement	with	those	practices	and	norms.		If	Hutchings	is	correct,	then	the	ability	of	care	ethics	to	
guide	international	policy	is	seriously	hindered.		However,	in	taking	Hutchings’	critique	seriously,	I	
argue	that	we	can	use	the	ethics	of	care	to	judge	across	contexts,	and	that	its	transformative	
potential	is	not	a	null	prospect	as	Hutchings	claims.	
	 I	will	first	provide	a	brief	overview	of	feminist	standpoint	theory	and	elaborate	on	the	
relationship	between	standpoint	theory	and	the	ethics	of	care.		Second,	I	explore	and	develop	
Hutchings’	critique	of	care	ethics	and	feminist	standpoint	theory,	drawing	out	how	standpoint	
theory	and	the	ethics	of	care	have	similar	methodologies,	which	allows	Hutchings’	critique	to	have	
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purchase.		This	critique	is	closely	tied	to	her	positive	argument	for	a	different	and	new	kind	of	ethical	
method	that	avoids	the	pitfalls	of	standpoint	theory	and	thus	is	a	better	method	for	engaging	in	
feminist	international	ethics.		My	aim,	in	this	chapter,	is	rather	narrow.		Instead	of	providing	a	
critique	of	Hutchings,	I	demonstrate	that	critical,	feminist	care	ethics	can	adapt	to	the	criticism	that	
Hutchings	levels	against	the	theory,	much	like	the	shift	from	the	‘orthodox’	ethics	of	care	to	a	critical	
ethic	of	care	as	outlined	in	Chapter	One.		If	my	rejection	of	Hutchings’	conclusions	about	critical,	
feminist	care	ethics	is	successful	here,	then	my	argument	in	the	previous	chapter	stands,	and	care	
ethics	remains	a	viable	substantive	guide	for	public	policy.		First,	I	argue	that	Hutchings’	
understanding	of	transformation	is	admittedly	more	radical	than	that	of	care	ethics,	but	that	does	
not	mean	care	ethics	lacks	a	transformative	capacity.		Care	ethics,	instead,	represents	a	reformist-
type	transformation,	which	rests	on	continual	discursive	exchange.		Second,	that	the	tension	
between	the	universal	standpoint	of	care	and	moral	judgments	in	any	particular	context	is	not	
impossible	to	overcome.		I	take	inspiration	from	the	well-known	work	of	Seyla	Benhabib	and	argue	
that	this	tension	does	not	necessarily	preclude	us	from	being	able	to	morally	judge	in	particular	
contexts,	even	when	our	particular	context	does	not	match	the	context	of	another.		Hutchings’	
critique,	in	the	end,	forces	care	ethics	to	confront	the	tension	that	lies	in	the	heart	of	the	theory,	and	
in	so	doing,	pushes	care	ethics	to	hold	a	more	nuanced	practice	of	moral	judgment.	
	
Section 1 – Care Ethics and Standpoint Theory 
Feminist	standpoint	theory	(or	standpoint	epistemology)	originated	in	the	early	1980s	as	a	way	of	
developing	a	different	picture	of	how	we	experience	the	world	and	what	kind	of	knowledge	we	have	
about	the	world.		Standpoint	theory	argues	that	there	is	a	gendered	production	of	knowledge,	
where	women	have	special	knowledge	about	the	world	that	men	do	not.		This	line	of	argument	
draws	from	a	Marxist	epistemology,	which	argues	that	those	who	are	less	privileged	in	a	society	
know	more	about	that	society	than	privileged	others.		Although	standpoint	theory	is	not	without	its	
internal	differences	and	external	detractors,	those	nuances	are	not	the	focus	here.		The	focus	here	is	
first	to	provide	a	brief	overview	of	what	standpoint	theory	is	in	general.		Then,	I	will	discuss	how	the	
ethics	of	care,	both	the	‘orthodox’	and	critical,	feminist	versions,	are	related	to	standpoint	theory.		I	
will	present	Robinson’s	argument	that	the	two	theories	are	too	dissimilar	in	content	to	be	critiqued	
on	the	same	grounds,	because	each	theory	has	a	different	grounding	principle.		Care	as	an	ethical	
foundation,	the	claim	is,	is	not	problematic	in	the	way	that	women’s	experiences	are.	
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Section 1.1 – Feminist Standpoint Theory 
The	most	basic	principle	of	feminist	standpoint	theory	is	that	“it	is	women’s	unique	standpoint	in	
society	that	provides	the	justification	for	the	truth	claims	of	feminism	while	also	providing	it	with	a	
method	with	which	to	analyse	reality.”1		Women	have	special	epistemic	status	within	society,	and	
this	status	provides	justifications	for	the	larger	goals	of	feminism,	and	also	provides	women	with	
another	tool	to	critique	the	reality	they	live	within	according	to	their	own	standards.		As	standpoint	
theory	has	evolved,	its	course	has	been	shaped	by	two	central	claims:	1)	“knowledge	is	situated	and	
perspectival”2	and	2)	“there	are	multiple	standpoints	from	which	knowledge	is	produced.”3		This	
means	that	whatever	anyone	knows	about	the	world	is	just	that,	what	they	know.		Their	knowledge	
is	embedded	with	and	bracketed	by	their	culture,	their	place	in	society,	and	the	relations	of	power	
that	surround	them	(i.e.	politics).		However,	every	person	has	different	knowledge	about	the	world,	
which	means	that	standpoint	theory	has	had	to	contend	with	charges	of	relativism	and	has	struggled	
to	incorporate	intersectional	analysis,	i.e.	the	way	in	which	multiple	forms	of	difference	(gender	and	
race,	for	example)	combine	to	make	an	entirely	unique	lived	experience	that	cannot	be	broken	down	
into	discrete	parts.	
	 Standpoint	theory	requires	that	standpoints	be	developed	through	an	awareness	of	
oppression	and	in	cooperation	with	others.		A	standpoint,	therefore,	“requires	political	organization	
to	do	that	work	[of	achieving	a	standpoint]	because	the	perceived	naturalness	of	the	dominant	
group’s	power	depends	upon	obscuring	how	social	relations	actually	work.”4		The	simple	fact	of	
being	a	woman	does	not	provide	me	with	a	standpoint.		I	might	not	notice	my	oppression,	nor	have	
given	critical	thought	to	my	possible	future	role	as	a	wife	and	mother.		My	knowledge	claims	about	
the	world	are	incomplete	if	I	do	not	think	about	my	role	within	the	larger	framework	of	my	culture	
and	society,	or	about	the	relations	of	power	that	are	threaded	through	my	life.		Achieving	a	
standpoint,	on	the	other	hand,	is	something	that	is	accomplished	through	concerted	collective	
efforts.5		To	continue	the	above	example,	instead	of	not	noticing	my	oppression,	I	take	note	of	it.		
Then	I	become	involved	with	work	aimed	at	challenging	the	dominant	group’s	power	or	discourse	(in	
this	case	that	group	is	men).		I	work	with	others—academics,	social	advocates,	or	community	
members—to	undermine	assumptions	about	women,	disrupting	the	supposed	naturalness	of	the	
social	order.		The	process,	for	most	standpoint	theorists,	is	meant	to	be	a	critical	and	rigorous	one,	
requiring	reflective	thought	rather	than	relying	on	any	assumptions	one	had	before	beginning	this	
process.		Still	then,	perhaps	I	have	not	achieved	a	standpoint,	but	I	have	helped	to	achieve	a	
																																								 																				
1	Susan	Hekman,	"Truth	and	Method:	Feminist	Standpoint	Theory	Revisited,"	Signs	22,	no.	2	(1997):	341.	
2	Ibid.,	342.	
3	Ibid.	
4	Sandra	Harding,	"Standpoint	Theories:	Productively	Controversial,"	Hypatia	24,	no.	4	(2009):	195.	
5	Hekman,		346.	
163	
	
standpoint	that	is	a	collective	understanding,	unique	to	women,	about	the	world	that	we	inhabit.		A	
standpoint	is	able	to	better	explain	the	world	as	I	live	it	by	standards	that	make	sense	to	me	and	
others	like	me,	not	by	the	standards	of	the	group	in	power.	
	 In	standpoint	theory,	one	claim	is	that	the	less	privileged	standpoint	has	a	‘better’	
understanding	of	the	world	as	it	actually	is.		The	first	formulations	of	standpoint	theory	drew	heavily	
on	the	work	of	Marx	and	the	idea	that	the	proletariat	had	a	more	complete	picture	of	the	world	
because	they	knew	both	the	world	of	the	worker	and	the	world	of	the	bourgeoisie,	whereas	the	
latter	only	knew	their	own	world.6		This	assumption	about	‘less	privileged’	persons	having	greater	
knowledge	was	then	abstracted	to	the	feminist	viewpoint	that	women,	then,	have	a	better	
understanding	of	the	world	because	they	know	both	their	own	world	and	the	world	that	men	inhabit.		
Men,	conversely,	do	not	need	to	understand	the	world	of	women	in	order	to	get	along	in	life,	thus	
men	do	not	necessarily	know	what	women	know.		The	oppressed	section	of	society,	then,	is	deemed	
to	have	a	sort	of	epistemic	privilege.		Although	they	might	be	less	privileged	in	more	material	ways,	
any	oppressed	group	must	understand	the	dominant	group	in	order	to	survive.		As	such,	their	
knowledge	about	the	world	draws	from	more	sources	than	the	non-oppressed	group.		Therefore,	
any	claim	the	oppressed	group	makes	about	the	world	is	closer	to	the	truth	than	any	claim	the	non-
oppressed	group	makes	because	the	latter	have	less	information	about	the	world.			
	 However,	the	idea	that	any	one	standpoint	had	any	‘better’	way	of	understanding	the	world	
created	tension	between	feminists.		The	dual	claims	that	all	knowledge	was	situated	and	that	there	
were	multiple	standpoints	sat	uneasily	with	the	idea	that	the	standpoint	of	all	women	was	privileged.		
The	problem	was	that	the	standpoint	of	women	in	general	obscures	the	standpoints	of	black	women,	
Hispanic	women,	Asian	women,	and	women	in	non-Western	nations.7		Yet	there	was	theoretical	
resistance	to	breaking	down	the	female	standpoint,	in	part	due	to	a	fear	of	relativism,	which	had	
plagued	feminist	theory	for	years.		What	was,	and	still	is,	at	stake	for	non-white,	and	non-Western	
women	is	that	their	standpoints	and	unique	experiences	become	subsumed	under	that	of	white,	
middle-class,	heterosexual,	Western	women,	because	the	standpoint	of	such	women	was	taken	to	
amount	to	the	standpoint	of	‘women	in	general’.8		The	problem	occurs	most	strongly	when	gender	is	
the	only	lens	through	which	one	views	the	world,	because	oppression	is	not	perpetuated	through	
only	one	process,	but	the	intersection	of	many	different	processes.9		For	example,	although	white	
																																								 																				
6	Ibid.,	343.	
7	Ibid.,	356.	
8	Patricia	Hill	Collins,	Black	Feminist	Thought	:	Knowledge,	Consciousness,	and	the	Politics	of	Empowerment	
(New	York:	Routledge,	1991),	116.	
9	Anna	Carastathis,	"The	Concept	of	Intersectionality	in	Feminist	Theory,"	Philosophy	Compass	9,	no.	5	(2014):	
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and	black	women	might	be	subject	to	similar	gender	norms,	the	black	woman	has	to	negotiate	not	
just	gender	norms	but	the	intersection	of	gender	and	race	that	makes	her	lived	experience	and	thus	
the	knowledge	she	has	about	the	world	different	from	that	of	a	white	woman’s.		This	intersection,	or	
intersectionality,	of	race	and	gender	is	necessary	to	understanding	the	particular	oppression	a	black	
woman	faces.		Intersectionality	makes	manifest	the	unique	worlds	and	problems	of	those	who	
experience	multiple	forms	of	oppression,	and	it	is	more	than	a	matter	of	adding	together	the	
different	layers,	but	understanding	how	the	different	patterns	of	privilege	combine	to	make	each	
experience	of	oppression	in	the	world	unique.		The	intersectional	critique	of	standpoint	theory	
foregrounds	Hutchings’	critique	of	care	ethics,	which	is	focused	on	the	tension	between	holding	any	
universal	standpoint	while	attempting	to	judge	across	contexts.	
	
Section 1.2 – Care as a Standpoint? 
The	ethics	of	care,	especially	the	‘orthodox’	ethics	of	care	of	Gilligan	and	Ruddick,	was	informed	and	
assisted	by	the	then	nascent	standpoint	theory.		Robinson,	however,	distances	her	critical	ethics	of	
care	from	the	‘orthodox’	ethics	of	care	and	from	standpoint	theory	in	general.		Robinson	argues	that	
care	ethics	and	standpoint	theory	are	not	synonymous,	that	a	critical	care	ethics	does	more	than	
offer	“an	epistemological	argument	about	women’s	privileged	standpoint	based	on	their	universal	
oppression.”10		I	will	argue,	however,	that	in	spite	of	the	theoretical	distance	that	Robinson	tries	to	
establish	about	the	content	of	both	theories,	critical	care	ethics	shares	a	methodology	with	
standpoint	theory.		Because	methodology	is	the	focus	for	Hutchings’	critique	of	standpoint	theory,	
her	claims	have	purchase	on	critical,	feminist	care	ethics	as	well.	
	 Early,	‘orthodox’	care	ethics	is	tied	to	standpoint	theory,	particularly	the	work	of	Gilligan	and	
Ruddick,	who	argued	that	it	was	women’s	situated	knowledge	about	the	world	(their	relational	
outlook)	that	produced	the	moral	judgments	that	we	have	come	to	call	care	ethics.11		Sara	Ruddick,	
in	her	book	Maternal	Thinking,	argued	that	there	was	political	importance	in	the	way	that	mothers	
think.12		The	mother’s	standpoint	was	one	which	“illuminates	both	the	destructiveness	of	war	and	
the	requirements	of	peace.”13		Ruddick	drew	on	other	theorists	to	assert	that	the	mother’s	
standpoint	was	a	superior	one	that	was	opposed	to	the	dominant	moral	and	political	discourse.		
From	this,	we	can	see	how	early	care	ethics	was	very	similar	to	standpoint	theory	when	it	came	to	
how	(i.e.	the	methodology	used)	both	theories	examined	the	world.		Standpoint	theory	also	offers	a	
																																								 																				
10	Robinson,	"Care	Ethics,	Political	Theory,	and	the	Future	of	Feminism,"	305.	
11	Hutchings,		115-6.	
12	For	Ruddick,	‘mothers’	could	be	female	or	male,	as	‘fathers’	were	something	different.		She	did	not	
necessarily	link	mothering	to	gender,	but	did	note	that	often	mothers	were	women.	
13	Ruddick,	136.	
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way	to	see	and	resist	the	dominant	group’s	distortion	of	political	discourse.		The	production	of	
knowledge	and	the	ability	to	use	that	knowledge	to	shape	a	discourse	can	generate	power	for	those	
who	have	produced	the	knowledge	in	the	first	place.		That	power	can	in	turn	be	applied	to	other	
groups,	using	the	knowledge	produced	by	the	dominant	group	to	oppress	others.		For	example,	the	
discourse	that	care	is	a	private	matter,	not	to	be	the	subject	of	public	discourse,	is,	in	and	of	itself,	an	
application	of	‘knowledge’	about	the	practices	of	care.		This	knowledge	is	not	only	generated	by	
people	in	power,	with	the	kinds	of	legislation	they	enact,	focus	on,	and	dismiss,	but	also	by	every	
individual	who	maintains	that	how	and	why	we	care	for	particular	others	is	somehow	an	apolitical	
area	of	life.		Because	care,	then,	is	not	a	suitable	public	concern,	those	who	provide	and	need	care	
are	often	excluded	and	marginalized	from	political	participation	and	devalued	by	the	wider	socio-
cultural	community,	as	argued	in	Chapter	Two.		The	production	of	knowledge	generates	social	
power,	but	standpoint	theory	also	seeks	an	“engagement	with	the	particular	ways	such	
knowledge/power	relations	work	out	in	the	public	agenda	and	disciplinary	contexts,	among	other	
sites.”14		Standpoint	theory	and	the	‘orthodox’	ethic	of	care	do	not	end	with	the	assertion	of	
epistemic	privilege,	but	extend	to	an	analysis	of	how	the	production	of	knowledge	can	generate	
social	power	and	how	that	power	is	carried	out	through	political	policy.		The	goal	of	both	theories	is	
to	put	forward	the	knowledge	claims	about	the	oppressed	group	in	order	to	disrupt	the	dominant	
discourse,	either	that	of	women	or	‘caring	mothers’	as	per	Ruddick’s	work.		If	all	knowledge	is	
understood	as	situated	and	discursive,	then	there	is	no	basis	on	which	to	judge	any	one	set	of	
knowledge	as	more	‘true’	than	any	other.	
This	inability	to	disrupt	the	dominant	discourse	is	tied	to	dual	problems	for	standpoint	
theory	and	the	‘orthodox’	ethics	of	care’:	the	problems	of	reductionism	and	essentialism.		Yet,	the	
experience	of	mothering,	like	the	standpoint	of	a	woman,	is	hardly	the	same	for	all	women,	i.e.	
standpoints	are	not	reductive.		Racial	and	socio-economic	divides	produce	different	standpoints,	and	
what	one	subset	of	mothers	knows	about	the	world	is	not	what	all	mothers	know	about	the	world.		
Additionally,	Carol	Gilligan	was	roundly	critiqued	for	her	work	In	a	Different	Voice	because	her	
interviewees,	upon	whom	she	based	the	ethic	of	care,	were	predominantly	white,	middle-class	
women	with	higher	levels	of	education.15		Although	Gilligan	defended	her	claims	by	arguing	that	her	
work	was	defined	by	theme	not	gender,	this	raised	problems	for	extending	her	formulation	of	care	
ethics	across	racial	and	socio-economic	divides.		In	spite	of	Gilligan’s	defence,	her	critics	maintained	
that	the	experiences	of	some	women	could	not	count	for	the	experiences	of	all	women	even	when	it	
came	to	how	women	understand	and	practice	care,	because	differently	situated	women	carry	out	
																																								 																				
14	Harding,		196.	
15	Robinson,	Globalizing	Care:	Ethics,	Feminist	Theory,	and	International	Relations,	22.	
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caring	labour	under	different	pressures	and	inside	of	different	sets	of	normative	assumptions.		In	
other	words,	early	care	ethics	was,	like	standpoint	theory,	charged	with	being	reductive.		Second,	
both	theories	appeared	to	make	essentialist	claims	about	gender.		For	example,	Ruddick	claimed	
that	the	mother’s	standpoint	was	the	best	platform	from	which	one	might	begin	to	resist	war	and	
implement	peace.		This	implies	that	there	might	be	something	inherently	peaceful	about	the	role	of	
mothering,	which	requires	one	to	adopt	a	particular	point	of	view,	privilege	the	needs	of	another,	
and	become	receptive	to	another	with	whom	you	cannot	always	communicate.		Ruddick	gives	ample	
space	in	her	book	to	how	women	are	possibly	as	bloodthirsty	as	men,	but	this	is	only	because	these	
women	are	adopting	the	masculine	values	about	war,	duty,	and	honour,	instead	of	investing	in	the	
more	feminine	virtues	of	peace	and	compromise.16		Gilligan’s	theory	was	also	criticized	for	producing	
an	essentialist	view	of	gender.		For	Gilligan	women’s	different	experiences—their	very	knowledge—
of	the	world	produces	a	different	moral	outlook.17		The	concern	for	other	feminists	was	that	if	
feminine	knowledge	produces	a	different	moral	outlook,	it	might,	in	fact,	mean	that	women	are	
more	concerned	about	particular	others	and	less	concerned	about	abstract	rules	than	men	are,	
taken	as	a	whole.		The	critique	levelled	at	both	Gilligan	and	Ruddick,	as	explained	in	Chapter	One,	
was	that	by	elaborating	a	theory	of	care	or	mothering,	their	work	reinforced	a	kind	of	gender	
essentialism,	that	women	by	virtue	of	being	women	were	carers.		These	two	critiques,	of	the	
reductionism	and	essentialism	present	in	early	care	ethics,	culminate	in	the	criticism	that	like	
standpoint	theory,	early	care	theory	does	not	actually	disrupt	the	dominant	discourse.		These	
theories	instead	focus	overtly	on	the	‘feminine’	and	not	on	the	‘feminist.’	
Both	standpoint	theory	and	critical	feminist	care	ethics,	however,	responded	to	their	
critiques.		The	first	critique	was	that	the	early	incarnations	of	both	theories	were	unable	to	disrupt	
the	dominant	(or	hegemonic)	discourse.		Hegemonic	discourse	in	some	sense	can	be	viewed	as	
writing	a	“particular	script	for	a	certain	category	of	subjects.”18		Consider	the	script	that	we	follow	
for	the	majority	of	modern	political	theory	we	have	today,	where	human	rights	have	become	a	
hegemonic	international	political	discourse.		It	is	grounded	in	absolute,	universal	principles,	such	as	
the	drive	toward	crafting	a	set	of	human	rights	that	could	be	applied	regardless	of	gender,	race,	
sexual	orientation,	nationality,	age,	or	culture.		The	rights	outlined	in	the	UDHR	are	a	one-size-fits	all	
protection	against	government	aggression	that	are	profoundly	shaped	by	a	particular	historical	
context.		Yet,	as	noted	in	Chapter	Three,	over	the	last	sixty	years	human	rights	has	become	a	
																																								 																				
16	Sara	Ruddick,	"Maternal	Work	and	the	Practice	of	Peace,"	Journal	of	Education	167,	no.	3	(1985):	100.	
17	Gilligan,	74.	
18	Hekman,		357.	
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hegemonic	discourse,19	one	that	is	used	by	many	people	and	groups	around	the	world	to	lend	
legitimacy	to	their	causes.		For	example,	there	is	the	Gulabi	Gang	in	India	that	challenges	the	norms	
around	domestic	violence	and	sexual	violence	against	women	on	the	basis	of	human	rights.20		
Indigenous	Australians	have	also	taken	up	the	language	of	human	rights,	and	have	utilized	the	
United	Nation’s	Declaration	on	the	Rights	of	Indigenous	Peoples,	to	underwrite	their	advocacy	and	
goals	for	recognition,	hoping	to	change	mainstream	white	Australian	attitudes	toward	Indigenous	
people.21		However,	as	also	noted	in	Chapter	Three,	often	the	discourse	cannot	encompass	the	
varied	and	complex	situations	that	arise	in	wildly	different	contexts	around	the	world.		Modern	
humans	rights	discourse	cannot	incorporate	moral	contexts	where	although	people	suffer,	their	
human	rights	have	been	met,	such	as	the	case	of	the	transnational	migrant	care	worker	who	has	not	
been	abused	or	exploited	(as	we	might	understand	it	today),	but	has	been	put	in	the	position	of	
making	the	impossible	choice	between	providing	better	material	support	to	her	children	and	being	
able	to	directly	care	for	her	children	herself,	to	love	them	directly	and	not	have	her	love	imported	
and	expended	on	a	child	not	her	own.22		The	script	provided	to	the	transnational	care	worker	is	that	
she	should	be	glad	of	the	opportunity	to	earn	more	money	for	her	children	in	spite	of	the	fact	to	
earn	that	money	she	must	export	her	love	and	caring	labour,	spending	it	on	another’s	child.		
Resistance,	however,	can	come	from	using	“other	discursive	formations	to	oppose	that	script,”23	
such	as,	but	not	limited	to,	care	ethics.		Standpoint	theory	offers	a	different	script	as	well,	although	
the	standpoint	would	be	that	of	the	worker	herself,	by	focusing	on	her	experience	of	her	life	as	she	
has	lived	it.		The	ethics	of	care	and	the	standpoint	of	the	transnational	care	worker	provide	different	
starting	points	to	different	moral	and	political	scripts.			
In	answer	to	the	second	problem,	that	both	standpoint	theory	and	‘orthodox’	care	ethics	
were	feminine	theories	not	feminist	ones,	the	critical	ethic	of	care	was	structured	as	profoundly	
feminist,	and	aimed	at	challenging	embedded	relations	of	power	that	contribute	to	oppression	and	
suffering.		Robinson	draws	on	Tronto	to	make	the	difference	between	feminine	and	feminist	clear,	
and	this	is	how	Robinson,	in	part,	strives	to	put	theoretical	distance	between	standpoint	theory	and	
critical	care	ethics.		The	feminine	theory	is	one	that	is	constructed	in	opposition	to	the	masculine,	
and	ties	women	to	care	work,	which	stands	in	opposition	to	the	political	and	social	activities	of	men.		
The	feminist	approach	instead	works	to	de-couple	gender	and	care	work,	undermining	pervasive	
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20	"Gulabi	Gang	Official,"		http://www.gulabigang.in/.		Accessed	9	November	2015.	
21	"National	Congress	of	Australia's	First	Peoples,"		http://nationalcongress.com.au/.		Accessed	9	November	
2015.	
22	Hochschild,	21-2.	
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harmful	norms,	and	collapsing	the	dichotomy	of	gender	rather	than	reinforcing	it.		The	feminine	
theory	is	problematic	for	care	ethics	because	the	attentiveness	aspect	of	care	could	then	“be	seen	as	
a	survival	mechanism	for	women	who	are	dealing	with	oppressive	conditions—a	way	of	anticipating	
the	wishes	of	one’s	superior.”24		A	feminine	approach	to	care	theory	to	some	degree	accepts	
traditional	gender	roles	and	devalues	the	activities	of	women	who	are	in	those	caring	roles.		In	this	
sense,	caring	is	only	“a	corrective	morality”25	that	does	not	suggest	fundamentally	new	kinds	of	
thinking	or	areas	of	moral	concern.	
Feminist	care	ethics,	as	argued	in	Chapters	One,	Two	and	Four,	instead	seeks	to	illuminate	
and	transform	current	notions	of	gender	as	well	as	expand	the	scope	of	moral	and	political	concern.		
In	reviewing	the	critiques	levelled	against	standpoint	theory,	Robinson	notes:	“‘Standpoint’	feminists	
argue	that	their	perspective	accounts	for	the	achievements	of	feminist	theory	because	it	is	a	
politically	engaged	approach	which	starts	from	the	perspective	of	the	social	experience	of	the	
subjugated	sex/gender.”26		However,	to	attempt	to	develop	a	politics	that	aims	to	free	all	women	
from	gender	hierarchy,	based	on	a	single	type	of	woman’s	experience,	produces	the	result	that	
standpoint	theory	is	simply	“yet	another	falsely	universalizing	project.”27		Robinson	argues	that	
standpoint	theories	are	themselves	suspect.		In	addition,	she	argues	that	critical	care	ethics	is	not	a	
standpoint	theory	because	the	critical	ethics	of	care	expressly	does	not	generalize	from	women’s	
unique	experiences	as	the	traditional	caregivers.		Robinson’s	argument	is	predicated	on	the	idea	that	
it	is	the	content	of	each	theory	that	sets	critical	care	ethics	and	feminist	standpoint	theory	apart.		
While	standpoint	theory	attempts	to	generalize	from	the	perspective	of	‘women,’	the	ethics	of	care	
does	not	privilege	any	one	type	of	person	but	instead	a	type	of	activity	that	all	human	beings	should	
engage	in.		However,	in	spite	of	Robinson’s	attempt	to	distance	the	critical,	feminist	ethics	of	care	
from	standpoint	theory,	I	acknowledge	that	the	similarity	of	methodology	allows	for	Hutchings’	
critique	to	have	purchase.			
	
Section 2 – Feminist International Ethics 
Kimberly	Hutchings	critiques	not	only	Robinson’s	critical	ethic	of	care,	but	also	standpoint	theory	in	
general.		Her	criticism	does	not	necessarily	take	issue	with	their	goals,	but	rather	the	ethical	method	
that	both	theories	employ.		Hutchings	argues	that	if	we	do	not	use	the	correct	ethical	method,	we	
run	the	risk	of	extending	legitimacy	to	the	very	problematic	moral	contexts	we	wish	to	transform.		
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25	Ibid.,	23.	
26	Ibid.,	21.	
27	Ibid.	
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According	to	her,	the	better	ethical	method	to	employ	is	one	that	is	properly	transformative,	where	
we	avoid	the	risk	of	legitimizing	bad	practices	and	instead	create	possible	new	worlds,	worlds	where	
morally	problematic	practices	and	modes	of	thought	are	rendered	unthinkable.		Hutchings	argues	
that	this	is	possible	when	we	stop	privileging	the	ethical	content	of	particular	theories,	such	as	the	
standpoint	of	women	or	care.		This	section	will	proceed	in	three	parts.		The	first	part	will	provide	the	
background	for	Hutchings’	critique,	elaborating	some	of	the	basic	concepts	she	utilizes.		The	second	
part	will	focus	specifically	upon	the	critique	of	the	critical	ethics	of	care,	and	where	I	concede	that	
Hutchings	makes	a	salient	point	about	a	previously	unexplored	tension	in	critical,	feminist	care	ethics.		
The	third	and	final	part	will	examine	Hutchings’	argument	for	how	to	engage	in	international	
feminist	ethics	without	a	standpoint.	
	
Section 2.1 – The Background 
For	Hutchings,	ethical	method	(the	way	in	which	we	do	ethics),	not	just	its	content,	is	inherently	
political,	which	means	that	morality	and	ethical	judgment	are	irrevocably	bound	up	in	the	political.		
Hutchings	does	agree	with	standpoint	theory	(and	care	ethics)	about	one	thing,	which	is	“that	moral	
knowledge	like	other	knowledge	is	situated.”28		Because	moral	knowledge	is	not	abstract	or	
objective,	it	is	possible	to	understand	that	our	moral	knowledge	and	ethical	method	are	in	many	
ways	shaped	by	our	political	contexts.		Politics,	and	by	extension	power,	produces	“patterns	and	
hierarchies	of	inclusion	and	exclusion,”29	and	these	in	turn	shape	what	is	good	and	what	is	bad,	what	
is	right	and	what	is	wrong.		Ethics	is	not	something	that	works	counter	to	world	politics.		Rather,	
ethics	is	“one	of	the	discourses	through	which	world	politics	is	actively	produced	and	re-produced.”30		
Just	as	politics	can	shape	one’s	moral	picture	of	the	world,	one’s	moral	picture	can	in	turn	reinforce	
(or	perhaps	alter)	the	production	of	power	in	the	world.		The	relationship	between	ethics	and	
politics	is	not	simply	a	one-way	street,	but	rather	a	very	complicated	circle	of	influence,	production,	
and	possible	change	that	cannot	have	its	parts	separated	out	and	theorized	about	as	though	distinct.	
	 The	job	of	the	theorist,	specifically	the	ethical	theorist,	is	to	illuminate	and	possibly	begin	to	
explain	the	relation	between	ethical	stances	and	relations	of	power.31		The	goal	of	the	feminist	
theorist	is	then	to	bring	focus	and	attention	to	the	ways	in	which	gendered	understandings	of	power	
play	out	in	moral	and	political	systems.		For	Hutchings,	“the	key	feature	of	feminist	international	
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ethics	is	that	it	necessarily	bring	politics	back	into	the	heart	of	moral	judgment	and	prescription.”32		
This	suggests	a	different	way	of	doing	ethics,	specifically	international	ethics,	which	would	have	
implications	for	the	norms	involved	around	sites	of	power	and	gender	discrimination.		Admittedly,	
while	the	goals	might	be	similar	to	critical,	feminist	care	ethics,	the	method	to	achieve	those	goals	is	
very	different	from	care	ethics,	which	employs	a	standpoint-like	method	of	analysing	specific	
contexts	from	a	universal	perspective,	that	of	care,	in	this	case.		And	for	Hutchings,	method	matters.		
Since	morality	and	politics	are	not	separate,	this	means	that	the	theorist	can	no	longer	hold	any	
claim	to	being	outside	the	picture	of	their	theory;	they	too	must	be	‘seen.’			This	‘seeing’	involves	
understanding	that	one’s	own	moral	foundation	is	contingent,	as	is	the	foundation	of	others.33		
Therefore,	one’s	own	moral	phenomenology	and	genealogy	must	be	‘seen’	as	well	as	the	other’s,	
and	understood	as	a	part	of	the	social	and	political	context	within	which	they	were	formed.	
When	it	comes	to	an	international	ethic,	moral	phenomenology	works	to	make	one	‘see’	the	
“range	of	values	and	principles	institutionalized	within	different	aspects	of	the	international	
order,”34	and	how	they	function	either	in	support	or	opposition	to	each	other.		How	I	experience	the	
world,	and	how	I	assess	the	world	from	a	moral	point	of	view	greatly	depends	upon	where	I	sit	
within	the	international	order.		My	experience	of	the	moral	goodness	or	badness	of	anything	is	
heavily	informed	by	my	lived	location.		Genealogy,	understood	and	defined	with	relation	to	morality,	
is	three	things:	1)	a	historical	account	of	how	knowledge	claims	come	to	be;	2)	the	way	moral	theory	
emerges	out	of	those	practices	that	produced	those	knowledge	claims;	and	3)	the	political	and	social	
effects	of	this	historical	process.35		Genealogy	seeks	to	make	clear	what	the	effects	of	power	are.		
Thus,	we	must	as	what	are	the	“benefits	and	inclusions,	costs	and	exclusions	[that]	follow	from	any	
particular	normative	prescription	and	on	what	grounds	are	they	identified	as	costs	and	
exclusions?”36		The	theorist	must	then	be	honest	about	placing	their	ideas	within	the	context	that	
gave	rise	to	them.		This	is	another	level	of	‘seeing’	in	terms	of	understanding	one’s	own	subjectivity.		
As	Hutchings	asserts,	our	lived	ethical	selves	and	our	historical	background	influence	our	moral	
methodology.		Assuming	any	sort	of	objectivity	or	claim	to	universalizability	is	dishonest	and	
methodologically	suspect,	obscuring	the	ethical	picture	that	any	particular	philosopher	builds,	which	
according	to	Hutchings	is	the	prime	failing	of	the	ethics	of	care	because	it	is	not	honest	about	its	
specificity.	
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Section 2.2 – Critique of Robinson’s Global Care Ethic 
Hutchings’	critique	of	Robinson’s	critical	ethic	of	care	is	twofold.		First,	she	claims	that	Robinson’s	
argument	does	not	have	clear	prescriptive	consequences.37	This	might	seem	redundant	to	my	stated	
argument	in	Chapter	Five,	which	is	that	critical,	feminist	care	ethics	can	offer	practical	policy	
guidance;	however,	the	point	here	is	that	care	ethics	cannot	provide	clear	cross-contextual	moral	
judgment.		This	is	founded	on	Hutching’s	second	critique,	which	is	that,	like	standpoint	theory,	the	
critical	ethics	of	care	utilizes	a	problematic	ethical	methodology	that	results	in	an	appeal	to	the	
universal	ideal	of	care,	while	at	the	same	time	attempting	to	hold	on	to	sensitivity	to	context	and	
partiality	of	judgment.		The	result	is	that	the	critical	ethics	of	care	is	not	transformative	in	the	way	
that	Hutchings’	claims	feminist	ethics	should	be.	
	 Although	Robinson	argues	that	the	content	and	the	scope	of	standpoint	theory	and	the	
ethics	of	care	are	different,	this	does	not	directly	address	Hutchings’	critique,	which	is	focused	on	
the	similarity	of	method	of	the	ethics	of	care	and	standpoint	theory.		The	methods	of	standpoint	
theory	and	care	ethics	share	three	main	features.38		The	first	point	of	similarity	is	that	like	standpoint	
theory,	critical	care	ethics	has	a	universalizing	aspect	that	sits	uneasily	with	the	assertion	that	all	
knowledge,	and	thus	all	ethical	reasoning,	is	contextual.		This	seems	at	odds	with	the	fact	that	
Robinson	argues	strenuously	against	a	universalizing	ethics	within	the	international	context.		She	
argues	that,	in	order	for	a	universal	ethics	to	hold,	the	moral	principles	employed	must	be	ones	that	
are	acceptable	to	all	rational	persons,	or	at	least	ones	that	cannot	be	reasonably	rejected.		The	
problem,	however,	is	the	“pronounced	diversity	of	individuals,	cultures,	societies,	and	indeed	
moralities	in	the	world	today.”39		Ethical	principles	that	are	so	abstract	to	be	acceptable	to	all	
persons	have	a	dual	problem.		First,	they	are	too	abstract	to	be	practicable.		Second,	as	argued	in	
Chapter	Three,	abstraction	often	treats	all	persons	as	‘the	same,’	which	begs	the	question	‘the	same	
as	what?’,	and	also	obscures	the	ways	in	which	differences	matter	materially	to	people’s	lives	as	
they	live	them.		The	problem	for	critical,	feminist	care	ethics,	however,	is	that	care	itself	becomes	an	
abstract,	universalized	concept.		The	ethical	and	political	project	of	care	ethics	does	not	hold	that	we	
must	care	about	all	other	persons.		The	point	of	critical	care	ethics	is	to	instead	begin	to	see	what	
has	been	hidden:	the	division	of	labour,	the	gendered	aspects	of	care,	the	ways	in	which	political	
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policy	fails	to	support	the	caring	relationships	people	need.40		As	I	argued	in	Chapter	Two,	these	
once-hidden	facets	can	be	revealed	on	a	global	scale,	demonstrating	that	the	relationships	between	
nations	can	be	assessed	by	the	standards	of	the	practices	of	care,	which	are	assumed	to	be	
reasonable	tools	of	universal	ethical	engagement.	
The	theorized	concept	of	care,	then,	is	the	concept	that	grounds	the	critical	assessment	
aimed	at	disrupting	the	dominant	discourse.		It	is,	methodologically,	a	standpoint,	and	this	is	the	
second	point	of	similarity,	that	both	theories	use	a	standpoint	of	some	kind.		Understanding	what	it	
means	to	care	and	what	the	practices	of	care	entail	offers	a	different	sort	of	knowledge	about	the	
world.		The	moral	epistemology	of	care	“includes	taking	experiences	into	account,	exercising	self-
reflections	and	sensitive	judgments	where	contextual	differences	are	attended	to.”41		This	
knowledge	then	grounds	the	larger	philosophical	project	at	hand:	globalizing	an	ethic	of	care.		Since	
the	lens	of	care	can	assess	every	level	of	human	interaction,	and	even	institutional	interaction,	on	
the	basis	that	these	are	all	different	types	of	relationships,	then	care	can	be	mobilized	to	critically	
assess	and	suggest	political	courses	of	action.		Standpoint	theory,	Hutchings	argues	(and	I	concede),	
does	functionally	the	same	thing.		When	the	oppressed	group’s	standpoint	begins	to	emerge,	then	
the	standpoint	can	be	used	as	the	basis	to	challenge	the	dominant	discourse	and	change	the	political	
landscape.		The	larger	project	for	the	critical	ethics	of	care	and	standpoint	theory	is	not	merely	to	
critique	the	world,	but	to	change	it.		In	sum,	both	theories	advocate	that	the	world	should	be	
brought	more	into	line	with	the	information	the	formally	ignored	standpoint	(of	women	or	care)	has	
about	the	world.			
	 Third,	the	ethics	of	care,	even	as	a	critical	tool,	is	one	aimed	at	universal	application.		The	
assumption	is	that	the	practices	of	care	(attentiveness,	responsibility,	and	responsiveness	as	
outlined	by	Robinson)	are	tools	that	are	abstract	enough	to	be	able	to	fit	the	vastly	different	moral	
contexts	around	the	world.		Although	Robinson	eschews	the	feasibility	of	any	universalized	ethics	
that	focuses	on	abstract	principles	that	cannot	be	reasonably	rejected	by	rational	actors,	she	does	
argue	for	the	possibility	for	the	standards	of	care	being	a	universal	moral	bedrock	that	can	
nevertheless	be	applied	with	contextual	sensitivity	to	particular	moral	contexts	internationally,	and	
most	importantly	cross-culturally.		Perhaps	it	is	possible	that	the	practises	of	care,	as	they	are	
practices,	are	not	as	unyielding	as	the	abstract	moral	rules	of	the	kind	that	rights-theorists	might	
employ.		For	example,	were	one	to	no	longer	be	attentive,	then	one	is	no	longer	upholding	a	kind	of	
ethic	of	care.		What	attentiveness	might	entail	could	be	different	for	different	people	and	cultures,	
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19	(2011):	55.	
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but	it	must	remain	as	a	practice	to	be	carried	out	and	not	abandoned.		Regardless,	this	could	very	
well	culminate	in	the	problem	that	what	care	means	to	some	people	is	not	what	care	means	to	
others.		Just	as	early	standpoint	theory	sought	to	theorize	from	the	standpoint	of	all	women,	other	
philosophers	soon	realized	that	to	do	so	was	to	obscure	and	marginalize	the	standpoints	of	black	or	
queer	women.		Although	critical,	feminist	care	theorists	no	longer	make	identity	claims,	the	
methodology	of	critical	care	ethics	is	similar	enough	to	standpoint	theory	that	Hutchings’	critique	
about	the	tension	between	the	universal	aspect	of	care	and	the	goal	of	contextual	moral	judgment	
can	be	applied.			
	 Hutchings’	elaborates	three	questions	that	any	feminist	theory	should	have	answers	to.		The	
point	of	these	questions	is	to	ascertain	what	any	particular	feminist	theory	is	actually	doing,	and	the	
nature	of	its	theoretical	scope.		The	questions	are:	
• From	a	feminist	perspective,	how	are	the	nature	and	conditions	of	ethical	judgment	
within	the	international	arena	to	be	understood?	
• From	a	feminist	perspective	what	is	ethically	significant	within	the	realm	of	
international	politics?	
• What	are	the	prescriptive	consequences	of	taking	a	feminist	turn	in	international	
ethics?42	
	
The	three	areas	of	focus	then	are	ethical	judgment,	ethical	significance,	and	the	prescriptive	
consequences	of	the	theory.		These	questions	are	important	because	they	not	only	form	the	
standards	of	critique	for	care	ethics,	but	are	the	questions	that	all	feminist	ethical	theories	must	be	
able	to	answer.		Hutchings	claims	that	care	ethics	cannot	adequately	answer	these	questions	and	as	
such	it	is	not	the	feminist	ethical	theory	we	require	for	a	true	transformation	of	international	politics.		
	 First,	Hutchings	calls	into	question	what	exactly	the	morally	prescriptive	consequences	of	
the	critical	ethic	of	care	are.		If	ethical	judgment	is	always	relational	and	contextual,	in	virtue	of	ways	
in	which	our	responsibilities	are	embedded	in	relationships	with	particular	others,	then	there	cannot	
be	morally	universally	applicable	principles.		Yet	contextual	judgments	are	both	necessary	and	
difficult,	and	are	“oriented	in	relation	to	the	mode	of	responsiveness	to	others	which	is	defined	as	
‘caring’.”43		Ethical	and	contextual	judgment	are	supposed	to	be	able	to	give	a	larger	picture	and	
provide	an	injunction	against	rushing	into	premature	judgment	and	focus	on	“paying	attention	to	
the	actual	situations	from	which	moral	dilemmas	and	questions	emerge.”44		Ethical	judgment	in	
critical,	feminist	care	ethics	is	caught	between	an	abstract	standard	of	judgment	and	the	
acknowledgement	of	the	need	to	judge	in	light	of	particular	contexts.		For	example,	I	hold	a	
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particular	concept	of	what	it	is	to	care,	but	it	is	not	necessarily	the	case	that	I	can	apply	that	
standard	of	care	to	others	in	contexts	not	my	own.		Therefore,	I	am	not	necessarily	able	to	judge	
others	outside	my	own	context	because	we	lack	a	shared	ethical	background,	which	informs	our	
different	conceptions	of	care	in	the	first	place.	
	 Hutchings	notes	that	for	Robinson	ethical	significance	is	found	in	the	structures	and	
institutions	of	the	international	system,	and	the	relations	of	power	between	them.		In	terms	of	
ethical	judgment,	care	ethics	goes	beyond	a	prescription	against,	for	example	war,	but	also	critically	
assesses	the	institutions	that	support	the	possibility	of	global	violence	and	inequality	in	the	first	
place.		The	question	is	not	so	much	whether	or	not	something	is	wrong,	but	what	the	root	causes	of	
any	situation	are.45		Yet	Robinson	does	not	provide	an	“explicit	prescriptive	agenda	in	relation	to	
war”46	itself.		Hutchings	claims	that	Robinson’s	overall	prescriptive	agenda	is	not	clearly	defined.		The	
problem	lies	in	the	mismatch	between	the	partiality	of	judgment	and	the	universal	scope	for	the	
significance	of	that	judgment.		This	means	that	for	care	ethics,	because	its	ability	to	judge	is	suspect	
and	is	juxtaposed	with	the	aim	to	judge	international	relations	of	power,	it	seems	as	though	any	
prescriptive	agenda	is	inherently	flawed.		If	judgment	is	suspect	and	cannot	be	universally	applied,	
then	any	claims	to	being	able	to	judge	internationally	are	‘non-starters,’	so	to	speak.		They	have	no	
purchase	to	begin	with.	
	 Thus	we	are	led	to	the	second	part	of	the	critique:	the	tension	between	the	drive	to	
understand	ethical	judgment	as	situated	on	the	one	hand	and	the	idealization	of	care	as	a	
standpoint	on	the	other.		The	stated	purpose	of	the	critical	ethic	of	care	is	not	only	to	judge,	but	also	
to	transform	the	current	international	realm	into	one	where	caring	is	protected	and	sustained.		This	
universal	drive	sits	uneasily	next	to	Robinson’s	“insistence	of	the	importance	of	power	relations,	
complexity	and	context.”47		This	tension	is	in	and	of	itself	problematic,	and	is	something	that	
Robinson	strove	to	avoid	as	evidenced	by	her	critique	of	standpoint	theory.		But	while	Robinson	
shows	that	the	content	of	critical,	feminist	care	ethics	is	very	different,	the	methodology	remains	the	
same.	
	 Standpoint	theory	and	the	critical	ethic	of	care	are	both	theories	that	work	to	explain	the	
world	as	it	is,	and	to	transform	it	into	a	world	where	the	wrongs	experienced	in	the	now	become	
unthinkable.		The	very	norms	that	permit	the	moral	wrongs	are	ones	that	will	be	challenged	and	
overturned.		Yet,	the	problem	remains	that	if	all	ethical	judgment	is	situated,	then	applying	the	
standards	and	practices	of	the	ethic	of	care	would	depend	upon	the	ethic	of	care	having	some	sort	
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of	authority.		The	point	for	Hutchings	is	that	the	ethical	theories	of	one	context	do	not	necessarily	
have	authority	over	moral	questions	in	another	context,	and	that	instead	we	must	understand	ethics	
as	embedded	within	politics	and	thus	never	free	from	power	dynamics.		If	care	ethics	is	never	free	of	
power	dynamics,	we	can	question	the	ability	of	care	ethics	to	pass	judgment	on	those	very	power	
relations	in	the	first	place.48		The	conclusion	remains	that	in	order	apply	international	feminist	ethics	
one	must	reject	any	standpoint.		How	Hutchings	accomplishes	this,	is	what	I	turn	to	next.	
	
Section 2.3 – Hutchings’ Ethical Method 
Hutchings	does	not	seek	to	develop	an	ethical	theory	based	on	a	particular	morally	privileged	
foundation,	such	as	an	appeal	to	human	dignity,	women’s	experiences,	or	care.		Instead,	she	outlines	
an	ethical	method	that	eschews	any	foundational	standpoint.		Because	Hutchings’	ethical	method	
eschews	a	moral	foundation,	she	cannot	offer	an	ethical	theory	that	has	universal	rules	or	even	
ethical	guidelines.		Rather,	she	offers	three	examples	to	showcase	how	her	method	operates	by	
answering	the	questions	about	ethical	judgment,	significance,	and	prescription.		The	examples	are	
about	how	perceptions	of	war	and	human	rights	have	impacted	our	ethical	evaluations	of	specific	
international	moral	contexts.		To	underwrite	her	method,	she	mobilizes	the	understanding	that	
ethics	and	politics	are	never	separable.		Further,	that	every	individual’s	moral	bedrock	is	shaped	by	
his	or	her	moral	phenomenology	(i.e.	the	experience	of	living	in	a	specific	moral	community)	and	
genealogy	(the	history	of	the	moral	rules	they	live	by).		In	acknowledging	this,	Hutchings	one	
interdiction	is	that	feminist	ethics	should	“always	be	sceptical	of	any	kind	of	moral	essentialism	or	
claims	to	ethical	necessity.”49		This	ethical	method	is	meant	to	make	clear	what	our	ethical	
assumptions	are	by	questioning	those	things	that	are	thought	of	as	‘necessary,’	such	as	the	norm	
that	designates	women	as	‘natural’	carers.		Once	we	are	able	to	see	how	norms	are	considered	
‘necessary’	and	that	these	‘necessary’	understandings	permeate	the	world,	we	can	then	challenge	
more	aspects	of	life	that	have	this	embedded	ethical	significance.		This	is	meant	to	be	a	sharp	
contrast	to	the	method	of	critical,	feminist	care	ethics	(and	standpoint	theory)	because	once	we	give	
up	any	claims	to	a	universal	ethics	we	must	then	accept	the	vulnerability	of	our	own	ethical	
judgments	considering	that	the	judgment	of	others	might	be	just	as	valid	as	our	own.		The	ethics	of	
care	and	traditional	ethical	theories,	on	the	other	hand,	have	morally	troubling	outcomes,	because	
they	do	not	view	their	own	judgments	as	vulnerable.		This	acceptance	of	vulnerability,	alongside	
Hutchings’	three	guidelines	to	for	prescriptive	judgment,	is	meant	to	enable	her	ethical	method	to	
fulfil	the	promise	of	the	transformative	power	of	ethics.	
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	 The	first	example	Hutchings	uses	concerns	the	ethics	surrounding	warfare,	just	war	theory,	
and	our	ethical	judgments	about	it.		The	point	here	is	to	demonstrate	the	ability	of	her	ethical	
method	to	make	‘seen’	what	was	previously	‘unseen,’	specifically	the	implicit	judgment	that	war,	on	
some	level,	is	necessary.		Just	war	theory,	she	notes,	typically	focuses	on	war	as	an	action	of	last	
resort.		Yet	for	any	feminist	method	of	ethics,	violence,	even	constrained	violence,	is	problematic	
when	the	starting	point	for	analysis	is	that	violence	may	be	necessary	in	some	circumstances.		If	
Hutchings	is	correct	here,	then	it	is	problematic	that	some	feminist	ethics	can	be	used	to	endorse	
just	war	theory,	such	as	liberal	feminist	ethics.		Further,	as	Robinson	and	Held	have	argued,	critical,	
feminist	care	ethics	must	be	able	to	deal	with	issues	of	violence	if	it	is	to	reduce	the	possibly	of	
violence	in	the	first	place,	which	I	discussed	in	Chapters	Two	and	Four.		The	point	for	Hutchings	is	
that	the	feminist	theories	that	endorse	any	use	of	force	are	not	going	to	be	properly	transformative	
because	they	will	only	perpetuate	the	acceptability	of	violence,	which	is	part	of	our	moral	
experience	of	the	world	owing	to	the	long	history	of	violence	being	an	acceptable	method	to	solve	
international	disputes.		Hutchings	claims	her	ethical	method	“calls	into	question	the	assumed	
boundaries	between	violence	and	non-violence,	peace	and	war,	security	and	insecurity.”50		Such	an	
ethic	does	not	operate	on	the	bald	opposition	to	the	notion	that	political	violence	is	ever	necessary,	
but	rather	it	questions	“the	kind	of	ethical	life	which	generates	the	tragic	dilemma	of	weighing	up	
individual	lives	against	each	other	or	against	collective	interests	or	abstract	norms.”51		Violence	itself	
is	not	forbidden	as	a	practice,	but	rather	the	assumption	of	necessary	political	violence	as	a	norm	is	
strenuously	questioned	and	opposed.		The	attempt	to	justify	violence	is	something	that	is	possible	to	
question,	but	any	claim	to	‘justified	violence’	cannot	be	ruled	out	“in	advance	by	an	appeal	to	a	
necessary	standpoint	for	judgment.”52		Hutchings	uses	the	example	about	just	war	theory	to	
demonstrate	the	ability	of	her	method	to	assess	contexts	for	previously	unseen	ethical	problems	in	
addition	to	underscoring	her	scepticism	about	the	possibility	of	any	ethical	standpoint	to	reject	
problematic	claims	without	first	engaging	with	them.	
	 The	second	example	centres	on	female	circumcision	and	its	ethical	significance.		Hutchings	
states	that	the	first	question	should	be	to	determine	“how	[a	practice]	is	ethically	meaningful	within	
the	context	of	a	particular	form	of	ethical	life.”53		Often,	such	practices	are	considered	an	ethical	
necessity	within	the	community	itself.		However,	once	again	Hutchings’	method	would	first	establish	
that	ethical	necessities	are	not	absolute	necessities,	but	are	instead	tied	up	in	socially	constructed	
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understandings	of	culture,	politics,	economic	practices,	and	institutions.54		Human	rights	advocates,	
she	notes,	often	condemn	the	practice,	and	do	so	under	the	guidelines	of	the	UDHR.		They	ignore,	
unfortunately,	that	the	UDHR	also	invests	ethical	significance	in	the	family	and	the	community.		As	
such,	these	rights	are	in	tension	with	the	right	to	be	protected	against	torture,	which	many	activists	
mobilize	in	an	effort	to	stop	female	circumcision.55		This	is	the	problem	with	any	attempt	to	
universalize	moral	standpoints:	they	often	conflict	when	applied	to	contexts	that	did	not	produce	
them.		Hutchings	suggests	that,	instead	of	keeping	the	same	set	of	rights	and	simply	extending	their	
sphere	of	applicability,	it	might	become	necessary	to	create	new	rights,	which	might	in	turn	
“revolutionize	or	even	destroy	the	institutions	to	which	the	UDHR	refers.”56		Ethical	significance	in	
the	case	of	female	circumcision	is	not	a	right	against	torture,	because	rights	themselves	are	not	
actually	“ethical	trump	card[s],”57	that	is	they	are	not	ethically	necessary.		Rights	must	be	
understood	in	relation	to	how	they	function	in	the	broader	social	and	political	context.		Failing	to	
understand	rights	in	context	results	in	the	problematic	tension	explored	here.		What	Hutchings’	
feminist	ethical	method	can	say	about	female	circumcision,	then,	is	the	when	the	ethical	significance	
of	any	practice	has	particular	burdens	that	are	almost	exclusively	borne	by	a	particular	group,	
specifically	along	gendered	lines,	that	is	where	we	can	begin	to	question	the	norms	that	surround	
the	practice.		But	in	order	to	question,	one	must	also	understand,	which	enjoins	the	theorist	and	the	
activist	to	engage	with	the	people	by	whom	and	on	whom	female	circumcision	is	practiced.		This	
means	that	the	theorist	must	first	understand	their	own	moral	context	(a	combination	of	moral	
phenomenology	and	genealogy)	as	well	as	try	to	understand	the	moral	context	of	those	who	
practice	female	circumcision.		Once	there	is	honesty	about	one’s	own	moral	contexts,	the	
conversation	can	progress	to	an	ethical	judgment	made	through	dialogue,	and	then	a	possible	
solution	can	be	achieved.	
	 Hutchings’	final	example	is	how	the	organized	and	systematic	rape	in	the	Bosnian	War	was	
categorized	as	a	crime	against	humanity,	and	how	the	content	of	our	ethical	prescription	matters.		It	
is	important	that	such	a	heinous	action	is	condemned,	but	the	reasons	behind	it	were	ultimately	
very	problematic.		The	rapes	in	the	Bosnian	war	were	justified	as	crimes	against	humanity	on	two	
counts:	1)	it	was	organized	systematically	(‘weaponized’),	and	2)	it	was	an	attempt	at	ethnic	
genocide	by	enforced	pregnancy.58		There	are	two	strident	responses	to	this	within	Hutchings’	
feminist	ethical	method.		The	first	is	that	weaponized	rape	only	makes	sense	within	a	specific	
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context	of	“patriarchal	assumptions	about	the	meaning	of	rape	as	an	instrument	for	hurting	and	
undermining,	not	the	victims	themselves	as	individuals,	but	their	male	relations	and	compatriots	
who	comprise	the	‘enemy.’”59		Rape	as	a	weapon	is	constructed	not	as	an	action	taken	against	the	
women	per	se,	but	rather	against	husbands,	brothers,	and	fathers	who	would	be	demoralized	when	
finding	out	their	female	relation	or	partner	had	been	raped.		The	victims	themselves	are	obscured	by	
the	focus	on	the	reaction	of	her	male	relations	and	their	reactions	to	the	violence	committed	upon	
her	body	and	mind.60		This	first	point	also	focuses	on	only	female	victims	of	rape.		The	male	victims	
of	rape	are	hidden	from	view,	which	renders	their	suffering	as	not	worthy	of	being	noted	as	a	crime	
against	humanity	at	all.		Secondly,	the	view	of	systematic	rape	as	attempted	genocide	also	obscures	
women,	viewing	them	primarily	as	“vessels	for	the	propagation	of	the	race.”61		This	understanding	
continues	to	tie	the	value	of	women	as	people	to	their	ability	to	produce	children.		The	reasons,	then,	
for	categorizing	the	rapes	in	the	Bosnian	war	as	crimes	against	humanity	only	serve	to	reinforce	the	
ways	in	which	rape	can	remain	a	weapon.		By	engaging	with	the	deplorable	acts	in	the	Bosnian	war	
in	the	terms	used	by	the	perpetrators,	the	legal	prescriptions	only	serve	to	reinforce	a	world	where	
such	acts	remain	a	possibility.		This	case	also	demonstrates	the	danger	of	assuming	that	the	theorists’	
position	is	universalizable,	because	this	“globalises	[…]	the	privileged	position	of	the	theorist.”62		If	
there	is	to	be	a	real	transformation	of	the	world	we	must	be	ever	vigilant	against	the	reproduction	of	
our	standpoints	through	our	assumptions	that	our	understanding	of	the	world	can	count	for	that	of	
others,	even	the	assumption	that	care	can	be	universally	applied.		Unreflexive	or	uncritical	judgment	
is	what	will	result	in	“reproducing	old	exclusions	or	introducing	new	ones.”63	
	 This	returns	us	to	what	Hutchings	claims	to	be	the	failure	of	critical,	feminist	care	ethics:	that	
ethics	should,	but	so	far	has	failed	to	be	transformative.		Although	the	critical	ethics	of	care	is	
constructed	to	be	able	to	assess	the	world	as	it	is	and	suggest	possible	new	worlds,	according	to	
Hutchings	it	does	so	by	too	readily	engaging	a	universalizing	claim	about	care	in	order	to	judge	
whether	or	not	certain	relationships	foster	and	sustain	care.		Instead,	what	is	necessary	is	to	move	
beyond	the	drive	to	judge	the	actions	of	others	in	light	of	abstract	principles,	and	begin	to	assess	and	
deconstruct	the	“background	values,	practices	and	institutions	which	give	those	actions	meaning.”64		
The	first	order	within	Hutchings	ethical	method	must	be	to	understand	the	possible	assumptions	
behind	the	practice,	rather	than	judging	from	a	standpoint,	either	that	of	women	or	that	of	care.		
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However,	this	rejection	of	a	‘bedrock’	for	judgment,	and	a	corresponding	focus	on	how	context	
colours	all	aspects	of	judgment,	leads	to	the	question	of	whether	moral	judgments	are	possible	at	all.		
Margaret	Urban	Walker	notes	that	although	we	could	judge	within	the	system,	we	cannot	judge	
outside	the	social	system,	and	we	have	no	authority	to	do	so.65		Those	who	do	not	have	the	same	
moral	bedrocks	might	not	hold	to	ethics	that	are	mutually	intelligible.		In	order	to	cross	that	divide,	
one	would	have	to	change	the	entirety	of	someone’s	socio-cultural	life,	which	is	impossible,	morally	
wrong,	or	more	likely	both.66		If	we	cannot	judge	because	we	have	no	authority,	there	is	no	rational	
justification	for	any	intervention	in	the	lives	of	others.		The	moral	actions	we	take,	then,	are	ones	
that	are	geared	toward	ensuring	that	that	whatever	changes	we	make	to	our	ways	of	life	do	not	
negatively	impact	others.67	
	 Hutchings,	however,	rejects	the	impossibility	of	judgment.		If	ethics	are	to	be	transformative	
in	fact,	not	just	in	vain	hope,	then	judgments	must	occur.		Feminist	ethics	must	be	primarily	focused	
on	the	problems	stemming	from	the	norms	that	produce	gendered	relations	of	power,	and	the	
judgments	involved	should	be	aimed	at	challenging	those	norms.		Yet,	these	judgments	are	not	
mean	to	be	universal	ones,	because	all	judgment	is	built	upon	one’s	own	moral	and	political	bedrock.		
Even	feminist	concerns	are	not	apolitical.		Rather	than	striving	for	universally	applicable	judgments,	
Hutchings	accepts	the	vulnerability	and	contextual	nature	of	judgments	and	suggests	three	
guidelines	for	the	theorist	to	follow	when	judging.		First,	the	theorist	must	“recognise	and	
acknowledge	the	moral	imaginary	that	she	takes	for	granted.”68		This	is	a	restatement	of	the	earlier	
understanding	that	the	ethical	theorist	must	be	aware	of	their	own	moral	bedrock	from	which	they	
theorize.		Second,	she	must	“work	on	engagement	with	other	moral	imaginaries	in	modes	other	than	
those	of	protection,	education	or	punishment.”69		Instead	of	assuming	that	the	role	of	the	theorist	is	
to	engage	in	only	their	native	mode	of	thought,	the	theorist	instead	seeks	to	expand	their	
understanding	of	the	different	moral	imaginaries	in	the	world	before	taking	other	action.		Third	and	
last,	“to	embrace	the	risk	of	judgment	as	one	in	which	worlds	are	always	wagered	and	in	which	wins	
and	losses	are	crucial	for	everyone,	including	the	moral	theorist	herself	as	well	as	those	about	whom	
she	writes.”70		The	ethical	theorist	accepts	that	when	she	judges,	she	does	so	in	very	real	terms	that	
can	entail	real	consequences.		To	judge	another’s	world	is	to	invite	judgment	about	your	own	world,	
and	that	is	a	very	risky	proposition,	intellectually	and	personally.			
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Section 3 – Transformation and Judgment 
The	critique	that	Hutchings	levels	at	the	ethics	of	care	suggests	that	critical,	feminist	care	ethics	is	
vulnerable	to	the	problems	created	by	the	tension	between	the	universal	standpoint	of	care	and	the	
particularity	of	moral	judgments.		Further,	because	care	ethics	engages	too	closely	with	harmful	
norms	and	practices	(gendered	power	relations	being	one	example),	it	might	only	reinforce	the	
status	quo,	making	it	unable	to	support	the	kind	of	transformation	that	Hutchings	deems	preferable	
for	feminist	ethics.		Yet,	I	question	the	notion	that	there	is	only	one	acceptable	mode	of	
transformation,	and	we	can	think	of	the	transformation	that	Hutchings	offers	as	being	more	radical	
while	the	transformation	of	care	ethics	is	more	reformist.		I	argue,	contrary	to	Hutchings,	that	there	
is	nothing	wrong	with	wanting	to	reform	international	politics,	to	fix	it	step-by-step	rather	than	seek	
radical	transformation.		Further,	I	argue	the	tension	that	Hutchings	draws	out	is	one	that	care	ethics	
must	pay	close	attention	to	if	it	is	to	be	transformative,	and	that	it	is	a	tension	that	is	compatible	
with	the	possibility	of	moral	judgment	based	on	the	practices	of	care	in	the	first	place.		Because	of	
Hutchings’	critique,	the	ethics	of	care	can	be	further	refined	and	improved,	much	as	the	theory	
developed	to	answer	the	critiques	of	‘orthodox’	care	ethics	as	discussed	in	Chapter	One.	
	
Section 3.1 - Transformation 
Considering	that	my	goal	in	this	thesis	is	to	demonstrate	the	practicability	of	critical,	feminist	care	
ethics	as	a	tool	of	critical	analysis	for	global	moral	and	political	contexts,	as	well	as	a	guide	for	public	
policy,	it	remains	my	conviction	that	care	ethics	is	an	ethical	theory	that	can	give	us	practical	
guidance	to	engage	with	the	world	as	it	is	today.		I	am	dubious	of	the	viability	of	an	ethical	method	
that,	once	it	identifies	bad	moral	practices	and	norms,	attempts	to	transcend	them	in	favour	of	the	
creation	of	new	practices	on	the	assumption	that	this	is	the	best	way	to	defy	patterns	of	oppression.		
Even	if	I	were	to	concede	that	Hutchings	outlines	a	better	method,	I	need	not	concede	that	her	kind	
of	transformation	is	the	only	kind	of	transformation	possible.		The	transformative	potential	of	care	
ethics	is	reformist	in	nature.		It	is	not	a	platform	for	a	‘care	revolution’	in	a	radical	sense,	“but	only	a	
slow,	plodding	journey	where	tiny	victories	are	achieved	each	time	a	moment	is	spent	listening	
attentively	and	patiently	to	the	needs	of	another,	where	that	moment	spent	can	be	recognized	as	
deeply	moral	and	of	great	personal	and	societal	value	without	coming	at	great	immediate	or	long-
term	cost,	either	to	individuals	or	to	society	as	a	whole.”71		The	critical	ethics	of	care	offers	a	more	
modest,	and	perhaps	more	fraught	kind	of	transformation,	but	it	is	the	kind	of	transformation	we	
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can	start	enacting	right	now	in	our	lives	as	we	live	them	by	using	the	standpoint	of	care	to	assess	
ourselves,	those	around	us,	and	the	state	of	the	world	today.		We	can	change	the	world,	and	
although	it	will	come	in	small	steps,	in	a	long	process,	it	is	not	beyond	us.			
	 Hutchings	has	too	readily	dismissed	what	it	is	to	engage	with	harmful	norms	and	practices.		
She	claims	that	the	best	way	to	defy	the	oppression	that	these	norms	and	practices	foster	is	to	
ensure	that	we	do	not	perpetuate	them.72		She	uses	the	example	of	the	mass	rapes	in	the	Bosnian	
war	to	illustrate	how	engagement	can	be	problematic	for	transformation.		In	spite	of	the	legislation	
passed	to	categorise	‘weaponised	rape’	as	a	crime	against	humanity,	the	legislation	itself	obscures	
the	gendered	relations	of	power	inherent	in	rape.		Further,	because	it	defines	forcible	impregnation	
as	genocidal,	this	reinforces	and	tacitly	accepts	the	idea	that	“the	rapist	determines	the	nationality,	
ethnicity,	race	or	religion	of	the	child	and	confirms	both	the	potential	effectiveness	of	rape	as	a	
weapon	and	the	justifiability	of	the	shame	experienced	by	and	attributed	to	the	victims.”73		In	an	
attempt	to	engage	with	the	horrors	of	the	Bosnian	war,	the	United	Nations	issued	legislation	that	
was	not	critical	enough	of	the	underlying	assumptions	that	made	mass	rapes	possible	in	the	first	
place.		But	although	this	is	a	telling	point	against	human	rights	discourses,	it	is	the	same	problem	
that	the	care	critique	holds	against	human	rights.		As	I	argued	in	Chapter	Three,	human	rights	do	not	
always	‘see’	the	root	causes	of	complicated	moral	and	political	contexts.		The	care	critique	of	human	
rights	specifically	targets	the	fact	that	human	rights	cannot	always	‘see’	the	underlying	normative	
assumptions	that	produce	the	problem	in	the	first	place,	such	as	the	idea	that	issues	of	social	
reproduction	are	not	proper	political	concerns,	which	has	fostered	the	crisis	of	care	we	currently	
face	as	well	as	the	plight	of	the	transnational	migrant	care	worker.	
	 The	ethics	of	care	is	a	critical	tool	that	is	meant	to	engage	with,	understand,	unpack,	and	
access	the	root	causes	of	why	these	atrocities	happen	in	the	first	place.		Engagement	with	current	
practices	is	necessary,	and	it	allows	us	to	engage	with	and	alter	current	practices	by	bringing	them	
more	in	line	with	the	critical,	feminist	ethics	of	care.		This	is	vastly	important,	as	changing	practices	
also	changes	those	who	are	impacted	by	those	practices.74		Without	engagement,	we	cannot	
understand.		Without	understanding,	we	cannot	alter	what	is	into	something	else,	that	is,	we	cannot	
transform	the	moral	and	political	landscape.		As	Zhou	points	out,	when	we	document,	map,	and	
trace	how	our	dense	interdependent	relations	are	shaped	by	policy,	norms,	and	other	institutional	
patterns	of	power,	this	“provides	an	empirical	basis	for	developing	social	justice	theories,	and	their	
related	policies,	wherein	the	pursuit	of	equity	includes	issues	that	go	far	beyond	the	classic	welfare	
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state	model…”	but	expands	to	include	“…	the	social	division	of	labour	and	structures	of	decision-
making	power.”75		The	ethics	of	care	seeks	to	transform	the	world,	but	not	through	a	sceptical	
ethical	method.		Rather,	it	works	through	existing	relationships	and	patterns	of	power	to	question	
those	patterns	of	power.76		As	argued	in	Chapter	Two,	the	transformative	potential	of	critical,	
feminist	care	ethics	lies	in	its	ability	to	enable	and	stimulate	a	different	kind	of	action	that	can	serve	
to	counteract	morally	problematic	practices.		Action	is	not	just	individual	action	but	takes	place	
between	persons	“in	the	way	individuals	simultaneously	relate	to	one	another	in	common	(and	
collective)	interaction,	within	and	with	regard	to	institutions.”77		The	location	and	method	of	
transformation	that	care	ethics	offers	is	relational,	opposing	oppressive	relations	of	power	through	a	
demonstration	of	how	we	can	act	better	as	individuals,	and	also	how	institutions	can	enable	rather	
than	hinder	our	caring	relations.		No	less	than	Hutchings’	method	does	the	ethics	of	care	strive	to	
make	‘seen’	what	was	previously	rendered	invisible	by	the	current	state	of	international	politics:	the	
relations	of	power	between	nations,	gender	and	racial	norms,	and	economic	and	political	forces	that	
render	certain	people	vulnerable	to	oppression,	marginalization,	and	exploitation.		These	relations	
are	then	reformed,	reshaped	and	altered	so	that	they	promote	worlds	in	which	people	can	better	
fulfil	their	caring	responsibilities.	
	
Section 3.2 - Judgment 
However,	Hutchings’	main	claim	is	that	the	critical	ethic	of	care	is	caught	between	the	universalizing	
standpoint	of	care	and	the	acknowledgement	that	cross-contextual	judgment	is	inherently	
problematic.78		The	soundness	of	our	moral	judgments,	even	based	on	the	standpoint	of	care,	is	
problematic	when	we	always	make	judgments	embedded	within	particular	contexts.		The	claim	is	
that,	as	such,	we	cannot	properly	judge	the	context	of	others.		However,	this	tension	is	not	
impossible	to	overcome.		Seyla	Benhabib	argues	that	it	is	possible	to	make	judgments	in	the	
particular	from	a	universal	abstraction.	Benhabib	focuses	on	a	similar	tension	in	the	work	of	Hannah	
Arendt	in	making	this	claim,	and	I	adopt	her	method	in	order	to	reconcile	this	tension	in	the	critical,	
feminist	ethics	of	care.		Given	Hutchings’	emphasis	on	method	rather	than	foundational	moral	
content,	it	is	fitting	that	I	adopt	the	same	strategy	in	defence	of	her	charge	against	the	ethics	of	care.		
Although	both	Arendt	and	Benhabib	use	the	language	of	duties	and	maxims,	Benhabib’s	aim	is	the	
same	as	my	own:	to	demonstrate	how	we	can	have	moral	judgments	about	particular	contexts	while	
operating	from	a	universalist	position.		Unlike	Benhabib,	I	focus	on	care.		Interestingly,	she	claims	
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that	although	Arendt’s	attempt	to	combine	Aristotle’s	concern	with	particulars	with	a	universalist	
Kantian	standpoint	was	confusing,	it	nevertheless	contained	a	deeply	important	insight.		The	insight	
was	that	“by	weakening	the	opposition	between	contextual	judgment	and	a	universalist	morality,”	
this	can	“help	us	see	through	some	false	fronts	in	contemporary	moral	and	political	theory.”79		For	
example,	one	of	the	false	fronts	that	critical,	feminist	care	ethics	allows	us	to	see	through	is	the	
division	between	the	private	and	the	public	spheres	of	life,	as	discussed	in	Chapter	One.		The	
methodological	result	is	that	moral	and	political	judgment	become	part	of	a	political	ethic,	where	we	
must	incorporate	honesty	about	how	our	own	particular	contexts	influence	our	judgments	based	on	
the	universal	standpoint	of	care.		In	being	honest	about	our	own	moral	contexts,	we	are	able	to	
engage	in	a	transformative	project	with	others—who	also	have	their	own	particular	contexts—
because	we	can	both	begin	from	the	shared	standpoint	that	care	is	necessary	to	the	continuance	of	
human	life.		Because	every	human	society	involves	some	form	of	care,	whether	it	is	emotional,	
physical,	or	institutional,	we	can	start	from	this	fact	and	use	it	as	a	flexible	tool	to	change	the	world.	
	 Benhabib	argues	that	moral	judgment	is	a	pervasive	and	unavoidable	part	of	human	life;	she	
writes:	“Moral	judgment	is	what	we	‘always	already’	exercise	in	virtue	of	being	immersed	in	a	
network	of	human	relationships	that	constitute	our	life	together.”80		If	we	withdraw	from	moral	
judgment,	however,	we	cease	to	interact	with	the	rest	of	the	human	community.81		If	we	accept	that	
moral	judgment	is	an	integral	part	of	human	life,	then	the	critical,	feminist	ethics	of	care	must	be	
able	to	engage	in	judgment.		Refusing	to	judge,	even	across	contexts,	would	then	be	to	remove	
ourselves	from	the	patterns	of	relations	that	connect	our	world	together.		There	are	few	who	are	so	
isolated	as	to	be	completely	untouched	by	the	web	of	global	relations	that	are	sustained	through	
political,	economic,	and	cultural	exchange.		We	must	be	able	to	have	the	tools	of	moral	judgment	if	
we	are	to	engage	with	the	rest	of	the	world.	
	 There	are	three	ways	in	which	moral	judgment	can	be	understood	as	a	form	of	moral	
interaction	with	others.		These	are,	in	general	terms,	the	assessment	of	one’s	responsibilities,	one’s	
actions	regarding	the	carrying	out	of	responsibilities,	and	the	ethical	‘bedrock’	as	expressed	or	
revealed	through	one’s	actions.82		With	regard	to	one’s	responsibilities,	there	is	a	tension	between	
how	we	understand	them	in	the	abstract,	based	on	the	standpoint	of	care,	and	what	the	practices	of	
care	would	demand	of	us	in	any	particular	situation.		Our	caring	responsibilities	for	others	are	often	
extended	toward	friends	and	family,	and	how	we	assess	our	responsibilities	depends	on	the	
contextual	situation	of	those	relations.		In	other	words,	“The	exercise	of	moral	judgment	that	is	
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concerned	with	the	epistemic	identification	of	human	situations	and	circumstances	as	morally	
relevant	does	not	proceed	according	to	the	model	of	the	subsumption	of	a	particular	under	a	
universal.”83		For	example,	I	might	have	a	responsibility	to	my	friend,	but	the	circumstances	that	
surround	our	relationship	can	alter	the	content	of	that	responsibility,	such	as	distance.		Similarly,	
governments	have	responsibilities	toward	those	who	fall	under	their	power	(understanding	that	
governments	can	act	on	non-citizens	as	well	as	citizens),	and	the	content	of	those	responsibilities	
can	change	as	the	relationship	itself	changes.		Consider	that	when	children	grow	into	adults	the	
government	then	has	different	responsibilities	for	that	person	generated	by	their	changed	status.		
That	we	have	caring	responsibilities	is	not	in	dispute,	but	the	question	is	how	we	judge	what	the	
content	of	those	responsibilities	should	be	in	light	of	shifting	contextual	factors.		Judgment	is	
possible	because	the	practices	of	care,	particularly	attentiveness,	can	be	used	as	a	critical	tool	to	
investigate	what	our	responsibilities	should	be.		In	the	case	of	my	friend,	I	can	perhaps	rely	on	
intuition	(though	in	cases	where	my	intuition	fails,	I	could	use	the	lens	of	care	to	try	to	uncover	what	
my	friend	might	need	from	me).		In	the	case	of	governments,	as	I	argued	in	Chapter	Five,	the	ethics	
of	care	and	the	caring	practice	of	responsibility	can	be	used	to	clarify	the	responsibility	the	
government	has	toward	particular	persons	under	its	power,	such	as	the	responsibility	the	
government	has	to	develop	a	policy	that	will	address,	for	example,	the	needs	of	the	transnational	
care	worker.		Establishing	the	responsibilities	of	individuals	and	institutions,	and	how	that	
responsibility	is	made	manifest,	is	the	first	step	toward	being	able	to	make	moral	and	political	
judgments.		
	 Secondly,	we	must	consider	that	how	we	act	on	our	responsibilities	is	another	source	of	
moral	interaction.		Benhabib	claims	that:	“The	identity	of	a	moral	action	is	not	one	that	can	be	
construed	in	light	of	a	general	rule	governing	particular	instances	but	entails	the	exercise	of	moral	
imagination	which	activates	our	capacity	for	thinking	of	possible	narratives	and	act	descriptions	in	
light	of	which	our	actions	can	be	understood	by	others.”84		For	example,	although	the	practices	of	
care	demand	that	caring	polices	are	responsive	to	their	target	groups,	the	different	requirements	of	
each	person	in	the	target	group	of	any	policy	might	require	slightly	different	responses	from	us	(i.e.	
actions)	based	on	their	context.		Judgment	is	not	as	simple	as	‘responsive	or	not’,	as	though	it	were	a	
tick-box	on	a	form.		Rather,	judgment	would	depend	on	how	well	the	policy	responded	to	the	
nuanced	needs	of	the	target	group	bounded	by	the	contexts	of	that	policy,	especially	the	various	
kinds	of	resources	that	were	available	to	enact	the	policy	in	the	first	place.		Perhaps	the	policy	could	
only	be	minimally	responsive	because	of	a	lack	of	money	or	personnel,	or	perhaps	there	was	enough	
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money	and	people	to	implement	the	policy	but	it	was	not	deemed	worth	the	investment	of	such	
resources.		Our	judgment	in	this	case	rests	on	a	sliding	scale,	changing	as	we	track	the	conditions	in	
which	any	policy	is	enacted.		In	the	first	instance	we	might	make	the	moral	judgment	that	the	
government	doing	something	imperfectly	was	better	than	not	doing	it	all,	but	that	in	the	second	
instance	there	was	a	degree	of	failure	in	the	government’s	responsiveness	to	the	target	group	
because	it	could	have	enacted	a	more	responsive	policy.	
	 Third,	and	last,	we	must	assess	what	our	ethical	foundations	are	as	they	are	revealed	
through	our	actions.		As	Benhabib	notes:	“The	assessment	of	the	maxim	of	one’s	intentions,	as	these	
embody	moral	principles,	requires	understanding	the	narrative	history	of	the	self	who	is	the	actor;	
this	understanding	discloses	both	self-knowledge	and	knowledge	of	one’s	self	as	viewed	by	others.”85		
Essentially,	if	I	am	to	be	honest	about	my	ethical	foundations,	which	is	a	necessary	precondition	for	
engagement	in	cross-contextual	moral	judgment,	I	must	understand	how	my	self	is	constructed	
through	the	webs	of	relations	I	inhabit,	not	just	from	inside	my	own	mind,	but	in	the	minds	of	others	
as	well.		Unless	I	can	see	myself	and	understand	that	others	might	see	something	different,	we	
cannot	properly	access	our	ethical	‘bedrock’	and	thus	cannot	be	honest	about	it.		Consider,	for	
example,	an	attempt	to	build	peace	between	two	previously	hostile	factions.		Both	sides	see	
themselves	as	having	valid,	even	heroic	reasons	for	acting,	and	often	cast	the	other	as	an	
unreasoning	belligerent.		Alternatively,	they	ascribe	motives	to	the	opposing	faction	that	are	only	
internally	intelligible,	making	real,	honest	communication	unlikely.		Rather,	we	must	combine	the	
internal	and	external	views	of	ourselves	if	we	are	to	assess	the	way	in	which	the	universal	standpoint	
of	care	is	expressed	through	our	particular	contexts.	
	 This	results,	then,	in	the	creation	of	a	robust	political	ethic	that	is	able	to	mediate	between	a	
universal	moral	standpoint	of	care	and	the	varied,	particular	contexts	in	which	care	is	expressed,	
enabled,	or	hindered.		Further,	Benhabib	claims	that	the	political	ethic	can	go	a	step	further	and	
involve	the	cultivation	and	encourage	a	particular	public	ethos.		For	Arendt,	that	would	be	an	ethos	
of	democratic	participation.86		When	based	on	the	standpoint	of	care,	it	is	instead	a	public	ethos	of	
care	that	would	be	cultivated	and	encouraged.		This	ethos	would	focus	on	bringing	care	firmly	into	
the	public	sphere,	because	the	practices	of	care	are	necessary	to	all	life.		As	argued	in	Chapter	Three,	
without	the	acknowledgement	of	the	importance	of	care	in	our	lives,	we	can	obscure	important	
moral	concerns	about	social	reproduction	and	continue	to	devalue	care,	care	givers,	and	care	
recipients.	
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	 It	is	through	this	particular	method	of	resolving	the	universal	and	the	particular	that	we	
come	to	understand	that	“articulation	of	differences	through	civic	and	political	associations	is	
essential	for	us	to	comprehend	and	to	come	to	appreciate	the	perspective	of	others.”87		Rather	than	
close	off	the	possibility	of	moral	judgment	between	contexts,	we	must	be	open	to	it,	because	only	
through	this	moral	and	political	engagement	are	we	able	to	overcome	the	notion	that	our	
differences	are	a	source	of	inexorable	division.		Overcoming	this	notion	will	also	challenge	
institutions,	norms,	and	other	practices	that	use	our	differences	as	a	source	of	oppression,	exclusion,	
and	violence.		We	must	be	open	to	the	perspectives	of	others,	because	in	so	doing	we	are	able	to	
cultivate	our	moral	imaginations,	allowing	for	our	self-centred	perceptions	of	ourselves	to	be	
“constantly	challenged	by	the	multiplicity	and	diversity	of	perspectives	that	constitute	public	life.”88		
Our	self-perspectives,	and	thus	our	ethical	foundations,	can	be	profoundly	challenged	on	the	
international	level.		This	kind	of	challenge	demands	the	honesty	of	the	self	and	our	ethical	‘bedrock,’	
which	in	turn	means	that	although	we	accept	that	our	judgments	are	most	intelligible	from	within	
the	perspective	of	our	own	contexts,	this	does	not	preclude	the	ability	to	extend	that	judgment	
outwards.	
	 The	ethics	of	care,	therefore,	owes	a	debt	to	Hutchings,	for	without	her	critique	of	the	
methodology	of	care	ethics	and	the	challenge	to	its	capacity	for	prescriptive	judgment	and	its	
transformative	aims,	it	may	have	run	the	risk	of	remaining	unresponsive	to	an	internal	tension.		Like	
the	response	to	the	critiques	of	the	early,	‘orthodox’	ethics	of	care	as	discussed	in	Chapter	One,	
which	pushed	care	philosophers	towards	a	political	ethic	of	care,	this	response	to	Hutchings	does	
not	demonstrate	that	care	is	immune	to	critique,	but	rather	demonstrates	the	ability	of	critical,	
feminist	care	ethics	to	adapt	to	important	critiques	without	losing	its	core	commitments.		It	is	
through	critiques	that	the	ethics	of	care	has	grown,	developed,	and	become	a	robust	moral	and	
political	theory.		The	ethics	of	care	remains	committed	to	a	relational	understanding	of	persons,	to	
demonstrating	how	the	lens	of	care	can	be	used	to	analyse	the	ways	in	which	norms,	institutions,	
and	patterns	of	power	shape	those	relations,	and	to	identify	the	root	causes	of	global	moral	contexts.		
Additionally,	care	ethics	is	committed	to	furthering	practical	outcomes,	and	argues	that	the	practices	
of	care	can	be	used	to	guide	not	only	personal	but	institutional	action	as	well,	specifically	through	
public	policy.		Although	we	must	accept	the	situated	nature	of	moral	judgment,	this	does	not	
preclude	the	possibility	of	judgment	at	all,	because	the	standpoint	of	care	provides	us	with	a	
touchstone	for	cross-contextual	dialogue	as	we	negotiate	our	self-perceptions	in	light	of	a	wide	
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diversity	of	perspectives.		The	possibility	for	transformation,	then,	lies	in	our	willingness	to	continue	
to	engage	that	very	dialogue	and	act	upon	our	judgments.
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Conclusion 
	
The	main	concern	of	this	thesis	is	to	assert	that	while	human	rights	discourses	have	done	much	to	
ground	the	efforts	that	institutions	and	individuals	have	made	to	reduce	the	prevalence	of	global	
poverty	and	increase	the	security,	education,	and	economic	wellbeing	of	women	and	girls	around	
the	world,	these	issues	are	nevertheless	ongoing.		Further,	human	rights	discourses	have	not	been	
able	to	curtail	the	rising	levels	of	inequality	within	and	between	nations,	and	neither	are	they	well	
suited	to	addressing	the	context	of	the	transnational	care	market,	the	migrant	care	workers	who	are	
in	that	market,	and	the	dark	logic	of	human	trafficking	that	often	runs	alongside	the	‘legitimate’	
migrant	care	market.		The	primary	argument	of	this	thesis	is	that	the	ethics	of	care	is	a	powerful	tool	
that	can	be	used	to	address	these	contexts	by	offering	new	insights,	redefining	problems,	expanding	
the	scope	of	moral	and	political	concern,	while	also	being	able	to	provide	cross-contextual	
judgments,	new	motivation	for	action,	and	spurring	the	transformation	of	our	global	moral	political	
landscape.			
	 However,	in	order	to	understand	how	we	can	justify	using	care	ethics	on	a	global	scale,	it	has	
been	necessary	to	explore	the	conceptual	history	of	the	ethics	of	care,	demonstrating	how	critique	
has	been	important	to	the	development	of	care	ethics	since	its	inception	in	the	early	1980s.		The	
ethics	of	care	began	in	the	work	of	Gilligan,	Noddings,	and	Ruddick,	all	of	whom	express	profound	
dissatisfaction	with	mainstream	ethical	theories,	because	such	theories	hold	a	(perhaps	unconscious)	
male	bias;	thus	care	theorists	reject	the	primacy	of	mainstream	theories	such	as	Kantian	ethics	or	
utilitarianism.		The	ethics	of	care,	Gilligan	claims,	more	accurately	represents	how	women	and	girls	
reason	morally,	because	they	view	the	moral	self	in	a	multi-directional	web	of	relations	rather	than	a	
vertical	hierarchy	of	rights	holders	and	duty	bearers.		Predicated	on	this	conception	of	self	as	
embedded	within	relations	with	others,	moral	questions	are	less	about	to	whom	one	owes	duties,	
but	rather	about	how	one	best	balances	the	competing	responsibilities	one	has	in	virtue	of	the	
inexorable	fact	of	our	embeddedness	in	relations.		Noddings’	and	Ruddick’s	work	on	care	ethics	
builds	on	Gilligan’s	work,	expanding	beyond	her	work	on	psychological	moral	development	in	order	
to	produce	a	philosophical	account	of	the	ethics	of	care	as	a	fully-fledged	moral	theory.		While	
Ruddick	argues	that	care	could	be	understood	through	the	practice	of	mothering,	her	main	focus	is	
how	women’s	experiences,	especially	those	of	care	giving,	were	absent	from	traditional	moral	
philosophy,	and	the	claim	that	such	experiences	could	provide	a	basis	for	different	answers	to	moral	
problems.		Noddings	argues	that	it	is	not	only	women	who	have	been	ignored	in	moral	philosophy,	
but	the	entire	private	sphere.		This	is	problematic	because	the	private	sphere	is	where	care	giving	
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and	receiving	takes	place,	and	historically	the	only	one	women	could	occupy	because	they	were	
barred	from	public,	political	participation.		Noddings	also	draws	out	the	importance	of	emotional	
attachment	in	our	ethical	reasoning,	arguing	that	feeling	is	an	essential	part	of	caring,	though	not	
the	only	part.		Importantly,	Noddings	also	acknowledges	the	possibility	that	care	can	be	paternalistic,	
manipulative,	or	exploitative,	and	as	such	she	highlights	an	important	distinction	for	the	early,	
‘orthodox’	ethics	of	care:	although	we	assess	relations	from	the	perspective	of	care,	the	goal	is	not	
to	say	‘all	care	is	good’,	but	rather	to	find	ways	to	morally	evaluate	relations	of	care.	
	 However,	the	early	ethics	of	care	faced	sharp	criticism	from	different	sources.		Mainstream	
ethical	philosophers	questioned	the	ability	of	care	ethics	to	be	a	public	ethic,	that	is,	to	have	scope	
outside	of	the	private	sphere	because	of	its	focus	on	interpersonal	relationships.		While	certainly	
there	needed	to	be	an	investigation	into	the	moral	choices	one	makes	in	and	amongst	one’s	
relations,	it	was	not	clear	how	the	ethics	of	care	could	ever	be	used	as	an	ethic	for	public	life.		If	the	
ethics	of	care	could	not	be	applied	to	public	life,	then	it	would	also	be	unable	to	answer	moral	
questions	of	justice.		Between	these	two	critiques,	it	seemed	as	though	the	ethics	of	care	would	
remain	a	private,	parochial	ethic.		On	the	other	hand,	feminist	philosophers	expressed	deep	concern	
and	critiqued	the	ethics	of	care	because	they	claimed	it	served	to	reinforce	gender	roles,	linking	
women	and	care	work,	rather	than	challenging	them,	based	on	the	claim	that	women’s	experiences	
as	carers	gave	them	unique	insight	into	the	moral	contexts	around	care	work.	
	 As	biting	as	these	critiques	were,	I	have	argued	they	were	nevertheless	a	vital	part	of	the	
growth	of	care	ethics	from	its	origins	into	a	robust	political	ethic	with	a	deep	commitment	to	critical,	
feminist	analysis.		The	work	of	Tronto,	Held,	and	Kittay	demonstrates	a	shift	away	from	the	focus	on	
the	individual	in	relationship	and	the	moral	choices	one	faces	there,	to	a	question	about	how	
institutions	such	as	governments,	businesses,	and	social	norms	shape	the	relations	we	inhabit.		The	
ethics	of	care	became	a	critical	theory,	a	lens	on	the	political	that	asked	questions	guided	by	the	
practices	of	care.		For	Tronto	the	practices	of	care	are	attentiveness,	responsibility,	competence,	and	
responsiveness.		When	we	ask	questions	such	as	“why	do	women	the	bulk	of	the	care	work	at	
home?”	and	“why	is	the	provision	of	care	not	considered	a	public	good?”	we	begin	to	see	how	care	
work,	carers,	and	care	receivers	have	often	been	pushed	to	the	political	margins,	sidelined	and	
unable	to	give	political	voice	to	their	interests.		The	ethics	of	care	is	more	than	a	private	morality;	it	
is	a	morality	that	challenges	the	public/private	divide,	and	highlights	how	questions	of	justice	and	
care	cannot	be	neatly	separated	from	one	another.		While	the	public	sphere,	on	the	grounds	of	
justice,	has	already	infiltrated	the	private	sphere,	particularly	in	family	law,	the	reverse	has	not	often	
been	the	case;	care	provision	has	remained	an	issue	often	sidestepped	in	politics,	particularly	in	
nations	like	the	United	States.		Additionally,	the	increased	prevalence	of	austerity	measures	since	
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the	2008	Global	Financial	Crisis	has	shrunk	the	care	provisions	in	formerly	more	expansive	nations,	
which	has	primarily	impacted	“women,	children,	minorities,	migrants,	and	the	poor,”1	i.e.	those	who	
are	most	often	vulnerable	to	oppression,	marginalization,	and	exploitation.		Lastly,	and	most	strongly,	
care	theorists	argue	that	the	ethics	of	care	does	not	necessarily	reproduce	gender	norms,	but	can	
instead	critically	investigate	such	norms	as	one	of	the	root	causes	of	women’s	continued	
marginalization	and	oppression.		Because	the	ethics	of	care	has	become	a	political	ethic,	it	is	possible	
to	see	how	policies	such	as	family	leave	or	welfare	can	potentially	serve	to	reinforce	gender	norms.		
Rather	than	reinforcing	the	idea	that	women	are	‘naturally’	carers,	the	critical	ethics	of	care	argues	
that	social,	political,	and	economic	patterns	of	power	serve	to	‘code’	women	as	carers	to	others.		
The	responses	to	the	critiques	considered	here	demonstrate	the	ability	of	care	ethics	and	care	
theorists	to	go	beyond	the	early	formulation	of	care	ethics,	improving	the	theory	to	better	articulate	
the	world	around	us	and	provide	different	answers	to	moral	and	political	questions.	
	 Although	care	ethics	is	a	political	ethic,	my	goal	has	been	to	address	global	moral	and	
political	contexts,	and	to	do	so	I	explored	the	work	of	Fiona	Robinson,	who	was	among	the	first	to	
turn	the	critical,	feminist	lens	of	care	ethics	to	the	field	of	international	relations.		The	justification	
Robinson	supplies,	and	I	support,	is	that	if	we	accept	that	the	international	sphere	is	composed	of	
sets	of	relationships—both	institutional	and	individual—and	that	the	ethics	of	care	is	a	prime	
method	to	assess	relationships	in	general,	then	the	ethics	of	care	is	an	excellent	tool	to	use	to	assess	
these	international	relationships.		I	have	argued	that	a	critical	ethics	of	care	is	a	viable	tool	to	
address	specific	issues	of	moral	concern	within	the	global	context	in	addition	to	a	human	rights	
analysis.		The	central	claim	is	that	a	care	ethics	analysis,	guided	by	the	practices	of	care,	offers	
deeper	insight	into	the	root	causes	of	moral	contexts	such	as	difference	and	exclusion,	skewed	
gender	relations,	and	violence	and	human	insecurity.		Further,	it	uncovers	the	ways	in	which	norms	
about	gender,	race,	and	class	are	embedded	in	institutions,	which	in	turn	can	shape	the	concrete	
relationships	that	are	shared	by	people	in	their	everyday	lives.		Subsequently,	the	information	
revealed	by	the	lens	of	care	allows	us	to	imagine	and	enact	different	kinds	of	solutions	to	the	
problems	we	face	today,	problems	such	as	an	increase	in	transnational	migration	and	the	
exploitation	of	caring	labour,	the	continued	difficulties	that	women	and	girls	face	in	obtaining	an	
education,	housing	or	even	basic	security,	and	the	patterns	of	exclusion	that	allow	for	the	
continuance	of	severe	poverty.		In	my	analysis	I	drew	on	the	work	of	Weir,	Hochschild,	Wilcox,	and	
Jaggar	to	underscore	the	theoretical	aspect	of	a	global	care	ethics	with	practical	examples	of	
women’s	continued	oppression	and	marginalization,	in	particular	focusing	on	the	case	of	the	
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transnational	migrant	care	worker.		I	sought	to	show	how	the	lens	of	care	is	able	to	bring	to	the	fore	
moral	contexts	that	were	often	over	looked	by	mainstream	human	rights	discourses.	
Additionally,	because	care	ethics	offers	this	deeper	analysis	and	demands	critical,	reflective	
engagement	with	the	moral	contexts	it	investigates,	it	also	can	be	used	to	identify	possible	sites	of	
transformation.		These	sites	are	places	where	our	understanding,	and	then	possibly	our	actions,	can	
be	altered	to	ensure	that	our	subsequent	actions	enable,	rather	than	hinder,	the	practices	of	care	
that	are	necessary	for	human	life	to	continue	and	flourish.		Transformation	in	this	instance	must	also	
be	understood	as	a	relational	practice,	one	that	happens	between	and	with	others	and	with	regard	
to	institutions.		The	transformative	potential	of	care	ethics	lies	in	its	different	perspective	and	in	the	
practices	of	care	that	are	meant	to	guide	our	actions	as	we	develop	and	implement	solutions,	such	
as	through	transforming	the	policy	process	to	bring	considerations	of	care	into	focus.		Robinson’s	
practices	of	care	(attentiveness,	responsibility,	and	responsiveness)	remind	us	that	although	we	
might	have	the	best	of	intentions,	it	is	entirely	possible	for	‘care’	to	be	paternalistic	or	pernicious,	
such	as	enacting	policy	measures	that	unnecessarily	curtail	or	dictate	the	activities	of	a	portion	of	
the	population	‘for	their	own	good.’		The	practices	of	care,	if	followed	correctly,	are	meant	to	help	
guide	our	actions	without	falling	into	providing	bad	forms	of	care.		A	global	ethic	of	care	does	not	
mandate	that	we	should	care	about	all	others.		Instead,	it	approaches	global	moral	contexts	from	the	
view	that	care	is	vital	to	continued	human	survival,	and	the	ways	in	which	institutions	and	individuals	
devalue	care	contribute	to	human	suffering.		Care	ethics	offers	a	different	way	to	understand	issues	
of	inequality	and	injustice	that	goes	beyond	an	identification	of	a	problem	in	order	to	ask:	what	
caused	the	problem	in	the	first	place	and	how	might	the	causes	of	such	problems	be	addressed?	
The	fact	that	the	critical,	feminist	ethics	of	care	rejects	the	adequacy	of	mainstream	moral	
and	political	philosophies	does	not	mean	that	I	argue	for	the	wholesale	rejection	of	human	rights	
discourse.		I	provided	a	brief	overview	of	the	nature	and	the	usefulness	of	human	rights	to	address	
international	moral	and	political	contexts	through	the	work	of	Griffin,	Beitz,	and	Pogge.		Through	
their	work	I	argue	that	in	spite	of	the	differences	in	human	rights	discourse,	human	rights	can	be	
thought	of	in	general	as	a	set	of	standards	that	function	as	enforceable	claims.		What	this	means	is	
that	human	rights	function	as	a	minimum	moral	and	political	standard	for	what	it	means	to	live	an	
autonomous	life,	and	that	these	standards	sometimes	generate	far-reaching	claims	of	duty	upon	
institutions	and	individuals.		The	benefits	of	using	human	rights	are	not	to	be	easily	set	aside,	and	I	
agree	that	human	rights	have	important	advantages.		First,	human	rights	are	strong	claims	of	justice,	
such	that	the	standards	of	human	rights	are	not	ones	that	require	others	to	perform	acts	of	
extraordinary	kindness,	but	rather	justice	demands	that	we	ensure	people	do	not	fall	below	a	
particular	standard.		Secondly,	human	rights	often	mark	out	areas	of	international	concern,	and	are	
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often	taken	up	by	disadvantaged	groups	around	the	world	to	lend	legitimacy	to	their	concerns.		
Third,	and	last,	human	rights	can	offer	clear	and	well-defined	policy	guidance.			
My	argument	has	not	been	to	reject	the	importance	or	usefulness	of	human	rights,	but	
rather	to	question	the	capacity	of	human	rights	to	address	the	complexity	of	moral	and	political	
contexts	in	the	international	sphere.		I	have	argued	that	in	spite	of	the	advantages	of	human	rights	
discourses,	it	is	not	the	only	ethical	tool	available	when	assessing	and	attempting	to	address	
complex	global	moral	concerns.		In	this	thesis	I	have	critiqued	human	rights	from	the	perspective	of	
care	in	order	to	show	that	human	rights	can	overlook	the	very	contexts	that	the	lens	of	care	brings	
into	focus.		I	have	sought	to	demonstrate,	firstly,	that	human	rights	discourses	often	cannot	address	
the	structural	harms	of	modern	globalization	because	they	cannot	‘see’	the	root	causes	of	the	moral	
contexts	in	the	first	place.		Proclaiming	that	certain	persons	have	rights	does	not	necessarily	tell	us	
why	some	people	are	unable	to	access	those	rights	in	the	first	place,	because	the	reasons	for	a	lack	
of	access	may	be	due	the	underlying	structure	of	the	current	global	order.		Further,	human	rights	can	
carry	with	them	a	cultural	and	gender	bias,	and	although	it	would	be	wrong	to	claim	that	other	
cultures	cannot	negotiate	their	own	relationship	to	human	rights	discourses,	it	is	true	that	women	
and	other	historically	disadvantaged	persons	often	need	to	be	treated	as	recipients	of	‘special’	rights,	
particularly	in	the	case	of	reproductive	rights	for	women.		However	because	having	‘special’	rights	
can	undercut	the	intended	universal	nature	of	human	rights,	we	can	begin	to	understand	how	
oppression	and	marginalization	can	occur	even	if	someone’s	human	rights	have	been	met.		Lastly,	
human	rights	also	struggle	to	incorporate	the	concerns	of	social	reproduction,	i.e.	care	work,	
because	rights	discourses	do	not	often	‘see’	care	work	as	an	area	where	rights	are	an	issue.		Because	
human	rights	discourses	most	often	focus	on	the	individual	taken	singly,	this	obscures	the	fact	that	
we	are	embedded	within	webs	of	relations.	Some	crucial	human	relationships	are	structured	in	such	
a	way	that	women	shoulder	the	majority	of	the	care	work.		As	such	care	work,	care	givers,	and	those	
who	receive	care	are	often	rendered	less	important	and	devalued	on	a	human	rights	account.		When	
the	primary	goal	is	to	answer	questions	of	justice—construed	in	terms	of	rights	and	duties—
questions	about	who	cares	and	why	are	often	pushed	to	the	side,	even	though	the	current	ways	in	
which	care	is	allocated	is	certainly	unfair	and	unjust.		The	point,	then,	was	to	show	that	while	human	
rights	are	important,	they	are	not	the	only	way	to	approach	moral	and	political	problems;	there	are	
some	areas	where	human	rights	are	not	well	suited	to	provide	possible	solutions.		Instead,	we	can	
and	should	turn	to	the	critical,	feminist	ethics	of	care	to	be	our	moral	and	political	guide,	in	some	
situations	in	particular,	and	more	broadly	as	a	way	to	expand	the	scope	of	our	thought	and	generate	
even	more	ways	to	address	global	moral	contexts	of	injustice.	
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This	thesis	has	worked	to	highlight	the	unique	and	powerful	perspective	of	the	critical,	
feminist	ethics	of	care	when	it	comes	to	global	moral	and	political	contexts.		For	the	ethics	of	care,	
our	situated	contexts	matter,	and	we	can	come	to	understand	how	those	very	contexts	and	the	
relations	we	hold	are	shaped	by	international	patterns	of	political,	economic,	and	social	power.		In	
line	with	Robinson,	I	have	argued	that	the	institutional	relations	at	the	international	level	are	ripe	for	
a	care	analysis.		By	using	the	practices	of	care	to	guide	our	thought	about	such	institutions,	we	are	
able	to	see	moral	and	political	contexts	in	a	different	light	and	bring	to	the	fore:	the	experiences	of	
those	who	have	faced	exclusion	predicated	on	being	‘different;’	the	impact	gender	and	race	have	
upon	one’s	lived	moral	and	political	life;	and	how	violence	can	be	perpetuated	through	our	
normative	and	institutional	commitments.		This	is	not	to	deny	the	practical	usefulness	and	the	
importance	of	human	rights	as	a	political	ethic,	but	rather	to	encourage	an	expansion	of	our	
theoretical	toolkit.			
	 However,	one	might	be	tempted	to	combine	care	ethics	and	human	rights	to	create	a	single,	
powerful	political	ethic.		Daniel	Engster	made	one	such	attempt.		He	claims	that	in	spite	of	the	
analysis	that	a	critical	care	ethic	can	provide,	it	lacks	the	ability	to	provide	cogent	action	guidance,	
particularly	for	makers	of	public	policy.		It	is	the	very	flexibility	of	critical,	feminist	care	ethics	that,	
while	useful	for	providing	analysis,	renders	it	problematic	when	one	tries	to	take	specific	action	or	
make	public	policy.		He	also	argues	that	building	a	theory	of	human	rights	based	on	care	would	have	
two	general	benefits.		First,	they	would	ensure	that	concerns	about	care	itself	become	central	to	our	
concept	of	what	human	rights	are	meant	to	protect.		Second,	care	as	a	foundation	for	human	rights	
would	avoid	having	to	make	cross-culturally	controversial	esoteric	appeals	to	autonomy,	
personhood,	or	basic	human	dignity.		If	care	is	a	human	universal,	as	care	theorists	claim,	then	it	
seems	obvious	that	grounding	a	set	of	human	rights	on	care	theory	would	generate	the	care	claims	
we	want	to	make,	but	in	the	powerful	language	of	rights.	
While	I	have	expressed	sympathy	with	Engster’s	aims,	and	find	some	of	his	policy	
suggestions	laudable,	I	have	argued	that	his	conception	of	care	theory	is	deeply	problematic.		First,	
Engster	relies	on	an	uncritical	acceptance	of	our	relations	of	dependence	in	order	to	ground	a	theory	
of	rational	obligation	that	forms	the	basis	for	the	‘caring’	human	rights	claims	of	distant	strangers.		
Yet,	as	I	have	argued,	relying	on	an	uncritical	acceptance	of	our	relations	of	dependence	serves	to	
perpetuate	the	very	moral	contexts	that	care	ethics	is	meant	to	address:	contexts	of	exclusion	and	
difference.		The	second	problem	is	that	Engster	presents	his	‘caring’	human	rights	as	only	minimally	
feminist	in	order	to	underwrite	the	practical	aim	of	increased	uptake	and	broad	acceptance	across	
cultures.		This	is	problematic,	I	argue,	because	by	not	supporting	women’s	full	and	equal	political	
participation,	his	care	theory	could	allow	for	the	continued	of	the	exclusion	of	women	from	political	
194	
	
life,	which	has	long	been	a	part	of	women’s	oppression,	marginalization,	and	greater	vulnerability.		
Engster	assumes	that	simply	bringing	care	into	public	discussion	would	be	enough	without	women—
history’s	traditional	carers—being	a	part	of	that	discussion.		Therefore,	I	maintain	that	we	should	not	
utilize	a	combination	of	care	ethics	and	human	rights	that	requires	that	we	alter	care	ethics	so	that	it	
lacks	the	very	components	that	make	it	such	a	powerful	tool	in	the	first	place.	
My	rejection	of	Engster,	however,	meant	that	I	was	left	with	the	challenge	of	whether	the	
critical,	feminist	ethics	of	care	could	be	used	to	guide	action,	specifically	in	the	formation	of	public	
policy.		My	argument	for	using	care	ethics	as	a	guide	for	policy	is	a	culmination	of	my	larger	
argument	that	human	rights	alone	are	not	enough	to	address	the	deep	moral	problems	present	in	
the	world	today.		Human	rights,	for	the	past	fifty	years,	have	been	increasingly	incorporated	into	the	
business	of	real	world	politics,	and	in	particular	the	processes	of	public	policy.		While	human	rights	
have	specific	benefits,	they	also	tend	to	overlook	the	deep,	structural	factors	that	allow	suffering,	
oppression,	and	violence	to	continue.		The	major	focus	of	human	rights	since	1948	has	been	the	
fundamental	equality	of	all	persons,	often	construed	as	‘sameness’,	which	cannot	encompass	the	
ways	in	which	difference	matters	to	our	lives	as	we	live	them.		This	means	that	those	who	are	
‘different’	from	the	hegemonic	model	(the	historically	privileged	group),	have	often	had	to	be	
considered	a	‘special	group’	with	special	kinds	of	rights.		Any	public	policy	that	speaks	about	care,	
gender,	and	race,	and	which	does	so	in	an	authoritative	way,	codifies	the	ways	in	which	we	think	
about	care,	or	sexual	and	racial	difference.	When	women	are	constructed	as	a	‘special	group’,	in	
need	of	special	protections	to	ensure	they	can	continue	to	care,	or	if	they	are	assumed	to	be	the	
primary	carer,	or	the	one	who	initiates	the	consumption	of	care,	this	only	serves	to	reinforce	morally	
problematic	gender	norms	within	a	socio-political	community.	Public	policy	informed	only	by	a	
human	rights	discourse	is	not	enough	to	combat	the	ways	in	which	those	who	are	different	(women,	
racialized	persons,	differently	abled	persons,	gender-queer	persons,	and	those	of	lower	socio-
economic	status)	are	often	marginalized	and	excluded	even	if	all	of	their	human	rights	have	been	
met.	
In	this	thesis,	I	have	sought	to	show	that	the	critical,	feminist	ethics	of	care	can	be	a	
substantive	guide	for	the	policy	process.		I	used	the	policy	stages	theory	as	a	guide	to	demonstrate	
that	the	ethics	of	care	can	be	used	at	every	point	in	the	policy	process	to	offer	a	fresh	perspective	on	
social	problems	and	public	goods,	generate	different	sets	of	solutions,	reimagine	the	role	of	
institutions	in	our	lives,	guide	policy	implementation,	and	suggest	a	different	measure	of	policy	
success.		I	used	case	studies	offered	by	Hankivsky,	Sevenhuijsen,	Williams,	and	Zhou	in	order	to	
underwrite	my	claims	about	care	ethics	having	practical	applications.		Their	case	studies	
demonstrate	that	while	care	ethics	is	certainly	a	robust	critical	theory	in	terms	of	assessing	the	
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quality	of	public	policy,	policies	nevertheless	could	be	improved	by	relying	on	the	practices	of	care	as	
a	means	of	action	guidance	for	policy	makers.		The	ethics	of	care	could	transform	the	policy	process	
itself,	requiring	policy	makers	to	be	more	attentive	to	the	needs	of	those	they	are	meant	to	
represent,	encourging	us	to	rethink	the	kinds	of	responsilbities	institutions	have	toward	people	and	
the	webs	of	relations	they	inhabit.		Care	ethics	also	demands	a	more	responsive	kind	of	public	
administration	of	policy,	and	can	provide	a	different	metric	for	policy	evaluation.		The	practical	
application	of	the	ethics	of	care	is	possible	and	can	be	put	into	action	right	now.	
Lastly,	I	investigated	whether	or	not	the	critical,	feminist	ethics	of	care	was	vulnerable	to	the	
criticism	directed	at	human	rights	discourses,	namely,	that	such	discourses	often	overlook	and	are	
not	sensitive	to	people’s	lived	ethical	and	political	experiences.		Hutchings	offers	a	strong	critique	of	
the	ethics	of	care	along	these	lines,	claiming	that	the	theory	does	not	provide	the	right	tools	for	
cross-contextual	prescriptive	judgment	or	the	actual	transformation	of	our	international	moral	and	
political	landscape.		As	Hutchings	points	out,	the	ethics	of	care	uses	a	method	that	appears	to	be	
similar	to	feminist	standpoint	theory,	and	as	such	is	vulnerable	to	the	same	criticisms.		Her	criticism	
is	that	care	ethics	valorises	the	standpoint	of	care,	which	means	that	when	we	use	care	ethics	to	
guide	our	moral	reasoning,	we	are	actually	privileging	our	own	conception	of	care	and	are	unable	to	
engage	with	others	who	do	not	share	our	cultural	framework.		Thus,	we	cannot	produce	intelligible	
judgments	across	cultural	divides.		In	other	words,	care	ethics	is	another	falsely	universalizing	project.		
Further,	the	transformative	potential	of	care	ethics	is	suspect	because	it	too	closely	engages	with	the	
current	problematic	norms	and	practices	that	engender	harmful	situations	in	the	first	place.		Care	
ethics	could	possibly	result	in	lending	further	legitimacy	to	those	norms	and	practices.		Subsequently,	
Hutchings	develops	her	own	feminist	ethical	method	to	demonstrate	that	it	is	not	necessary	to	have	
a	theory	as	such,	but	rather	to	insist	that	ethical	reasoning	is	in	and	of	itself	a	practice,	that	is,	the	
method	by	which	we	carry	out	ethical	judgment	matters.		Judgment,	for	Hutchings,	is	then	based	on	
an	ethical	method	that	eschews	a	universal	standpoint	and	instead	asks	particular	questions	
designed	to	show	how	such	harmful	norms	and	practices	impact	real	persons.		By	understanding	the	
norms	and	practices	that	underwrite	the	situations	that	we	have	judged	to	be	morally	suspect,	we	
are	then	meant	to	be	able	to	transform	the	global	moral	and	political	landscape.		Our	judgments	will	
not	be	focused,	exclusively,	on	how	to	correct	or	compensate	for	certain	harms,	but	rather	spur	a	
transformation	of	the	norms	and	practices	involved	that	generated	the	harm	in	the	first	place.		The	
transformative	goal	for	Hutchings	is	that	we	radically	reimagine	the	norms	and	practices	that	
generated	harmful	outcomes	such	that	they	will	no	longer	be	able	to	produce	those	harmful	
outcomes	at	all.				
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	 While	I	concede	that	care	ethics	and	feminist	standpoint	theory	share	certain	
methodological	similarities,	I	have	rejected	Hutchings’	claim	that	the	critical,	feminist	ethics	of	care	
lacks	the	capacity	for	moral	judgment	or	to	spur	socio-political	transformation.		Care	ethics	has	its	
foundations	in	the	dialogue	between	the	normative	and	the	empirical,	and	as	such	it	must	take	into	
account	the	interaction	of	context	and	value.	I	claim	the	ethics	of	care	owes	a	debt	to	Hutchings	for	
the	elaboration	of	a	previously	unexplored	tension	at	the	heart	of	care	ethics.		However,	the	ethics	
of	care	is	a	flexible	tool	and	is	able	to	respond	to	her	critique.		By	taking	Hutchings	critique	seriously,	
care	ethics	can	maintain	the	understanding	that	people	make	situated	judgments,	while	still	holding	
to	the	useful	and	powerful	standpoint	of	care	as	a	moral	foundation.		I	drew	on	the	well-known	work	
and	insight	of	Benhabib	to	support	my	argument	that	a	negotiation	between	a	universal	standpoint	
and	specific	moral	contexts	is	possible.		Because	care	ethics	expands	the	domains	of	moral	
consideration	from	the	private	to	the	global	level,	the	tasks	of	the	moral	philosopher	are	then:	to	
investigate	and	explain	other	moral	communities;	to	begin	a	dialogue	about	problems	and	possible	
solutions;	to	provide	well-reasoned	justifications;	and	to	draw	out	possible	inconsistencies	and	
outcomes	of	acting	on	certain	moral	commitments.		The	point	is	that	through	an	honest	interaction	
with	the	values	and	contexts	of	others,	and	accepting	that	our	own	values	and	norms	are	subject	to	
similar	types	of	challenges	that	we	pose	to	others,	we	are	able	to	negotiate	different	contexts	while	
maintaining	the	universal	standpoint	of	care.		The	awkwardness	that	Hutchings	identifies	within	care	
ethics—that	it	is	situated	between	the	universal	standpoint	of	care	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	
acknowledgement	of	the	partiality	of	judgment	on	the	other—sits	uneasily	only	when	we	fail	to	be	
honest	about	our	own	contexts	and	perspectives.		Judgment	for	the	ethics	of	care	is	not	a	simple	
yes/no	proposition,	but	a	constant	dialogue	with	others,	negotiating	judgment	in	a	back-and-forth	
effort	to	reach	greater	understanding	in	order	to	aim	for	a	cooperative	transformation	of	our	shared	
world.	
Further,	I	reject	Hutchings	claim	that	the	kind	of	transformation	that	she	suggests,	that	of	
rendering	certain	harms	unthinkable,	is	the	only	or	best	kind	of	transformation	possible.		The	kind	of	
transformation	that	the	critical,	feminist	ethics	of	care	offers	is	a	slow	process,	but	one	that	is	
nevertheless	worth	working	towards.		It	is	one	that	will	require	concerted	effort,	but	an	effort	that	
could	serve	to	improve	the	lives	of	billions	of	people.		It	is	a	transformation	that	reorders	our	
priorities,	predicated	on	the	understanding	that	we	are	inexorably	connected	to	each	other	through	
international	relations	of	power	that	have	become	part	of	our	daily	lives.		Further,	only	once	we	
acknowledge	that	these	relations	of	power	shape	our	lives	can	we	challenge	the	embedded	norms	
and	assumptions	within	them	and	then	reshape	them	to	enable	better	caring	relations	instead	of	
allowing	them	to	perpetuate	harmful	ones.		The	ethics	of	care	demands	change,	but	does	so	through	
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the	practices	of	care	and	prioritizes	contextual	sensitivity,	with	the	standpoint	of	care	as	the	starting	
point	for	moral	and	political	dialogue	with	others.		The	ethics	of	care	requires	us	to	accept	the	
vulnerability	of	our	judgment,	understanding	that	only	once	we	are	honest	about	our	own	
contextual	biases	can	we	make	progress.			
The	ethics	of	care	is	a	feminist	ethical	and	political	theory	that	can	be	used	today,	can	be	
applied	to	the	world	as	it	is	in	order	to	begin	a	process	that	could	one	day	change	the	world,	where	
care	is	finally	understood	as	a	necessary	condition	for	human	life	and	given	subsequent	respect	as	
such.		Without	care,	none	of	us	would	survive.		Without	good	care,	none	of	us	would	be	able	to	
thrive.		By	expanding	the	critical,	feminist	ethics	of	care	to	have	global	scope,	we	begin	the	process	
of	creating	a	different	kind	of	world:	a	world	where	women	and	girls	in	particular	would	face	fewer	
structural	barriers	to	their	health,	happiness,	and	security;	a	world	where	there	is	less	inequality;	a	
world	where	there	is	less	division,	exclusion,	and	violence.		We	begin	to	create	a	more	caring	world.			
198	
	
Bibl iography 
	
Arendt,	Hannah.	The	Origins	of	Totalitarianism.	3rd	ed.		London:	George	Allen	&	Unwin	Ltd.,	1967.	
Ash,	Angie.	"Ethics	and	the	Street-Level	Bureaucrat:	Implementing	Policy	to	Protect	Elders	from	
Abuse."	Ethics	and	Social	Welfare	4,	no.	2	(2010):	201-09.	
Baier,	Annette	C.	"The	Need	for	More	Than	Justice."	In	Justice	and	Care,	edited	by	Virginia	Held,	47-
58.	Colorado:	Westview	Press,	1995.	
———.	"What	Do	Women	Want	in	a	Moral	Theory?".	Nous	19,	no.	1	(1985):	53-63.	
Beitz,	Charles	R.	The	Idea	of	Human	Rights.		Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2009.	
Beneria,	Lourdes.	"The	Crisis	of	Care,	International	Migration,	and	Public	Policy."	Feminist	Economics	
14,	no.	3	(2008):	1-21.	
Benhabib,	Seyla.	"Citizens,	Residents,	and	Aliens	in	a	Changing	World:	Political	Membership	in	a	
Global	Era."	Social	Research	66,	no.	3	(1999):	709-44.	
———.	"The	Generalized	and	Concrete	Other:	The	Kohlberg-Gilligan	Controversy	and	Feminist	
Theory."	Praxis	International	5,	no.	4	(1986):	402-24.	
———.	Situating	the	Self:	Gender,	Community	and	Postmodernism	in	Contemporary	Ethics.		
Cambridge:	Polity	Press,	1992.	
Berg,	R.	C.,	and	E.	Denison.	"A	Tradition	in	Transition:	Factors	Perpetuating	and	Hindering	the	
Continuance	of	Female	Genital	Mutilation/Cutting	(Fgm/C)	Summarized	in	a	Systematic	
Review."	Health	Care	Women	International	34,	no.	10	(2013):	837-59.	
Briody,	Blaire.	"What	Are	Stay-at-Home	Moms	Really	Worth?"	The	Fiscal	Times,	
http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2012/05/04/What-Are-Stay-at-Home-Moms-Really-
Worth.	
Brown,	Rachel	H.	"Re-Examining	the	Transnational	Nanny."	International	Feminist	Journal	of	Politics	
18,	no.	2	(2015):	210-29.	
Brysk,	Alison.	Global	Good	Samaritans:	Human	Rights	as	Foreign	Policy.		Oxford:	Oxford	University	
Press,	2009.	
Calhoun,	Cheshire.	"Justice,	Care,	Gender	Bias."	The	Journal	of	Philosophy	85,	no.	9	(1988):	451-63.	
Caputo,	Richard	K.	"Social	Justice,	the	Ethics	of	Care,	and	Market	Economies."	Families	in	Society	83,	
no.	4	(2002):	355-64.	
Carastathis,	Anna.	"The	Concept	of	Intersectionality	in	Feminist	Theory."	Philosophy	Compass	9,	no.	
5	(2014):	304-14.	
Chandhoke,	Neera.	"'How	Much	Is	Enough	Mr.	Thomas?	How	Much	Will	Ever	Be	Enough?'."	In	
Thomas	Pogge	and	His	Critics,	edited	by	Alison	M.	Jaggar,	67-83.	Cambridge:	Polity	Press,	
2010.	
Churcher,	Millicent.	"When	Adam	Met	Sally:	The	Transformative	Potential	of	Sympathy."	Social	
Epistemology	30,	no.	4	(2016):	420-39.	
Collins,	Patricia	Hill.	Black	Feminist	Thought	:	Knowledge,	Consciousness,	and	the	Politics	of	
Empowerment.		New	York:	Routledge,	1991.	
Conradi,	Elisabeth.	"Redoing	Care:	Societal	Transformation	through	Critical	Practice."	Ethics	and	
Social	Welfare	9,	no.	2	(2015):	113-29.	
Cransnow,	Sharon.	"Is	Standpoint	Theory	a	Resource	for	Feminist	Epistemology?	An	Introduction."	
Hypatia	24,	no.	4	(2009):	189-92.	
Crozier,	G.	K.	D.	"Care	Workers	in	the	Global	Market:	Appraising	Applications	of	Feminist	Care	
Ethics."	The	International	Journal	of	Feminist	Approaches	to	Bioethics	3,	no.	1	(2010):	113-37.	
Dallmayr,	Fred.	""Asian	Values"	and	Global	Human	Rights."	Philosophy	of	East	and	West	52,	no.	2	
(2002):	173-89.	
Dancy,	Jonathan.	"Caring	About	Justice."	Philosophy	62,	no.	262	(1992):	447-66.	
Desai,	Murli.	"Social	Policy	Approaches,	Human	Rights,	and	Social	Development	in	Asia."	Social	
Development	Issues	35,	no.	2	(2013):	1-17.	
199	
	
"Development	Goals	in	an	Era	of	Demographic	Change."	Washington	D.C.:	World	Bank	Group	and	
International	Monetary	Fund,	2015.	
Dietz,	Mary	G.	"Citizenship	with	a	Feminist	Face:	The	Problem	with	Maternal	Thinking."	Political	
Theory	13,	no.	1	(1985):	19-37.	
———.	"Context	Is	All:	Feminism	and	Theories	of	Citizenship."	Daedalus	116,	no.	4	(1987):	1-24.	
"Divided	We	Stand:	Why	Inequality	Keeps	Rising."	Paris:	OECD,	2011.	
Engster,	Daniel.	"Care	Ethics	and	Natural	Law	Theory:	Toward	an	Institutional	Political	Theory	of	
Caring."	The	Journal	of	Social	Politics	66,	no.	1	(2004):	113-35.	
———.	The	Heart	of	Justice:	Care	Ethics	and	Political	Theory.		Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2007.	
———.	"Mary	Wollstonecraft's	Nurturing	Liberalism:	Between	an	Ethic	of	Justice	and	Care."	The	
American	Political	Science	Review	95,	no.	3	(2001):	577-88.	
———.	"Rethinking	Care	Theory:	The	Practice	of	Caring	and	the	Obligation	to	Care."	Hypatia	20,	no.	
3	(2005):	50-74.	
———.	"Strategies	for	Building	and	Sustaining	a	New	Care	Movement."	Journal	of	Women,	Politics	&	
Policy	31,	no.	4	(2010):	289-312.	
Erel,	Umut.	"Introduction:	Transnational	Care	in	Europe	-	Changing	Formations	of	Citizenship,	Family,	
and	Generation."	Social	Politics	19,	no.	1	(2012):	1-14.	
"Facts	and	Figures:	Ending	Violence	against	Women."	United	Nations,	
http://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/ending-violence-against-women/facts-and-
figures			
Flanagan,	Owen,	and	Kathryn	Jackson.	"Justice,	Care,	and	Gender:	The	Kohlberg-Gilligan	Debate	
Revisited."	Ethics	97,	no.	3	(1987):	622-37.	
Folbre,	Nancy.	"Should	Women	Care	Less?	Intrinsic	Motivation	and	Gender	Inequality."	British	
Journal	of	Industrial	Relations	50,	no.	4	(2012):	597-619.	
Friedman,	Marilyn.	"Beyond	Caring:	The	De-Moralization	of	Gender."	In	Justice	and	Care,	edited	by	
Virginia	Held,	61-77.	Colorado:	Westview	Press,	1995.	
Gabriel,	Christina.	"Migration	and	Globalized	Care	Work:	The	Case	of	Internationally	Educated	
Nurses	in	Canada."	In	Feminist	Ethics	and	Social	Policy:	Towards	a	New	Global	Political	
Economy	of	Care,	edited	by	Rianne	Mahon	and	Fiona	Robinson,	39-59.	Vancouver:	University	
of	British	Columbia	Press,	2011.	
Gasper,	Des,	and	Thanh-Dam	Truong.	"Development	Ethics	through	the	Lenses	of	Caring,	Gender,	
and	Human	Security."	Institute	of	Social	Studies	Working	Paper	No.	459	(2008):	1-37.	
Gatens,	Moira.	"Conflicting	Imaginaries	in	Australian	Multiculturalism:	Women's	Rights,	Group	Rights,	
and	Aboriginal	Customary	Law."	In	Political	Theory	and	Australian	Multiculturalism,	edited	
by	Geoffry	Brahm	Levey,	151-70.	Oxford:	Berghahn	Books,	2008.	
"Gender	and	Efa	2000-2015:	Acheivements	and	Challenges."	Paris:	UNESCO,	2015.	
Gheaus,	Anca.	"Care	Drain:	Who	Should	Provide	for	the	Children	Left	Behind?".	Critical	Review	of	
International	Social	and	Political	Philosophy	16,	no.	1	(2013):	1-23.	
Gilligan,	Carol.	In	a	Different	Voice:	Psychological	Theory	and	Women's	Development.		Cambridge,	
Mass.:	Harvard	University	Press,	1993.	
Glenn,	Evelyn	Nakano.	"Gender,	Race	and	the	Organisation	of	Reproductive	Labor."	In	The	Critical	
Study	of	Work:	Labor,	Technology,	and	Global	Production,	edited	by	Rick	Baldoz,	Charles	
Koeber	and	Philip	Kraft,	71-82.	Philadelphia:	Temple	University	Press,	2009.	
"Global	Migration	Trends	Factsheet	2015."	http://iomgmdac.org/global-trends-factsheet/:	
International	Organization	for	Migration,	2016.	
Griffin,	James.	"Group	Rights."	In	Rights,	Culture	and	the	Law:	Themes	from	the	Legal	and	Political	
Philosophy	of	Joseph	Raz,	edited	by	Stanley	L.	Paulson	Lukas	H.	Meyer,	and	Thomas	W.	
Pogge,	161-82.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2003.	
———.	On	Human	Rights.		Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2008.	
Guendel,	Ludwig.	"Evaluation,	Public	Policies,	and	Human	Rights."	New	Directions	for	Evaluation,	no.	
134	(2012):	29-37.	
200	
	
"Gulabi	Gang	Official."		http://www.gulabigang.in/.	
Haile,	Aster	Georgo,	and	Karin	Astrid	Siegmann.	"Masculinity	at	Work:	Intersectionality	and	Identity	
Constructions	of	Migrant	Domestic	Workers	in	the	Netherlands."	In	Migration,	Gender	and	
Social	Justice:	Perspectives	on	Human	Insecurity,	edited	by	Thanh-Dam	Truong,	Des	Gasper,	
Jeff	Handmaker	and	Sylvia	I.	Bergh,	105-19.	New	York:	Springer,	2013.	
Hankivsky,	Olena.	"The	Dark	Side	of	Care:	The	Push	Factors	of	Human	Trafficking."	In	Feminist	Ethics	
and	Social	Policy:	Towards	a	New	Global	Political	Economy	of	Care,	edited	by	Rianne	Mahon	
and	Fiona	Robinson,	145-61.	Vancouver:	University	of	British	Columbia	Press,	2011.	
———.	"Imagining	Ethical	Globalization:	The	Contributions	of	a	Care	Ethic."	Journal	of	Global	Ethics	2,	
no.	1	(2006):	91-110.	
———.	"Rethinking	Care	Ethics:	On	the	Promise	and	Potential	of	an	Intersectional	Analysis."	
American	Political	Science	Review	108,	no.	2	(2014):	252-64.	
———.	Social	Policy	and	the	Ethic	of	Care.		Vancouver:	University	of	British	Columbia	Press,	2004.	
Harding,	Sandra.	"Standpoint	Theories:	Productively	Controversial."	Hypatia	24,	no.	4	(2009):	192-
200.	
"Health	in	All	Policies:	Report	on	Perspectives	and	Intersectoral	Actions	in	the	African	Region."	
Brazzaville:	WHO	Regional	Office	for	Africa,	2013.	
Hekman,	Susan.	"Moral	Voices,	Moral	Selves:	About	Getting	It	Right	in	Moral	Theory."	Human	
Studies	16,	no.	1	(1993):	143-62.	
———.	"Truth	and	Method:	Feminist	Standpoint	Theory	Revisited."	Signs	22,	no.	2	(1997):	341-65.	
Held,	Virginia.	"Can	the	Ethics	of	Care	Handle	Violence?".	Ethics	and	Social	Welfare	4,	no.	2	(2010):	
115-29.	
———.	The	Ethics	of	Care:	Personal,	Political,	and	Global.		Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2006.	
———.	"Feminist	Moral	Inquiry	and	the	Feminist	Future."	In	Justice	and	Care,	edited	by	Virginia	Held,	
153-76.	Colorado:	Westview	Press,	1995.	
———.	"Feminist	Transformations	of	Moral	Theory."	Philosophy	and	Phenomenological	Research	50,	
no.	Supplement	(1990):	321-44.	
———.	"The	Meshing	of	Care	and	Justice."	Hypatia	10,	no.	2	(1995):	128-32.	
———.	"Military	Intervention	and	the	Ethics	of	Care."	The	Southern	Journal	of	Philosophy	46	(2008):	
1-20.	
Hessler,	Kristen.	"Hard	Cases:	Philosophy,	Public	Health,	and	Women's	Human	Rights."	Journal	of	
Value	Inquiry	47,	no.	4	(2013):	375-90.	
Hobbes,	Thomas.	Leviathan.	Edited	by	C.	B.	MacPherson	London:	Penguin	Classics,	1981.	
Hochschild,	Arlie	Russell.	"Love	and	Gold."	In	Global	Woman:	Nannies,	Maids	and	Sex	Workers	in	the	
New	Economy,	edited	by	Barbara	Ehrenreich	and	Arlie	Russell	Hochschild,	15-30.	New	York:	
Henry	Holt	and	Company,	2002.	
Howlett,	Michael,	and	M.	Ramesh.	Studying	Public	Policy:	Policy	Cycles	and	Policy	Subsystems.		
Ontario:	Oxford	University	Press,	2003.	
Hunt,	Lynn.	Inventing	Human	Rights.		New	York:	W.	W.	Norton	&	Company,	2007.	
Hutchings,	Kimberly.	"Feminist	Ethics	and	Political	Violence."	International	Politics	44	(2007):	90-106.	
———.	International	Political	Theory:	Rethinking	Ethics	in	a	Global	Era.		London:	Sage	Publications,	
1999.	
———.	"A	Place	of	Greater	Safety?	Securing	Judgment	in	International	Ethics."	In	The	Vulnerable	
Subject:	Beyond	Rationalism	in	International	Relations,	edited	by	Amanda	Russell	and	Shick	
Beattie,	Kate,	25-42.	New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2013.	
———.	"The	Possibility	of	Judgement:	Moralizing	and	Theorizing	in	International	Relations."	Review	
of	International	Studies	18,	no.	1	(1992):	51-62.	
———.	"Thinking	Ethically	About	the	Global	in	'Global	Ethics'."	Journal	of	Global	Ethics	10,	no.	1	
(2014):	26-29.	
———.	"Towards	a	Feminist	International	Ethics."	Review	of	International	Studies	26,	no.	05	(2000):	
111-30.	
201	
	
"International	Domestic	Workers	Network."		http://www.idwfed.org/en.	
"International	Migration	Report	2015	(Highlights)."	New	York:	United	Nations,	2016.	
Isaksen,	Lise	Widding,	Sambasivan	Uma	Devi,	and	Arlie	Russell	Hochschild.	"Global	Care	Crisis:	A	
Problem	of	Capital,	Care	Chain,	or	Commons?".	American	Behavioral	Scientist	52,	no.	3	
(2008):	405-25.	
Ivison,	Duncan.	"The	Logic	of	Aboriginal	Rights."	Ethnicities	3,	no.	3	(2003):	321-44.	
———.	"The	Moralism	of	Multiculturalism."	Journal	of	Applied	Philosophy	22,	no.	2	(2005):	171-84.	
———.	Rights.		Stocksfield:	Acumen	Publishing	Ltd,	2008.	
Jaggar,	Alison	M.	"Caring	as	a	Feminist	Practice	of	Moral	Reason."	In	Justice	and	Care,	edited	by	
Virginia	Held,	179-202.	Colorado:	Westview	Press,	1995.	
———.	"Does	Poverty	Wear	a	Woman’s	Face?	Some	Moral	Dimensions	of	a	Transnational	Feminist	
Research	Project."	Hypatia	28,	no.	2	(2013):	240-56.	
Joseph,	Saud.	"Problematizing	Gender	and	Relational	Rights:	Experiences	from	Lebannon."	Social	
Politics	1,	no.	3	(1994):	271-85.	
Keller,	Jean.	"Autonomy,	Relationality,	and	Feminist	Ethics."	Hypatia	12,	no.	2	(1997):	152-64.	
———.	"Rethinking	Ruddick	and	the	Ethnocentrism	Critique	of	Maternal	Thinking."	Hypatia	24,	no.	4	
(2010):	834-51.	
Kelly,	Christine.	"Making	'Care'	Accessible:	Personal	Assistance	for	Disabled	People	and	the	Politics	of	
Language."	Critical	Social	Policy	31,	no.	4	(2011):	562-82.	
Khaja,	K.,	K.	Lay,	and	S.	Boys.	"Female	Circumcision:	Toward	an	Inclusive	Practice	of	Care."	Health	
Care	Women	International	31,	no.	8	(Aug	2010):	686-99.	
Kittay,	Eva	Feder.	"The	Ethics	of	Care,	Dependence,	and	Disability."	Ratio	Juris	24,	no.	1	(2011):	49-58.	
———.	"A	Feminist	Public	Ethic	of	Care	Meets	the	New	Communitarian	Family	Policy."	Ethics	111,	no.	
3	(2001):	523-47.	
———.	Love's	Labor:	Essays	on	Women,	Equality,	and	Dependency.	Thinking	Gender.		New	York:	
Routledge,	1999.	
———.	"Welfare,	Dependency,	and	a	Public	Ethic	of	Care."	Social	Justice	25,	no.	1	(1998):	123-45.	
Kittay,	Eva	Feder,	Bruce	Jennings,	and	Angela	A.	Wasunna.	"Dependency,	Difference	and	the	Global	
Ethic	of	Longterm	Care."	The	Journal	of	Political	Philosophy	13,	no.	4	(2005):	443-69.	
Koggel,	Christine	M.	"A	Critical	Analysis	of	Recent	Work	on	Empowerment:	Implications	for	Gender."	
Journal	of	Global	Ethics	9,	no.	3	(2013):	263-75.	
Kurki,	Milja	and	Wright,	Colin.	"International	Relations	and	Social	Science."	In	International	Relations	
Theories,	Discipline,	and	Diversity,	edited	by	Milja	Kurki	Tim	Dunne,	and	Steve	Smith,	14-35.	
Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2013.	
Landman,	Todd.	"Measuring	Human	Rights:	Principle,	Practice,	and	Policy."	Human	Rights	Quarterly	
26,	no.	4	(2004):	906-31.	
League,	Kathleen.	"Individualism,	Class,	and	the	Situation	of	Care:	An	Essay	on	Carol	Gilligan."	
Journal	of	Social	Philosophy	24,	no.	3	(1993):	69-79.	
"Leave	No	One	Behind:	Ageing,	Gender	and	the	2030	Agenda."	edited	by	United	Nations	
Development	Programme.	New	York:	United	Nations,	2016.	
Lebow,	Richard	Ned.	"Internal	Borders:	Identity	and	Ethics."	Global	Society	27,	no.	3	(2013):	299-318.	
Lepora,	Chiara,	and	Robert	E.	Goodin.	On	Complicity	and	Compromise.		Oxford:	Oxford	University	
Press,	2013.	
Levine,	Daniel	H.	"Care	and	Counterinsurgency."	Journal	of	Military	Ethics	9,	no.	2	(2010):	139-59.	
Linklater,	Andrew.	"The	Harm	Principle	and	Global	Ethics."	Global	Society	20,	no.	3	(2006):	329-43.	
Locke,	John.	Second	Treatise	of	Government.	Edited	by	C.	B.	MacPherson	Indianapolis:	Hackett	
Publishing	Company	Inc.,	1980.	
Ludsin,	Hallie.	"Relational	Rights	Masquerading	as	Indiviudal	Rights."	Duke	Journal	of	Gender,	Law	
and	Policy	15,	no.	195	(2008):	195-221.	
202	
	
Mahon,	Rianne,	and	Fiona	Robinson.	"Introduction."	In	Feminist	Ethics	and	Social	Policy:	Towards	a	
New	Global	Political	Economy	of	Care,	edited	by	Rianne	Mahon	and	Fiona	Robinson,	1-17.	
Vancouver:	University	of	British	Columbia	Press,	2011.	
May,	Peter	J.	"Reconsidering	Policy	Design:	Policies	and	Publics."	Journal	of	Public	Policy	11,	no.	2	
(1991):	187-206.	
McGinn,	Therese,	Jacqueline	Bhabha,	Richard	Garfield,	Kristen	Johnson,	Gretchen	Luchsinger,	Lisa	
Oddy,	Monica	Adhiambo	Onyango,	Sarah	Shetir,	and	Lousie	Searle.	"Shelter	from	the	Storm:	
A	Transformative	Agenda	for	Women	and	Girls	in	a	Crisis-Prone	World."	Columbia:	United	
Nations	Population	Fund,	2015.	
Mearsheimer,	John	J.	"Structural	Realism."	In	International	Relations	Theories,	Discipline,	and	
Diversity,	edited	by	Milja	Kurki	Tim	Dunne,	and	Steve	Smith,	77-93.	Oxford:	Oxford	
University	Press,	2013.	
Mendus,	Susan.	"Different	Voices,	Still	Lives:	Problems	in	the	Ethics	of	Care."	Journal	of	Applied	
Philosophy	10,	no.	1	(1993):	17-27.	
Mills,	Charles	W.	"Realizing	(Though	Racializing)	Pogge."	In	Thomas	Pogge	and	His	Critics,	edited	by	
Alison	M.	Jaggar,	151-74.	Cambridge:	Polity	Press,	2010.	
Mitnick,	Eric	J.	"Three	Models	of	Group-Differentiated	Rights."	Columbia	Human	Rights	Law	Review	
35,	no.	215	(2004):	215-58.	
Moyn,	Samuel.	"The	Continuing	Perplexities	of	Human	Rights."	Qui	Parle:	Critical	Humanities	and	
Social	Sciences	22,	no.	1	(2013):	95-115.	
Narayan,	Uma.	"Colonialism	and	Its	Others:	Considerations	on	Rights	and	Care	Discourses."	Hypatia	
10,	no.	2	(1995):	133-40.	
"National	Congress	of	Australia's	First	Peoples."		http://nationalcongress.com.au/.	
Nayak,	Bhabani	Shankar.	"Challenges	of	Cultural	Relativism	and	the	Future	of	Feminist	
Universalism."	Journal	of	Politics	and	Law	6,	no.	2	(2013):	83-89.	
Nedelsky,	Jennifer.	"Citizenship	and	Relational	Feminism."	In	Canadian	Political	Philosophy:	
Contemporary	Reflections,	edited	by	Ronald	Beiner	and	W.	J	Norman,	131-46.	Oxford:	
Oxford	University	Press,	2001.	
———.	"Communities	of	Judgment	and	Human	Rights."	Theoretical	Inquiries	in	Law	1,	no.	2	(2000):	
1-38.	
———.	"The	Gendered	Division	of	Household	Labor:	An	Issue	for	Constitutional	Rights."	In	Feminist	
Constitutionalism:	Global	Perspectives,	edited	by	Beverley	Baines,	Daphne	Barak-Erez	and	
Tsvi	Kahana,	15-47.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2012.	
———.	Law's	Relations:	A	Relational	Theory	of	Self,	Autonomy,	and	Law.		Oxford:	Oxford	University	
Press,	2011.	
———.	"Receptivity	and	Judgment."	Ethics	and	Global	Politics	4,	no.	4	(2011):	231-54.	
———.	"Reconceiving	Rights	and	Constitutionalism."	Journal	of	Human	Rights	7,	no.	2	(2008):	139-
73.	
———.	"Relations	of	Freedom	and	Law's	Relations."	Politics	&	Gender	8,	no.	2	(2012):	231-38.	
Neysmith,	Shelia	M.,	and	Yanqiu	Rachel	Zhou.	"Mapping	Another	Dimension	of	a	Feminist	Ethics	of	
Care:	Family-Based	Transnational	Care."	International	Journal	of	Feminist	Approaches	to	
Bioethics	6,	no.	2	(2013):	141-59.	
Noddings,	Nel.	"Care	Ethics	and	“Caring”	Organizations."	In	Care	Ethics	and	Political	Theory,	edited	
by	Daniel	Engster	and	Maurice	Hamington,	72-83.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2015.	
———.	Caring,	a	Feminine	Approach	to	Ethics	&	Moral	Education.		Berkeley:	University	of	California	
Press,	1984.	
———.	Starting	at	Home:	Caring	and	Social	Policy.		Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	2002.	
Nussbaum,	Martha.	Creating	Capabilities:	The	Human	Development	Approach.		Cambridge,	MA:	
Harvard	University	Press,	2011.	
———.	"Women's	Capabilities	and	Social	Justice."	In	Gender	Justice,	Development,	and	Rights,	
edited	by	Maxine	Molyneux	and	Shahra	Razavi,	45-74.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2002.	
203	
	
Nyamu,	Celestine	I.	"How	Should	Human	Rights	and	Development	Respond	to	Cultural	Legitimization	
of	Gender	Hierarchy	in	Developing	Countries?".	Harvard	International	Law	Journal	41	(2000):	
381-418.	
Okin,	Susan	Moller.	"Reason	and	Feeling	in	Thinking	About	Justice."	Ethics	99,	no.	2	(1989):	229-49.	
Olinto,	Pedro;	Beegle,	Kathleen;	Sobrado,	Carlos	and	Uematsu	Hiroki	"The	State	of	the	Poor:	Where	
Are	the	Poor,	Where	Is	Extreme	Poverty	Harder	to	End,	and	What	Is	the	Current	Profile	of	
the	World’s	Poor?":	Poverty	Reduction	and	Economic	Management	(PREM)	Network,	2013.	
Pateman,	Carole.	The	Sexual	Contract.		Cambridge:	Polity	Press,	1988.	
Peters,	Heather,	Jo-Anne	Fiske,	Dawn	Hemingway,	Anita	Vaillancourt,	Christina	McLennan,	Barb	
Keith,	and	Anne	Burrill.	"Interweaving	Caring	and	Economics	in	the	Context	of	Place:	
Experiences	of	Northern	and	Rural	Women	Caregivers."	Ethics	and	Social	Welfare	4,	no.	2	
(2010):	172-87.	
Pettersen,	Tove.	"Conceptions	of	Care:	Altruism,	Feminism,	and	Mature	Care."	Hypatia	27,	no.	2	
(2012):	366-89.	
———.	"The	Ethics	of	Care:	Normative	Structures	and	Empirical	Implications."	Health	Care	Analysis	
19	(2011):	51-64.	
Pogge,	Thomas.	"The	International	Signifigance	of	Human	Rights."	The	Journal	of	Ethics	4,	no.	1	
(2000):	45-69.	
———.	"Moral	Universalism	and	Global	Economic	Justice."	Politics,	Philosophy	&	Economics	1,	no.	1	
(2002):	29-58.	
———.	"Responses	to	the	Critics."	In	Thomas	Pogge	and	His	Critics,	edited	by	Alison	M.	Jaggar,	175-
250.	Cambridge:	Polity	Press,	2010.	
———.	"Severe	Poverty	as	a	Human	Rights	Violation."	In	Freedom	from	Poverty	as	a	Human	Right:	
Who	Owes	What	to	the	Very	Poor?,	edited	by	Thomas	Pogge,	11-53.	Oxford:	Oxford	
University,	2007.	
———.	World	Poverty	and	Human	Rights.	2nd	ed.		Cambridge:	Polity	Press,	2008.	
"Progress	of	the	World's	Women	2015-2016."	United	States:	UN	Women,	2015.	
Reichert,	Elisabeth.	Social	Work	and	Human	Rights.		New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2003.	
"Report	on	Austerity	Measures	and	Economic	and	Social	Rights."	United	Nations	Human	Rights	
Office	of	the	High	Commissioner,	2013.	
Richardson-Self,	Louise.	Justifying	Same-Sex	Marriage:	A	Philosophical	Investigation.		London:	
Rowman	&	Littlefield	International,	2015.	
Robinson,	Fiona.	"After	Liberalism	in	World	Politics?	Towards	an	International	Political	Theory	of	
Care."	Ethics	and	Social	Welfare	4,	no.	2	(2010):	130-44.	
———.	"Beyond	Labour	Rights."	International	Feminist	Journal	of	Poliitcs	8,	no.	3	(2006):	321-42.	
———.	"Care	Ethics	and	the	Transnationalization	of	Care:	Reflections	on	Autonomy,	Hegemonic	
Masculinities,	and	Globalization."	In	Feminist	Ethics	and	Social	Policy:	Towards	a	New	Global	
Political	Economy	of	Care,	edited	by	Rianne	Mahon	and	Fiona	Robinson,	127-44.	Vancouver:	
University	of	British	Columbia	Press,	2011.	
———.	"Care	Ethics,	Political	Theory,	and	the	Future	of	Feminism."	In	Care	Ethics	and	Political	
Theory,	edited	by	Daniel	Engster	and	Maurice	Hamington,	293-310.	Oxford:	Oxford	
University	Press,	2015.	
———.	"Care,	Gender	and	Global	Social	Justice:	Rethinking	‘Ethical	Globalization’."	Journal	of	Global	
Ethics	2,	no.	1	(2006):	5-25.	
———.	The	Ethics	of	Care:	A	Feminist	Approach	to	Human	Security.		Philadelphia:	Temple	University	
Press,	2011.	
———.	"Global	Care	Ethics:	Beyond	Distribution,	Beyond	Justice."	Journal	of	Global	Ethics	9,	no.	2	
(2013):	131-43.	
———.	Globalizing	Care:	Ethics,	Feminist	Theory,	and	International	Relations.		Boulder,	Colo.:	
Westview	Press,	1999.	
204	
	
———.	"Human	Rights	and	the	Global	Politics	of	Resistance:	Feminist	Perspectives."	Review	of	
International	Studies	29	(2003):	161-80.	
———.	"The	Importance	of	Care	in	the	Theory	and	Practice	of	Human	Security."	Journal	of	
International	Political	Theory	4,	no.	2	(2008):	167-88.	
———.	"Stop	Talking	and	Listen:	Discourse	Ethics	and	Feminist	Care	Ethics	in	International	Political	
Theory."	Millennium:	Journal	of	International	Studies	39,	no.	3	(2011):	845-60.	
Ruddick,	Sara.	"Injustice	in	Families:	Assault	and	Domination."	In	Justice	and	Care,	edited	by	Virginia	
Held,	203-23.	Colorado:	Westview	Press,	1995.	
———.	Maternal	Thinking:	Toward	a	Politics	of	Peace.	2nd	ed.		Boston:	Beacon	Press,	1995.	
———.	"Maternal	Work	and	the	Practice	of	Peace."	Journal	of	Education	167,	no.	3	(1985):	97-111.	
Rummery,	Kirstein,	and	Michael	Fine.	"Care:	A	Critical	Review	of	Theory,	Policy	and	Practice."	Social	
Policy	and	Administration	46,	no.	3	(2012):	321-43.	
Samuels,	Harriet.	"Feminizing	Human	Rights	Adjudication:	Feminist	Method	and	the	Proportionality	
Principle."	Feminist	Legal	Studies	21	(2013):	39-60.	
Sen,	Amartya.	"Human	Rights	and	Capabilities."	Journal	of	Human	Development	6,	no.	2	(2005):	151-
66.	
Sevenhuijsen,	Selma.	"Caring	in	the	Third	Way:	The	Relation	between	Obligation,	Responsibility	and	
Care	in	Third	Way	Discourse."	Critical	Social	Policy	20,	no.	5	(2000):	5-37.	
———.	Citizenship	and	the	Ethics	of	Care:	Feminist	Considerations	on	Justice,	Morality,	and	Politics.	
Translated	by	Liz	Savage.		New	York:	Routledge,	1998.	
———.	"The	Place	of	Care:	The	Relevance	of	the	Feminist	Ethic	of	Care	for	Social	Policy."	Feminist	
Theory	4	(2003):	179-97.	
Sevenhuijsen,	Selma,	Vivienne	Bozalek,	Amanda	Gouws,	and	Marie	Minnaar-McDonald.	"South	
African	Social	Welfare	Policy:	An	Analysis	Using	the	Ethic	of	Care."	Critical	Social	Policy	23,	no.	
3	(2003):	299-321.	
Smith,	Steve.	"Introduction."	In	International	Relations	Theories:	Discipline	and	Diversity,	edited	by	
Milja	Kurki	Tim	Dunne,	and	Steve	Smith,	1-13.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2013.	
Stensota,	Helena	Olofsdotter.	"The	Conditions	of	Care:	Reframing	the	Debate	About	Public	Sector	
Ethics."	Public	Administration	Review	70,	no.	2	(2010):	295-303.	
———.	"Public	Ethics	of	Care--a	General	Public	Ethics."	Ethics	and	Social	Welfare	9,	no.	2	(2015):	
183-200.	
Sterling-Folker,	Jennifer.	"Neoliberalism."	In	International	Relations	Theries,	Discipline,	and	Diversity,	
edited	by	Milja	Kurki	Tim	Dunne,	and	Steve	Smith,	114-31.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	
2013.	
Stone,	Deborah	A.	"Causal	Stories	and	the	Formation	of	Policy	Agendas."	Political	Science	Quarterly	
104,	no.	2	(1989):	281-00.	
Tan,	Kok-Chor.	"Rights,	Harm,	and	Institutions."	In	Thomas	Pogge	and	His	Critics,	edited	by	Alison	M.	
Jaggar,	46-66.	Cambridge:	Polity	Press,	2010.	
Tickner,	J.	Ann,	and	Laura	Sjoberg.	"Feminsim."	In	International	Relations	Theories	Discipline	and	
Diverstiy,	edited	by	Milja	Kurki	Tim	Dunne,	and	Steve	Smith,	205-22.	Oxford:	Oxford	
University	Press,	2013.	
Tilley,	J.	J.	"Cultural	Relativism,	Universalism,	and	the	Burden	of	Proof."	Millennium	-	Journal	of	
International	Studies	27,	no.	2	(1998):	275-97.	
"Trafficking	in	Persons	Report	".	Washington	D.C.:	United	States	Department	of	State,	2015.	
Tronto,	Joan	C.	"Care	as	a	Basis	for	Radical	Political	Judgments."	Hypatia	10,	no.	2	(1995):	141-49.	
———.	Caring	Democracy:	Markets,	Equality,	and	Justice.		New	York:	New	York	University	Press,	
2013.	
———.	"Creating	Caring	Institutions:	Politics,	Plurality,	and	Purpose."	Ethics	and	Social	Welfare	4,	no.	
2	(2010):	158-71.	
———.	"A	Feminist	Democratic	Ethics	of	Care	and	Global	Care	Workers:	Citizenship	and	
Responsibility."	In	Feminist	Ethics	and	Social	Policy:	Towards	a	New	Global	Political	Economy	
205	
	
of	Care,	edited	by	Rianne	Mahon	and	Fiona	Robinson,	162-77.	Vancouver:	University	of	
British	Columbia	Press,	2011.	
———.	Moral	Boundaries:	A	Political	Argument	for	an	Ethic	of	Care.		New	York:	Routledge,	1993.	
Tsuji,	Yuki.	"Reimagined	Intimate	Relations:	Elder	and	Child	Care	in	Japan	since	the	1990s."	In	
Feminist	Ethics	and	Social	Policy:	Towards	a	New	Global	Political	Economy	of	Care,	edited	by	
Rianne	Mahon	and	Fiona	Robinson,	111-24.	Vancouver:	University	of	British	Columbia	Press,	
2011.	
"Undp	Support	to	the	Implementation	of	Sustainable	Development	Goal	1:	Poverty	Reduction."	
edited	by	United	Nations	Development	Program.	New	York:	United	Nations,	2016.	
"Undp	Support	to	the	Integration	of	Gender	Equality	across	the	Sdgs	Including	Goal	5."	edited	by	
United	Nations	Development	Program.	New	York:	United	Nations,	2016.	
Vazquez,	Daniel,	and	Domitille	Delaplace.	"Public	Policies	from	a	Human	Rights	Perspective:	A	
Developing	Field."	SUR	-	International	Journal	on	Human	Rights	8,	no.	14	(2011):	33-61.	
Waldron,	Jeremy.	"When	Justice	Replaces	Affection:	The	Need	for	Rights."	Harvard	Journal	of	Law	&	
Public	Policy	11,	no.	3	(1988):	625-47.	
Walker,	Margaret	Urban.	Moral	Understandings:	A	Feminist	Study	in	Ethics.		New	York:	Routledge,	
1998.	
———.	"Moral	Understandings:	Alternative	"Epistemology"	for	a	Feminist	Ethics."	Hypatia	4,	no.	2	
(1989):	15-28.	
Ward,	Lizzie,	and	Beatrice	Gahagan.	"Crossing	the	Divide	between	Theory	and	Practice:	Research	and	
an	Ethic	of	Care."	Ethics	and	Social	Welfare	4,	no.	2	(2010):	210-16.	
Ward,	Tony,	and	Karen	Salmon.	"The	Ethics	of	Care	and	Treatment	of	Sex	Offenders."	Sex	Abuse:	A	
Journal	of	Research	and	Treatment	23,	no.	3	(2011):	397-413.	
Waring,	Marilyn.	"Counting	for	Something!	Recognizing	Women's	Contribution	to	the	Global	
Economy	through	Alternative	Accounting	Systems."	Gender	and	Development	11,	no.	1	
(2003):	35-43.	
Weir,	Allison.	"Global	Care	Chains:	Freedom,	Responsibility,	and	Solidarity."	The	Southern	Journal	of	
Philosophy	46	(2008):	166-75.	
———.	"The	Global	Universal	Caregiver:	Imagining	Women's	Liberation	in	the	New	Millennium."	
Constellations	12,	no.	3	(2005):	308-30.	
Wilcox,	Paula.	"Communities,	Care	and	Domestic	Violence."	Critical	Social	Policy	26,	no.	4	(2006):	
722-47.	
Williams,	Fiona.	"A	Good	Enough	Life:	Developing	a	Political	Ethic	of	Care."	Soundings,	no.	30	(2005):	
17-32.	
———.	"In	and	Beyond	New	Labour:	Towards	a	New	Political	Ethics	of	Care."	Critical	Social	Policy	21,	
no.	4	(2001):	467-93.	
———.	"Markets	and	Migrants	in	the	Care	Economy."	Soundings,	no.	47	(2011):	22-33.	
———.	"Migration	and	Care:	Themes,	Concepts	and	Challenges."	Social	Policy	and	Society	9,	no.	3	
(2010):	385	-	96.	
———.	"Towards	a	Transnational	Analysis	of	the	Political	Economy	of	Care."	In	Feminist	Ethics	and	
Social	Policy:	Towards	a	New	Global	Political	Economy	of	Care,	edited	by	Rianne	Mahon	and	
Fiona	Robinson,	21-38.	Vancouver:	University	of	British	Columbia	Press,	2011.	
Young,	Iris	Marion.	Justice	and	the	Politics	of	Difference.		Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	1990.	
Zhou,	Yanqiu	Rachel.	"Time,	Space	and	Care:	Rethinking	Transnational	Care	from	a	Temporal	
Perspective."	Time	&	Society	24,	no.	2	(2015):	163-82.	
———.	"Toward	Transnational	Care	Interdependence:	Rethinking	Relationships	between	
Immigration	and	Social	Policy."	Global	Social	Policy	13,	no.	3	(2013):	280-98.	
	
